Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18393/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while in contravention of a condition under s. 55.1(1)2 of the Act

Between:

Audrey Jacobs

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATORS:

Steve Clarke

Laura Hodgson

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Audrey Jacobs, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Martin He, Agent

HEARD by Teleconference: March 26, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Audrey Jacobs, (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of her motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Saturday, February 21, 2026. At the time of the impoundment, Z.J. (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

3As the appellant was one day late in the filing of her Notice of Appeal (NOA), she filed a Notice of Motion to extend time to appeal. The motion and merits hearing were heard together.

ISSUES

4The issues in dispute are:

i. Should the motion to extend the time to appeal be granted?

ii. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

5We grant the motion for an extension of time to file an appeal. We found that the justice of this case is served by granting an extension.

6For the reasons set out below the Registrar is ordered to release the impounded vehicle.

ANALYSIS

The motion to extend the time to appeal is granted

7The appellant’s vehicle was detained on February 21, 2026. The NOA is dated March 8, 2026, but was filed on March 9, 2026, at 5:41 pm. The statutory appeal period of 15-days ended on March 8, 2026.

8An appeal of an impoundment under s. 50.2 of the Act must be commenced within 15 days (Ontario Regulation 631/98). However, the Tribunal has the discretion pursuant to s. 7 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 12, Sch. G (the “LAT Act”), to extend the time for filing after the 15 days where there are “reasonable grounds for applying for the extension and for granting relief.”

9In determining whether to grant an extension of time under s. 7 of the LAT Act, the Tribunal generally weighs four factors to determine whether the justice of the case requires granting the extension. The four factors are set out by the Divisional Court in Manuel v. Registrar, 2012 ONSC 1492 (Div. Ct.) at paras. 13 – 17 and 40:

• The existence of a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period;

• The length of the delay;

• Prejudice to the other party; and

• The merits of the appeal.

10No single factor is determinative, and the “justice of the case” is the overriding consideration. The onus is on the appellant to establish that there are reasonable grounds for granting an extension.

11We find, based on the appellant’s testimony, she had a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period.

12The appellant’s son was driving her vehicle at the time of the impoundment, and she was not present. She was made aware of the impoundment the following day. She testified that she did not receive a Notice of Impoundment and, was unaware she could appeal the impoundment. The appellant only became aware of the possibility of an appeal, from a friend, on March 7, 2026. She testified that she spent time on the weekend of March 7 and 8th researching her appeal options. She made several efforts to contact the Tribunal and eventually received a link to the appeal forms midday on Monday March 9th. In the process of submitting her NOA on that date her computer mouse froze, and she needed someone to attend her house and give her technical assistance. She was able to file the NOA later that evening.

13The respondent stated the NOA was due on March 8th and was received on the March 9, at 5:41pm making it two days late. The respondent added that a Notice of Impoundment should have been sent by the Ministry, via regular mail, to the appellant, on February 21, 2026.

14We find that the appellant established that, within the appeal period, she turned her mind to appealing the impoundment and made inquiries. Due to computer issues beyond her control she was unable to file the NOA within the requisite appeal period. She had a bona fide intention to appeal within the 15-day period.

15We also considered the length of the delay of the appeal and the potential prejudice to the respondent. As the NOA was due on Sunday March 8, 2026, in accordance with rule 5.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“The Rules”), the NOA was due on the next day which was not a holiday – Monday, March 9, 2026. As the NOA was received at the Tribunal after five pm on March 9, 2026, in accordance with Rule 6.5 of the Rules, it was deemed to have been received on March 10, 2026. We find, in the circumstances here, a delay of one day is not significant. The respondent made no submissions with respect to prejudice and we find there wasn’t any. In fact, we find that there would be prejudice to the applicant if the extension is not granted.

16As set out below we find there is merit to the appeal warranting release

17As there was a bona fide intention to appeal during the appeal period, there was no demonstrated prejudice to the respondent, the delay of the time to appeal was minimal and there is merit to the appeal, we find the justice of the case requires that the extension request be granted.

The impoundment will cause exceptional hardship

18For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

19We are satisfied, on balance of probabilities, that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

20The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

The owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate, or adequately mitigate, any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

21If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

22The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

23We are satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

24The appellant testified that she had no alternative option to the impounded vehicle. While she owns another vehicle it is not currently operable. The appellant does not have family members who can easily assist her. She has a brother who is disabled, and she often assists him with his transportation needs. One son, the driver of the impounded car, lives with her. Another son lives an hour away and works shifts. He is not readily available to provide transportation.

25The appellant testified that there is no public transportation, in her area and that there is no local taxi service. She added, the last time she called a taxi it cost $75.00, as the taxi had to come from Dunnville. The appellant testified that she cannot afford a rental car. She noted that she receives disability benefits and is already facing the prospect of having to get a loan to pay the impoundment fee.

26The respondent asked the appellant if she was aware of a transportation service for seniors with special needs. The appellant responded that she was not aware of the service and wasn’t sure if she would even qualify.

27We find that the appellant has established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle. Taking a taxi and a rental vehicle are cost prohibitive given her limited income. Further, there is no evidence before us that the appellant qualifies for or that there is availability of the seniors’ transportation service highlighted by the respondent.

Threat to heath, safety, the environment or property

28We are satisfied that the impoundment will result in a threat to the health and safety of a person ordinarily transported by the vehicle.

29The appellant stated that she has recently had foot surgery and a knee replacement and that she requires follow-up medical appointments as a result. She testified that she is experiencing pain but has had to postpone scheduling a follow up with her surgeon because of the impoundment. Further, she has missed two medical appointments related to other health issues, as a result of not having available transportation.

30The respondent asked the appellant if she has access to groceries. She responded saying, that on occasion she does but, there are times where she must get groceries from a nearby gas station, due to the lack of transportation.

31We accept the appellant’s testimony and find she has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship, as that term is defined in the Regulation.

Conclusion

32We find that:

i. the appellant has established that she has no access to reasonable alternative transportation, and the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

33The Tribunal Orders that the Registrar shall release the impounded vehicle.