Manav Rallay v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2026 CanLII 29539

RECONSIDERATION DECISION

Before: Craig Mazerolle, Vice-Chair

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17617/HTA

Case Name: Manav Rallay v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Written Submissions by:

For the Appellant: Gurinder Pal Multani, Paralegal

For the Respondent: No submissions received

OVERVIEW

1On December 4, 2025, the appellant submitted a request for reconsideration with respect to the Tribunal’s decision dated November 19, 2025 (“decision”).

2A teleconference hearing took place on October 28, 2025. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Tribunal confirmed the decision from the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (“Registrar” / “respondent”) to suspend the appellant’s Class A driver’s licence.

3The grounds for a request for reconsideration are found in Rule 18.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“Rules”). To grant a request for reconsideration, the Tribunal must be satisfied that one or more of the following criteria are met:

a) The Tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction or committed a material breach of procedural fairness;

b) The Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made; or

c) There is evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it, and would likely have affected the result.

4The appellant is relying on all three criteria to support his request for reconsideration. He is seeking an order quashing the suspension and downgrade from Class A(Z) to Class G(Z) of his licence, as well as an order directing the Ministry of Transportation to remove certain entries from his driving record. In the alternative, the appellant asks the Tribunal to set the matter down for a re-hearing, with an order directing “fuller disclosure” of certain investigative material.

5The respondent was provided with an opportunity to provide responding submissions. No submissions were received by the respondent in accordance with the deadline set out by the Tribunal.

RESULT

6The appellant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.

ANALYSIS

7The test for reconsideration under Rule 18.2 involves a high threshold. The reconsideration process is not an opportunity for a party to re-litigate its position where it disagrees with the Tribunal’s decision, or with the weight assigned to the evidence. The requestor—in this case, the appellant—must show how or why the decision falls into one of the categories in Rule 18.2.

8The appellant raises several grounds for reconsideration:

a. There have been several Class A licence cases released by the Tribunal following this present decision that represent “new law”;

b. The Tribunal failed to address his licence downgrade;

c. The Tribunal applied the incorrect standard of proof;

d. The Tribunal improperly relied on “sparse, hearsay police evidence”, all the while failing to “grapple with evidentiary gaps”;

e. The Tribunal did not “meaningfully consider” the appellant’s “training, driving record, innocence, and the impact of the decision”;

f. The Tribunal used an overly broad interpretation of “any other sufficient reason” in s. 47(1)(g) of the Act; and,

g. The appellant’s right to procedural fairness was impaired by incomplete disclosure of “the full underlying investigative record”.

9While the appellant checked off Rule 18.2(c) on his Request for Reconsideration form, none of the grounds he presented in his supporting submissions appear to invoke this criterion. As such, I have focused my analysis on Rule 18.2(a) and Rule 18.2(b).

New Tribunal Case Law

10The appellant submits there has been a series of similar Class A licence cases released following his hearing, e.g., Sekhon v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2025 ONLAT HTA 17763 and Karan v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles and the Minister of Transportation, 2025 ONLAT HTA 17798 (“Karan”). According to the appellant, these cases are not only “new law”, but they share “the same or very similar” disclosure to the present matter. Therefore, the appellant takes issue with how the outcome of his case was different from these other, more recent cases.

11It is well-established that Tribunal cases are not binding, such that an adjudicator’s choice to depart from non-binding case law will rarely be a successful ground for reconsideration. This is especially true if the cases were released following the disposition of another matter.

12Additionally, considering the nature of the Act is focused of ensuring public safety (as noted in the decision), I recognize that these kinds of suspension cases require an individualized assessment of the facts. Put another way, the broad scope of the public safety mandate means it is difficult to see why cases with similar sets of facts will necessarily lead to the same result, as each case must be decided on its own merits.

No Reference to the Licence Downgrade in the Decision

13As noted by the appellant, there is no reference to his licence downgrade from Class A(Z) to Class G(Z) in the decision. The appellant claims there is significant overlap between the suspension and the downgrade, e.g., the October 10, 2025 letter that initiated the downgrade specifically referenced the Class A testing process. As such, by failing to exercise its jurisdiction over these downgrades, the appellant argues the Tribunal breached his right to procedural fairness as it “did not resolve a live, expressly appealable issue” with the same practical effect as his licence suspension.

14I do not find the appellant has established a ground for reconsideration as it relates to the Tribunal’s lack of engagement with the downgrade. Nowhere in the decision or in the appellant’s reconsideration submissions is there any indication that he asked to have this issue added to the dispute. Though the appellant may claim that the downgrade is necessarily connected to the suspension, I do not agree. Rather, if the appellant wanted to have this issue addressed, it was necessary for him to put both the Tribunal and the respondent on notice, namely, through a Notice of Motion or an oral request at the hearing. Without any evidence to show that such a request was made, the appellant has not shown how the Tribunal breached his right to procedural fairness or acted outside of its jurisdiction.

15The appellant cites Karan as a case where a licence downgrade was addressed. However, in addition to my comments above regarding the non-binding nature of Tribunal cases, I note that the appellant in Karan specifically asked (and was granted permission) to add the downgrade as an issue.

Standard of Proof and the Registrar’s Evidence

16Turning to the appellant’s next two grounds for reconsideration, i.e., the legal test used to assess his appeal and the weighing of the Registrar’s evidence, I find these grounds are, in effect, improper attempts to have the Tribunal re-weigh evidence that was considered at first instance.

17First, the appellant argues that, while it noted that the Registrar must prove there is “sufficient reason” for the suspension on a balance of probabilities, the Tribunal “implicitly” equated this correct standard with the lower threshold of “reasonable grounds to believe”. Overall, the appellant claims that the Tribunal did not apply the correct civil standard of proof from F.H. v. McDougall, 2008 SCC 53.

18I recognize that the term “reasonable grounds to believe” is a lower standard of proof than the requirement under s. 47(1)(g) for the Registrar to establish, on a balance of probabilities, “any other sufficient reason” for the suspension. However, I do not find the appellant has shown how or where in the decision the Tribunal “implicitly” equated these two standards. It is the appellant’s onus to show that a ground for reconsideration has been made out, and he has not done so.

19Moreover, though it did not explicitly use the term “balance of probabilities”, I am satisfied that—when the decision is read as a whole—the Tribunal clearly understood the correct standard of proof, and it applied this standard to the Registrar’s evidence. I see no error or unfairness with this approach.

20In a similar vein, the appellant challenges the Tribunal’s reliance on what he describes as “sparse, hearsay police evidence”. According to the appellant, the Tribunal’s conclusions were based on a weak evidentiary basis, e.g., there was no testimony from an OPP officer. Considering how similarly sparse records were seen as unconvincing in other suspension cases, the appellant claims the Tribunal did not adequately grapple with these “gaps in the evidence”.

21After detailing the evidence it received from the OPP at paragraph 13, the core of the Tribunal’s analysis of the suspension can be found at paragraphs 16 and 17:

The evidence presented in the letters from the OPP satisfy me that the road test undertaken by the appellant was tainted by a bribery scheme and was inadequate to provide satisfactory evidence of the appellant’s ability to drive a commercial vehicle safely. The facts set out by the OPP in their letters was uncontradicted by any other evidence at the hearing and sets out that the driver examiner who was taking bribes for providing favourable test results was sent the appellant’s driver’s licence and was the appellant’s examiner for the road test. This was the system used by the persons complicit in the bribery scheme and there was no other explanation offered for this having occurred involving the appellant.

I do not find that the appellant participated in this transaction or that he knew anything about it, but I accept that the testing process is one of the primary methods by which the Registrar can be satisfied that the appellant will drive a motor vehicle safely and that the appellant’s testing process cannot provide that assurance because of the impugned transaction.

22The Tribunal is not expected to address every argument and piece of evidence put forward during a hearing, but rather it must show it was attuned to the key aspects of the parties’ cases. This requirement follows the guidance from Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 (“Vavilov”), namely, the need at paragraph 102 for a “line of analysis within the given reasons that could reasonably lead the tribunal from the evidence before it to the conclusion at which it arrived”.

23Reviewing the decision in this light, I am satisfied that there is a “line of analysis” that allows me to trace the Tribunal’s assessment of the evidence to the conclusion. Briefly, it found there was sufficient evidence to show that the testing the appellant used to receive his Class A licence was “tainted”, such that the Registrar had a sufficient reason to suspend his licence. The appellant may believe that there was insufficient information about the OPP investigation available to the Tribunal to reach this conclusion, but this complaint is better understood as a disagreement with the outcome, not a legal or factual error.

Consideration of the Appellant’s Personal Circumstances

24In a similar vein to these arguments about the Registrar’s evidence, I find the appellant’s complaint about the Tribunal’s assessment of his “training, driving record, innocence, and the impact of the decision” is another disagreement with the outcome. Though I accept his position that a high level of fairness is owed to individuals when their livelihoods are at stake (e.g., Baker v. Canada [Minister of Citizenship and Immigration], 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817), the appellant has not shown how the Tribunal erred or acted unfairly in its handling of this part of his case.

25In paragraphs 14 and 15 of the decision, the Tribunal considered most of these arguments:

The appellant says that there is no evidence that the appellant was involved in the improper transaction. The appellant argued that at this point there is no final conclusion of the investigation and no allegation against the appellant. He argues that the Registrar’s conclusions that the appellant was involved in the bribery scheme amounts to speculation and that the appellant is being penalized for something that the Registrar is currently unable to prove.

The appellant points out that he has a clean driving record with no history of accidents and that he has satisfied all of the MTO’s requirements to obtain a Class A licence. The driving test is in the full control of the MTO and the appellant should not be penalized for the MTO’s failure to conduct the driving test properly.

26Once again, disagreement with the outcome is not sufficient to trigger reconsideration under Rule 18.2. Therefore, while he may believe that the Tribunal dismissed his concerns about his driving record, training, etc. in a “brief paragraph”, I am still satisfied that these factors played a role in the analysis.

27I note that there is no explicit reference to “the impact of the decision” in the Tribunal’s reasons. However, aside from there being no requirement for a decision-maker to list every argument made by the parties, I am not satisfied that the appellant has shown how the explicit consideration of this one, additional factor would likely have impacted the outcome. A number of other personal factors were weighed in the case, and yet the suspension was confirmed.

Interpretation of s. 47(1)(g) of the Act

28The appellant challenges the Tribunal’s interpretation of the term “any other sufficient reason” in s. 47(1)(g) of the Act, claiming it improperly treated “suspected irregularities in the testing process, attributable to third parties, as sufficient”. According to the appellant, allowing such a broad interpretation to stand would effectively allow the Registrar to suspend a licence “in the name of safety in every case”.

29I do not agree. Not only is the term “any other sufficient reason” broad in scope, but the extensive nature of this provision makes sense in light of the public safety mandate of the Act. I also note that the appellant has not pointed to any legal authorities that support his narrow interpretation of s. 47(1)(g). Taken together, I find this argument is another attempt to challenge the outcome of the decision.

Disclosure and Procedural Fairness

30Finally, the appellant claims the Tribunal unfairly required him to defend against the Registrar’s position, even though there was incomplete disclosure of the underlying investigation materials. The appellant accepts that this case involves a criminal matter, but he contends that the underlying principles from R. v. Stinchcombe, 1991 CanLII 45 (SCC) (“Stinchcombe”), namely, the importance of full disclosure when an investigation has taken place, should apply here.

31The appellant does not draw the Tribunal’s attention to any Notice of Motion he filed seeking further disclosure from the Registrar, nor is there any indication in the decision that such a request was made during the hearing. Parties are expected to put their best foot forward during the hearing, and it is not appropriate to raise new procedural requests on reconsideration. By not asking for additional document disclosure prior to, or during, the hearing, I find the appellant has not shown how the Tribunal’s reliance on the evidentiary record presented by the parties amounts to a material breach of procedural fairness.

32I further note that, and the appellant himself concedes, Stinchcombe addresses the disclosure obligations of the Crown in a criminal proceeding. Though I accept the premise that more fulsome document exchange often leads to more effective adjudication, there is no Stinchcombe-type obligation for document disclosure at the Tribunal. Rather, if a party is seeking a document from another party, there are avenues to obtain this relief through Rule 9 of the Tribunal’s Rules.

33Overall, I find the appellant has not demonstrated that the Tribunal materially breached his right to procedural fairness in how it addressed disclosure from the Registrar.

CONCLUSION & ORDER

34The appellant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.

Craig Mazerolle

Vice-Chair