Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18465/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while in contravention of a condition under s. 55.1(1)2 of the Act

Between:

Chad Gray

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Bernard Trottier

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Chad Gray, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Leila Pereira, Agent

Heard by teleconference:

April 8, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Chad Gray (the “appellant”) appeals the impoundment of his motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on March 17, 2026. At the time of the impoundment, Daniel Lotz (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle while his driver's licence was subject to a condition that prohibits him from driving a motor vehicle that is not equipped with an ignition interlock device as described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1). A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that he exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver's licence of the driver of the motor vehicle, at the time it was detained in order to be impounded, was not then subject to the condition described in subparagraph 55.1(1)(b), and also that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issues in dispute are:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(c) of the Act, whether the appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle, at the time it was detained in order to be impounded, was not then subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1); and

ii. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below, the Registrar is ordered to release the impounded vehicle.

ANALYSIS

5For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 of the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The appellant did not exercise due diligence to determine if the driver was properly licensed

6The appellant has not established that he exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle was not, at the time it was impounded, subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1).

7In considering what actions might amount to due diligence, the Supreme Court of Canada, in R. v. Sault Ste. Marie 1978 CanLII 11 (SCC), [1978] 2 S.C.R 1299 (“R. v. Sault Ste. Marie”), describes due diligence as taking all reasonable care and the actions a reasonable person would have taken in the same or similar circumstances.

8Although due diligence does not require perfection, it does require that the appellant must establish that they took reasonable actions to determine that the driver was properly licensed rather than simply assuming that to be true. In general, the driver’s own representation that they are properly licensed is not sufficient to establish that due diligence was taken.

9The appellant testified that he asked the driver to show him his driver’s licence in January or February of 2026. The appellant testified that the driver showed him an Alberta driver’s licence, but the appellant could not recollect whether he saw the expiration date or whether there were any conditions on the licence. He testified, further, that he thought the licence of the driver was a class-G licence.

10The appellant testified that he did not investigate whether the licence of the driver was valid by calling Service Ontario (with the driver on the call), or by inquiring via the Ministry of Transportation of Ontario website.

11The respondent provided evidence that, on the date of the impoundment, the licence of the driver was cancelled, with a condition of a mandatory ignition interlock required to operate a vehicle upon reinstatement of the licence. Also, the respondent testified that Alberta utilizes a numbering system to classify its licences, not letters as in Ontario, and it argued that the appellant’s recollection of seeing a “G” classification could not be accurate.

12I find that the appellant accepted the driver’s representation that he was properly licenced, rather than perform appropriate due diligence. I find that the appellant could not recall critical information including the expiration date and any conditions, and that the appellant’s submissions are insufficient to establish that he exercised reasonable due diligence, consistent with the standard in R. v. Sault Ste. Marie, in determining whether the driver was properly licensed.

13For these reasons, I find that the appellant has not established that he exercised a reasonable level of due diligence in attempting to determine that the licence of the driver was not subject to the condition of an ignition interlock device.

The impoundment will cause exceptional hardship

14I am satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

15The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) of the Regulation states that to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

16If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

17If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

18The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) of the Regulation from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

i. will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

ii. will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

19The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

20I am satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle as it pertains to the appellant’s ability to generate income from his work in construction.

21The appellant lives in London, with his mother and stepfather. The appellant testified that he collected social assistance via Ontario Works (“OW”) and that he supplemented his income via residential construction work, which he had performed over the last six years. He testified that he had established an unincorporated business and charged Harmonized Sales Tax. He testified that he hired other workers depending on the nature of the project.

22He testified that he aspired to no longer receive OW support once he could secure more construction work. He testified, further, that he was working on a small construction project with the driver on the afternoon the vehicle, a 2017 Kia Sportage (the “vehicle”), was impounded. He testified, also, that he had completed a construction project in February of 2026. He testified that he needed his vehicle to visit potential new customers to provide quotes on future projects for the upcoming spring/summer construction season. He testified that, in the days following the impoundment, he had been planning to provide quotes for projects in London, St. Thomas, Lambeth and Sarnia, but that he had to postpone seeing those potential customers.

23The appellant testified that his construction work required that he bring his tools, and for that purpose he could not reasonably take a taxi or transit. He testified that he could not reasonably take a taxi or transit to visit potential new customers either, because of the cost to do so, and because it would not “present” well in the eyes of the customer to appear without his own transportation, and he would not likely win a contract.

24The appellant testified that he did not need the vehicle to obtain necessities such as groceries, because he walk, cycle or take transit within London.

25He testified, further, that his mother and stepfather did not have a vehicle that they could lend, and that renting a vehicle, even intermittently, for the duration of the impoundment period would be prohibitively expensive on the $733 per month that he received from OW, irrespective of how much he could earn in construction. The appellant testified that renting a vehicle would consume most of his OW and other income.

26The respondent argues that the appellant has provided insufficient evidence that he could not rent a vehicle to pursue and perform construction work during the impoundment period. The respondent argues that, because the appellant has the onus to prove that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, the Tribunal should confirm the impoundment of the vehicle.

27I find that, to obtain groceries and other essentials, the appellant has reasonable alternatives to the impounded vehicle, including walking, cycling and transit.

28However, I find that the impoundment of the vehicle will impede the appellant’s ability to generate income from his work in construction. Although the appellant did not make specific submissions on the cost of a rental vehicle for customer quotes and subsequent construction work, I accept his argument that a rental vehicle, including taxes, fees and other charges, would consume a significant part of any construction income he could gain in the near term. For this reason, I find that renting a vehicle is not a reasonable alternative to the impounded vehicle, because the appellant would have little income, after expenses, for his effort.

29For the reasons above, I find that the appellant has established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

Threat to heath, safety, the environment or property

30The appellant did not submit that the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, under s. 10(1)(a) of the Regulation. For this reason, I will not consider that there is a threat to public health of safety, or to the environment or property, in determining whether there is exceptional hardship.

Financial, Economic, Employment or Education Losses

31The appellant alleges that the impoundment will cause financial or economic loss. In particular, the appellant alleges that the impoundment prevents him from quoting for and undertaking construction work during the impoundment period.

32The appellant lives on fixed income from OW. The appellant did not testify as to how much of his OW income, if any, is clawed back when he receives income from construction. I accept that the appellant is sincere when he states that he wants to work and stop receiving OW support.

33I am satisfied that, under s. 10(3)(b), the appellant’s loss will be immediate, significant and lasting, because the impoundment of his vehicle will make him unable to visit customer sites, generate quotes and perform the work. I accept the appellant’s submissions that the impact has been immediate, because he has been unable to work in construction since the impoundment. I find that the impact is significant because it affects the appellant’s main potential source of income outside of OW. I find that the impact is lasting, because his inability to work during the impoundment period cannot be recovered at a later date, and his inability to quote on work now will have repercussions for the weeks and months after the impoundment period.

34I am satisfied that, under s. 10(3)(c), the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, namely the appellant.

35I am satisfied that, under s. 10(3)(d)(i), that a person other than the driver will suffer loss as a result of the impoundment, because it will be the appellant, not the driver, who will suffer loss.

36I am satisfied that, under s. 10(3)(d)(ii), the impact of the loss will not be a result of financial or employment loss by the suspended driver.

37For the reasons set out above, I find that the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined in the Regulation.

Conclusions

38I find that:

i. There is no reasonable alternative to the impounded vehicle.

ii. The economic loss will be immediate, significant and lasting.

iii. The impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the vehicle.

iv. The impact of the loss will be upon a person other than the driver.

v. The impact of the loss will not be a result of financial or employment loss of the suspended driver.

39For these reasons, I find that the appellant has established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

40The Tribunal orders that the Registrar shall release the impounded vehicle.