Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18349/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while in contravention of a condition under s. 55.1(1)2 of the Act

Between:

Teresa Rotondo

Appellant

And

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

PANEL:

Laura Hodgson Steve Clarke

For the Appellant:

Teresa Rotondo, Self-represented Martina Rotondo, daughter of appellant

For the Respondent:

Leila Pereira, Representative

HEARD: By Teleconference Thursday, March 26, 2026

1Teresa Rotondo, (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of their motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Saturday, February 7, 2026. At the time of the impoundment, Michael Rotondo (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded and that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issues in dispute are:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(a) of the Act, whether the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded;

ii. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below the Registrar is ordered to release the impounded vehicle.

ANALYSIS

5For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The vehicle was stolen

6We are satisfied that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded.

7In Marshall v. Ontario (Registrar of Motor Vehicles) [2002] O.J. No. 745 (Div. Ct.) (“Marshall”) the Divisional Court held that a vehicle is “stolen” in this context “when it is taken without the owner’s consent and when the perpetrator intends to deprive the owner of it, whether permanently or temporarily”.

8In other words, in order to establish that the vehicle was stolen for the purposes of s. 50.2(3)(a) of the Act, the appellant must prove that the vehicle was taken without the owner’s consent, and that the driver intended to deprive the owner of the vehicle, either permanently or temporarily.

9The appellant testified that she is a senior who, in the last year, has had a stroke and lost her husband. Her adult son, the driver of the impounded vehicle, lives with her. She testified that she was aware her son’s license was suspended and has told him not to drive the vehicle. She testified that when her husband was alive, he was the only driver - her son was not permitted to drive the vehicle and is not on the insurance. The appellant stated that her son has not asked to borrow the car since her husband died but, later in her testimony, acknowledged that he has taken it a few times without her permission.

10The appellant testified that she keeps the vehicle’s two sets of keys in her purse and agreed that her son knew they were kept there. On the night of the impoundment, the appellant’s purse was in her bedroom closet where she was sleeping. Her son entered her room and took the keys and some money from her purse without her knowledge. The appellant only learned the vehicle had been taken the next day when she awoke and the car was gone. She testified that it was a shock. She was then contacted by police. Initially the appellant indicated that her son was charged with theft of her vehicle. It was later clarified that he was charged with driving while under suspension. The appellant testified that police asked her if she wanted her son to be charged for taking her vehicle and she said she did not. The appellant acknowledged that when she learned her vehicle was taken, she did not think that it would not be returned to her.

11It is the respondent’s position that the appellant has not established the vehicle was stolen because there was a pattern of the appellant’s son taking her keys and she should have taken additional steps to have prevented this. The respondent submitted that, the keys’ location should have been rotated, suggesting for example, that they could be kept under the appellant’s pillow or in a lock box. Lastly, the respondent submits that intent to deprive the appellant of use of the vehicle was not established because the appellant testified that she did not believe that that car would not be retuned to her.

12We find that the appellant has established that the motor vehicle was stolen at the time it was impounded. We believe the appellant had told her son that he was not to drive her vehicle and did not consent to him taking it. We recognize that there was evidence that the appellant’s son had previously taken the vehicle without permission and that he knew the keys were in appellant’s purse. There was no evidence that it was common knowledge that the purse and keys were in the appellant’s bedroom closet. We disagree that the appellant was required to rotate her keys or have a safe box for it to be established the keys were taken without her consent. There was no reason for the appellant to expect her son would enter her room, while she was sleeping, and take keys and money from her purse in the closet. There was no direct or implied consent. Further, it was established that in taking her car that night, the appellant’s son intended to temporarily deprive the appellant of her vehicle. We find this is consistent with the definition of stolen highlighted by the court in Marshall.

13Given the above, we find on a balance of probabilities that the driver took the appellant’s vehicle without consent, or permission, with the intent of depriving the appellant of it on a temporary basis. The vehicle was released to the appellant on March 24, 2026. As confirmed by the Registrar at the hearing, the practical effect of the Tribunal’s order that the vehicle ‘be released’ is that the Registrar reimburses towing and impound charges paid by the appellant to recover her vehicle.

14Because we have found that the vehicle is to be released on this ground, we need not determine whether exceptional hardship was established.

Conclusion

15We find that:

i. the appellant has established that the motor vehicle was stolen at the time it was impounded;

ORDER

16The Tribunal Orders that the Registrar shall release the impounded vehicle.

Released: April 8, 2026

__________________________

L.Hodgson

Adjudicator