Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18490/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while in contravention of a condition under s. 55.1(1)2 of the Act

Between:

Maria La Peruta

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATORS:

Steve Clarke, Member Rebecca Hines, Vice Chair

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Maria La Peruta, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Martin He, Agent for the Registrar

HEARD By Teleconference: Friday, April 10, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Maria La Peruta, (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of her motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Saturday, March 28, 2026. At the time of the impoundment, the driver (“J.F”) was driving the vehicle while their driver's licence was subject to a condition that prohibits them from driving a motor vehicle that is not equipped with an ignition interlock device, as described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1). A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant filed a Notice of Appeal (NOA) on April 2, 2026.

3The appellant appeals on the following grounds:

i. That the vehicle was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded; and

ii. That the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

4During the hearing, exceptional hardship was added on consent, as a ground for appeal.

ISSUES

5The issues in dispute are:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(a) of the Act, whether the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded; and

ii. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

6We find that the appellant has demonstrated that the vehicle was stolen. Since the appellant need only satisfy one of the five grounds in s. 50.2(3) for the Tribunal to order the vehicle be released, we do not need to determine if the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship. The Registrar is ordered to release the impounded vehicle.

ANALYSIS

7For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal as set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The vehicle was stolen

8We are satisfied that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded.

9In Marshall v. Ontario (Registrar of Motor Vehicles) [2002] O.J. No. 745 (Div. Ct.) (“Marshall”) the Divisional Court held that a vehicle is “stolen” in this context “when it is taken without the owner’s consent and when the perpetrator intends to deprive the owner of it, whether permanently or temporarily”.

10In other words, in order to establish that the vehicle was stolen for the purposes of s. 50.2(3)(a) of the Act, the appellant must prove that the vehicle was taken without the owner’s consent, and that the driver intended to deprive the owner of the vehicle, either permanently or temporarily.

11The respondent submitted evidence that, at the time of the impoundment, the vehicle was being driven by J. F., whose driver’s license had a condition requiring an ignition interlock device. Accordingly, the vehicle was impounded for 45 days.

12The appellant testified the vehicle belonged to her and that J.F., an estranged partner, was told that he was not ever to drive her car. The appellant testified that J.F. is the father of her children, and although they are estranged she allows him to visit for the sake of her kids.

13The appellant testified that she solely is responsible for all vehicle payments, maintenance and insurance and that she is the only driver of the vehicle.

14The appellant testified that on the morning of the impoundment, she had made it clear that she would drive J.F. to his medical clinic after first feeding and taking care of her kids.

15The appellant testified that she was unaware that J.F. had taken the vehicle and when she realized he and the vehicle were missing she tried calling his cell phone, which was out of service She added that she did not hear from him until he called from the clinic when he informed her that he had been arrested and the vehicle had been impounded.

16The appellant testified that she initially did not know how J.F. had taken the car because it needed gas and she was going to get gas from her father prior to driving J.F. to the clinic. She testified that she subsequently learned that J.F.’s sister had given the driver $20 for gas. The appellant testified that even the sister sought to be assured that the appellant would be driving and not J.F.

17During cross-examination, the appellant testified that she kept the keys hanging in her kitchen in her basement apartment. She added that it never occurred to her that she would need to secure the keys as she never thought J.F. would ever take the car, and that he had never done this before.

18The appellant testified that she did not report the car stolen as she believed the driver would bring the car back, at some point.

19The appellant testified that she knows that driving is a privilege and that she has always conformed accordingly, taking care of her vehicle, maintenance, insurance and the rules adding that she believes that she has not even had a parking ticket.

20We find that the vehicle was stolen because we accept that J.F. took the appellant’s vehicle without her consent and against her express instructions that he was prohibited from driving it. We find the appellant’s testimony to be credible in that she had no reason to hide her car keys because J.F. had never taken her vehicle before and as a result she had no reason to suspect that he would take her vehicle on the date in question. In addition, we believe that the appellant would not expect J.F. to take her vehicle because it needed gas and they were going to borrow gas from her father because they did not have any money. We also find that it is understandable why she would not call the police because J.F. is the father of her two young children.

21As noted above, the Marshall decision essentially creates a two-part test that the appellant must prove in order to establish that the vehicle was stolen, for the purposes of s. 50.2(3)(a) of the HTA. The first test is whether the vehicle was taken without the owner’s consent, and the second part is whether the driver intended to deprive the owner of the vehicle, even temporarily.

22In this case, we find that the driver took the vehicle without the owner’s consent and that the driver intended to deprive the owner of the vehicle, at least temporarily.

23We find that the appellant has established that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded.

Exceptional hardship

24Since we find that the vehicle was stolen, it is not necessary to consider the other ground in s.50.2(3), exceptional hardship, upon which the appellant relies.

Conclusion

25We find that the appellant has established, on a balance of probabilities, in relation to 50.2(3)(a), that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded. Since the appellant need only satisfy one of the five grounds in s. 50.2(3) in her appeal, it is not necessary to determine if the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

26Pursuant to subsection 50.2(5) of the Act, the Tribunal Orders that the Registrar release the impounded vehicle.