Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18480/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while in contravention of a condition under s. 55.1(1)2 of the Act

Between:

Brian Gonzales

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Caley Howard

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Brian Gonzales, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Martin He, Representative

Leila Perreira, Representative

HEARD: By Teleconference April 16, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Brian Gonzales, (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of their motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on March 16, 2026. At the time of the impoundment, the appellant was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the ground that that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issues in dispute are:

i. whether the appellant may rely on the ground of exceptional hardship in light of s. 50.2(4) of the Act; and, if so

ii. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

The ground of exceptional hardship under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act is not available to the appellant

5The owner of a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 of the Act may, pursuant to the grounds set out in s. 50.2, appeal the impoundment and request an order that the Registrar release the vehicle.

6The appellant, who owns the impounded vehicle jointly with his wife, Sherri Budd, submits that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship and should be released under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act. However, s. 50.2(4) of the Act provides that the exceptional hardship ground of appeal is not available if there has been a previous impoundment under s. 55.1 of the Act with respect to any motor vehicle then owned by the same owner.

7The respondent submits that on March 13, 2020, a 2004 GMC owned solely by Sherrie Budd was impounded under s. 55.1, and that this previous impoundment prevents the appellant from claiming exceptional hardship with respect to the current impoundment, despite the appellant not being a co-owner of the previously impounded vehicle. In support of its submission, the respondent relies on the Notice to Registrar respecting the incident, the Ministry of Transportation record confirming that Ms. Budd was the owner of the vehicle in question, and the driving record of Mr. Gonzales.

8The appellant testified that he did not recall the previous impoundment. I note that while Mr. Gonzales was not an owner of the previously impounded vehicle, he was driving it on a suspended licence, which led to its impoundment. The appellant did not make submissions on the application of s. 50.2(4).

9I find that the documents provided by the respondent prove that a vehicle owned by Ms. Budd was previously impounded under s. 55.1. The driver at the time of the previous impoundment was Mr. Gonzales. Mr. Gonzales’ driving record confirms that his license was suspended at the time of the March 13, 2020 impoundment and the suspension number on his driving record matches that set out in the Notice to Registrar. Similarly, the Ministry of Transportation record confirms that the vehicle identified on the Notice to Registrar was owned by Ms. Budd. I give significant weight to the Notice to Registrar, because it was created by a police officer in a professional context and because the relevant information is confirmed in other Ministry of Transportation documents.

10On a plain reading of s. 50.2, I read the phrases “an owner” and “same owner” in each subsection as being connected. When there are co-owners of an impounded vehicle, as there were in this case, both of the co-owners are entitled to file an appeal of the impoundment pursuant to s. 50.2(1).

11However, s. 50.2(2) provides that “the owner” and the Registrar are the parties to an appeal under this section. In the case of co-owners, I read “the owner” in this section as applying to the owner who files the appeal. As a result, a plain reading favours the interpretation that “same owner” in s. 50.2(4) refers to only the co-owner who filed the appeal. However, I find that there is some ambiguity to the use of the word owner throughout s. 50.2.

12One of the fundamental purposes of the Act is to ensure the public’s safety on highways. See British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), 1999 CanLII 646 (SCC) at para 26-28; Mitanidis v Ontario (Transportation), 2024 ONSC 5879; Adam Giffen v. Ontario (Minister of Transportation), 2013 ONSC 7461 at para. 33.

13Section 50.2 relates specifically to impoundments under s. 55.1 of the Act. Section 55.1 requires the impoundment of vehicles where the driver is found to be: driving while suspended under specific sections of the Act relating to criminal offences, driving while disqualified and driving while prohibited; driving without a required interlock device; or driving while suspended under a conduct review program. The context of s. 50.2 therefore relates to the prevention of conduct that poses a significant danger to the public on highways.

14Section 50.2(4) refers to “a previous impoundment under s. 55.1 with respect to any motor vehicle then owned by the same owner.” An interpretation of this subsection that limited the phrase “same owner” to the co-owner who filed the appeal would potentially allow individuals with previous impoundments to avoid the operation of s. 50.2(4) by asking their co-owner to file an appeal of a currently impounded and co-owned vehicle. I find that this effect would be contradictory to the public safety purposes of s. 50.2(4) of the Act.

15While a plain reading of the statute points more strongly to s. 50.2(4) applying only to the appellant and not to Ms. Budd, that narrow interpretation is not consistent with the purpose of the Act and is not supported by the statutory context of s. 50.2(4). Therefore, I find that the phrase “same owner” in s. 50.2(4) applies to both the appellant and Ms. Budd.

16As a result, I find that s. 50.2(4) of the Act prevents the appellant from appealing the current impoundment on the ground of exceptional hardship.

17As the appellant did not argue any other ground for appeal, his appeal must be dismissed.

Conclusion

18I find that:

i. The ground of exceptional hardship under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act is not available to the appellant.

ORDER

19The Tribunal Orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

Caley Howard

Adjudicator