Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 24-009259/AABS
In the matter of an application pursuant to subsection 280(2) of the Insurance Act, RSO 1990, c I.8, in relation to statutory accident benefits.
Between:
Maimoona Saeed
Applicant
and
Allstate Insurance Company of Canada
Respondent
DECISION
ADJUDICATOR:
Laura Goulet
APPEARANCES:
For the Applicant:
Michael Ferrante, Paralegal
For the Respondent:
Sophia Chaudri, Counsel
HEARD:
By way of written submissions
OVERVIEW
1Maimoona Saeed, the applicant, was involved in an automobile accident on August 23, 2023, and sought benefits pursuant to the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule – Effective September 1, 2010 (including amendments effective June 1, 2016) (the “Schedule”). The applicant was denied benefits by the respondent, Allstate Insurance Company of Canada, and applied to the Licence Appeal Tribunal – Automobile Accident Benefits Service (the “Tribunal”) for resolution of the dispute.
PRELIMINARY ISSUES
2The preliminary issues to be decided are:
i. Is the applicant barred from proceeding to a hearing for non-earner benefits (“NEBs”) because she failed to attend an insurer’s examination (“IE”) under s. 44 of the Schedule?
ii. Is the applicant barred from proceeding to a hearing for psychological services, issue [3]iii below, because she failed to attend an IE under s. 44 of the Schedule?
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
3The substantive issues in dispute are:
i. Are the applicant’s injuries predominantly minor as defined in s. 3 of the Schedule and therefore subject to treatment within the $3,500.00 Minor Injury Guideline (“MIG”) limit?
ii. Is the applicant entitled to a NEB of $185.00 per week from September 20, 2023, to ongoing?
iii. Is the applicant entitled to $4,204.32 for psychological services proposed by Downsview Healthcare (“Downsview”) in a treatment plan/OCF-18 (“plan”) submitted on January 5, 2024?
iv. Is the applicant entitled to physiotherapy treatment proposed by Physiomed Erin Mills as follows:
(a) $2,926.00 in a plan submitted on September 12, 2023?
(b) $3,006.00 in a plan submitted on January 10, 2024?
(c) $2,267.00 in a plan submitted on July 2, 2024?
v. Is the applicant entitled to $2,486.00 for a psychological assessment proposed by Downsview in a plan dated October 13, 2023?
vi. Is the applicant entitled to $2,486.00 for a chronic pain assessment proposed by Downsview in a plan dated April 26, 2024?
vii. Is the respondent liable to pay an award under s. 10 of Reg. 664 because it unreasonably withheld or delayed payments to the applicant?
viii. Is the applicant entitled to interest on any overdue payment of benefits?
RESULT
4The applicant is not barred from proceeding to a hearing for NEBs.
5The applicant’s injuries are predominantly minor as defined in s. 3 of the Schedule and therefore subject to treatment within the MIG.
6Since the applicant has not demonstrated that her accident-related impairments warrant removal from the MIG, it is not necessary to determine the reasonableness and necessity of the disputed treatment plans.
7The applicant is not entitled to an NEB.
8The respondent is not liable to pay an award.
9The applicant is not entitled to interest.
ANALYSIS
PRELIMINARY ISSUES
The applicant is not barred from proceeding to hearing for NEBs
10For the following reasons, I find that the applicant is not barred from proceeding to a hearing for NEBs.
11Section 44 of the Schedule provides that an insurer may require an insured person to be examined at an IE to assess entitlement to a benefit under the Schedule, but not more than is reasonably necessary. A proper notice under s. 44(5) must state the medical and any other reasons for the examination; whether the insured’s attendance is required at the IE; the name, title and designation of the assessor conducting the IE; and the date, time, and location of the assessment. The insurer shall make reasonable efforts to schedule the IE for a day, time and location that are convenient for the insured.
12Pursuant to section 55(1), an insured person shall not apply to the Tribunal if the insured has not complied with a s. 44 request.
13Section 55(2) allows the Tribunal to “permit an insured person to apply” despite a missed IE, and s. 55(3) allows the Tribunal to impose terms and conditions on this permission. The insured person has the onus to demonstrate that the circumstances merit the exercise of the Tribunal’s discretion to permit the application to proceed.
14The respondent submits that the applicant was provided notice to attend an IE addressing NEBs, the MIG, and the plan for psychological services in the amount of $4,204.32. On the basis that she failed to attend, the respondent argues that the applicant ought to be barred from proceeding with the application for a NEB, a determination that her injuries fall outside of the MIG, and the plan for psychological treatment.
15Whether the applicant is barred from proceeding with a determination that her injuries fall outside of the MIG is not an issue in dispute. I find that it would be procedurally unfair to the applicant to address this when it was raised for the first time in the respondent’s responding submissions. As such, I will not be addressing this issue. Further, the preliminary issue is only relevant to the psychological treatment plan if the applicant’s injuries are outside the MIG, unless the applicant raised a s. 38(8) issue with respect to the plan. Since I have found, below, that the applicant’s injuries fall within the MIG, and the applicant does not raise s. 38(8) of the Schedule, the preliminary issue regarding the treatment plan is moot. Accordingly, I will only address the preliminary issue as it relates to the NEBs.
16The respondent refers to its Explanation of Benefits (“EOB”) dated January 3, 2024, advising the applicant that, pursuant to the report of Dr. Yuri Marchuk dated December 27, 2023, she did not suffer from a complete inability to carry on a normal life. The EOB indicates that the applicant could perform her self-care tasks and mobility tasks independently, and there were no objective findings or evidence to substantiate a disability or any limitations or restrictions with respect to activities of normal life.
17The respondent submits that it is trite law that as information becomes available and requests are made for benefits, it is incumbent on an insurer to continue to adjust entitlement to the benefits sought.
18The respondent indicates that on January 8, 2024, following receipt from the applicant of the report of Dr. Jacqueline Brunshaw, psychologist, it requested an IE with psychologist Dr. Sharleen McDowall. The respondent submits that the IE was reasonable and necessary to address the NEB, and that the applicant was provided with appropriate notice, but remains in non-compliance. The respondent refers to its letter dated February 7, 2024, confirming that the applicant failed to attend her psychological assessment with Dr. McDowall scheduled for February 6, 2024, and submits that the applicant did not provide advance notice of her intention not to attend. The respondent also refers to its letter dated February 15, 2024, advising the applicant that the NEB would not be considered until she was compliant, and asking her to provide a written reasonable explanation for her nonattendance and dates and times of her availability. The respondent submits that the applicant did not provide a reasonable explanation or dates and times for her availability.
19The applicant submits that she attended an IE addressing both medical rehabilitation and NEBs on December 9, 2023, and the respondent denied the NEB. The applicant further submits that the respondent requested that she attend a subsequent IE on February 6, 2024 for the NEB that it had already denied. The applicant refers to an email dated January 10, 2024, advising the respondent that she would not attend another IE addressing the NEB, given that it was already denied, unless the respondent paid the NEB pending the outcome of the IE.
20The applicant refers to a second email dated February 2, 2024, advising the respondent that it did not reply to the previous email, therefore she would not be attending the examination because the NEB had already been denied and therefore it was not reasonable or necessary to address it again.
21The applicant further submits that the respondent cannot take the position that the original s. 44 assessment addressed the NEB from a physical perspective, and it now wished to do so from a psychological perspective, because the respondent had knowledge of the psychological component. The applicant points out that the OCF-3 dated August 26, 2023 recommended a psychological evaluation, and the respondent denied the plan for a psychological assessment by letter dated October 18, 2023. The applicant argues that the respondent had ample opportunity to address the psychological component during the December 9, 2023 assessment, but chose not to do so.
22The applicant also submits that the Schedule is not meant to allow the respondent to continually request the applicant to attend assessments for a benefit which the respondent has already denied.
23To determine whether the applicant has complied with s. 44 of the Schedule, I must first determine if she was required to attend the second IE. Since s. 44 allows an insurer to request an IE “not more than is reasonably necessary,” I must assess whether the second IE was reasonably necessary.
24Since IEs are inherently intrusive and constitute an invasion of individual privacy interests, I find that I must balance the respondent’s right to examine the applicant against the privacy interest of the applicant. In this case, we are dealing with a psychological assessment, which I find to be highly intrusive. As submitted by the applicant, the respondent was aware of her claim of psychological injuries based on the OCF-3, and the plan for a psychological assessment that had previously been proposed. The respondent had the opportunity to conduct a psychological assessment of the applicant during its first IE on December 9, 2023.
25The respondent submits that it requested its second IE following receipt of the psychological report of Dr. Brunshaw.
26I have compared the respondent’s Notice of Examination (“NOE”) dated October 18, 2023 for the first IE, as well as the respondent’s NOE dated January 8, 2024 for the second IE. I note that the reasons for the examination for both IEs are the same:
At this time we have no compelling medical evidence to support that you have sustained injuries which are not predominantly minor in nature as outlined above, or that you have a documented pre-existing medical condition that would prevent you from achieving maximum medical recovery under the MIG treatment protocol monetary limits. We believe the MIG applies and that the treatment proposed is not reasonable or necessary. We are therefore unable to accept this treatment plan as submitted. At this time we need to determine your initial entitlement for Non-Earner Benefit as per Disability Certificate (OCF-3), duration period is 9-12 weeks.
27There is nothing in the second NOE to suggest that the purpose of the IE is to evaluate the applicant’s psychological impairments. Based on the NOE, the second IE is proposed for the same reasons as the first IE, which was conducted only one month prior. In these circumstances, I find that the respondent has not established that there is a new condition that it needs to assess or that needs to be evaluated.
28Based on the evidence, I find that the second IE was not reasonably necessary pursuant to s. 44, and therefore the applicant did not refuse to comply with a valid s. 44 request.
29For these reasons, I find that the applicant is not barred from proceeding to a hearing for NEBs.
Applicability of the MIG
30Section18(1) of the Schedule provides that medical and rehabilitation benefits are limited to $3,500.00 if the insured sustains impairments that are predominantly a minor injury. Section 3(1) defines a “minor injury” as “one or more of a sprain, strain, whiplash associated disorder, contusion, abrasion, laceration or subluxation and includes any clinically associated sequelae to such an injury.”
31An insured may be removed from the MIG if they can establish that their accident-related injuries fall outside of the MIG or, under s. 18(2), that they have a documented pre-existing condition combined with compelling medical evidence stating that the condition precludes recovery if they are kept within the confines of the MIG. The Tribunal has also determined that chronic pain with functional impairment or a psychological condition may warrant removal from the MIG. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the applicant.
32The applicant generally submits that she should be removed from the MIG due to “the combination of her physical and psychological injuries.”
The applicant is not removed from the MIG because of her accident-related injuries
33The applicant has not met her onus to prove on a balance of probabilities that she should be removed from the MIG due to her accident-related injuries.
34The applicant refers to the following accident-related physical injuries from the clinical notes and records (“CNRs”) of her family physician, Dr. Jeffery Pereira, from August of 2023: pain in the neck, back, shoulders, AC joint, right elbow and wrist, right thigh and knee, chest, as well as nausea, and facial injuries (mild abrasion to nose and lips). Dr. Pereira’s CNRs from September 2023 also refer to the applicant’s reporting of anxiety, flashbacks and panic attacks caused by the accident. She was prescribed Cipralex.
35The applicant also refers to Physiomed CNRs between October and December 2023 indicating that she reported pain in the neck, bilateral shoulders, back, knees, right foot, left hip, right wrist, nose and lip, occasional headaches, and numbness in one of her toes. I note that there are also Physiomed CNRs from 2024 referring to the applicant’s “full bodyache” since the accident and other CNRs in 2024 where the applicant advised that she was having neck and lower back pain due to her desk job, while she was pregnant.
36In addition, the applicant refers to Downsview CNRs, where she reported panic attacks while driving and taking anxiety medicine to help her sleep (February of 2024), feelings of depression (March of 2024), and being engaged in cognitive behavioral therapy (April of 2024).
37The applicant also refers to the psychological assessment of Dr. Brunshaw, dated November 14, 2023, where the applicant reported emotional distress, anxiety and trauma, depressive symptoms all combined with functional limitations such as difficulty performing activities of daily living, avoiding pre-accident social and recreational activities, and the inability to perform job duties at her pre-accident efficiency. The applicant was diagnosed with adjustment disorder with anxiety, major depressive disorder, recurrent episode, and specific phobia, situational type (vehicular, moderate to severe vehicular).
38I place little weight on Dr. Brunshaw’s report or on the applicant’s reporting of psychological symptoms in the Downsview CNRs in February and March of 2024 for the following reasons.
39I note that Dr. Pereira’s CNRs contain the following references:
i. October 17, 2023: The applicant’s sleep and emotions had improved, and she was less anxious.
ii. November 1, 2023: The applicant was doing better, her mood was less labile, and she was emotionally more stable.
iii. January 4, 2024: The applicant reported being calmer, with improved mood and energy. Her sleep and appetite were good, and she was able to handle stressful situations better.
iv. March 5, 2024: The applicant’s depression was ongoing but stable. Her second marriage was rocky. There were stress issues at home. (There was no mention of the accident).
v. April 8, 2024: The applicant’s depression was better. She was more settled with her husband. Her mood, sleep, and anxiety had all improved and she wanted to cut down on her medication. (There was no mention of the accident.)
vi. May 7, 2024: The applicant was pregnant. Her depression was resolved, and she stopped taking Cipralex two weeks prior. (There was no mention of the accident.)
40I find that the applicant’s reporting to Dr. Brunshaw about her psychological symptoms on November 14, 2023 are inconsistent with her reporting to Dr. Pereira on October 17 and November 1, 2023, that her mood was improving. Further, as submitted by the respondent, Dr. Brunshaw’s report was prepared less than three months after the accident and does not reference the applicant’s significant improvement in relation to her prognosis.
41Further, I find that the applicant’s report of accident-related depression is not consistent. Although she reported anxiety, panic attacks, and flashbacks to Dr. Pereira in September of 2023, her reports of depression in March and April 2024 were in the context of marital issues. Although the applicant reported to Dr. Brunshaw that she had separated from her husband in August of 2023, as submitted by the respondent, there is no discussion in the report of the applicant’s familial relations as a cause of her anxiety. Similarly, there is no discussion in the report of the applicant’s familial relations as a cause of her depression.
42In addition, I note that Dr. Brunshaw diagnosed the applicant with specific phobia, situational type (vehicular, moderate to severe vehicular), based solely on self-reporting, despite the fact that the results of the applicant’s score on the Accident Fear Questionnaire was “below” the range of individuals identified as suffering from a specific phobia, which suggests that she was not experiencing symptoms of a specific phobia in terms of travelling-related fears.
43Further, I find that the applicant’s family doctor, who met regularly with the applicant after the accident, would be in the best position to gauge the applicant’s psychological condition. I place significant weight on Dr. Pereira’s CNRs, which indicate that the applicant’s psychological state improved steadily after October 2023, to the point of being resolved in May of 2024. After October of 2023, there is no indication in Dr. Pereira’s CNRs of any accident-related psychological complaints. Based on the evidence before me, I am not satisfied that she suffers from a psychological condition because of the accident that would remove her from the MIG.
44The applicant does not direct me to evidence with respect to any of her physical injuries that would justify a removal from the MIG. She does not make submissions or direct me to evidence about having a pre-existing condition combined with compelling medical evidence stating that the condition precludes recovery if she is kept in the MIG.
45The applicant makes submissions that she meets the criteria for a chronic pain assessment because her pain lasted more than three to six months post-accident and interferes with daily functioning or quality of life, which she indicates is supported throughout the CNRs of Dr. Pereira and Physiomed. However, the applicant does not point to specific examples in the CNRs, nor does the applicant make submissions that she suffers from chronic pain that would result in her removal from the MIG. Further, the applicant does not make submissions or direct me to evidence or a diagnosis of chronic pain or chronic pain syndrome.
46For these reasons, I find that the applicant has not met her onus to demonstrate on a balance of probabilities that she should be removed from the MIG due to her accident-related injuries. Accordingly, I find that the applicant’s injuries are predominantly minor as defined in s.3 of the Schedule and therefore subject to treatment within the MIG funding limit.
47As the applicant is in the MIG, it is unnecessary to consider the reasonableness and necessity of the treatment plans in dispute.
The applicant is not entitled to an NEB
48The applicant is not entitled to an NEB.
49Section 12(1) provides that an insurer shall pay an NEB to an insured person who sustains an impairment as a result of the accident, if the insured person suffers a complete inability to carry on a normal life as a result of and within 104 weeks after the accident. Section 3(7)(a) defines a “complete inability to carry on a normal life” as “an impairment that continuously prevents the person from engaging in substantially all of the activities in which the person ordinarily engaged before the accident.” The Court of Appeal set out the guiding principles for NEB entitlement in Heath v. Economical Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 ONCA 391 (“Heath”), which, generally, focuses on a comparison of the applicant’s pre- and post-accident activities.
50The applicant submits that she meets the criteria for an NEB on the basis that the collective clinical findings demonstrate that she has suffered a complete inability to carry on a normal life, directly related to the injuries sustained in the accident. The applicant further submits that she has not returned to pre-accident functioning in her home, social, or psychological roles. The applicant also argues that the evidence supports that she is unable to work at pre-accident efficiency, has withdrawn from social and family roles, demonstrates avoidance of household activities and driving, and has a loss of emotional regulation, sleep and concentration.
51I note that Dr. Brunshaw’s report addresses the applicant’s reporting of pre-accident and post-accident abilities:
i. The applicant had been making mistakes at work due to difficulties with focus, whereas before the accident she did not. She experienced accident-related pain and had to frequently switch between standing and sitting.
ii. She was having difficulty with housekeeping chores, such as cleaning the bathtub, dusting, changing bed sheets, making the bed, vacuuming and sweeping the floor, washing dishes, completing the laundry, and grocery shopping.
iii. She was having difficulty participating in pre-accident activities and hobbies such as going out with family to the shopping mall or out to eat.
iv. Prior to the accident, she had some disrupted sleep due to occasional nightmares of dangerous situations. After the accident, her sleep has worsened. She struggled to fall asleep, she tossed and turned, and she woke up throughout the night. As a result, she did not feel well rested in the morning, and her body tended to feel stiff.
v. Before the accident, she had a lot of energy and was generally able to engage in activities without difficulty. Since the accident, her energy level had decreased considerably and she was unable to do many of the activities that she used to, such as going out with family. She tried to spend time with her niece and nephew, but she now tired easily, and everything required significant effort.
vi. The applicant did not socialize as often as she did before the accident, when she used to go out with extended family. She now preferred to be around her parents and daughter and avoided extended family. Since the accident, she no longer went out with or visited her family and friends as often and she no longer attended social events.
52The respondent refers to the OCF-1, which indicates that the applicant returned to work after the accident at her full-time job as a passport officer on September 5, 2023.
53The respondent points out that the Court in Heath (at para. 50) held that to determine whether the claimant’s ability to continue engaging in substantially all their pre-accident activities has been affected to the required degree, all the pre-accident activities in which the claimant ordinarily engaged should be considered, with greater weight assigned to those activities which the claimant identifies as being important to their pre-accident life. The Court in Heath went on to hold that the phrase ‘continuously prevents” means that a claimant must prove “disability or incapacity of the requisite nature, extent or degree which is and remains uninterrupted.”
54The respondent submits that the applicant has failed to provide any evidence of the activities that have been affected by the accident and the weight to be assigned to each based on importance. The respondent further submits that the applicant failed to provide any evidence that “substantially all” of her pre-accident activities have been affected, particularly since after the accident she became pregnant at age forty-four, carried the pregnancy to full term, delivered a child without complication, and continued to perform housekeeping and caregiving chores as well as continued to work full time.
55The respondent refers to the applicant’s employment file, submitting that she continued to work full time, and there was no mention of any modification to her duties, hours, or pay. The respondent points out that her year end assessments are positive, with no reference to the accident, and that her November 5, 2024 assessment indicates that the applicant consistently completes all commitments in a timely manner, actively completes additional work, and ensures she provides assistance whenever she can. The assessment further indicates that she participates in weekend duty when required.
56The respondent further submits that the applicant has not provided any affidavit evidence or documentary evidence establishing that her soft tissue injuries have continuously prevented her from engaging in substantially all her pre-accident activities. The respondent also argues that Dr. Brunshaw’s November 16, 2023 report is flawed because there is no discussion of the applicant’s familial relations as a cause of her anxiety, her return-to-work full time without modification, or her role as a new mother.
57The respondent also relies on the s. 44 assessment conducted by Dr. Yuri Marchuk, Physiatrist, on December 9, 2023. Dr. Marchuk reviewed medical documentation, conducted an interview and a physical examination. Dr. Marchuk diagnosed the applicant with WAD II, lumbar musculoligamentous dysfunction, and thoracic and bilateral calf myofascial dysfunction. Dr. Marchuk concluded that there were no objective findings or evidence to substantiate a disability or any limitations or any restrictions with respect to the identified activities of normal life. Dr. Marchuk also opined that the applicant does not suffer a complete inability to carry on a normal life due to accident-related injuries.
58I am not persuaded by Dr. Brunshaw’s report as it relates to the applicant’s complete inability to carry on a normal life for the following reasons.
59Based on her assessment, Dr. Brunshaw opined that the applicant was unable to resume her pre-accident activities of normal life. I find that this is not consistent with the applicant’s reporting that she was “having difficulties” with certain tasks and that she reduced her participation in certain activities. I find that, in general, the applicant did not report being “completely” unable to do the tasks or the activities. Dr. Brunshaw also indicated that the applicant was depressed and anxious, which led to difficulty with sleep, a low energy level, cognitive difficulties, and she could not socialize as she used to. As indicated above, I find that the applicant’s reporting to Dr. Brunshaw is generally inconsistent with her reporting to Dr. Pereira on October 17 and November 1, 2023 that her mood was improving. Further, the applicant advised Dr. Brunshaw on November 16, 2023 that her sleep worsened after the accident, whereas she had reported to Dr. Pereira on October 17, 2023 that her sleep had improved.
60Dr. Brunshaw also opined that from a psychological and emotional standpoint, the applicant suffered a substantial inability to perform her pre-accident employment at her usual efficiency. Dr. Brunshaw pointed out that the applicant was making mistakes at work, she needed to alternate between standing and sitting which interfered with her ability to work as efficiently as usual, and her difficulties with concentration, memory, processing information, and decision-making abilities made it likely that she would be unable to perform her essential job tasks and duties as required. I find that this is inconsistent with the information in the applicant’s employment file, particularly her November 5, 2024 assessment, which indicates that she is a “positive employee that does exceptionally well in her role as a Passport Officer.” The assessment goes on to state that when she is on the counter, she processes a high volume of file intake, and she is dependable whenever she is assigned a task or responsibility.
61Further, aside from efficiency in the workplace, the fact that the applicant continues to work full time contradicts her submission that she has suffered a complete inability to carry on a normal life.
62I am not satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the evidence establishes that the applicant’s functionality is reduced to the point that she suffers a complete inability to carry on a normal life.
63For these reasons, I find that the applicant is not entitled to an NEB.
Interest
64Interest applies on the payment of any overdue benefits pursuant to s. 51 of the Schedule. Since there are no overdue payments, no interest is ordered.
Award
65The applicant sought an award under s. 10 of Reg. 664. Under s. 10, the Tribunal may grant an award of up to 50 per cent of the total benefits payable if it finds that an insurer unreasonably withheld or delayed the payment of benefits. To attract an award, the insurer’s conduct must be excessive, imprudent, stubborn, inflexible, unyielding, or immoderate.
66The applicant submits that the respondent should pay an award because the respondent served her with log notes past the deadline set out in the Case Conference Report and Order dated November 19, 2024, which was no later than forty-five days from the date of the case conference. The applicant points out that the respondent served the log notes on July 16, 2025, after her submissions were prepared and filed on July 15, 2025.
67The applicant does not address why she could not consider the log notes in the time between receiving them on July 16, 2025, and her filing of the reply submissions on August 8, 2025. In any event, the applicant does not make submissions with respect to how the late filing of the log notes resulted in the unreasonable withholding or delaying of the payment of benefits.
68The applicant also submits that the respondent did not respond to the applicant’s emails pertaining to the issue of re-instatement or removal of the NEB questions for its s. 44 assessment and the respondent did not re-schedule a psychological assessment addressing the denied psychological assessment and counselling, even after being advised that the applicant would attend such an assessment.
69I have not been directed to any correspondence indicating that the applicant advised she would attend the psychological assessment. Further, even if I had been directed to such correspondence, I decline to make an order for an award with respect to the respondent’s non-response to correspondence in relation to the NEB or the psychological assessment, since I have not found that the plan for psychological services or the NEB are payable. Since no benefits were unreasonably withheld or delayed, the applicant is not entitled to an award with respect to the NEB or the plan for psychological services.
70For these reasons, I find on a balance of probabilities that the applicant is not entitled to an award under Reg. 664.
ORDER
71For the above reasons, I find:
i. The applicant is not barred from proceeding to a hearing for NEBs.
ii. The applicant’s injuries are predominantly minor as defined in s. 3 of the Schedule and therefore subject to treatment within the MIG.
iii. Since the applicant has not demonstrated that her accident-related impairments warrant removal from the MIG, it is not necessary to determine the reasonableness and necessity of the disputed treatment plans.
iv. The applicant is not entitled to an NEB.
v. The respondent is not liable to pay an award.
vi. The applicant is not entitled to interest.
vii. The application is dismissed.
Released: March 20, 2026
Laura Goulet
Adjudicator