Prabhjot Singh Dhami v. Minister of Transportation and Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2026 CanLII 29538

RECONSIDERATION DECISION

Before: Craig Mazerolle, Vice-Chair

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17628/HTA

Case Name: Prabhjot Singh Dhami v. Minister of Transportation and Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Written Submissions by:

For the Appellant: Gurinder Pal Multani, Paralegal

For the Respondent: No submissions received

OVERVIEW

1On December 2, 2025, the appellant submitted a request for reconsideration with respect to the Tribunal’s decision dated November 24, 2025 (“order”).

2A teleconference hearing took place on October 29, 2025. At the conclusion, the Tribunal confirmed the decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (“Registrar” / “respondent”) to suspend the appellant’s Class A driver’s licence based on s. 47(1)(g) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (“Act”). The Tribunal also confirmed the Registrar’s downgrade of his licence from a Class A(Z) to a Class G(Z), pursuant to s. 32(5)(b)(i) of the Act.

3The grounds for a request for reconsideration are found in Rule 18.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“Rules”). To grant a request for reconsideration, the Tribunal must be satisfied that one or more of the following criteria are met:

a) The Tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction or committed a material breach of procedural fairness;

b) The Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made; or

c) There is evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it, and would likely have affected the result.

4The appellant is relying on all three criteria to support his request for reconsideration. He is seeking an order quashing the suspension and downgrade of his licence. In the alternative, the appellant asks for a re-hearing, with an order directing the Registrar and Minister of Transportation to provide disclosure of “all underlying investigative materials” and to have “Any OPP officer relied upon attend for questioning”.

5The respondent was provided an opportunity to file responding submissions. The Tribunal has not received any submissions from the respondent to date.

RESULT

6The appellant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.

ANALYSIS

7The test for reconsideration under Rule 18.2 involves a high threshold. The reconsideration process is not an opportunity for a party to re-litigate its position where it disagrees with the Tribunal’s decision, or with the weight assigned to the evidence. The requestor—in this case, the appellant—must show how or why the decision falls into one of the categories in Rule 18.2.

8The appellant raises several grounds for reconsideration:

a. There have been several Class A licence cases released by the Tribunal since the hearing—cases that had the same evidentiary record, yet a different outcome;

b. The Tribunal erred in its application of the standard of proof;

c. The Tribunal relied on “Bare OPP Opinion Without Underlying Evidence”;

d. The Tribunal’s analysis of the licence suspension and downgrade failed to consider his driving record, livelihood, and possible immigration implications; and,

e. The Tribunal breached his right to procedural fairness by choosing to rely on the Registrar’s evidence without more fulsome disclosure.

9While the appellant checked off Rule 18.2(c) on his Request for Reconsideration form, none of the grounds he presented in his submissions invoke this criterion. As such, I have focused my analysis on Rule 18.2(a) and Rule 18.2(b).

New Tribunal Case Law

10The appellant submits a series of similar Class A licence cases were released after the hearing, i.e., Sekhon v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2025 ONLAT HTA 17763 (“Sekhon”) and Karan v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles and the Minister of Transportation, 2025 ONLAT HTA 17798 (“Karan”). According to the appellant, these cases involved the same investigative evidence that was used in his file, yet the results were different—a result that runs counter to the guidance from Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 (“Vavilov”).

11Not only is it well-established that Tribunal cases are not binding, but a licence suspension based on “public safety” necessarily requires an individualized assessment of the facts. Each case must be decided on its own merits.

12Furthermore, I note that both Sekhon and Karan were released several weeks after the hearing took place. The appellant accepts that these cases were not available during the hearing, but he contends that they were both released on November 12, 2025, i.e., prior to the issuance of the Tribunal’s written reasons for his case on November 24, 2025.

13Despite the fact that Sekhon and Karan were released prior to the release of the written reasons for his case, I note that they were not available when the Tribunal first decided to confirm the suspension and downgrade of the appellant’s licence in the order it released on November 3, 2025. These written reasons provided an explanation for the Tribunal’s order to confirm the suspension and downgrade, so it was not open to the Tribunal to reverse these determinations through its written reasons. When considering this timeline, I see no breach of procedural fairness or inconsistency in the Tribunal’s approach to Sekhon and Karan.

Application of the Legal Test and the Registrar’s Evidence

14Turning to the appellant’s grounds involving the legal test and evidence that was used to assess his appeal, I find these grounds are, in effect, attempts to have the Tribunal re-weigh evidence that was considered at first instance.

15First, the appellant argues that the Tribunal used the lower threshold of “reasonable grounds to believe” to uphold his suspension. Citing cases like Karan, the appellant submits that the proper standard is a balance of probabilities.

16I accept that the term “reasonable grounds to believe” is a lower standard of proof than the standard required under s. 47(1)(g) of the Act, i.e., the Registrar must establish, on a balance of probabilities, “any other sufficient reason” for the suspension. However, the appellant does not direct my attention to any specific part of the decision where the Tribunal swapped out the balance of probabilities for a lower standard of proof. Rather, I note that the Tribunal both detailed and applied the correct legal standard to the suspension at paragraphs 32 and 33 of the decision:

I accept the Registrar’s position that on a balance of probabilities, the evidence presented establishes there are reasonable grounds to believe fraud was involved in the appellant obtaining his Class A driver’s licence. Therefore, I find the road test results are unreliable which rise to potential issues with public safety as the appellant has not been properly road tested.

The Registrar is no longer alleging that the appellant was directly complicit in the fraud, but simply that the driving test examiner and the school were. I do not make a finding on if the appellant was complicit in the fraud, but only that on a balance of probabilities, there was fraud involved in the obtention of his Class A licence and that therefore the result of the practical test are not reliable.

17A similar line of analysis was used to confirm the licence downgrade at paragraphs 45 – 47.

18When the decision is read as a whole, I am satisfied that the Tribunal understood and applied the correct standard of proof. I am further satisfied that, while the appellant has the onus on reconsideration, he has not pointed to any specific areas in the decision where the incorrect legal standard was applied.

19In a similar vein, the appellant challenges the Tribunal’s reliance on what he describes as a “scarce” and “insufficient” evidentiary basis to uphold the Registrar’s conclusions. According to the appellant, his case has the “same evidentiary pattern” as Karan, yet the Tribunal in his matter does not address the evidentiary “gaps”. Overall, when applying the standard from Vavilov, the appellant argues the Tribunal used an “internally defective” line of reasoning.

20I do not accept this ground. At paragraph 30 of the decision, the Tribunal recognized the appellant’s concern that the investigative evidence being relied upon by the Registrar was “speculative”, but, in the end, it concluded that there was sufficient support for the suspension (and, by extension, the downgrade). Though the applicant may claim that more attention should have been paid to what he saw as “gaps” in the evidentiary record, this submission appears to be a request to re-litigate the parties’ arguments and re-weigh the evidence. As noted above, the reconsideration process is not a venue for asking the Tribunal to re-litigate evidence and arguments that were considered at first instance.

21Further, the Tribunal explained the chain of reasoning that allowed it to conclude the Registrar had established a “sufficient reason” for the suspension and the downgrade—reasons that linked the parties’ arguments and evidence to its conclusions. The appellant has not shown how the Tribunal erred or acted unfairly in this regard. Rather, I find its reasons are in accordance with the standard for reasonable decision-making from Vavilov. The decision allowed me to conduct my review, and the Tribunal adequately grappled with the key issues, arguments, and evidence at hand.

22The appellant has not established grounds for reconsideration with respect to the application of the legal test to the Registrar’s evidence.

Appellant’s Personal Characteristics and the Tribunal’s Analysis

23Next, turning to its application of s. 32(5)(b)(i) and s. 47(1)(g), the appellant claims the Tribunal should have conducted a “proper balancing of factors” that touched on his personal characteristics. Specifically, the appellant claims the Tribunal ignored his driving record, and did not consider his “livelihood, employment impact, or possible immigration consequences”.

24Once again, the reconsideration process is not an opportunity for a party to re-litigate its position where it disagrees with the weight assigned to the evidence. Though the appellant may claim that other factors should have been incorporated into its assessment, the Tribunal is empowered to consider the evidence and arguments at hand and issue a decision based on its assessment of the case.

25The Tribunal’s assessment of the suspension was explained in the decision at paragraphs 24 – 36, while the Tribunal addressed the downgrade at paragraphs 40 – 47. It is not enough to disagree with the outcome of a decision, but rather a party requesting reconsideration must show how the Tribunal erred in its assessment of the evidence. I find the appellant has not met this onus.

26I also note that, while there may not have been an extensive assessment of these personal factors in the decision, it is clear that the Tribunal was aware of the appellant’s arguments concerning his driving record, his employment, and his work permit (at paragraphs 28, 29, and 31):

The appellant denies the allegations that he was involved and states that he acted honestly and lawfully in the testing process.

The appellant explained that he initially enrolled in a training program and the school booked three road tests for him. He was unsuccessful in all three attempts. Due to repeated failures at the same test centre, he decided to change schools to attempt his road test at a different test centre. His road test was scheduled by his school and he successfully completed it in January 2023 at a different test centre and was issued a Class A licence.

He adds that he has a work permit based on his trucking licence and is not currently working. He has completed his vision and knowledge tests as required in the letter of October 10, 2025, but has yet to complete his practical tests. He is concerned of the impact of a suspension on his record.

27Again, these arguments may not have been explored at length. However, I am still satisfied that the appellant has not shown that the Tribunal failed to consider them at all. In sum, he has not met his onus under Rule 18.2 for this ground.

Disclosure of the Investigative Materials

28Finally, the appellant claims the Tribunal unfairly relied upon incomplete disclosure of the underlying investigation materials to reach its conclusions, and, by extension, required him to challenge key evidence that was not present. In addition to citing Supreme Court cases involving procedural fairness, the appellant contends that the underlying principles from the criminal law case, R. v. Stinchcombe, 1991 CanLII 45 (SCC) (“Stinchcombe”), applies. In particular, he believes “the disclosure logic of Stinchcombe (adapted to administrative law)” should apply.

29The appellant does not draw the Tribunal’s attention to any Notice of Motion he filed seeking further disclosure from the Registrar, nor is there any indication in the decision that such a request was made during the hearing. By not asking for additional document disclosure prior to, or during, the hearing, I find the appellant has not shown how the Tribunal’s reliance on the evidentiary record presented by the parties amounts to a material breach of procedural fairness.

30I further note that Stinchcombe addresses the disclosure obligations of the Crown in a criminal proceeding. Though I accept the premise that more fulsome document exchange often leads to more effective adjudication, there is no Stinchcombe-type obligation for document disclosure at the Tribunal. Rather, if a party is seeking a document from another party, there are avenues to obtain this relief through Rule 9 of the Tribunal’s Rules.

31Overall, I find the appellant has not demonstrated that the Tribunal materially breached his right to procedural fairness in how it addressed disclosure from the Registrar.

CONCLUSION & ORDER

32The appellant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.

Craig Mazerolle

Vice-Chair