Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18379/MED
An appeal under subsection 50(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from a decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to suspend a licence pursuant to Section 47(1) of the Act.
Between:
Lourdes Allen
Appellant
and
Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Respondent
DECISION
ADJUDICATOR: Dr. Isla McPherson, Member
APPEARANCES:
For the Appellant: Lourdes Allen, Appellant
For the Respondent: Stephen Grootenboer, Agent
Held by teleconference: April 2, 2026
OVERVIEW
1Lourdes Allen (the “appellant”) appeals the decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (“Registrar”) to suspend her Class G licence under s. 47(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) after the Registrar received an unsolicited medical report stating that the appellant suffers from a medical condition that may affect her ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.
2The Registrar has the authority under s. 47(1)(g) of the Act to suspend or cancel a driver’s licence for any sufficient reason. Section 14(1)(a) of O. Reg. 340/94 under the Act (the “Regulation”) states that a holder of a driver’s licence must not suffer from any mental, emotional, nervous or physical condition or disability likely to significantly interfere with their ability to drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely. Under s. 14(2)(b) of the Regulation, the Minister of Transportation may require a driver to provide satisfactory evidence that they are able to drive safely.
3The Registrar takes the position that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely cognitive impairment, that is likely to significantly interfere with her ability to drive safely and that this provides sufficient reason to suspend her licence under s. 47(1)(g) of the Act.
4The appellant appeals the suspension under s. 50(1) of the Act. She disagrees that she suffers cognitive impairment and denies that she suffers from a medical condition which interferes with her ability to drive safely.
5Pursuant to section 50(2) of the Act, after a hearing the Tribunal may confirm, modify, or set aside the decision or order of the Registrar.
ISSUES
6The issue in this appeal is whether the appellant suffers from a medical condition that is likely to significantly interfere with her ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.
7To resolve that issue, I will address the following questions:
i. Does the appellant suffer from cognitive impairment?
ii. If so, is this likely to significantly interfere with her ability to drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely?
8The Registrar bears the burden of proving on a balance of probabilities that the answer to each of the above questions is “yes.”
RESULT
9Having considered all the evidence and submissions and for the reasons that follow, I find that the Registrar has satisfied its burden to establish that the appellant suffers from a medical condition that is likely to significantly interfere with her ability to drive a motor vehicle safely and I confirm the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.
ANALYSIS
Does the appellant suffer from cognitive impairment?
10The evidence presented at the hearing establishes that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely cognitive impairment.
11The Registrar’s position is supported by a Medical Condition Report (MCR) dated February 10, 2026, completed by the appellant’s family physician, Dr. M. On this form Dr. M documented the appellant suffers from cognitive impairment that affects attention, judgement and problem solving, planning and sequencing, memory, insight, reaction time or visuospatial perception, and results in substantial limitation of the person’s ability to perform activities of daily living. Dr. M provided narrative comments indicating that the appellant had recently undergone MoCA testing and that concerns had been raised by family. She recommended the appellant have a drive test assessment with full cognitive testing. Dr. M further recorded that the appellant had failed the Trails B test and the clock drawing test, exhibited short term recall issues, and had been getting lost when driving.
12In response to the receipt of the MCR from Dr. M the Registrar suspended the appellant’s driver’s licence and requested a Functional Driving Assessment.
13The appellant’s position is that she does not suffer from cognitive impairment. The appellant testified that she had become lost twice while driving on her own several months apart, once was when driving home after dropping her sister off at her own home. She was able to find her way back home by stopping and asking for directions. She could not recall when these events occurred. She testified she was not at all concerned about these incidents, but when she told her daughter, her daughter suggested they make an appointment with the family physician, Dr. M.
14The appellant did not provide any medical opinion or evidence in support of her position.
15Under cross-examination the appellant testified that her daughter attended the doctor’s appointment and described to Dr. M how the appellant had become lost while driving. The appellant was asked by the Registrar if she remembered undergoing cognitive testing at Dr. M’s office. She responded that she could, but with further questioning could not recall or describe any of the cognitive testing that was done during the appointment, including the clock drawing or the Trails B test that were documented on the MCR. The appellant instead described that she was 83 years old and had completed the test required to renew your licence for those over 80 years old over a year ago. She described how she had passed the vision testing easily.
16In response to questioning about whether Dr. M had discussed the results of the cognitive testing or provided a diagnosis during the appointment, the appellant testified that the results of the testing were never discussed, and Dr. M was laughing that she had become lost. She testified it was never discussed with Dr. M that she should not drive or that a MCR had been completed.
17In response to questioning, the appellant testified that Dr. M has been her family physician for over five years, and she sees her regularly and had seen her as recently as a month prior to the hearing. The appellant testified she had not discussed her suspended licence or cognition at the latest appointment with Dr. M.
18The only medical evidence before the Tribunal is the MCR from Dr. M documenting failed in-office cognitive screening tests and a diagnosis of cognitive impairment. While the appellant disagrees with this diagnosis, she did not produce any medical evidence to dispute the diagnosis relied upon by the Registrar. By the appellant’s testimony, Dr. M has been the appellant’s physician for several years, and she attends appointments with her regularly. This longitudinal relationship would position Dr. M well to recognize a change to the appellant’s cognitive status and make a diagnosis of cognitive impairment.
19I find the medical evidence in this case relevant and persuasive. While the appellant argues she does not have cognitive impairment, I give more weight to the medical opinion of Dr. M as a qualified physician, and a treating physician who would reasonably be expected to be familiar with the appellant’s medical history. Based on the information available, I find that the Registrar has established on a balance of probabilities that the appellant suffers from cognitive impairment.
Is the appellant’s medical condition likely to significantly interfere with her ability to drive a motor vehicle safely?
20I find that the Registrar has proven on a balance of probabilities that the appellant’s medical condition is likely to significantly interfere with her ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.
21The Registrar argued that the appellant’s medical condition is likely to interfere with her ability to drive a vehicle safely and supported their position with the Canadian Council of Motor Transport Administrators Medical Standards for Drivers [2025] (the “CCMTA Standards”), Chapter 6. This chapter documents that following an extensive review of the scientific literature, it was concluded by a panel of experts that cognitive problems often have a direct effect upon fitness to drive.
22The Registrar stated that these Standards are written by physicians and experts across the country and used as guidelines in Ontario and other jurisdictions to assess driver fitness as it pertains to medical conditions.
23The Registrar stated that Standard 6.6.1 applies to the appellant’s medical condition, and it states that drivers who are diagnosed with cognitive impairment would be eligible for a licence if:
i. Complete medical assessment indicates cognitive functions necessary for driving are not impaired.
ii. Where required, functional driving assessment shows the condition does not affect ability to drive.
iii. Conditions for maintaining a licence are met.
24The Registrar submits that cognitive impairment can and will impair the safe operation of a vehicle and the Registrar did take the appropriate action in suspending the appellant’s licence. The Registrar has not received any medical information or a completed Functional Driving Assessment as of the time of the hearing. The Registrar submits that the law and national medical standards are being applied reasonably and correctly and on the balance of probabilities the medical evidence supports that the appellant’s medical condition will impair her ability to drive safely.
25Section 14(2)(a) of the Regulation allows the Registrar to consider the CCMTA Standards when determining whether the requirements of s. 14(1) are met. The Tribunal may take the CCMTA Standards into consideration but is not bound by them.
26The appellant’s Notice of Appeal describes that she has been driving for 45 years and at no time has a police officer indicated there was a problem with her driving performance and she has not been accused of any driving offenses. She testified that she is shocked that making a wrong turn would result in revoking her licence and she cannot understand this. The appellant described her driving habit to include traveling to and from a nearby casino for dinner with her husband.
27Under cross-examination the appellant responded that she would be willing to do the requested Functional Driving Assessment but would need to ask her spouse about that.
28The appellant’s spouse testified that he and his wife go to a restaurant often and on the drive home half the time he drives and half the time she drives. He testified that on a four-lane road, if his wife is driving and the other driver indicates, she eases up to allow the other driver an opportunity to turn. He testified she is a courteous and professional driver. He further testified that he does not attend medical appointments with her and would have no way of knowing of Dr. M’s assessment.
29Pursuant to s. 16(b) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, I as a physician duly licenced to practice medicine in Ontario take notice that the Trails B test referenced by Dr. M is an in-office cognitive assessment tool used to help identify those with at-risk driving. Dr. M has identified the appellant had a concerning result on the test when she has written “Failed Trails B”.
30I considered the appellant’s position that she does not have a medical condition that will impact her ability to drive safely, and her and her husband’s testimony. However, this is weighed against the medical evidence that the appellant has failed relevant cognitive screening tools designed to identify those with at-risk driving, that the appellant’s daughter has raised concerns about the appellant’s driving with the appellant’s physician, that the medical opinion of the appellant’s physician is that she requires an on road driving assessment, and the scientific research that cognitive problems often have a direct effect upon fitness to drive, as outlined in the CCMTA Standards. Furthermore, there is no medical opinion or evidence that supports the reinstatement of the appellant’s driver’s licence or is inconsistent with the medical evidence which supports the Registrar’s position that her condition is likely to significantly interfere with her ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.
31Although this Tribunal is not bound by the CCMTA Standards, they can be considered when making the decision for the reason that these Standards are the result of a lengthy and intensive process to provide medical standards based on the best evidence available and with a focus on functional ability to drive rather than exclusively on medical diagnoses. My review of the evidence shows that none of the conditions recommended for relicensing outlined in the CCMTA Standards have been met.
32I acknowledge the burden that the lack of a driver’s licence is having on the appellant. However, the medical evidence is compelling in this case.
33As such, for the reasons cited, I am satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the appellant’s medical condition is likely to significantly interfere with her ability to drive safely.
Conclusion
34I find that the Registrar has discharged the onus of establishing on a balance of probabilities that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely cognitive impairment, and that condition is likely to significantly interfere with her ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.
ORDER
35For the reasons set out above, pursuant to subsection 50(2) of the Act, I confirm the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.
Released: April 20, 2026
Isla McPherson MD
Adjudicator

