Rajvir Singh v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2026 CanLII 29542

RECONSIDERATION DECISION

Before: Craig Mazerolle, Vice-Chair

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17614/HTA

Case Name: Rajvir Singh v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Written Submissions by:

For the Appellant: Gurinder Pal Multani, Paralegal

For the Respondent: Sidra Saeed, Articling Student

OVERVIEW

1On November 17, 2025, the appellant submitted a request for reconsideration with respect to the Tribunal’s amended order and decision dated October 30, 2025 (“decision”).

2A teleconference hearing took place on October 27, 2025. At the conclusion, the Tribunal confirmed the decision from the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (“Registrar” / “respondent”) to suspend the appellant’s Class A driver’s licence, pursuant to s. 47(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (“Act”). The Tribunal also decided it would not address the appellant’s licence downgrade from Class A(Z) to Class G(Z).

3The grounds for a request for reconsideration are found in Rule 18.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“Rules”). To grant a request for reconsideration, the Tribunal must be satisfied that one or more of the following criteria are met:

a) The Tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction or committed a material breach of procedural fairness;

b) The Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made; or

c) There is evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it, and would likely have affected the result.

4The appellant is relying on all three criteria to support his request for reconsideration.

5He is asking the Tribunal to set aside the suspension and the downgrade. He is further asking for all notations about the suspension and downgrade to be removed from his driving record. In the alternative, the appellant asks the Tribunal to set the matter down for a rehearing (with directions on certain issues).

6The respondent is asking the Tribunal to dismiss the appellant’s request.

RESULT

7The appellant’s request for reconsideration is granted.

8Pursuant to Rule 18.4, the decision is cancelled, save for the confidentiality order.

9A teleconference rehearing will be held before a new adjudicator.

PROCEDURAL ISSUE – PAGE LIMIT

10As noted in the order that the Tribunal released on December 1, 2025:

Rule 18.1 also states that the submissions in support of a reconsideration request must not exceed ten (10) double-spaced pages in length, exclusive of evidence and authorities. The appellant’s submissions are fourteen (14) pages in length, and, therefore, exceed the submissions page limit. It is at the discretion of the adjudicator hearing the request for reconsideration whether to consider submissions that exceed the prescribed page limits.

11Despite this breach, I do not find these additional pages had any bearing on my review of the appellant’s request. Rather, the submissions concerning the ground for reconsideration that I have detailed below are all found before the 10-page mark. As such, I see no prejudice facing the respondent from this breach, nor do I find there is any procedural order I need to now issue in relation to these additional pages.

ANALYSIS

12The test for reconsideration under Rule 18.2 involves a high threshold. The reconsideration process is not an opportunity for a party to re-litigate its position where it disagrees with the Tribunal’s decision, or with the weight assigned to the evidence. The requestor—in this case, the appellant—must show how or why the decision falls into one of the categories in Rule 18.2.

13The appellant raises several grounds for reconsideration. However, since I have found he was successful on his ground concerning mootness (and this finding about mootness formed the core of the decision under review), there is no need to consider the other grounds in the request.

Rule 18.2(c) – New Evidence

14The 90-day suspension of the appellant’s Class A licence started on September 4, 2025. Prior to the end of this 90-day period, the suspension was converted to a downgrade on October 14, 2025, i.e., just under two weeks before the hearing.

15The Tribunal addressed this timeline (and the appellant’s response) at paragraphs 8 – 10 of the decision:

The Registrar submitted that the appellant was advised by letter dated October 10, 2025, that the suspension period of his driver’s licence had changed and that effective October 14, 2025 the suspension “will come to an end and your Ontario Class A(Z) driver’s licence will be downgraded to Class G(Z)”. The Registrar submits that, as the suspension has ended, the issue of the suspension is now moot.

The appellant also submitted that as the suspension is now over, the issue regarding the suspension is moot and they will no longer be pursuing this issue in their appeal.

As the suspension in dispute has ended, and as the appellant no longer wishes to pursue this issue, I find that the issue of the suspension of the appellant’s Class A driver’s licence to be moot. Therefore, the suspension of the appellant’s Class A driver’s, such suspension being from September 4, 2025 to October 14, 2025, is confirmed.

16The appellant challenges this ruling by arguing that there are ongoing impacts resulting from his now lapsed suspension, namely, his employment prospects are impacted and his insurance premiums have increased. He also claims this finding diverges from the Supreme Court of Canada’s guidance in Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General), 1989 CanLII 123 (SCC), as well as similar Class A licence cases, e.g., Karan v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles and the Minister of Transportation, 2025 ONLAT HTA 17798 (“Karan”).

17The appellant argues that this ground engages both Rule 18.2(b) and Rule 18.2(c). For the following reasons, I find the appellant has established a ground for reconsideration based on Rule 18.2(c).

18To trigger Rule 18.2(c), the requesting party must establish three elements:

i. There is “evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision”;

ii. This evidence “could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it”; and,

iii. This evidence “would likely have affected the result”.

19First, as the appellant notes in his supporting submissions, the increase in his insurance premiums and the impacts on his employment prospects both “post-date the Decision”. Proof of these post-decision events includes a letter from an employer (dated November 10, 2025) that states the appellant’s “suspension notation renders him ineligible to drive or be insured under the company’s fleet insurance policy”. He also filed an insurance quote from Certas Direct Insurance Company (produced November 10, 2025) that shows an increase in his premiums compared to a previous quote from CAA Insurance Company (dated February 6, 2024). Considering when these documents were produced, I am satisfied that they constitute “evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision”.

20Next, I find this evidence could not have been obtained previously. As the quotation above notes, the suspension ended shortly before the hearing. This change led the appellant to conclude there was no need for him to continue contesting the suspension. As such, he told the Tribunal during the hearing that he was no longer pursuing the suspension appeal, and the Tribunal, in turn, confirmed the suspension in its decision released on October 30, 2025.

21Subsequently, the appellant received information about his employment prospects and insurance premiums that accounted for this new set of circumstances. At that point, the appellant realized that the ongoing notations on his driving record had these continuing, negative impacts.

22Considering this timeline, I am satisfied that the appellant could not have reasonably understood the full impact of the suspension lapsing, yet remaining on his driving record, until after the decision to confirm this suspension was released.

23Finally, I am satisfied that this evidence would likely have affected the outcome of the decision. The appellant has pointed me to another Tribunal case where the impact of a suspension notation on one’s driving record was sufficient to conclude that the suspension appeal was not moot: see Karan at paragraphs 5 – 7:

The Registrar submitted that the matter of the suspension of the appellant’s Class A licence is moot, as the suspension of the Appellant’s driver’s licence ended on October 14, 2025. [This hearing took place on November 12, 2025.]

The Appellant submitted that the suspension of his driver’s [sic] Class A driver’s licence is not moot as the suspension, although ended, will continue to appear on his driving record unless the suspension is set aside by the Tribunal. This prejudices the Appellant’s employment opportunities in the future.

I agree with the Appellant in this regard. The suspension of the Appellant’s Class A driver’s licence continues to be in issue as it does affect his driving record with the MTO.

24It is well-established that Tribunal cases are not binding, such that an adjudicator’s procedural choices in one matter do not have to mirror the choices made in another case with a similar set of facts. However, considering the similar, negative impacts on both appellants from these driving record notations, I find that, if the Tribunal had reviewed the new evidence now on hand, it would likely have triggered the same concerns about mootness as noted in Karan.

25While the respondent accepts that there is new evidence, it argues “this evidence would not have likely affected the result of the Tribunal’s decision.” Specifically, the respondent argues the Tribunal heard the parties’ evidence “and was not convinced that [the appellant’s] driving privilege should be reinstated.” Overall, the respondent claims the appellant is trying to re-argue his position from the hearing, an improper use of the reconsideration process.

26I do not agree. Though the adjudicator correctly assessed the appeal in light of the available evidence and arguments at the time (including the appellant’s choice not to proceed with his appeal), I accept that these new, post-decision developments would likely have impacted the Tribunal’s finding that the suspension appeal was moot.

27In a similar vein, I do not accept the respondent’s argument that this request for reconsideration is, in effect, an attempt to re-argue the case the appellant made at first instance. Rather, I am satisfied that this new evidence could not have been presented by the appellant during the hearing, and this evidence needs to now be assessed by the Tribunal.

28Taken together, the appellant has established a ground for reconsideration based on Rule 18.2(c). As noted above, since the appellant has established this ground, I do not find there is any need to assess his other arguments.

Rule 18.4 – Cancelling the Decision

29Due to the fact that there is new evidence at play (as well as the fact that the Tribunal did not engage in a fulsome analysis of the suspension at first instance), I find the only appropriate remedy under Rule 18.4 is to cancel most of the decision and order a rehearing. A rehearing is required to allow the parties the chance to fairly litigate this new evidence.

30However, to preserve the interests noted by the Registrar in paragraph 4 of the decision, I am confirming the confidentiality order granted during the hearing. The appellant did not object to this order during the hearing, nor did he take issue with it in his reconsideration request.

31This rehearing will take place before a new adjudicator.

32For clarity, since the decision is being cancelled (save for the confidentiality order), the Tribunal’s decision not to add the issue of the downgrade to the appeal has also been quashed. If the appellant would like to proceed with his request to add this issue to his appeal, he shall serve and file a Notice of Motion in accordance with Rule 15. This motion shall be served and filed no later than 10 days prior to the start of the rehearing.

33If a rehearing was ordered, the appellant asked the Tribunal to issue “directions respecting mootness, downgrade jurisdiction, the [F.H. v. McDougall, 2008 SCC 53] standard of proof, and the applicable administrative law principles” from a series of other Supreme Court cases.

34I do not see a need to issue these directions, as they may be seen as limits on the discretion of the new adjudicator to rehear this appeal. It is also open to the parties to present submissions at the rehearing on how they believe these topics should be addressed. As such, I am satisfied that no further guidance is needed at this juncture.

CONCLUSION & ORDER

35The appellant’s request for reconsideration is granted.

36Pursuant to Rule 18.4, the decision is cancelled, save for the confidentiality order.

37A teleconference rehearing will be held before a new adjudicator. The Tribunal shall schedule the rehearing to take place within 45 days of the release of this reconsideration decision.

38If the appellant would like to proceed with his request to add the licence downgrade issue to his appeal, he shall serve and file a Notice of Motion in accordance with Rule 15. This motion shall be served and filed no later than 10 days prior to the start of the rehearing.

39I am not seized.

Craig Mazerolle

Vice-Chair