RECONSIDERATION DECISION
Before: Colin Osterberg
Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18125/LLCA
Case Name: Vegas Island Inc. v. Registrar, Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario Act, 2019
Written Submissions by:
For the Appellant: Joseph Addelman, Counsel
For the Respondent: Aviva Harari, Counsel
OVERVIEW
1On February 11, 2026, the appellant requested reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision dated February 3, 2026 (“decision”).
2In its decision, the Tribunal found that the Immediate Suspension Order (“ISO”) with respect to the appellant dated December 11, 2025, pursuant to s. 13(2) of the Liquor Licence Control Act, 2019, S.O. 2019 c. 15, Sched. 22 (the “Act”) is necessary in the public interest and upheld the ISO.
3The grounds for a request for reconsideration are found in Rule 18.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“Rules”). To grant a request for reconsideration, the Tribunal must be satisfied that one or more of the following criteria are met:
a) The Tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction or committed a material breach of procedural fairness;
b) The Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made; or
c) There is evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it, and would likely have affected the result.
4In its request for reconsideration, the appellant alleges that the Tribunal made errors of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made according to Rule 18.2(b)
5The respondent argues that the Tribunal did not commit any errors of law or fact that would have materially influenced the outcome of the hearing.
6The appellant requests that the Tribunal set aside the decision and rescind the ISO. In the alternative, the appellant requests that the Tribunal substitute appropriate conditions on the appellant’s licence pending the outcome of related criminal proceedings.
RESULT
7I am not satisfied the Tribunal made an error of law of fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made. The Tribunal’s decision is confirmed.
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
8Along with its request for reconsideration, the appellant included an affidavit executed by Clifford Bien-Aime, an officer and/or director of the appellant who gave evidence at the hearing. In its request for reconsideration, the appellant does not allege that there is evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it, and would likely have affected the result.
9A reconsideration request is not intended as an opportunity to place evidence before the Tribunal which could have been obtained previously. The appellant makes no submission that the evidence contained in the new affidavit could not have been obtained previously, particularly given that Mr. Bien-Aime gave evidence at the hearing.
10Further, the appellant’s submissions do not state that the evidence set out in the new affidavit would likely have affected the result.
11Given that the affidavit which was filed with the request for reconsideration has not been shown to contain evidence that may be admitted under Rule 18.2(c), it is of no relevance to this reconsideration and will not be considered.
ANALYSIS
12The test for reconsideration under Rule 18.2 involves a high threshold. The reconsideration process is not an opportunity for a party to re-litigate its position where it disagrees with the Tribunal’s decision, or with the weight assigned to the evidence. The requestor must show how or why the decision falls into one of the categories in Rule 18.2.
Is there an error of fact
13The appellant alleges the following errors of fact:
a. Finding that the appellant was wilfully blind to the fact that drugs were being sold at the licensed premises;
b. Finding that Mr. Bien-Aime texted “Mike” and, based on that, concluding that he downplayed their relationship;
c. Finding that the licensed premises were unsafe on the bases of the implication that there were firearms on the premises, an implication with no evidentiary basis.
Wilful blindness
14The appellant alleges that, by finding that if Mr. Bien-Aime was not aware of the drug-related activities taking place in the club, it was because he did not want to know, the Tribunal was effectively making a finding that he was “wilfully blind” to that fact. The appellant argues that a finding of wilful blindness requires proof of a conscious decision to avoid confirming a known risk and that the Tribunal’s finding in this regard contains no legal analysis or evidentiary grounding.
15The respondent argues that the evidence at the hearing supports that Mr. Bien-Amie knew, or ought to have known, about drug-dealing at the premises as set out in paragraph 21 of the decision and that details of Mr. Bein-Aime’s knowledge of the drug-dealing is set out in paragraph 24 of the decision.
16The Tribunal never uses the term “wilful blindness” in its decision. Rather, the Tribunal finds that the appellant knew or ought to have known of the drug-related activities which were taking place in the premises. In my view, there is no basis for the appellant’s position that the Tribunal may not make a finding that an appellant knew or ought to have known of a particular fact without satisfying what the appellant describes as an evidentiary basis sufficient to establish wilful blindness.
17I find that, in-so-far as the Tribunal found that Mr. Bien-Aime knew or ought to have known that there were drug-related activities taking place in the club, the decision sets out facts upon which the Tribunal could reasonably come to that conclusion including the following:
a. The Tribunal heard evidence that an undercover officer purchased cocaine inside the premises on three occasions from two different attendees and had been told by at least two other dancers that cocaine could be purchased in the club any time and that he need not worry about getting kicked out (para.11).
b. Evidence was presented at the hearing that Mr. Bien-Aime was told by a dancer that she was trying to help the undercover officer to buy cocaine (para. 12).
c. Evidence was presented that the undercover officer was told by “Mike” not to worry about being interrupted when purchasing cocaine in the bathroom because he had guns in the club.
d. The evidence was that the premises were small and that cocaine was widely used and available for sale in the premises because multiple dancers, on multiple dates, in the premises sold cocaine to the undercover officer, attempted to sell cocaine to the undercover officer, or helped the undercover officer locate another dancer who had cocaine to sell (para 18).
18The Tribunal summarizes its finding that Mr. Bien-Aime knew or ought to have known of the drug-related activities in the premises in paragraph 21 of the decision. The Tribunal’s finding in this regard is supported by the evidence and I find no error of fact in this regard bearing in mind that it is not the purpose of a reconsideration request to re-weigh the evidence and come to a different conclusion.
19The appellant’s reference to paragraph 28 of the decision where the Tribunal states “if Mr. Bien-Amie was not aware of the drug-related activities taking place in the club, it was because he did not want to know” does not assist the appellant. That comment was made with reference to the actions that the appellant says he had in place to monitor what was happening in the premises including security cameras, security guard, trusted staff, and on-site manager which should have been sufficient to alert Mr. Bien-Amie to the activities taking place at the premises. The Tribunal considered this as additional evidence in support of the finding that Mr. Bien-Amie knew or ought to have know of those activities. I see no error in the Tribunal’s finding in this regard.
20I am not satisfied that the Tribunal’s finding that the appellant knew or ought to have known of the drug-related activities in the premises was an error of fact.
Finding that Mr. Bien-Amie downplayed his knowledge of Mike
21The appellant argues that there was no documentary evidence presented which established that Mr. Bien-Amie texted Mike and so the Tribunal erred when it used the evidence that was presented that he did so to find that Mr. Bien-Amie was not credible and to make findings regarding Mr. Bien-Amie’s knowledge and control.
22The respondent argues that the Tribunal’s determination regarding whether Mr. Bien-Amie texted Mike would not have materially impacted the outcome and that there was other evidence to support the Tribunal’s finding that Mr. Bien-Amie was familiar with Mike without having to make a finding regarding the text.
23Again, the purpose of a reconsideration is not to re-weigh the evidence. The Tribunal reviewed the evidence in paragraphs 19 and 20 of the decision, including that given by Mr. Bien-Aime and the hearsay evidence of the undercover officer, and found that Mr. Bien-Amie downplayed how well he knows Mike. That the appellant disagrees with that conclusion or the weight to be given the contrary evidence, does not amount to an error of fact. The Tribunal’s conclusion was open to it on the facts presented at the hearing.
24Further, I am not satisfied that the finding that Mr. Bien-Amie downplayed how well he knew Mike was such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error, had it amounted to one, not been made. Whether or not Mr. Bien-Amie knew Mike well enough to text him was not mentioned again in the decision and does not appear to have played any significant part in the outcome.
25I find no error of fact with respect to this allegation and this issue does not support the appellant’s request for reconsideration.
Implication that there were firearms on the premises
26The appellant submits that the Tribunal gave significant weight to statements suggesting that the club was “unsafe” including references to alleged statements about firearms despite there being no evidence that firearms were ever present at the establishment and that no firearms charges had been laid. The appellant argues that findings must be grounded in evidence and not in speculative possibilities and that by treating unsubstantiated allegations as proof of imminent public danger, the Tribunal relied on evidence not established at the hearing.
27The respondent submits that the Tribunal did not rely on safety concerns mentioned in the evidence when making its decision and that, contrary to the submission of the appellant, Mr. Bien-Amie testified that he called police when a patron known as Mojo was waving a gun around inside the premises.
28The appellant’s position is without merit. The decision does not conclude that the premises were unsafe and certainly does not rely on that as a basis for upholding the ISO. The decision mentions guns in paragraph 14 only and that was in the context of Mike advising the undercover officer that he had guns on the premises so that the officer would not be concerned about getting caught purchasing cocaine in the bathroom. The Tribunal made no finding at all as to whether there actually were guns in the premises. In fact, in paragraph 16 of the decision, the Tribunal states that it does not find that everything said to the undercover officer by a dancer or Mike was necessarily the truth because it is possible that these individuals may have been mistaken at times or motivated to lie.
29The appellant has not established that, in this regard, there was an error of fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made.
Is there an error of law
30The appellant alleges the following errors of law:
a. Failing to conduct a structured analysis of why the ISO was necessary in the public interest, whether lesser regulatory measures could adequately protect the public or whether continuing the licence pending criminal proceedings posed an actual and ongoing risk to the public;
b. Finding the appellant was wilfully blind to the selling of drugs on the premises by applying the incorrect legal test for wilful blindness; and
c. Finding that the police officers involved in the investigation likely took accurate notes and that their evidence was credible and reliable even though their evidence was presented through the hearsay evidence of Officer McFarlane rather than by their own testimony.
Whether ISO necessary in the public interest
31The appellant argues that the Tribunal failed to conduct a structured analysis of why the ISO was necessary in the public interest, whether lesser regulatory measures could adequately protect the public or whether continuing the licence pending criminal proceedings posed an actual and ongoing risk to the public. The appellant argues that, in doing so the Tribunal conflates the eligibility considerations under s. 3(4)(f) of the Act relating to the requirement that the applicant exercise sufficient control over the premises in order to establish eligibility for a liquor licence, and the “heightened and urgent “necessity in the public interest” standard required for an ISO under s. 13(2).”
32I note that, while the appellant argues that there is a “heighted and urgent” threshold required in order to impose an ISO under the Act, the Act does not contain that language and I am not satisfied that such a standard exists either in the Act by implication or in the authorities decided under s. 13(2). Section 13(2) of the Act simply states that the “Registrar may suspend a licence issued under this Act without issuing a proposal if the registrar considers it to be necessary in the public interest”.
33In paragraph 8 of the decision, the Tribunal sets out the correct test for the issuance of an ISO. The Tribunal then reviews the basis on which the respondent issued the ISO, being the allegation that cocaine was being sold in the premises, that Mr. Bien-Amie knew or ought to have known that cocaine was being sold in the premises, that s. 3(4)(f) of the Act required that the licensee exercise sufficient control over the premises in order to be eligible for a liquor licence, and that Mr. Bien-Amie either facilitated that occurring or did not do enough to prevent it from happening.
34I see no error in law in either the stated test to be met or in the application of the test to the facts. Finding that an ISO is appropriate where criminal activity is being carried on within licensed premises which was known to the licensee or where the licensee ought to have known of the illegal activity, is well within the kind of circumstance in which an ISO may be issued. In my view the Tribunal’s findings in that regard are both reasonable and correct.
35The appellant does not say specifically what it means when it argues that the Tribunal erred by conflating the requirements of s. 3(4)(f) and the issuance of an ISO under s. 13(2). In any event, I see no such conflation. The Tribunal notes that a licensee is obligated to exercise sufficient control over the premises, and while the Tribunal found that the appellant did not, the Tribunal applied the correct legal test in finding that the ISO was necessary in the public interest.
36I find that the appellant did not establish that the Tribunal erred in law in this regard.
Wilful blindness
37The appellant alleges that not only did the Tribunal make an error of fact when it found that Mr. Bien-Amie was wilfully blind to the drug-related activities which were occurring on the premises, it also erred at law by failing to properly analyze or apply the test for wilful blindness.
38As found above, the Tribunal did not find the appellant was wilfully blind. Rather it determined that he knew or ought to have known of the drug-related activities which were taking place in the premises. As I have already found, the Tribunal had evidence before it upon which to make that determination.
39I find no error of law with respect to this issue.
Hearsay evidence
40The appellant alleges that the Tribunal erred in law with respect to its treatment of hearsay evidence.
41First, the appellant alleges that the Tribunal effectively bolstered the credibility of multiple non-testifying officers through the testimony of a single witness and assumed the reliability of investigating officers’ notes without those officers testifying and being subject to cross-examination.
42Second, the appellant alleges that the Tribunal’s finding that the officers “likely took accurate notes” is speculative and unsupported by independent evidence and the reliability of those officers was not directly before the Tribunal and could not be properly assessed in their absence.
43Third, to the extent that Officer McFarlane relied on the notes of other officers, the decision does not meaningfully address the reliability concerns inherent in the use of this “double hearsay” evidence.
44Finally, the appellant argues that the Tribunal failed to evaluate the reliability and probative value of the hearsay evidence before it and that this constitutes an error of law which materially affected the outcome of the appeal.
45In my view, determinations related to the reliability of evidence primary relate to weighing evidence that is presented to the Tribunal and this is not a proper basis for reconsideration. Significantly, the appellant has not referred me to any specific notes which he alleges are inaccurate or any evidence of Officer McFarlane which is unreliable. Alleging that the Tribunal did not properly weigh the evidence in light of its status as hearsay is not the proper basis of reconsideration. Even if I agreed in principle with the appellant’s allegations regarding the sufficiency of analysis in the decision with respect to the impact of the hearsay evidence, which I do not, the appellant has failed to satisfy me, or even suggest to me, that such error of law would have materially influenced the outcome of the hearing particularly given that no specific evidence of concern is referred to.
46I am not satisfied that the Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made with respect to this issue.
CONCLUSION & ORDER
47I am not satisfied the Tribunal made an error of law of fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made.
48The Tribunal’s decision is confirmed.
Colin Osterberg
Vice-Chair
Tribunals Ontario – Licence Appeal Tribunal
Released: April 20, 2026