Shannon Plante v. Definity Insurance Company, 2026 CanLII 331

Citation: Plante v. Definity Insurance Company, 2026 ONLAT 23-011001/AABS - R

RECONSIDERATION DECISION

Before: Trina Morissette, Vice-Chair

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 23-011001/AABS

Case Name: Shannon Plante v. Definity Insurance Company

Written Submissions by:

For the Applicant: Christopher Obagi, Counsel

For the Respondent: Martin Forget, Counsel

OVERVIEW

1This request for reconsideration was filed by the applicant in this matter on October 10, 2025. It arises out of a September 19, 2025 decision (“the 2025 decision”) in which the Tribunal found that the applicant was not catastrophically impaired (“CAT”), not entitled to the disputed portions of a treatment plan in dispute, nor interest, and the respondent was not liable to pay an award.

2The grounds for a request for reconsideration are found in Rule 18.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“Rules”). To grant a request for reconsideration, the Licence Appeal Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) must be satisfied that one or more of the following criteria are met:

a) The Tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction or committed a material breach of procedural fairness;

b) The Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made; or

c) There is evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it, and would likely have affected the result.

3The applicant submits her request for reconsideration based upon Rules 18.2(a) and (b). She seeks to have the decision set aside and replaced with a decision confirming that she sustained a CAT impairment resulting in a 55% or more whole person impairment (“WPI”).

4The respondent argues the request for reconsideration should be dismissed.

BACKGROUND

5This matter was first heard at a videoconference hearing in 2023. On June 28, 2023, the Tribunal released its decision and found that the applicant was entitled to supervised aqua therapy as well as psychological treatment and interest for those therapies, but she was not entitled to other benefits which included attendant care benefits, a four-wheel scooter, a power lift chair, home modifications, rent, and occupational therapy. Within the required timeframe of Rule 18.1, the applicant filed a request for reconsideration of the June 2023 decision. A reconsideration decision dated October 13, 2023, dismissed the applicant’s request for reconsideration.

6The applicant appealed the June 2023 decision and the October 2023 reconsideration decision to the Divisional Court (“the Court”). The Court rendered its decision in the matter on December 20, 2024. In its decision, the Court granted the applicant’s appeal on the basis that aspects of the hearing were unfair to the applicant and were not a proper exercise of the discretion afforded to an adjudicator under the Rules and the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22: see Plante v. Economical Insurance Company, 2024 ONSC 7171 (“Plante”). Specifically, the Court took issue with the unilateral change in the length of the hearing; the decision to unilaterally sever the hearings of the applicant and her mother; and the decision to refuse the applicant’s request to cross-examine the respondent’s expert. Due to the breaches of procedural fairness, the Court directed that the June 2023 decision and the October 2023 reconsideration decision be set aside and returned the matter to the Tribunal for it to be heard de novo before a different adjudicator.

7Following the Court’s December 2024 decision, the Tribunal scheduled, and the parties participated in a case conference on March 20, 2024. A Case Conference Report and Order was issued to the parties on March 22, 2024 and identified the issues in dispute as: whether the applicant sustained a CAT impairment; a treatment plan for psychological services; a treatment plan for case management services; an award; and interest.

8The matter was set down for an 8-day videoconference hearing which was subsequently scheduled to commence June 23, 2025. The hearing took place June 23-24, 2025, concluding after the second day.

RESULT

9The applicant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.

ANALYSIS

10The test for reconsideration under Rule 18.2 involves a high threshold. The reconsideration process is not an opportunity for a party to re-litigate its position where it disagrees with the Tribunal’s decision, or with the weight assigned to the evidence. The requestor must show how or why the decision falls into one of the categories in Rule 18.2.

11The applicant sought a determination that she was CAT impaired pursuant to Criterion 7. To qualify for a CAT impairment under Criterion 7, the applicant must prove that she has a combination of physical and psychological impairment ratings from medical professionals that meet or exceed the 55% WPI threshold. The psychological impairment rating is determined in accordance with the methodology in Chapter 14, section 14.6 of the American Medical Association’s Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 6^th^ edition 2008 (“the Guides”) and is combined with the physical WPI rating from the Guides, 4^th^ edition, 1993, using the Combined Values Table. An impairment percentage derived by means of the Guides is intended to represent an informed estimate of the degree to which an individual’s capacity to carry out daily activities has been diminished.

12Pursuant to Rule 18.2(a), the applicant submits that the Tribunal breached her right to procedural fairness by allowing the respondent to proceed directly to cross-examination of its own expert neurologist, Dr. Dost, thereby eliciting a change in the expert’s opinion without prior notice to the applicant. Secondly, the applicant argues that the Tribunal failed to give notice to the parties that it would be disregarding Dr. Dost’s 5% WPI rating for headaches due to “a technicality” (i.e., failing to reference the specific section of the Guides). This lack of notice prevented the applicant from making submissions on this issue and/or addressing the issue with Dr. Dost directly during his viva voce testimony at the hearing.

13On the grounds of Rule 18.2(b), the applicant submits that the Tribunal erred by excluding the 5% WPI rating provided for headaches despite the issue being unchallenged by the parties, and it also erred by ignoring or misapprehending the documentary evidence and the viva voce evidence of Dr. Dost with respect to the exacerbation of the applicant’s incontinence impairment. Moreover, the applicant submits that the Tribunal erred by conflating the issue that was before it with respect to the disputed treatment plan for psychological treatment. She also argues that the Tribunal allowed the respondent to rely upon a previous decision of this Tribunal involving the parties that was set aside by the Court.

14The respondent submits that there are no grounds for reconsideration pursuant to Rules 18.2(a) or (b). It argues that the Tribunal did not breach the applicant’s right to procedural fairness in the hearing process, nor did it make any errors of law or fact. It argues that the applicant did not file her section 25 CAT assessment reports at the hearing and did not call any of her expert witnesses. Rather, the applicant chose to rely solely on the section 44 CAT assessment reports of the respondent which concluded she had a combined physical and psychological impairment that met the 55% WPI threshold under Criterion 7. The applicant received notice that the respondent would be disputing some of Dr. Dost’s ratings through written particulars it provided to the applicant prior to the hearing. It submits that the applicant’s request for reconsideration ought to be dismissed it its entirety.

15For the reasons that follow, I find the applicant has not established any grounds for reconsideration.

There is no material breach of procedural fairness pursuant to Rule 18.2(a)

16I find that the Tribunal’s decision and process did not result in a material breach of procedural fairness for the following reasons.

17In Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC), [1999] 2 SCR 817 (“Baker”), the Supreme Court of Canada indicated at paragraph 22:

(…) the purpose of the participatory rights contained within the duty of procedural fairness is to ensure that administrative decisions are made using a fair and open procedure, appropriate to the decision being made and its statutory, institutional, and social context, with an opportunity for those affected by the decision to put forward their views and evidence fully and have them considered by the decision-maker.

18The applicant relies on the Divisional Court’s decision in this matter (Plante), as well as Scarlett v. Belair Insurance, 2015 ONSC 3635, and submits that the basic principle underlying the duty of procedural fairness is that parties affected by the decision should have the opportunity to present their case fully and fairly, know the case to be met, and have decisions affecting their rights, interests or privileges made using a fair, impartial and open process.

19The applicant argues that procedural fairness was breached in two instances during the hearing: (1) the adjudicator allowed the respondent to elicit a new expert opinion from its own expert through cross-examination, without providing notice to the applicant prior to the hearing; and (2) the adjudicator failed to provide notice prior to the hearing of the grounds upon which it determined the WPI rating for headaches.

The Tribunal did not breach procedural fairness by allowing the respondent to question its expert neurologist

20The applicant submits that on the first day of the hearing, the adjudicator allowed the respondent to call its expert neurologist, Dr. Dost, as a witness, and sought to cross-examine him on his CAT report despite Dr. Dost not being an adverse or hostile witness. The applicant argues that, contrary to paragraph [19] of the decision, there was no clear indication that the respondent was intending to cross-examine the expert and submits that the applicant should not have to “read between the lines” to know whether or not a respondent is intending to pursue cross-examination of its own witness. She submits that it was only during its questioning of the expert that the respondent presented its own biased interpretation of narrowly selected surveillance footage to support its allegations against her. She relies on Sherre Maas v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 1996 ONICDRG 173 and submits that it is trite law that an insurer must not rely selectively on reports that tend to support its position, but rather, it must consider the totality of the evidence available to it.

21In doing so, the applicant submits that the Tribunal allowed the respondent to obtain a de facto verbal addendum report. The respondent knew of Dr. Dost’s change of opinion prior to the hearing, yet it provided no notice to the applicant. The respondent also did not obtain a proper addendum report nor did it provide a revised evidence summary from Dr. Dost. This, the applicant argues, was a strategic decision for the purpose of creating a procedural and evidentiary advantage. Allowing the respondent to elicit a change of opinion at the hearing is, according to the applicant, “trial by ambush”.

22The respondent submits that it is well established that there is no property in a witness. The Court has found that an expert witness’s duty is to come to trial and give their evidence as directed by the judge: see Bortnikov v. Rakitova, 2015 ONSC 1163. It argues that Dr. Dost attended the hearing, provided his oral evidence and the Tribunal adopted a flexible, fair approach to the questioning. The expert witness was cross-examined and the parties were able to test his evidence which is in line with the Court’s decision regarding cross-examination in Plante. The respondent submits that it would have been a denial of procedural fairness to allow Dr. Dost’s report into evidence without cross-examination.

23I note that at the hearing, the applicant objected to Dr. Dost being called as a witness. The Tribunal concluded at paragraph [16] of the 2025 decision that this was a request to have Dr. Dost’s report stand on its own, without any further testimony. The Tribunal considered the written particulars (i.e., the respondent’s determination that the applicant did not sustain a CAT impairment) provided to the applicant prior to the hearing and found that the applicant had received a clear indication that the respondent intended to challenge Dr. Dost’s ratings for gait and incontinence.

24At the hearing, the applicant also sought relief to exclude the respondent’s written particulars (paragraphs [9] and [10]). The Tribunal considered the applicant’s request and found that the particulars were ordered pursuant to a Motion Order dated May 15, 2025. The Tribunal found that the document was created as a result of an order and that the applicant did not provide sufficient grounds to exclude the document.

25At paragraph [19] of the decision, the Tribunal notes that the written particulars included statements that the applicant’s post-accident gait and incontinence issues, as reported to Dr. Dost, were inconsistent with other evidence. The Tribunal found that this was a clear indication that the respondent intended to challenge Dr. Dost’s ratings for gait and incontinence. Therefore, it would be procedurally unfair to prevent a party from testing the evidence of an expert as this would infringe the party’s ability to present its case, to be heard, and to ensure an understanding of the evidence. It also noted that Dr. Dost was on the respondent’s final witness list properly filed 21 days before the hearing. The Tribunal concluded that the applicant had not provided a sufficient basis to exclude him from the hearing.

26On reconsideration, the applicant argues that the Tribunal should not have permitted the respondent to proceed directly to cross-examination of its expert witness. In support of her argument, she cites Sahedeo v. Pafco Insurance Company but did not provide the full citation of this decision.

27Courts have long recognized that administrative tribunals have a more flexible process when conducting its hearings and here, the applicant has not shown that there was a pattern of inappropriate questioning.

28The applicant also argues that the Tribunal allowed the respondent to elicit a new expert opinion of Dr. Dost through its “cross-examination” of the witness without any prior notice to her.

29I am not persuaded that Dr. Dost provided a new expert opinion nor am I persuaded that the applicant did not have notice of the issues to be raised by the respondent with respect to the expert’s ratings. As noted above, the Tribunal, through a Motion Order, ordered the respondent to provide, prior to the hearing, written particulars to explain why it did not agree that the applicant sustained a CAT impairment. Within these written particulars, the Tribunal found that the respondent provided information that it would be challenging Dr. Dost’s ratings for gait and incontinence. I agree with the Tribunal that the applicant had notice of the respondent’s intended challenges to Dr. Dost’s report.

30I also find that Dr. Dost’s testimony at the hearing did not result in a “new expert opinion” as suggested by the applicant. Rather, Dr. Dost reviewed the WPI ratings he provided for gait and incontinence, and, when the respondent put other evidence before him, Dr. Dost testified that the information was not brought to his attention and would have affected his ratings. I find there is nothing unfair with allowing commentary and discussion within the four corners of an expert’s report. To be unfair, the applicant would need to show that a completely new opinion was solicited and/or that the Tribunal’s reasoning disregarded the four corners of the report. That is not the case here.

31Furthermore, section 44 of the Schedule states that an insurer may require an insured person to be examined by a health professional. The language of the Schedule is permissive (i.e., “may”) and it does not require the respondent to provide an additional report as the applicant submits. The respondent was not required to provide an addendum report prepared by Dr. Dost.

32In summary, on this argument, I find that the Tribunal did not breach procedural fairness. It was appropriate to allow the expert to testify at the hearing, the expert responded to questions posed by both parties and within the four corners of his report, there was no requirement that the respondent obtain an addendum report prior to the hearing, and the respondent provided notice to the applicant of the issues in Dr. Dost’s report it intended to challenge.

The Tribunal did not breach procedural fairness by rejecting the expert’s 5% WPI rating for headaches

33The applicant submits that she was denied procedural fairness because the Tribunal failed to provide notice upon which grounds it was determining the WPI ratings under Criterion 7. More specifically, the applicant submits that the Tribunal rejected Dr. Dost’s 5% WPI rating for headaches as it found that the expert had not identified which section in the Guides he used in calculating this rating. The applicant qualified this issue as a “technicality”. The WPI rating for headaches was never raised by either of the parties, and, as a result, the parties were not given an opportunity to address it at the hearing. The applicant argues that this is a breach of one’s right to be heard and is contrary to the Rules, caselaw and the principles of natural justice.

34The respondent submits that the Tribunal can accept or reject WPI ratings proffered by an expert and is not limited to selecting one set of expert findings over another: see Liu v. 1226071 Ontario Inc. (Canadian Zhorong Trading Ltd.), 2009 ONCA 571. The respondent argues that the applicant chose to rely on Dr. Dost’s report, solely, to ground her claim for a CAT determination. She chose not to call witnesses. She was given the same latitude to question Dr. Dost and test his findings. The respondent argues that it was open to the adjudicator to weigh the evidence (including Dr. Dost’s finding) and to weigh the WPI rating provided for headaches. It was not a violation of procedural fairness or a violation of the audi alteram partem (“hear the other side”) rule for the Tribunal to assign no weight to Dr. Dost’s headache rating: see Canada Post Corporation v. Public Service Alliance of Canada, 2019 ONSC 3676. As the parties were given a fair opportunity to present evidence and make submissions, both parties received procedural fairness.

35I find that there was no breach of procedural fairness regarding the applicant’s argument that the Tribunal did not provide the parties notice of the grounds upon which it would be determining the WPI ratings under Criterion 7, more specifically, the WPI rating provided for headaches. It is not the Tribunal’s obligation to prove or make the applicant’s case for her. The applicant relied on the WPI ratings provided by Dr. Dost to show that she was CAT impaired under Criterion 7. In doing so, the burden of proof is on her to satisfy the Tribunal that the ratings were appropriate and supported by the medical evidence. Being a CAT matter, the ratings provided must be supported by means of the Guides. The Tribunal found at paragraph [39] that the 5% rating could not be relied upon because it was not possible to understand how it was formulated. The applicant had the opportunity to further question Dr. Dost on his 5% rating but did not do so.

36Regarding the applicant’s further argument that the Tribunal erred by rejecting Dr. Dost’s 5% rating for headaches, at the hearing, the applicant argued that the Tribunal could not render independent WPI ratings separate from the ratings made by experts because Tribunal members are not specially trained medical experts in CAT. She argued that the only decision to be made by an adjudicator is whether to accept the rating of one expert over another. In the 2025 decision, the Tribunal disagreed and found at paragraph [25] that under section 280 of the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, the Tribunal has the authority to resolve disputes between the parties. In doing so, it must consider and weigh the evidence within the legislative framework. This is an adjudicative function that does not require specialized medical training.

37I find that it was within the Tribunal’s discretion to not accept Dr. Dost’s rating for headaches at face value. Pursuant to Paesano v. Coseco Insurance Co., 2025 ONSC 3245 at paras. 60-61; leave to appeal refused December 17, 2025 (COA-25-OM-0230) – a decision released on June 2, 2025 which neither party submitted but which I am bound by – I find that the Tribunal rejected Dr. Dost’s WPI% for headaches because it was not supported by the Guides. This is a reasonable finding based on the expert’s report. And, as per Dooman v. TD Insurance Co., 2025 ONSC 184 (at para. 36), another decision which I am bound by, while an adjudicator is obliged to consider all the evidence before them, they are not required to accept all of the medical expert’s evidence merely because there is no contrary expert evidence. The Tribunal is entitled to reach its own conclusion on whether the WPI rating for headaches is appropriate as part of its fact-finding function.

38In summary, I am not satisfied that the applicant has shown procedural fairness was breached or that there was an error of fact or law in the Tribunal’s determination for its rating for headaches.

The Tribunal did not commit an error of fact or law pursuant to Rule 18.2(b)

39Regarding Rule 18.2(b), the applicant makes the following arguments:

i. The Tribunal erred in relying on written particulars as proof that the respondent provided notice of its clear intentions at the hearing;

ii. The Tribunal misapprehended evidence regarding incontinence and rejected Dr. Dost’s WPI rating;

iii. The Tribunal misapprehended the evidence/issue before him regarding the rate applicable to registered psychotherapists; and

iv. The Tribunal erred by allowing the respondent to rely upon a previous decision of the Tribunal in this matter that was ultimately set aside by the Court on appeal due to fundamental breaches of procedural fairness.

40The reconsideration process is not an invitation for the Tribunal to reweigh evidence, nor is it an opportunity for a party to relitigate its position where it disagrees with the decision or where it failed to meet its burden at first instance. Put another way, the reconsideration process is not a venue to relitigate the same arguments in hopes of a different conclusion. Rather, to merit a reconsideration under Rule 18.2(b), a party must first establish a factual or legal error, and then it must show how remedying the error would have likely resulted in a different outcome. Only after these two steps have been met will the Tribunal consider whether it is appropriate to use the discretionary powers under Rule 18 to overturn the important principle of finality.

41The applicant relies on Burton v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 910 (“Burton”) and submits that the caselaw distinguishes between a challenge to the sufficiency or weight of evidence supporting a finding of fact (which does not give rise to an error of law) and an error in principle made in the course of the fact-finding exercise (which can give rise to an error of law). In the latter case, the applicant submits that the question is whether the findings of fact are unreasonable in the sense that the Tribunal erred in principle by disregarding, overlooking or mischaracterizing evidence material to its findings of fact.

Written particulars

42As discussed above, at the outset of the hearing, the applicant sought relief to exclude the respondent’s written particulars. The Tribunal noted that prior to the hearing, the applicant had filed a motion requesting a new case conference. The Tribunal Motion Order, dated May 15, 2025, denied the request for a new case conference but ordered the respondent to provide the applicant with particulars of its determination that she is not CAT. In its 2025 decision, the Tribunal reiterated its finding made at the hearing that it cannot strike documents simply because they are not evidence; there must be a reason to justify this action. The Tribunal found that the applicant had not identified any concerns or prejudice with the particulars and denied the applicant’s request.

43The applicant submits that the Tribunal erred when it allowed written particulars to be submitted. She argues that these particulars “were replete with the finding of the Court that set aside the decision.” More specifically, the applicant submits that the Tribunal erred in relying on those written particulars as proof that the respondent provided notice of its intentions for the hearing and argues that the opposite is true. These written particulars stated that the respondent’s denial was based on res judicata, and it made repeated reference to the findings of the quashed decision. The applicant notes that it was only during its opening statement at the hearing that the respondent withdrew its preliminary issue of res judicata. The applicant also submits that the particulars included the respondent’s own biased interpretation of narrowly selected evidence to support their allegations against the applicant. She submits that this does not qualify as notice that the respondent’s expert’s opinion is or will be changed.

44In my view, the applicant is attempting to re-litigate its objection to the admission of the respondent’s written particulars. The Tribunal denied the applicant’s objection at the hearing and provided its reasons. As discussed in the section above of this reconsideration decision, the written particulars were provided following an order of the Tribunal and included the respondent’s challenges to Dr. Dost’s ratings for gait and incontinence. The applicant submits that the written particulars also included the respondent’s arguments regarding res judicata, which, she argues, relied on references to the decision that was set aside by the Court. However, as she notes, the issue of res judicata was withdrawn by the respondent at the outset of the hearing and thus, the Tribunal did not consider these arguments nor any references to the 2023 decision. I find the applicant has not shown that the Tribunal committed an error of fact or law in doing so.

Incontinence

45The applicant submits that the Tribunal misapprehended the evidence when considering her rating for incontinence. She argues that Dr. Dost admitted that even if she wore diapers before the accident, a post-accident exacerbation in urgency (i.e., ability to make it to the washroom in time) was relevant and rateable, and he therefore awarded a combined WPI rating of 4% for incontinence. She adds that Dr. Dost made reference to the applicant’s incontinence before the accident, and he admitted that cerebral palsy is associated with incontinence.

46The applicant submits that it was clear that she continued to be able to use a toilet based on the respondent’s CAT occupational therapy report who witnessed her at her home for several hours. There was clear and accepted evidence of increased pain, as well as psychological and mobility changes arising from the accident. This was linked to an exacerbation of incontinence. Dr. Dost had all the relevant documents, including the occupational therapist’s copy and pasted pre-populated forms, and all of the respondent’s CAT reports. Both, in his report and during the hearing, Dr. Dost found that with all the evidence before him, the applicant’s accepted physical changes since the accident supported a minimum 4% rating for incontinence.

47In my view, the applicant is attempting to re-litigate this issue as well. At paragraphs [27] to [38], the Tribunal grappled with the evidence the applicant points to in her reconsideration submissions, including Dr. Dost’s rating for incontinence and his reasons for providing his WPI rating for incontinence. The Tribunal further reviews the evidence of the occupational therapist and Dr. Dost’s viva voce response to this evidence, including the reference to a 4% WPI rating for post-accident exacerbation of incontinence and other medical evidence submitted at the hearing.

48The Tribunal found that the evidence did not support a 10% WPI or a 4% WPI for incontinence. At paragraph [34] of the 2025 decision, the Tribunal considered Dr. Dost’s testimony that he would give no rating for incontinence if there was no post-accident change to the applicant’s issues with incontinence. The Tribunal found at paragraph [36] that, based on an occupational therapist report, there was no meaningful difference pre- and post-accident. “As the impairment did not get worse after the accident, there is no basis to rate incontinence as an accident-related impairment.” I see no reason to amend the adjudicator’s finding and find that the applicant has not shown any error in fact or law in the circumstances, pursuant to Rule 18.2(b).

49The applicant submits that the Tribunal misapprehended the evidence before him regarding the hourly rate applicable to registered psychotherapists. The only issue before the Tribunal was whether a registered psychotherapist is entitled to be paid at the same rate as psychologists. She argues that the Tribunal conflated the issue and proceeded to conduct an in-depth examination of the credentials of the social worker who completed the treatment plan, despite the evidence clearly indicating that a registered psychotherapist would be providing the psychological services in the treatment plan, including a letter from the clinic itself stating that fact. It is not for the Tribunal, on its own accord, to assume that the insurer is somehow being misled.

50At paragraphs [45] and [46] of the 2025 decision, the Tribunal found that the partial denial of the treatment plan in question was based on the hourly rate of the service provider. The Tribunal found that the health professional who completed the plan was not a psychotherapist but rather a social worker and it therefore denied the portion of the treatment plan claimed. I do not find that the Tribunal committed an error of fact or law in reaching its conclusion.

Reliance on the 2023 decision

51At the outset of the hearing, the applicant brought forward a motion to exclude the 2023 decision from the hearing. The Tribunal found that the decision was not evidence and therefore could not be entered into evidence and weighed in the manner suggested by the applicant. The Tribunal allowed the decision to be submitted as caselaw.

52The applicant submits that the Tribunal erred by allowing the respondent to rely upon and refer to the 2023 decision. She argues that caselaw is clear (Burton) that setting aside a decision – as the Court did in this case – has the effect of extinguishing the decision for all purposes and renders the decision void ab initio. Accordingly, it was an error for the Tribunal to allow the respondent to continually refer back to this decision, and the findings contained therein, both in its written particulars prior to the hearing and throughout the hearing itself to support its position on the issues in dispute.

53Regarding the applicant’s argument that the respondent referenced the 2023 decision in its written particulars, as noted above, the respondent withdrew its grounds for res judicata at the outset of the hearing. I therefore find that no reference to the 2023 decision was made or considered by the Tribunal regarding the written submissions as it relates to res judicata.

54Regarding the applicant’s allegation that the respondent “continually” referred back to this decision, the applicant has not provided any information to show the respondent did so or how these references influenced the Tribunal’s decision.

55I note, however, that at paragraphs [54] to [56] of the 2025 decision, the respondent appears to be referring to the 2023 decision in his submissions regarding the applicant’s claim for an award. Here, the Tribunal found that the respondent was not liable to pay an award to the applicant.

56Pursuant to Rule 18.2(b), the applicant must show how remedying the error would have likely resulted in a different substantive outcome. An award under section 10 of Regulation 664 may be payable where the respondent unreasonably withheld or delayed payment of a benefit. Here, the Tribunal found that no benefits were payable to the applicant. Therefore, even if the respondent’s references to the 2023 decision were considered in the context of an award, this would not have changed the outcome of the Tribunal’s decision as no award was payable since no benefits were payable.

57In summary, I find that the applicant has not shown how any of her grounds under Rule 18.2(b) have been met. Not only were most of these arguments addressed in the decision, there is no persuasive explanation for why the applicant believes the factual findings and legal interpretations in the decision are incorrect. The Tribunal is mandated to make factual and legal determinations based on the evidence and legislation before it, and a disagreement with these conclusions will not – in and of itself – be enough to merit a reconsideration.

58For all the above reasons, I find the applicant has not established any grounds for reconsideration. As such, the applicant’s reconsideration request is dismissed.

CONCLUSION & ORDER

59The applicant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.

Trina Morissette

Vice-Chair