Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18445/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while in contravention of a condition under s. 55.1(1)2 of the Act.

Between:

Marilyn Maracle

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Dagmara Szczudlo

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Dara Saunders, Paralegal

For the Respondent:

Martin He, Representative

HEARD: April 1, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Marilyn Maracle, (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of her motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Friday, January 30, 2026. At the time of the impoundment, Tessica Brant was driving the vehicle while her driver's licence was subject to a condition that prohibits her from driving a motor vehicle that is not equipped with an ignition interlock device as described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1). A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the following grounds:

i. that the driver's licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1);

ii. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(c) of the Act, whether the appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1); and

iii. that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

3Section 9 of Ontario Regulation 631/98 (the “Regulation”) provides that an appeal under s. 50.2 of the Act must be commenced within 15 days after the day of the impoundment, which was February 14, 2026 in these circumstances. The Notice of Appeal (“NOA”) in this proceeding was filed on March 17, 2026 together with a Notice of Motion requesting an extension of time for filing the appeal. The appellant appealed the impoundment thirty-one days after the required date for filing with the Tribunal.

4The extension motion was heard at the hearing, and the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (the “Registrar”) opposed the request to extend the time for filing.

RESULT

5For the reasons given below, I find that the justice of this case does not warrant an extension of the time for filing the appeal. The appellant’s motion is therefore denied.

ANALYSIS

Motion for Extension

6Section 7 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 12, Sch G gives the Tribunal the discretion to grant an extension of time where there are reasonable grounds for applying for the extension and for granting relief.

7In Manuel v. Registrar, Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002, 2012 ONSC 1492, the Divisional Court ruled that, on a motion to extend the time to appeal, the overriding consideration is whether the justice of the case requires that the extension be granted. The factors to be considered are:

a) the existence of a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period;

b) the length of the delay;

c) prejudice to the other party; and

d) the merits of the appeal.

8I have considered the evidence relating to each of these factors as they apply to this case.

Bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period

9It is clear from the appellant’s testimony that she relied on her daughter — who was also the driver of the impounded vehicle — to deal with the impoundment because her daughter assured her that she would obtain legal help. It follows that the appellant herself did not have the intention to appeal within the appeal period and delegated to others.

10The driver of the vehicle testified that she focused on obtaining legal representation and historical information regarding a prior 2007 criminal charge to address the current charges that accompanied the impoundment. The required information was collected from the courthouse and provided to the driver’s legal representative on March 13, 2026, and the NOA was filed with the Tribunal several days later on March 17, 2026. I find that this testimony supports the finding that the driver was focused on addressing the criminal charges and not on appealing the impoundment itself, which is separate from criminal proceedings.

11The appellant testified that as the vehicle’s owner, she did not receive a notice of the impoundment, nor view the notice provided to her daughter by the Police at the time the vehicle was detained. Although her daughter notified her that the impoundment occurred, she was not aware that a 15-day limit exists for filing an appeal.

12The Registrar submits that according to s. 11 (5) of the Road Safety Act, 2009, because the driver was served with a notice of impoundment by the Police, the owner of the vehicle is deemed to be served as well.

13Accordingly, I find that the appellant delegated the appeal to her daughter and as the owner of the impounded vehicle, did not have the intention to appeal within the 15-day appeal period herself.

Length of the delay

14The appellant appealed the impoundment on March 17, 2026. This is 46 days after the impoundment occurred and 31 days after the required date for filing with the Tribunal. The appellant’s vehicle was eligible for release from impoundment on March 16, 2026, 1 day before the appeal was filed.

15The length of the delay is significant and is due to factors that were within the appellant’s control. The appellant testified that she was aware that the vehicle was impounded and that her daughter believed that the detainment was unfounded and occurred due to an error when the Ministry of Transportation merged her recently acquired G1 driver’s licence with a former ‘placeholder’ licence generated because of her 2007 criminal conviction.

16Given these circumstances, I find a 31-day delay in filing the appeal to be unreasonable and give considerable weight to this factor.

Prejudice

17The Registrar benefits from a prompt hearing and would be prejudiced by an extension of the time for filing the appeal. If the appellant’s appeal is successful, the Registrar will be required to cover the cost of the impoundment. The earlier the appeal is dealt with, the less it will cost the Registrar to have the vehicle released. The prejudice to the Registrar is the risk of incurring greater expense than it would otherwise have been exposed to.

18In the present case, the delay of 31 days leads to an increased cost of impoundment for the Registrar and Ontario taxpayers. I find that the 31-day increase of cost is sufficient to cause the Registrar significant prejudice, particularly since the vehicle was already eligible for release before the appeal was filed.

The merits of the appeal

19On a motion to extend time, the appellant need not establish its case on a balance of probabilities but only that their version of events, if believed, could reasonably result in a favourable outcome.

20While this threshold is low, it appears that the appeal is unlikely to succeed on the merits, even if the time to appeal is extended.

21The grounds for appeal that the appellant appealed under s. 50.2(3) of the Act will be addressed in order.

Section 50.2(3)(b.1) - that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1).

22The Registrar referred to the appellant’s Extended Driver’s Record Search dated March 30, 2026 which shows that the appellant was convicted of driving with more than 80 mgs of alcohol in her blood, arising from an occurrence on June 30, 2007. The Registrar submits that a one-year ignition interlock system requirement was imposed on the appellant due to the conviction of September 20, 2007.

23The Registrar presented the Driver Status by Date for the appellant which shows that on January 30, 2026 the appellant had a mandatory ignition interlock condition on her driver’s licence because of the 2007 criminal conviction.

24The Registrar also presented a summary table showing a history of the appellant’s licence and the ignition interlock condition, as well as five reminders that were sent to the appellant regarding applying to remove the interlock condition. The Registrar submitted that completion of the Back on Track program does not automatically remove the interlock condition, and the driver must re-apply to the Ministry of Transportation to have the condition removed.

25Finally, the Registrar relied on a Conviction Report from September 20, 2017 that shows the driver operated a vehicle without the required interlock condition and pleaded guilty to that offence. The Registrar submitted that there was a more recent reminder of the interlock condition, and the driver should have known that the condition remained on her record.

26The appellant testified that she was not aware of the interlock condition on her daughter’s driver’s licence.

27The daughter and driver of the impounded vehicle testified that she was able to obtain her G1 licence for the first time in September 2025 and was not told that this licence had an interlock condition. The driver testified that she obtained a temporary licence and then a photo card. Several weeks later she received a letter from the Ministry of Transportation requesting that she return to Service Ontario to correct a discrepancy on her licence. She testified that a new photo card was given to her during this visit because her recently acquired G1 licence was merged with her former ‘placeholder’ licence. Finally, the driver testified that she completed the Back on Track program and thought that the events from 2007 were behind her.

28I am persuaded by the Registrar’s evidence that the appellant’s driver’s licence was subject to the condition of a mandatory interlock ignition system on the date of the impoundment. Therefore, I find that the ground that the appellant’s driver’s licence was not subject to the condition of a mandatory ignition interlock system is not likely to succeed at a hearing.

Section 50.2(3)(c) - that the owner of the motor vehicle exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension or subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1)

29In considering what actions might amount to due diligence, the Supreme Court of Canada, in R. v. Sault Ste. Marie 1978 CanLII 11 (SCC), [1978] 2 S.C.R 1299 (“R. v. Sault Ste. Marie”), describes due diligence as taking all reasonable care and the actions a reasonable person would have taken in the same or similar circumstances.

19Although due diligence does not require perfection, it does require that the appellant must establish that they took reasonable actions to determine that the driver was properly licensed rather than simply assuming that to be true. In general, the driver’s own representation that they are properly licensed is not sufficient to establish that due diligence was taken.

20The appellant testified that she was not aware of the interlock condition on her daughter’s driver’s licence. She did not provide testimony or evidence related to her efforts to check whether the driver’s licence was subject to the interlock condition.

21The Registrar did not make specific submissions related to this ground of appeal.

22As a result of limited submissions before me, I am unable to assess the merits of this ground of appeal and whether it could reasonably result in a favourable outcome in a hearing.

Section 50.2(3)(d) – that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship

23According to the Regulation, in considering the ground of exceptional hardship, the Tribunal must first consider whether there is an alternative to the impounded vehicle. Once it is established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, the Tribunal must consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used. The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training, except in certain circumstances.

24The appellant and owner of the vehicle did not provide testimony or evidence related to this ground of appeal nor alternatives to the impounded vehicle. The driver testified that she lives in a separate household from the appellant, approximately 15 minutes away from her mother’s residence in Pickton, Ontario and that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship due to the impound storage fees.

25The Registrar did not make specific submissions related to this ground of appeal, however, according to the RIN Summary for the appellant entered as evidence for the hearing, I note that the appellant owns several other vehicles.

26As a result of limited submissions before me, I am unable to fully assess the merits of this ground of appeal, however, the RIN Summary alone leads me to conclude that the appellant has access to alternate vehicles, and this could reasonably result in an unfavourable outcome in a hearing.

Conclusion

27I conclude that the appellant has not satisfied me that there was a bona fide intention to appeal within the prescribed period nor that there are merits to her appeal. This, along with my conclusion that the significant delay of 31 days does cause prejudice to the Registrar leads me to find that the appellant’s Motion for the Extension of Time for Filing the Notice of Appeal must fail.

ORDER

28The motion to grant an extension to the time limit to appeal the impoundment is denied.

29As a result, the appeal is dismissed.