Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18241/MED

In the matter of an appeal under subsection 50(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”), from a decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to suspend a licence pursuant to Section 47(1) of the Act.

Between:

Tanner Sirois

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR: Dr. Kailey Minnings

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Zachary Nicholson, Paralegal

For the Respondent: Melissa Litrenta, Representative

HEARD by teleconference: February 27, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Tanner Sirois (the “appellant”) appeals from the decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (“Registrar” or “respondent”) to suspend his Class G licence under s. 47(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) after the Registrar received a report from a treating health care provider that the appellant suffers from a medical condition that may affect his ability to drive safely.

2The Registrar has the authority under s. 47(1)(g) of the Act to suspend or cancel a driver’s licence for any sufficient reason. Section 14(1)(a) of O. Reg. 340/94 under the Act (the “Regulation”) states that a holder of a driver’s licence must not suffer from any mental, emotional, nervous or physical condition or disability likely to significantly interfere with their ability to safely drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely. Under s. 14(2)(b) of the Regulation, the Minister of Transportation may require a driver to provide satisfactory evidence that they are able to drive safely.

3The Registrar takes the position that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely possible alcohol use disorder, that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive safely and that this provides sufficient reason to suspend his licence under s. 47(1)(g) of the Act.

4The appellant appeals the suspension under s. 50(1) of the Act. He denies that he suffers from possible alcohol use disorder and denies that he suffers from a medical condition which interferes with his ability to drive safely.

5Pursuant to section 50(2) of the Act, after a hearing the Tribunal may confirm, modify, or set aside the decision or order of the Registrar.

PRELIMINARY ISSUES

6The appellant seeks costs pursuant to Rule 19 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) Rules of Practice and Procedure (July 21, 2023) (the “Rules”). The appellant’s representative submits that in the appellant’s view, there was no basis for the suspension and there was no diagnosis of a medical condition, therefore the Registrar acted unreasonably by suspending the licence. The appellant seeks $1,000 for each of the original hearing date and the rescheduled hearing date for a total of $2,000.

7The Registrar disagrees that costs should be awarded to the appellant. The Registrar maintains that they acted reasonably and accordingly following the receipt of an unsolicited Medical Condition Report (“MCR”) by suspending the appellant’s licence in the interest of road safety. The Registrar submits that any disagreement with the contents of the MCR is a matter attributable to the physician who completed it, not with the Registrar.

8I am not satisfied that there is any basis to find that Registrar’s conduct has risen to the level of acting unreasonably, frivolously, vexatiously or in bad faith, as required by Rule 19 of the Rules to authorize a costs award.

9I decline to award costs to the appellant.

ISSUES

10The issue in this appeal is whether the appellant suffers from a medical condition that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.

11To resolve that issue, I will address the following questions:

i. Does the appellant suffer from possible alcohol use disorder?

ii. If so, is this likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely?

12The Registrar bears the burden of proving on a balance of probabilities that the answer to each of the above questions is “yes.”

RESULT

13Having considered all the evidence and submissions and for the reasons that follow, I find that the Registrar has satisfied its burden to establish that the appellant suffers from a medical condition that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely and I confirm the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.

ANALYSIS

Background

14On June 22, 2025, emergency room physician Dr. Biondi completed an MCR and sent it, unsolicited, to the Registrar.

15In response, the Registrar sent the appellant a letter dated June 23, 2025 indicating that his driver’s licence was suspended due to possible alcohol use disorder. The letter indicated that in order to be considered for reinstatement, the Registrar required a Substance Use Assessment (“SUA”) form to be completed by a treating physician or nurse practitioner, and, if the appellant’s healthcare practitioner confirms a diagnosis of severe alcohol use disorder, the Ministry will require confirmation that he has remained abstinent from alcohol for a period of one year. This period may be reduced to six months if his healthcare practitioner confirms that he has successfully completed an alcohol treatment program.

16Following review of emergency room clinical notes submitted by the appellant, the Registrar sent the appellant a subsequent letter dated February 20, 2026 indicating that the appellant’s licence remained suspended, and indicates that the reported condition is alcohol use disorder. The letter indicates that further information is required and again requests a completed SUA form.

17The respondent clarified at the onset of the hearing that, despite the February 20, 2026 letter indicating a reported medical condition of “alcohol use disorder”, the reported condition is actually still “possible alcohol use disorder”.

Does the appellant suffer from possible alcohol use disorder?

18The evidence presented at the hearing establishes that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely possible alcohol use disorder.

19The Registrar’s position is supported by the following medical reports:

i. A June 22, 2025 unsolicited MCR completed by emergency physician Dr. Biondi. On the MCR, Dr. Biondi checked off “Substance Use Disorder, Alcohol” and, under the section titled discretionary report of medical condition or impairment, wrote, “it is not clear from this single episode if this is a pattern; however, the patient consumed 8 alcoholic drinks, then drove his motor vehicle, then reportedly fell asleep at the wheel, then struck a fire hydrant.”

ii. A June 22, 2025 Emergency Documentation clinical note by Dr. Biondi, which states,

Subjective: [Motor Vehicle Collision]: Laceration following collision with fire hydrant while driving at approx. 25-35 km/h. He says there was a passenger, a female, she has not come to the hospital; it is not known if she has any injuries; he says she was ambulatory on the scene and seemed okay. He says police came to the scene; he says they called ambulance and he came in by ambulance. Head struck windshield. Airbags did not deploy. Seatbelt in use. Alcohol consumed prior to incident – he says about 8 beers and 3 “lines” of cocaine….

Assessment and Plan: … 3. Driving under influence (305.0) resulting in MVC: Duty to report to Ministry of Transportation explained. Advised not to drive until cleared by Ministry. Informed that licence may be suspended and process for reinstatement explained. Clarified that this is not a police charge but a medical legal requirement of emergency physicians.

20The appellant’s position according to his Notice of Appeal is that Dr. Biondi did not diagnose him with alcohol use disorder, and that he does not have this condition. The appellant’s representative made submissions that Dr. Biondi did not or could not have properly assessed and diagnosed alcohol use disorder. The appellant did not provide oral testimony at the hearing.

21I note that section 203 (2) of the HTA authorizes a physician to make a discretionary report where, in the opinion of the prescribed person, an individual has or appears to have a medical condition, functional impairment, or visual impairment that may make it dangerous for the person to operate a motor vehicle.

22I disagree with the submissions that Dr. Biondi did not assess the appellant for alcohol use disorder or that he was not qualified to do so. I am satisfied that as an emergency medicine physician, Dr. Biondi would have training and expertise in screening for alcohol related disorders and their functional impact. In his note, the doctor documented a clinical history which includes questioning on alcohol intake and behaviour. The note concludes, in the assessment and plan section, “driving under the influence (305.0) resulting in [motor vehicle collision]. Duty to report to Ministry of Transportation explained. Advised not to drive until cleared by Ministry.” The physician indicates on the MCR that there is a substance use disorder – alcohol and that “it is not clear from this single episode if this is a pattern…”. I find, on a balance of probabilities, that Dr. Biondi completed a medical assessment which included questioning on alcohol use, and that his clinical impression according to the MCR is that the appellant has a possible alcohol use disorder.

23I place more weight on the medical documentation from Dr. Biondi than on the unsworn, untested statements of the appellant in his Notice of Appeal. There is no medical evidence before me to explain or clarify the appellant’s alcohol use or any medical evidence that contradicts Dr. Biondi’s opinion.

24I find that the Registrar has established on a balance of probabilities that the appellant suffers from possible alcohol use disorder.

Is the appellant’s medical condition likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely?

25I find that the Registrar has proven on a balance of probabilities that the appellant’s medical condition is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.

26The Registrar argues that possible alcohol use disorder interferes with the appellant’s ability to drive safely in that alcohol use disorder can interfere with the functional abilities required to drive.

27The Registrar relies on the Canadian Council of Motor Transport Administrators Medical Standards for Drivers [February 2021] (the “CCMTA Standards”), Chapter 15.6.3, which states that all drivers suffering from Substance Use Disorder, including alcohol, may be eligible for a licence if they meet the criteria for remission and/or have abstained for twelve months. It also states that earlier re-licencing may be considered upon favourable recommendation from an addiction specialist and/or treating physician recognized by the licensing authority, and the successful completion of a drug rehabilitation program.

28The Registrar points to the MCR, on which Dr. Biondi writes, “it is not clear from this single episode if this is a pattern; however, the patient consumed 8 alcoholic drinks, then drove his motor vehicle, then reportedly fell asleep at the wheel, then struck a fire hydrant” and argues that the appellant’s possible alcohol use disorder can and does interfere with his ability to drive safely.

29Section 14(2)(a) of the Regulation allows the Registrar to consider the CCMTA Standards when determining whether the requirements of s. 14(1) are met. The Tribunal may take the CCMTA Standards into consideration but are not bound by them.

30The appellant did not testify at the hearing. By way of his Notice of Appeal, the appellant denies that he was driving under the influence as Dr. Biondi’s notes suggest. However, the statements on the Notice of Appeal were not made under oath, and I assign little weight to them.

31I find the CCMTA standards reasonable, and I have considered them here. It is concerning that there is medical documentation indicating that the appellant consumed 8 alcoholic drinks and then drove his motor vehicle. At minimum, further information to better delineate the appellant’s alcohol use and diagnosis and functional impact (i.e., the SUA form) is required. If a severe alcohol use disorder is confirmed, I agree that a period of abstinence and a favourable recommendation from a treating physician are prudent and reasonable requirements for a return to driving.

32I am satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the appellant’s medical condition is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive safely.

Conclusion

33I find that the Registrar has discharged the onus of establishing on a balance of probabilities that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely possible alcohol use disorder, that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.

ORDER

34For the reasons set out above, pursuant to subsection 50(2) of the Act, I confirm the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.