Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18514/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended

Between:

Francoise (François) Lanktree

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Dagmara Szczudlo

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Francoise (François) Lanktree, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Martin He, Agent

Heard By Teleconference April 23, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Francoise (François) Lanktree, (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of their motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Monday, March 30, 2026. At the time of the impoundment, Jason A. Lakatos (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded and that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issues in dispute are:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(a) of the Act, whether the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded; and

ii. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below the Registrar is ordered to release the impounded vehicle.

PRocedural ISSUE

5The hearing in this matter started at 14:00 on April 23, 2026 because the appellant was not present during the scheduled start time of 13:30. As per Rule 3.7.1 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“the Rules”), if a party who has been given notice of a hearing, does not attend their in-person or electronic hearing within 30 minutes of the scheduled start time as stated in the hearing notice, the Tribunal may proceed with the hearing in the absence of that party.

6I was satisfied that the Tribunal issued a Notice of Hearing on April 16, 2026 and emailed the notice to the appellant’s email address on record. The hearing start was deferred, and the case management officer was engaged to help the 73-year-old appellant join the hearing successfully.

ANALYSIS

7For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The vehicle was stolen

8I am satisfied that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded.

9In Marshall v. Ontario (Registrar of Motor Vehicles) [2002] O.J. No. 745 (Div. Ct.) (“Marshall”) the Divisional Court held that a vehicle is “stolen” in this context “when it is taken without the owner’s consent and when the perpetrator intends to deprive the owner of it, whether permanently or temporarily”.

10In other words, in order to establish that the vehicle was stolen for the purposes of s. 50.2(3)(a) of the Act, the appellant must prove that the vehicle was taken without the owner’s consent, and that the driver intended to deprive the owner of the vehicle, either permanently or temporarily.

11The appellant testified that the driver of the impounded vehicle is not a relative but someone who was homeless and struggling financially. She permitted the driver to stay at her house, and he has been “nothing but a headache” to her because of that decision. On the day of the impoundment, the appellant and the driver were assisting her girlfriend to move to a new address. The appellant stayed behind in one location to pack belongings while her friend and the driver went to deliver a load to the new address.

12The appellant testified that she communicated to Jason (the driver), that neither he, nor his friends were allowed to drive her car approximately two weeks to a month before the incident. She stated that she found out that Jason’s licence was suspended because she found a document on her coffee table with this information. As a result, she was in the habit of taking her car keys to bed with her because Jason disregarded her request, particularly while she was in hospital when “everyone drove her car”.

13Continuing her testimony, the appellant stated that on the date of the impoundment, her friend was driving the car and left the keys in the ignition while the car was parked for unloading. The driver took the car without authorization while her friend was in the house. The friend notified the appellant that the car was missing at approximately 14:00 hours on March 30, 2026. The appellant testified that she called the Police to report the theft but did not recall exactly when she made the report nor provide a Police Report as evidence for the hearing because she does not have a printer to print the occurrence report. She testified that the Police asked her a lot of questions regarding the incident and approximately 3 days later a Police Officer came to her door and gave her a piece of paper which she included with her second Tribunal appeal.

14Finally, the appellant testified that she was advised to report the theft to her insurance company and was surprised to be told that her coverage entitles her to a rental car. She is currently driving a rental and although the car is new, “it does not drive like my car”, she “feels every lump in the road” and she would like to have her 2008 Buick back.

15The respondent submitted that the impoundment occurred lawfully because the driver was driving with a suspended licence and as per the Extended Driver Record Search, he is not eligible for licence reinstatement. The appellant did not meet her onus to prove that the vehicle was stolen because she did not provide evidence of filing a Police Report for the theft, nor the name of the Police Officer who took the report. Continuing submissions, the registrar argued that the appellant provided implied consent to drive her vehicle and did not take reasonable precautions to prevent the driver from accessing the car keys. The respondent argues that the request for impoundment be confirmed by the Tribunal.

16Based on the Extended Driver Record Search presented by the respondent, I find it plausible that the appellant came across information that Jason’s licence was suspended recently. The Extended Driver Record Search lists an unrelated offence which occurred on November 11, 2025 and a conviction dated February 20, 2026. I find, on a balance of probabilities, that the Ministry of Transportation would send the driver correspondence related to that offence and the appellant could view this correspondence if it was left in shared spaces.

17I was also able to confirm that the appellant filed two appeals for this matter with the Tribunal, the first appeal filed electronically, and the second appeal filed by traditional mail received on April 14, 2026. I reviewed the information that was mailed to the Tribunal and find that a police report was not included in this letter. I suspect that the appellant confused the Notice to Registrar document she did mail to the Tribunal with the police report she may have received by email. In any event, as per Marshall, a police report is not required for a ‘stolen’ finding.

18I accept the appellant’s testimony that the driver took her car without her permission and am satisfied that the driver intended to deprive the appellant of the use of her vehicle temporarily when the opportunity presented itself. I note that the appellant is an elderly lady who tried to help the driver while he was homeless and unable to pay rent. Unfortunately, she was not repaid with kindness and bears the consequences for the driver’s actions. On a balance of probabilities, I find that the driver acted without the appellant’s permission and deprived the appellant of the use of her vehicle temporarily.

19I find that the appellant has established that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded.

20Since I found that the vehicle is to be released on the ground that it was stolen, I do not need to determine whether the remaining ground for appeal (exceptional hardship) has been established.

Conclusion

21I find that:

i. the appellant has established that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded.

ORDER

22The Tribunal Orders that the Registrar shall release the impounded vehicle.