RECONSIDERATION DECISION
Before:
Craig Mazerolle, Vice-Chair
Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number:
24-004995/AABS
Case Name:
Srivathani Surendran v. Unifund Assurance Company
Written Submissions by:
For the Applicant:
Warren Whiteknight, Counsel
Samuel Davies, Counsel
For the Respondent:
Shivani Mehta, Counsel
OVERVIEW
1On December 23, 2025, the applicant requested reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision released December 5, 2025 (“decision”).
2Stemming from an accident on May 15, 2020 and a request for benefits made pursuant to the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule – Effective September 1, 2010 (including amendments effective June 1, 2016) (the “Schedule”), the parties participated in a written hearing. Two issues were in dispute:
a. Is the applicant an “insured person” as defined by s. 3(1) of the Schedule and therefore eligible for benefits?
b. Is the applicant entitled to $2,219.75 for psychological services, proposed by Ricci Psychology Professional Corporation in a treatment plan submitted April 14, 2023?
3In the decision, the Tribunal found the applicant was not “involved in” the accident, and, as a result, she was not entitled to claim benefits under an automobile insurance policy. The Tribunal further denied the treatment plan.
4The grounds for a request for reconsideration are found in Rule 18.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“Rules”). To grant a request for reconsideration, the Tribunal must be satisfied that one or more of the following criteria are met:
a) The Tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction or committed a material breach of procedural fairness;
b) The Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made; or
c) There is evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it, and would likely have affected the result.
5The applicant relies on Rule 18.2(b) to support her request. She is asking the Tribunal to find:
a. She is an “insured person” as defined by the Schedule;
b. She was involved in an accident; and,
c. The psychological services treatment plan is reasonable and necessary.
6The respondent asks the Tribunal to dismiss the request for reconsideration.
RESULT
7The applicant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.
ANALYSIS
8The test for reconsideration under Rule 18.2 involves a high threshold, and the requesting party must show how or why the decision falls into one of the categories in Rule 18.2. The reconsideration process is not an opportunity for a party to re-litigate its position where it disagrees with the Tribunal’s decision, or with the weight assigned to the evidence.
Decision Under Review
9The Tribunal summarized the events of the May 15, 2020 accident at paragraphs 5 and 6 of the decision:
On May 15, 2020, the applicant was a passenger in her husband’s vehicle. While driving they observed a Buick lose control and strike a hydro pole. The impact caused the hydro pole to break and there were wires across the roadway. The applicant’s husband pulled over and they both exited the vehicle and called 911. The applicant’s husband stood beside their vehicle while the applicant crossed the road toward the other vehicle in order to check on the Buick. A police cruiser approaching the scene failed to avoid the overhanging wires and drove into them, causing the wires and the hydro pole to hit the applicant’s husband who was killed.
The applicant claims that she suffers from psychological injuries as a result of her involvement in the accident and seeks entitlement to accident benefits. The applicant submits that at the time of the accident, she was not aware that her family’s insurance on their vehicle had lapsed. As a result, she claims entitlement to benefits from the respondent, the police cruiser’s insurer, on the basis that she was a person involved in an accident with the respondent’s insured automobile thus fitting under the (b) definition of an “insured person” in s. 3(1) of the Schedule.
10Section 3(1)(b) of the Schedule states that an individual is an “insured person” if they are “a person who is involved in an accident involving the insured automobile, if the accident occurs in Ontario”. The crux of the decision, therefore, became whether the applicant was “involved in” the May 15, 2020 accident.
11After reviewing the parties’ case law, the Tribunal concluded it is not sufficient for an individual to witness an accident to find that they were “involved in” said accident (at paragraphs 22 – 25 of the decision):
I find that witnessing an event is not the same as being involved in an event. In other words, the applicant is not “involved in” an accident just because she witnessed it. I concur with the Tribunal in the decisions in Amiri and Mireskandari v. The Co-Operators, 2021 CanLII 45657 (ON LAT) (“Amiri”)] and Jazayeri v. Economical Insurance Company, 2024 CanLII 30722 (ON LAT) (“Jazayeri”)] that proximity to an accident alone is insufficient. While I am not bound by either decision, I find that the fact scenarios in both decisions are similar to the matter before me and deal with a similar analysis as to whether witnessing an accident and its immediate aftermath constitutes being “involved in” and accident.
In Amiri, the Tribunal determined that the applicants were not involved in an accident, despite one of the applicant’s witnessing it first-hand, and the other applicant hearing it and witnessing the aftermath. The applicant’s involvement in the accident was limited to their proximity to the accident scene and relationship to the injured party. They were not struck by the vehicle, not in a vehicle that was part of the accident and were not physically injured as part of a sequence of events stemming from the accident.
In Jazayeri, the Tribunal determined that the applicant witnessed the accident claiming the life of her boyfriend and the immediate aftermath, just like one of the applicants in Amiri. The Tribunal concluded that that the applicant was not struck by the vehicle involved in the accident, nor was she an occupant of the vehicle at any time during the incident.
In the matter before me, while this was a very traumatic event, the applicant’s involvement in the accident is limited to her proximity to the accident and her relationship with her husband. The applicant was not struck by the vehicle, and she was not in a vehicle that was part of the accident. The applicant witnessed the accident at close range and the immediate aftermath and sustained psychological injuries as a result. I find that witnessing an event is not the same as being involved in an event.
12The applicant raises several alleged errors with this conclusion. She has grouped these submissions into factual errors and legal errors.
Factual Errors
13The applicant raises two main factual errors with the decision, i.e., the Tribunal misinterpreted her evidence, and the Tribunal mischaracterized one of the vehicles involved in the accident. I will address these two errors in turn.
14First, the applicant claims the Tribunal did not “correctly consider the uncontroverted evidence that one of the applicant’s impairments is caused by her apprehension of harm”, namely, the findings of her family doctor and the report of Dr. Emily Gavett-Liu, psychiatrist (dated March 28, 2025).
15The applicant takes issue with the following statements in paragraph 27 of the decision (emphasis added):
In this matter, the applicant submits in her Affidavit that her impairments are caused from “having to run to avoid being hit by the PT cruiser and the hydro pole and wire, and then hearing the crash just feet from me, and thereafter finding my husband dead.” However, I find that there is no reference in either the CNRs of her family physician or the report of Dr. Gavett-Liu, that the applicant sustained psychological injuries flowing from her apprehension of being hit by the police cruiser. Notably, the CNRs of her family physician note that she has poor sleep and intrusive thoughts of the accident, moderate depression and possible PTSD. I find that there are no details of the accident in the notes provided. While the applicant submits that the report of Dr. Gavett-Liu diagnosed the applicant with impairments including PTSD further to reports including flashbacks to the accident and hypervigilance like worrying about the possibility of getting hurt, and that the applicant stated she has nightmares almost every day and during her dreams she feels like a vehicle is coming and she is running away from it, Dr. Gavett-Liu does not make any comments or findings in her report that link the applicant’s psychological impairments to her fear of being hit by the police cruiser. Rather Dr. Gavett-Liu concludes that the applicant’s psychological impairments are grounded in mourning and grief, and not a fear for her own safety. I therefore find that the applicant has not proven that she sustained a psychological injury as a result of her fear of being hit by the vehicle.
16The applicant claims these findings are incorrect, as both the family doctor and Dr. Gavett-Liu connected her psychological condition to fears of being hit by a vehicle—a finding that is backed up by her affidavit.
17In a related vein, the applicant further claims the Tribunal did not have the authority to find Dr. Gavett-Liu’s diagnoses only related to the loss of her spouse, especially as there was no medical evidence presented to contradict these findings, nor was there any “cross-examination of the apprehension of harm”.
18I do not accept these grounds for reconsideration.
19To start, though the applicant may claim there is “uncontroverted evidence” that links her psychological condition to the accident, this submission appears to be a request to re-weigh the evidence. As noted above, the reconsideration process is not a venue for asking the Tribunal to re-weigh evidence that was considered at first instance. The Tribunal considered the applicant’s interpretation of the medical evidence and her affidavit, and it reached a different conclusion. For instance, as quoted above, the Tribunal weighed the evidence of both her family physician and Dr. Gavett-Liu. Unless the applicant can show this interpretation is factually incorrect or legally impermissible, as opposed to one that she disagrees with, Rule 18.2(b) will not be triggered.
20I also note that the applicant has the onus to show she is an “insured person”. This onus meant there was no need for the respondent to present any contradictory opinion to challenge her evidence.
21Furthermore, even if the applicant showed that the Tribunal erred in its assessment of this evidence, I do not find it would likely have impacted the outcome. As the Tribunal explained at paragraph 20 of the decision: “I find that the crux of the dispute before me is whether witnessing an accident, and believing that you may be hit, meets the definition of being ‘involved in’ under s. 3(1)(b) of the Schedule. I find that it does not.” This statutory determination formed the core of the Tribunal’s analysis, such that the applicant’s medical evidence ended up playing a minor, tertiary role in the decision. Put another way, even if the Tribunal accepted the applicant’s interpretation of her evidence, I do not find it would likely have impacted this key finding.
22Turning to the other alleged error, the applicant submits the Tribunal incorrectly and repeatedly referred to one of the vehicles in the accident as a “police cruiser”. It was a “PT Cruiser”. The respondent accepts that there was a “minor factual inaccuracy” in the decision, but that these errors were “immaterial”.
23I agree. The applicant has not explained how correcting these errors would likely have impacted the outcome. Once again, even if the Tribunal corrected the identity of this vehicle, I do not find it would likely have impacted the key finding that the applicant was not “involved in” the May 15, 2020 accident.
24In sum, I find the applicant has not established a factual error that triggers Rule 18.2(b).
Legal Errors
25For the alleged legal errors, the applicant raises four grounds.
26First, the applicant claims the Tribunal did not properly apply the binding definition of “involved” from Seetal et al. v. Quiroz et al., 2009 CanLII 92114 (ON SC) (“Quiroz”). Second, though this case was not cited in her written hearing submissions, the applicant claims the Tribunal should have still applied the Divisional Court’s ruling in Pourkhodayar v. The Personal Insurance Company, 2024 ONSC 6019 (“Pourkhodayar”). Specifically, the applicant argues this case involved the “same fact scenario” as the present dispute. Third, the applicant submits that the Tribunal misinterpreted the facts in Jayazeri. This earlier case is about “nervous shock”, yet the Tribunal found it was similar to her claim of psychological injuries. Finally, the applicant claims the Tribunal incorrectly “ignored the Purpose and Causation test [from Greenhalgh v. ING Halifax Insurance Co., 2004 CanLII 21045 (ON CA)] which is central to the analysis required to determine whether the Applicant sustained an impairment”.
27I do not find the applicant has established that any of these alleged legal errors meet the standard of Rule 18.2(b).
28First, I find the alleged error about the interpretation of Quiroz is better understood as another disagreement with the outcome. At paragraph 21 of the decision, the Tribunal highlighted the applicant’s argument about this case, and it agreed that the decision was “binding”. However, the Tribunal then went on to conclude that the test set out in Quiroz did not allow it to find the applicant was “involved in” an accident. The applicant may disagree with this outcome, but disagreement alone is not enough to trigger Rule 18.2(b).
29For instance, in considering Quiroz, the applicant claims that the Tribunal “did not comment on the Applicant’s participation, either passively or actively, in the events during the accident which led to her established psychological impairments”. Yet, as is apparent from the quotations above, the decision included a comprehensive assessment of both the accident and its impact on the applicant. I do not agree that the Tribunal ignored the findings from Quiroz.
30Turning to Pourkhodayar, I do not find the applicant has shown how the Tribunal erred by not considering this ruling. Though I accept that the Divisional Court’s decisions are binding on the Tribunal, the parties in Pourkhodayar were disputing a different issue than the one at hand. The question in Pourkhodayar was over whether an incident constituted an “accident” for the purposes of the Schedule. In the present case, the parties are disputing whether the applicant was “involved in” an accident.
31Further, as the applicant concedes, Pourkhodayar was not cited in her written hearing submissions. Parties are expected to put their best foot forward during the hearing, as the reconsideration process is not a venue for presenting new arguments that could have been reasonably raised at an earlier stage. This case was released months before the applicant’s written hearing submissions were due, so I do not see why it could not have been raised at first instance.
32Moving to the interpretation of Jazayeri, I do not find the applicant has shown how this alleged error triggers Rule 18.2(b). Aside from the fact that the applicant has not explained the substantive differences between a case involving “nervous shock” vs. one involving psychological injuries, I again note that the central finding in this present decision involved the interpretation of the term “involved in”. Even if the Tribunal had found the assessment of the evidence in Jazayeri was not applicable to its review of the applicant’s psychological condition, I do not see how remedying this alleged error would likely have altered the Tribunal’s interpretation of “involved in”.
33Finally, I find the applicant has not shown how the Tribunal erred when it decided not to conduct the Purpose and Causation test from Greenhalgh v. ING Halifax Insurance Co.
34The Tribunal explained this choice at paragraph 28:
As I have found that the applicant was not “involved in” an accident, an analysis of whether the accident meets the purpose and causation tests is unnecessary. The purpose and causation tests are used to determine if an incident involving an insured person, was an accident. The tests are unnecessary in this case because the applicant was not “involved in” an accident.
35Not only do I agree with the Tribunal’s reasoning, but the applicant has not explained why conducting this analysis would likely have impacted the outcome, especially as it did conduct a detailed assessment of whether the applicant sustained an accident-related psychological impairment.
36In sum, I find the applicant has not established a legal error that triggers Rule 18.2(b).
CONCLUSION & ORDER
25The applicant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.
Craig Mazerolle
Vice-Chair
Released: April 20, 2026