Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18474/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while in contravention of a condition under s. 55.1(1)2 of the Act

Between:

Lorraine Asselstine

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

VICE-CHAIR

Kevin Kovalchuk

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Lorraine Asselstine, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Laila Periera, Representative

HEARD: By Teleconference Thursday, April 9, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Lorraine Asselstine, (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of her motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Wednesday, March 4, 2026. At the time of the impoundment, D.A. (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle while his driver's licence was subject to a condition that prohibits him from driving a motor vehicle that is not equipped with an ignition interlock device as described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1). A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issue in dispute is:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

5For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship

6I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

7The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

8If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

9If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

10The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

11The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

12I am not satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

13The appellant testified that the prior to the impoundment, the impounded vehicle had an ignition interlock device (“device”) that allowed her son to drive the vehicle because he had an ignition interlock restriction on his driver’s licence. Due to a misunderstanding of the conditions for removal of the device, her son had the device removed from the vehicle prior to the Ministry of Transportation approving the removal of the interlock ignition condition from his driver’s licence. As a result, at the time of the impound her son was driving the vehicle while it was not equipped with a device but, while the device condition was still on his driver’s licence.

14The appellant further testified that she cannot afford the impoundment fees.

15With respect to reasonable alternatives, the appellant testified that she has access to two vehicles, one owned by her husband, the other by her mother. The appellant mainly uses her mother’s vehicle to pick up groceries and prescriptions as well as attend medical appointments. Her evidence was that her mother lives 5 to 10 kilometers from the appellant’s home. Her mother will drive to the appellant’s home, where they will switch drivers and the appellant will drive her mother’s vehicle wherever the appellant needs to go.

16The appellant testified that she could drive her husband’s vehicle on the occasions when he is not at work. Her evidence was that her husband works irregular hours such that his vehicle is available for her to use depending on his schedule. The appellant also testified that she could drive her husband to work but on occasion that would entail her picking him up from work at 3 A.M. She testified that she did not want to have to get up in the middle of the night.

17The respondent presented evidence that at the time of the impoundment the driver’s licence of D.A. (the driver of the impounded vehicle) was subject to condition “I” that vehicles he drove be equipped with an ignition interlock device.

18The respondent submits, that the misunderstanding with respect to the removal of the ignition interlock device is irrelevant to the grounds of exceptional hardship. I agree.

19I also agree with the respondent’s submissions that because the appellant has access to two other vehicles, she has alternative means of transportation with respect to her usual activities of buying groceries, picking up medication and attending medical appointments. I am not satisfied that the appellant has proven that there are any of her necessary activities for which there are no reasonable alternative means of transportation available to her.

20I find that the appellant has failed to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available.

21Since the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with the Act and the Regulation, and I need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship.

Conclusion

22I find that:

i. the appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

23The Tribunal Orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.