Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18364/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended.

Between:

Danielle Derrett

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

VICE-CHAIR:

Kevin Kovalchuk

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Danielle Derrett, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Leila Pereira, Representative

HEARD: By Teleconference March 18, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Danielle Derrett, (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of her motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Saturday, February 28, 2026. At the time of the impoundment, JS (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that that she exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver's licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension and that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issues in dispute are:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(c) of the Act, whether the appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension;

ii. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

5For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The appellant has not established that they exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension.

6I am not satisfied that the appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension.

7In considering what actions might amount to due diligence, the Supreme Court of Canada, in R. v. Sault Ste. Marie 1978 CanLII 11 (SCC), [1978] 2 S.C.R 1299 (“R. v. Sault Ste. Marie”), describes due diligence as taking all reasonable care and the actions a reasonable person would have taken in the same or similar circumstances.

8Although due diligence does not require perfection, it does require that the appellant must establish that they took reasonable actions to determine that the driver was properly licensed rather than simply assuming that to be true. In general, the driver’s own representation that they are properly licensed is not sufficient to establish that due diligence was taken.

9The appellant testified that on the night of the impoundment she was intoxicated and asked her cousin JS to drive her vehicle as she was more comfortable with him driving. She did not ask to see his driver’s licence, nor did he show a physical driver’s license to her. She did ask JS if he had a driver’s licence to which he replied in the affirmative. She testified that she had never seen a physical driver’s licence issued to JS.

10She testified that she did not contact the Ministry of Transportation Ontario (“MTO”) or use the online tools provided by the MTO to check the status of JS’s driver’s licence. Her reason for not doing so was that she was too intoxicated.

11I find that the appellant’s reliance upon JS to confirm that he had a valid driver’s licence is not sufficient to establish that due diligence was taken.

12I find that the appellant has not established that she exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension.

The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship.

13I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

14The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

15If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

16If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

17The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

18The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

19I am not satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

20The appellant is a stay-at-home mother. She lives in Peterborough Ontario. She has three children two boys age 11 and 3 and a daughter age 9. Her daughter lives with the child’s father in Cobourg, Ontario. The appellant has visitation rights three weekends a month. Initially the appellant testified that she was unable to pick up her daughter in Cobourg to take her to Peterborough for the weekend due to the impoundment. Later in her evidence she testified that the child’s father drove her to Peterborough on one occasion so the child could visit her mother.

21Her evidence was that neither the 11-year-old nor the 9-year-old have missed any time from school. The 11-year-old walks to school (which is across the street from his home), and the 9-year old’s father takes her to school in Cobourg. The 3-year-old is in daycare on Thursdays and Fridays. The daycare is 15 minutes from her home. She testified that the three-year-old missed “a couple” of daycare attendances but later testified that, she and the 3-year-old were living in Orillia with the appellant’s cousin from February 28, 2026, to March 14, 2026, when they returned to Peterborough. Since their return to Peterborough the appellant has arranged for a friend to drive her son to daycare.

22She testified that while she was living with her cousin, in Orillia, she was able to get groceries prescriptions and personal needs until March 13, 2026, when she returned to Peterborough. Since she returned to Peterborough, her neighbour has given her a ride to the grocery store. The store is 5 minutes away. She is able to walk to the grocery store although she testified that she can only walk to the store when buying a small number of groceries.

23The appellant testified that she could get rides from a neighbour or a family friend based on their availability. There is public transit available to her, however, she has not explored this alternative. She testified that although Peterborough has Uber and taxis, she has not explored their use as she cannot afford them.

24With respect to other alternatives for transportation, the appellant testified that she owns a second vehicle a 2010 Chevrolet, however, it has been in the garage requiring repairs and the appellant has not explored the cost to complete the repairs. She testified that the vehicle may require a new battery, but she was not sure.

25She testified that neither she nor her children have missed any appointments since the impoundment.

26I agree with the respondent’s submissions that because the appellant has access to taxi, Uber and public transit as well as a family friend or neighbour who can give her rides, she does have alternative means of transportation with respect to most of her usual activities. In addition, neither she nor her children have missed any appointments since the impoundment.

27I find that the appellant has failed to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. The appellant has not explored the use of public transit, the use of taxis or Uber nor the cost to repair the 2010 Chevrolet that she owns.

28I find that the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

29Since the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with the Act and the Regulation, and I need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship.

Conclusion(s)

30I find that:

i. the appellant has not established that she exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension;

ii. the appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

31The Tribunal Orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.