RECONSIDERATION DECISION
Before: Craig Mazerolle, Vice-Chair
Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17751/HTA
Case Name: Lakhwinder Singh v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Written Submissions by:
For the Appellant: Gurinder Multani, Paralegal
For the Respondent: Sidra Saeed, Articling Student
OVERVIEW
1On December 11, 2025, the appellant submitted a request for reconsideration with respect to the Tribunal’s decision dated December 4, 2025 (“order”).
2A teleconference hearing took place on December 1, 2025. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Tribunal confirmed the decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (“Registrar” / “respondent”) to suspend the appellant’s Class A driver’s licence. The Tribunal also dismissed the appellant’s motion to add the issue of the downgrade of his licence from a Class A(Z) to a Class G(Z).
3The grounds for a request for reconsideration are found in Rule 18.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“Rules”). To grant a request for reconsideration, the Tribunal must be satisfied that one or more of the following criteria are met:
a) The Tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction or committed a material breach of procedural fairness;
b) The Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made; or
c) There is evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it, and would likely have affected the result.
4The appellant is relying on all three criteria to support his request for reconsideration.
5He is seeking an order quashing the suspension and downgrade of his licence, as well as an order directing the Ministry of Transportation (“Ministry”) to remove certain entries from his driving record. In the alternative, the appellant asks for a re-hearing, with an order directing the Registrar and Ministry to provide disclosure.
6The respondent is asking the Tribunal to dismiss the appellant’s request.
RESULT
7The appellant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.
ANALYSIS
8The test for reconsideration under Rule 18.2 involves a high threshold. The reconsideration process is not an opportunity for a party to re-litigate its position where it disagrees with the Tribunal’s decision, or with the weight assigned to the evidence. The requestor—in this case, the appellant—must show how or why the decision falls into one of the categories in Rule 18.2.
9The appellant raises several grounds for reconsideration:
a. There have been several Class A licence cases released by the Tribunal that represent “a change in law and practice”;
b. The Tribunal erred in its determination about its jurisdiction concerning licence downgrades;
c. The Tribunal erred in its application of the civil standard of proof;
d. The Tribunal relied on “sparse OPP evidence”;
e. The Tribunal’s analysis of s. 47(1)(g) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (“Act”) was overbroad and failed to consider his “individual safety and livelihood”; and,
f. The Tribunal breached his right to procedural fairness in the manner that it dealt with disclosure.
10While the appellant checked off Rule 18.2(c) on his Request for Reconsideration form, none of the grounds he presented in his submissions invoke this criterion. As such, I have focused my analysis on Rule 18.2(a) and Rule 18.2(b).
Tribunal Case Law
11The appellant submits there has been a series of similar Class A licence cases that were not considered in the decision, e.g., Sekhon v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2025 ONLAT HTA 17763 (“Sekhon”) and Karan v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles and the Minister of Transportation, 2025 ONLAT HTA 17798 (“Karan”). According to the appellant, these cases “represent a clear change in the Tribunal’s law and practice” regarding suspensions and downgrades.
12Not only is it well-established that Tribunal cases are not binding, but a licence suspension based on “public safety” necessarily requires an individualized assessment of the facts. Each case must be decided on its own merits.
13Furthermore, there is no indication in the appellant’s reconsideration submissions that these cases were introduced during the hearing, even though both Sekhon and Karan were released several weeks before this hearing took place. Parties are expected to put their best foot forward during the initial hearing, as new arguments will rarely be considered on reconsideration.
14Taken together, I find there is neither a breach of procedural fairness nor an error made out on this ground.
Licence Downgrade Jurisdiction
15The Tribunal dismissed the appellant’s request to add his licence downgrade as an issue in dispute at paragraphs 12 – 13 and 17 – 19 of the decision:
The Registrar confirmed it was relying on s. 32(5)(b)(ii) of the Act for the downgrade.
The parties agree that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal under s. 32(5)(b)(ii).
Ontario Regulation 340/94 (“Regulation”) prescribes the kinds of decisions which may be appealed to the Tribunal and s. 25.1 states that a decision made by the Minister under s. 32(5)(b)(i) of the Act is a decision a person may appeal under s. 50 of the Act. There is no similar provision in the Regulation which specifically says that a decision made by the Minister pursuant to s. 32(5)(b)(ii) may be appealed under s. 50 of the Act.
I agree that a decision made pursuant to s. 32(5)(b)(ii) is not one which is appealable under s. 50(1) of the Act and is outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to determine.
I also do not find I have the authority to change the ground the Registrar is relying on for the suspension as it is different than varying a decision or order allowed under s. 50(2) of the Act.
16The appellant challenges this determination, claiming the Registrar’s downgrade letter is “substantively indistinguishable” from the letters used in cases like Karan. He argues that the “Tribunal should look to the substance of the Ministry’s decision, not just the subsection cited by the Registrar.” According to the appellant, this more holistic analysis would have allowed the Tribunal to find that this downgrade fell within the scope of safety concerns under s. 32(5)(b)(i), and, by extension, its jurisdiction under s. 50(1).
17I do not find the appellant has established a ground for reconsideration as it relates to the Tribunal’s refusal to add his licence downgrade as an issue to the appeal. The Regulation lays out the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to decide licence downgrade appeals. This jurisdiction does not extend to downgrades made under s. 32(5)(b)(ii). Though the appellant argues that the Tribunal has the authority to assess the substantive character of a downgrade to determine what part of the Act it better falls under, I have not been directed to any authorities to support this position. For instance, Karan involves a downgrade under s. 32(5)(b)(i).
18Further, I find changing the subsection that the Registrar used to support the downgrade would, in effect, require the Tribunal to usurp the role of the Legislature in defining what types of appeals fall within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The Regulation clearly excludes appeals for downgrades made under s. 32(5)(b)(ii). Therefore, allowing the Tribunal to change a downgrade under s. 32(5)(b)(ii) to a downgrade under s. 32(5)(b)(i) would, in effect, render this exclusion in the Regulation meaningless.
Application of the Legal Test to the Registrar’s Evidence
19Turning to the appellant’s grounds involving the evidence and legal test used to assess his appeal, I find these grounds are, in effect, attempts to have the Tribunal re-weigh evidence that was considered at first instance.
20First, the appellant argues that, while it articulated the correct legal standard, the Tribunal, in effect, used a lower threshold of “reasonable grounds to believe” to uphold his suspension. Citing cases like Karan, the appellant submits that the kind of evidence used to uphold his suspension was found to be insufficient in other cases. Overall, the appellant challenges the Tribunal’s decision by claiming that it did not apply the correct civil standard of proof from F.H. v. McDougall, 2008 SCC 53.
21The appellant appears to take issue with the following wording in paragraph 41 of the decision (emphasis added):
I accept the Registrar’s position that on a balance of probabilities, the evidence presented establishes there are reasonable grounds to believe fraud was involved in the appellant obtaining his Class A driver’s licence, including his name and licence in the Registrar’s evidence regarding the scheme. Therefore, I find the road test results are unreliable which rise to potential issues with public safety as the appellant has not been properly road tested.
22The term “reasonable grounds to believe” is a lower standard of proof than the requirement under s. 47(1)(g) for the Registrar to establish, on a balance of probabilities, “any other sufficient reason” for the suspension. However, I do not find this single instance of awkward wording is enough to trigger reconsideration. In my view, this alleged error is akin to the “line-by-line treasure hunt for error” that the Supreme Court of Canada cautioned against in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 (“Vavilov”), at paragraph 102 (citations removed):
To be reasonable, a decision must be based on reasoning that is both rational and logical. It follows that a failure in this respect may lead a reviewing court to conclude that a decision must be set aside. Reasonableness review is not a “line-by-line treasure hunt for error”. However, the reviewing court must be able to trace the decision maker’s reasoning without encountering any fatal flaws in its overarching logic, and it must be satisfied that “there is [a] line of analysis within the given reasons that could reasonably lead the tribunal from the evidence before it to the conclusion at which it arrived”.
23Rather, when the decision is read as a whole, I am satisfied that the Tribunal established it understood the correct standard of proof, and it concluded that the Registrar’s evidence met this standard. For instance, at paragraph 46, the Tribunal articulated the standard as follows: “I find that the Registrar has satisfied its burden to establish sufficient reason to suspend the appellant’s licence…”.
24In a similar vein, the appellant challenges the Tribunal’s reliance on what he describes as “sparse hearsay evidence”. According to the appellant, his case is “materially the same” as other appeals where drivers successfully overturned their suspensions. As such, the appellant claims the Tribunal has not adequately grappled with these “same deficiencies” in line with the guidance from Vavilov.
25The appellant raised several arguments during the hearing to challenge the Registrar’s evidence. The Tribunal summarized this part of his case at paragraphs 38 and 39:
The appellant argues that the documents from the OPP is not reliable, especially since the list of names of people involved has not been included and that the Registrar cannot rely on evidence that has not gone through court.
In addition, the appellant submits that there is no “sufficient reason” established as per s. 47(1)(g) as no chat messages are in evidence, no evidence of money being involved, no OPP officer present and no bank records and therefore no evidence tying the appellant to the scheme.
26The Tribunal addressed the submission about how this evidence “has not gone through court” at paragraph 43, finding the alleged need for court involvement “runs counter to the intent of [the Registrar’s] authority to suspend or cancel driver’s licences under s. 47(1) for public safety.” The Tribunal did not explicitly address the appellant’s other arguments about the lack of chat messages, bank records, etc., but, again, these arguments were expressly detailed in paragraphs 38 and 39.
27Though the Tribunal is not expected to address every argument put forward during a hearing, decision-makers must show they were attuned to the key aspects of the parties’ cases. This requirement follows the guidance from Vavilov, namely, the need for a “line of analysis within the given reasons that could reasonably lead the tribunal from the evidence before it to the conclusion”. In this case, I am satisfied that, despite the absence of an explicit ruling on some of these arguments, the Tribunal’s reasons establish a “line of analysis” that shows how it connected the relevant evidence to the legal test. Briefly, the Tribunal concluded that the Registrar’s evidence provided reasonable grounds to question the reliability of the appellant’s road test.
28Furthermore, the Tribunal explained how this analytical framework allowed it to conclude the Registrar had established a “sufficient reason” for the suspension—reasons that linked the parties’ key arguments and evidence to the conclusion. Overall, I find the appellant has not shown how the Tribunal erred or acted unfairly, because, while concise, its reasons are sufficient pursuant to Vavilov. Specifically, these reasons allowed me to conduct my review, as they adequately grappled with the key issues at hand.
29Finally, regarding the application of s. 47(1)(g), the appellant claims the Tribunal applied an overbroad interpretation of the “general safety concern” under this provision, as it gave little to no weight to his training, testing, and driving history. According to the appellant, this approach not only appears to have “mechanically” accepted the evidence from the OPP, but, once again, it runs counter to the analysis the Tribunal used in cases like Karan.
30The reconsideration process is not an opportunity for a party to re-litigate its position where it disagrees with the weight assigned to the evidence. Though the appellant may claim that other pieces of evidence should have been incorporated into its assessment, the Tribunal is empowered to consider the records at hand and issue a decision based on its weighing of this evidence. This assessment was explained in the decision at paragraphs 40 – 44.
31It is not enough to disagree with the outcome of a decision, but rather a party requesting reconsideration must show how the Tribunal erred in its assessment of the evidence. The appellant has not met this onus.
32I also again note that, while the appellant points to cases where similar sets of facts resulted in different outcomes, Tribunal case law is not binding. These determinations are highly fact-specific, so they must be made based on the specific set of facts at hand.
33The appellant has not established grounds for reconsideration with respect to the application of the legal test to the Registrar’s evidence.
Disclosure and Procedural Fairness
34Finally, turning to its handling of disclosure, the appellant claims the Tribunal unfairly relied on a lack of testimony from the OPP to find “the OPP’s investigative opinion as conclusive proof of fraud”. The appellant claims this approach differed from how disclosure was treated in another licence suspension case, i.e., Sharma v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2025 ONLAT HTA 17760.
35Beyond the fact that the evidentiary approach taken by one adjudicator is not binding on another, the appellant has not shown how the Tribunal’s handling of disclosure in this dispute materially breached his right to procedural fairness. Though the appellant may claim it was unfair for the Tribunal to rely on an allegedly incomplete record, he does not appear to have asked the Tribunal to order further disclosure from the Registrar.
36Parties are expected to put their best foot forward during the hearing. It is not appropriate to raise new procedural requests on reconsideration. By not asking for additional disclosure prior to, or during, the hearing, I find the appellant has not shown how the Tribunal’s reliance on the parties’ evidentiary record amounts to a material breach of procedural fairness.
37I do note that the appellant sent the Registrar a letter shortly before the hearing asking for certain disclosure. This letter was copied to the Tribunal. The letter stated that: “If the requested disclosure is not provided… please be advised that the Appellant will be seeking procedural remedies from the Tribunal”. Despite this comment falling under the header “Notice of potential motion”, there does not appear to have been a follow-up motion filed with the Tribunal seeking an order for these productions. There is also no reference to a request for productions in the appellant’s Notice of Motion that sought to add the licence downgrade as an issue in dispute.
38In sum, the appellant has not demonstrated how the Tribunal’s handling of disclosure provides any grounds for reconsideration.
CONCLUSION & ORDER
39The appellant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.
Craig Mazerolle
Vice-Chair
Released: March 27, 2026