Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18503/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while in contravention of a condition under s. 55.1(1)2 of the Act

Between:

Blaine A. Castonguay

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Caley Howard

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Blaine Castonguay, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Leila Perreira, Representative

HEARD: By Teleconference April 16, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Blaine Castonguay, (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of their motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on March 23, 2026. At the time of the impoundment, the appellant was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

PRELIMINARY ISSUES

3At the start of the hearing, the respondent raised the issue of whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the appeal under s. 50.2 of the Act, as the impounded vehicle, which was referred to as an “e-bike” in both the Notice to Registrar and the Notice of Appeal, may not meet the definition of a motor vehicle, which would preclude it from being impounded under s. 55.1 of the Act.

4I found that the appellant’s e-bike was a motor vehicle and that I therefore had the jurisdiction to hear the appellant’s appeal.

5Section 50.2 of the Act provides the Tribunal with the jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the owner of a motor vehicle that is impounded under s. 55.1. Section 1 of the Act defines a motor vehicle as an automobile, a motorcycle, a motor assisted bicycle unless otherwise indicated in the Act, and any other vehicle propelled or driven otherwise than by muscular power. A “power-assisted bicycle” is expressly excluded from the definition of a motor vehicle.

6The definition of power-assisted bicycle in the Act refers to a definition in the now repealed s. 2(1) of the Motor Vehicle Safety Regulations made under the Motor Vehicle Safety Act (Canada). Among other criteria, a power-assisted bicycle must have one or more electric motors with a total continuous power output rating of 500 W or less. The motor must also be incapable of providing further assistance when the bicycle attains a speed of 32 km/h.

7The appellant testified that his e-bike has pedals and can be used as a regular bike. However, when the motor is in use, it is impossible to pedal fast enough to keep up with the motor. He further testified that the e-bike was modified by adding two 1000 W motors and can travel at an assisted speed of at least 50 km/h. I find that the appellant’s e-bike does not qualify as a power-assisted bicycle, which would exempt it from the definition of motor vehicle.

8I further find that the appellant’s e-bike qualifies as a vehicle propelled or driven otherwise than by muscular power, and therefore meets the definition of motor vehicle under the Act. As a result, the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to hear the appeal under s. 50.2 of the Act.

ISSUES

9The issue in dispute is:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

10For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

11For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship

12I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

13The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

14If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

15If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

16The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

17The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

18I am not satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

19The appellant testified that he uses the e-bike to travel from his home in Kitchener to go to his doctor’s office in Cambridge and to help an elderly couple in Guelph. Both of these activities are attended on an as-needed basis and the appellant does not have an upcoming doctor’s appointment scheduled or an outstanding request to help the elderly couple. He confirmed that his prescription refills are available for pick-up at a pharmacy in Kitchener. I therefore find that it is reasonable for the appellant to do without the motor vehicle for travelling to Cambridge or Guelph for the duration of the impoundment.

20The appellant also testified that he uses the e-bike to get to the grocery store and pharmacy in Kitchener to pick up his medications and to purchase food and other necessities. The appellant testified to a number of health concerns and confirmed that he requires daily medications. He will need to pick up his medication refill at the pharmacy within three days. While there is public transit in Kitchener, the appellant testified that he is unable to take public transit due to his anxiety and that the last time he tried to take public transit the driver made him exit the bus as a result of his behaviour. I therefore find that public transit is not a reasonable alternative for the appellant. However, the appellant testified that he has a girlfriend who has access to a vehicle. The appellant testified that he has not asked his girlfriend to drive him to pick up his medications and other necessities as she lives in Cambridge, has a child, works full-time and would have to borrow a vehicle from her mother-in-law. While I understand that the appellant does not want to inconvenience his girlfriend, I find that asking his girlfriend to drive him to get groceries and pick up his medications is a reasonable alternative to the e-bike that the appellant has not considered and inquired into and that could mitigate any threat or loss caused by the impoundment.

21I find that the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

22Since the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with the Act and the Regulation and I need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship.

Conclusion

23I find that:

i. The impounded vehicle is a motor vehicle under the Act and the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to hear the appeal; and

ii. The appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

24The Tribunal Orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

Released: April 21, 2026

__________________________

Caley Howard

Adjudicator