Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18323/MED
In the matter of an appeal under subsection 50(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”), from a decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to suspend a licence pursuant to Section 47(1) of the Act.
Between:
Karoly Dombi
Appellant
and
Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Respondent
DECISION
ADJUDICATORS: Dr. Dimitri Louvish, Member Rupinder Hans, Vice-Chair
APPEARANCES:
For the Appellant: Karoly Dombi, Appellant Charles Dombi, Son and Representative
For the Respondent: Ian Sookram, Agent
Held by teleconference: March 24, 2026
OVERVIEW
1Karoly Dombi (the “appellant”) appeals the decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (the “Registrar”) to suspend his Class G driver’s licence for medical reasons, specifically cognitive impairment, under s. 47(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”).
2By letter dated February 5, 2026, the Registrar suspended the appellant’s driving privileges for cognitive impairment after receipt of an unsolicited Medical Condition Report dated February 3, 2026 (the “MCR”). The appellant appeals the suspension and asks the Tribunal to reinstate his licence.
3At the hearing, the appellant’s son Charles Dombi assisted and represented him.
4Having considered all the evidence and for the reasons that follow, we confirm the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.
ISSUES
5The issue in this appeal is whether the appellant suffers from a medical condition that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely.
6To resolve that issue, we will address the following questions:
a. Does the appellant suffer from cognitive impairment?
b. If the appellant does suffer from cognitive impairment, is this likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely?
RESULT
7We find the appellant does suffer from cognitive impairment, and it is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely. We confirm the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.
ANALYSIS
The Law
8The Registrar has the authority under s. 47(1)(g) of the Act to suspend or cancel a driver’s licence for any sufficient reason.
9Section 14(1)(a) of O. Reg. 340/94 enacted under the Act requires that a holder of a driver’s licence must not suffer from “any mental, emotional, nervous or physical condition or disability likely to significantly interfere with his or her ability to drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely.” Under s. 14(2)(b) of the Regulation, the Minister of Transportation may require a driver to provide satisfactory evidence that they are able to drive safely.
10Section 203(1) of the Act requires medical professionals to report a person who has or appears to have a prescribed medical condition to the Registrar, while s. 203(2) gives medical professionals the discretion to report persons who have or appear to have a medical condition that they believe may make it dangerous for a person to drive.
11Section 14(2)(a) of O. Reg. 340/94 allows the Minister of Transportation to consider the Canadian Council of Motor Transport Administrators Medical Standards for Drivers (“CCMTA Standards”) when determining whether the requirements of s. 14(1) are met. The CCMTA Standards may be considered but are not binding on this Tribunal.
12The Registrar has the burden of establishing on a balance of probabilities that one or more grounds for suspending a driver’s licence has been made out.
13Pursuant to s. 50(2) of the Act, after a hearing the Tribunal may confirm, modify or set aside the decision or order of the Registrar.
Does the appellant suffer from cognitive impairment?
14The evidence satisfies us, on a balance of probabilities, that the appellant suffers from cognitive impairment. We note the appellant does not dispute that he suffers from a cognitive impairment. In addition, we found convincing the medical evidence from the appellant’s treating neurologist, Dr. Neil Thomas.
15The Registrar alleges the appellant has a cognitive impairment which first came to its attention after receiving an unsolicited MCR completed by Dr. Thomas. The Registrar presented the MCR and a letter from Dr. Thomas dated March 11, 2026 (the “March 11th letter”) in support of its position.
16Dr. Thomas notes in the MCR: “[d]iagnosis of cognitive impairment. Requesting on-road functional during assessment.”
17Dr. Thomas provided additional details in the March 11th letter wherein he states the appellant’s cognitive testing demonstrated mild deficits in memory and language task, and an impairment with executive function. He diagnoses the appellant with possible mild cognitive impairment but noted that the testing was not performed in the appellant’s first language which may impact test results. He confirms that, due to the results of the assessment and cognitive testing of the appellant, he recommends an on-road functional driving assessment be arranged for the appellant.
18We give weight to Dr. Thomas’s medical opinion. In addition, the appellant acknowledged in his testimony that he suffers from the medical condition.
19Given the evidence before us, we find on a balance of probabilities, that the Registrar has established the appellant suffers from cognitive impairment.
Is the appellant’s cognitive impairment likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a vehicle safely?
20The Registrar has the burden of establishing that the appellant’s cognitive impairment medical condition is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle. We find that the Registrar has satisfied this burden.
21The Registrar relies on the CCMTA Standards, specifically, chapter 6 dealing with cognitive impairment. The CCMTA Standards state that cognitive problems often have a direct effect upon fitness to drive and any indications of possible cognitive compromises of fitness to drive must not be neglected by clinicians. Among other things, cognitive impairment can affect a person’s judgment, perception, and reaction, and may have a significant impact on a person’s ability to drive safely. Further, drivers with cognitive impairment or dementia are not able to compensate for their functional impairment.
22The Registrar relies on chapter 6.6.1 which states eligibility for any class of licence is supported if:
complete medical assessment indicates cognitive functions necessary for driving are not impaired; or where required, functional driving assessment shows condition does not affect ability to drive; conditions for maintaining licence are met.
23The Tribunal is entitled to take the CCMTA Standards into consideration but is not bound by them. The overriding consideration in this appeal is whether the Registrar has proven, on a balance of probabilities, that the appellant’s cognitive impairment is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.
24While the CCMTA Standards are well-reasoned and provide assistance, every case must be considered on its own facts.
25The Registrar submits the appellant’s treating neurologist diagnosed a cognitive impairment and noted that cognitive testing demonstrated mild deficits in memory, and language tasks and an impairment with executive function. In both the MCR and the March 11th letter, Dr. Thomas recommended/requested a functional driving assessment for the appellant given his cognitive impairment. The Registrar’s position is that the functional driving test should be completed by the appellant as twice recommended by his neurologist. The Registrar relies upon the MCR and the March 11th letter in meeting its burden and submits there are safety concerns hence the recommendation from the treating neurologist.
26We give weight to the opinion expressed by Dr. Thomas in the MCR and the March 11th letter, and his recommendation that the appellant take a functional driving assessment given his cognitive impairment. The appellant has not pointed or directed us to any contrary medical evidence.
27The appellant’s son, Charles Dombi, testified that there is no indication the appellant’s diagnosis impairs his ability to drive safely. However, he concedes he was not present during the cognitive testing that Dr. Thomas performed on the appellant. He further acknowledges he is not a medical professional.
28The appellant testified he has been driving since 1971, and he feels he can drive safely. He further testified he is willing to take the on-road functional driving test.
29In this case, we are persuaded to apply the CCMTA Standards and take them into consideration. We note the only medical evidence provided to the Tribunal with regards to the cognitive impairment is the MCR and the March 11th letter from the appellant’s treating neurologist. Knowing the circumstances and having met and assessed the appellant, Dr. Thomas concluded there were safety concerns with his driving and submitted the MCR and further recommended an on-road functional driving assessment. We find that the Registrar’s reliance on the MCR and the March 11th letter is not misplaced.
30We note that CCMTA Standard 6.6.1 states that a driver could be eligible to drive if a complete medical assessment indicates cognitive functions necessary for driving are not impaired, or where required, a functional driving assessment shows the condition does not affect ability to drive. We find that it is reasonable for a person to undergo a functional driving assessment to ensure that they have the cognitive functions necessary for driving a vehicle safely for their own safety and the safety of others on the road.
31We find that the CCMTA Standards are reasonable and should be followed in the circumstances. Experiencing cognitive impairment while driving a vehicle can have catastrophic consequences. It is reasonable to require drivers who are cognitively impaired, to refrain from driving a vehicle until their ability to do so safely can be properly assessed. The Registrar has asked the appellant to take the functional driving assessment. We note Dr. Thomas has repeatedly stated the appellant should undergo a functional driving assessment, and the appellant is not opposed to taking the test. Based upon the evidence before us, we find it is reasonable to require the appellant to take the test.
32At present, the appellant falls short of the criteria set out in the CCMTA Standards.
33Based on a careful consideration of all the evidence before us, we are satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the appellant’s medical condition is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.
ORDER
34For the reasons set out above, pursuant to subsection 50(2) of the Act, we confirm the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver licence.
Licence Appeal
Dr. Dimitri Louvish, Member
Rupinder Hans, Vice-Chair
Released: 22 April 2026