Jessica Pagett v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2026 CanLII 34306

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18394/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under Section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”), from an impoundment of a motor vehicle pursuant to Section 55.1 of the Act.

Between:

Jessica Pagett

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

ADJUDICATOR:

Raymond C. Ramdayal, Member

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Jessica Pagett, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Martin He, Agent

Heard:

March 18, 2026

OVERVIEW

1The appellant, Jessica Pagett, appeals the 45-day impoundment of her 2010 Chevrolet Malibu motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”).

2The appellant’s vehicle was impounded on March 1, 2026, after police found it being operated by (K.E.R.), whose driver’s licence had been suspended following a conviction under the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46 (“Criminal Code”). K.E.R. was subject to a mandatory ignition interlock from November 26, 2025, to November 26, 2026. The appellant’s vehicle is not equipped with a mandatory ignition interlock device. The parties do not dispute the fact that the vehicle was being driven by K.E.R. at the time of the impoundment.

3Subsection 55.1(1) of the Act allows for the impoundment of a vehicle for 45 days where a police officer is satisfied that the driver’s licence of the person who is driving a vehicle is under suspension at the time for, among other specified reasons, a blood/alcohol content of over .08mgs. K.E.R. was convicted of this offence on May 13, 2025. As a result of discovering this information at roadside and the fact he did not have an ignition interlock device, police impounded the vehicle pursuant to s. 55.1(1) of the Act. The appellant was in the passenger seat at the time and admitted to giving K.E.R. permission to operate the vehicle.

4Section 50.2 of the Act allows a motor vehicle owner to appeal its impoundment to the Licence Appeal Tribunal (the “Tribunal”). Under section 50.2, the grounds on which the Tribunal may release the appellant’s vehicle are as follows:

a) The impounded motor vehicle was stolen at the time it was detained;

b) The driver’s licence of the motor vehicle operator was not under suspension at the time the vehicle was detained;

c) The driver’s licence of the motor vehicle operator was not subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1 (1) of the Act at the time the vehicle was detained;

d) The motor vehicle owner exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the motor vehicle operator was not under suspension at the time the vehicle was detained; or

e) The vehicle impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

5In all cases, the appellant bears the onus of proving a ground of appeal. For this matter, the appellant indicated in her Notice of Appeal (“NOA”) that she was appealing on the grounds that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ISSUE

6The issue to be determined is whether the appellant’s vehicle impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act. To succeed in her appeal, the appellant must establish that she suffered exceptional hardship, as a result of the impoundment, on a balance of probabilities.

RESULT

7Having considered the parties’ evidence and submissions, I find that the impoundment will not result in exceptional hardship under section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, as the appellant has reasonable alternatives to the impounded vehicle. The appeal is dismissed, and the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

8It is undisputed between the parties that the appellant is the owner of the impounded vehicle, that K.E.R. was driving it at the time it was impounded, and that K.E.R.’s driver’s licence was suspended with a condition of mandatory ignition interlock. I am satisfied that the vehicle was lawfully detained and impounded under s. 55.1 of the Act.

The applicability of exceptional hardship

9I am not satisfied that the appellant has demonstrated the impoundment of her vehicle will result in exceptional hardship under section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

10Section 10 of Regulation 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that the Tribunal must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment.

11Section 10(1) requires the Tribunal to consider whether an alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) says that to show there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

“[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.”

12If the owner establishes there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health and safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health or safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

13The Tribunal is generally precluded by section 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for employment or training. However, section 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

a) No alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

b) The loss will be immediate, significant, and lasting;

c) The impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

d) The impact of the loss

i. Will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

ii. Will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in the clause (2) (b), (c) or (d)

14The Tribunal cannot consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Will the appellant experience exceptional hardship due to the impoundment?

15The appellant testifies that she lives with K.E.R. and her two sons, aged 8 and 3 months, in Walkerton, Ontario. Her older son must be driven to school as they are located outside of the district and there is no school bus provided. The appellant has been able to arrange for him to get a ride to school from friends. He has only missed one day of school since the impoundment of the vehicle.

16The appellant has also been able to make alternate arrangements for any medical appointments the children may have. This includes obtaining rides from neighbours, her oldest son’s parents, and her mother. She testified that she is required to do this because there is no public transportation in her area.

17The appellant testified that she was aware that K.E.R. was required to have an ignition interlock device but needed assistance on that particular day to drive while she attended to her youngest child’s needs. She states they were only going a short distance and believed it would be acceptable. K.E.R. was pulled over shortly after getting into the driver’s seat.

18The appellant explained that the younger child has multiple medical appointments but she has been able to obtain alternate transportation for all except one of those appointments. She stated that she is able to reschedule that appointment.

19The appellant advanced little evidence to support her ground that she has experienced exceptional hardship as a result of the impound.

20The respondent asserts that the appellant has been able to access alternatives to the impounded vehicle with the support of friends and family. The appellant also has access to K.E.R.’s vehicle when he is not at work. The appellant also explained that she is able to walk to a nearby gas station for any necessities, including milk, in the event she requires something when an alternate vehicle is not available to her. The appellant has no doubt endured some inconvenience, but she has been able to overcome most of them with the assistance of others.

21At the hearing, the appellant testified that the cost of the impoundment was beyond her financial means, however, she failed to provide sufficient evidence to support this. There was nothing to indicate that there was any immediate, significant or lasting financial loss. She stated that she could not afford renting a vehicle but admitted to not looking into the cost when questioned by the respondent.

22I would note that the cost of impoundment can only be relied on if there are no alternatives. In this particular case, I find alternatives to be present, therefore, I am unable to consider the cost of impoundment as part of the exceptional hardship analysis in this case.

23The appellant did not offer any evidence to demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities, that she has no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle. The appellant testified that she has been able to access other reasonable options and has been able to make arrangements for her son’s transportation to school and attending appointments. While I accept her testimony that the impounded vehicle plays an important role in her day-to-day activities, I also take into consideration that the impoundment is temporary and there has been no significant disruption in her routine of getting her older son to school, obtaining groceries, or attending other appointments.

24It appears the appellant has been able to meet her personal and family obligations while her vehicle is impounded. I find that she has reasonable alternatives which have allowed her to continue her daily routine with no major disruption. The loss of her vehicle is no doubt inconvenient, but she has considered, and indeed, taken advantage of opportunities to overcome this temporary loss. In any event, s. 10(2)(a) of the Regulation prohibits the Tribunal from considering inconvenience.

25The Regulation sets out that if the appellant fails to establish that there are no reasonable alternatives to the impounded vehicle, then an appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship cannot succeed. For the reasons set out in this decision, I find that the appellant has failed to discharge the threshold burden of establishing on a balance of probabilities that there are no reasonable alternatives to the impounded vehicle. She therefore does not meet the test for exceptional hardship, as set out in the Regulation, based on the alternatives available to her.

ORDER

26For the reasons set out above, pursuant to the Tribunal’s authority under s. 50.2(5) of the Act, I confirm the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle.