Iuliia Sokol v. Allstate Insurance Company of Canada, 2026 CanLII 26837

Citation: Sokol vs. Allstate Insurance Company of Canada, 2026 ONLAT 24-012327/AABS

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 24-012327/AABS

In the matter of an application pursuant to subsection 280(2) of the Insurance Act, RSO 1990, c I.8, in relation to statutory accident benefits.

Between:

Iuliia Sokol

Applicant

and

Allstate Insurance Company of Canada

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR: Rachel Levitsky

APPEARANCES:

For the Applicant: Ilia Estrah, Counsel

For the Respondent: Duha Sikander, Counsel

HEARD: By way of written submissions

OVERVIEW

1Iuliia Sokol, the applicant, was involved in an automobile accident on January 20, 2023, and sought benefits pursuant to the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule - Effective September 1, 2010 (including amendments effective June 1, 2016) (the “Schedule”). The applicant was denied benefits by the respondent, Allstate Insurance Company of Canada, and applied to the Licence Appeal Tribunal - Automobile Accident Benefits Service (the “Tribunal”) for resolution of the dispute.

ISSUES

2The issues in dispute are:

i. Are the applicant’s injuries predominantly minor as defined in s. 3 of the Schedule and therefore subject to treatment within the $3,500.00 Minor Injury Guideline (“MIG”) limit?

ii. Is the applicant entitled to $2,486.00 for a psychological assessment, proposed by A & B Medical Assessments Inc. in a treatment plan/OCF-18 dated September 22, 2023?

iii. Is the applicant entitled to interest on any overdue payment of benefits?

3I note that the applicant withdrew the issue of whether she is entitled to a chronic pain assessment in the amount of $2,486.00 proposed in a treatment plan dated April 1, 2024.

RESULT

4The applicant has not sustained an injury that would warrant her removal from the MIG.

5As I have found that the applicant is not removed from the MIG, it is not necessary for me to determine whether the treatment plan in dispute is reasonable and necessary pursuant to s. 15(1) of the Schedule.

6As no benefits are owing, interest is not payable.

ANALYSIS

Application of the Minor Injury Guideline

7I find that the applicant has not proven, on a balance of probabilities, that she suffers from a psychological condition such that she should be removed from the MIG.

8Section 18(1) of the Schedule provides that medical and rehabilitation benefits are limited to $3,500.00 if the insured sustains impairments that are predominantly a minor injury. Section 3(1) defines a “minor injury” as “one or more of a sprain, strain, whiplash associated disorder, contusion, abrasion, laceration or subluxation and includes any clinically associated sequelae to such an injury.”

9An insured may be removed from the MIG if they can establish that their accident-related injuries fall outside of the MIG or, under s. 18(2), that they have a documented pre-existing injury or condition combined with compelling medical evidence stating that the condition precludes recovery if they are kept within the confines of the MIG. The Tribunal has also determined that chronic pain with functional impairment or a psychological condition may warrant removal from the MIG. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the applicant.

10The applicant submits that she should be removed from the MIG as she sustained a psychological impairment. She relies on a report dated October 12, 2023, from Stacy Yong, registered psychotherapist, and Mandeep Singh, supervising psychological associate. Their report noted the following diagnoses:

i. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Recurrent, Severe;

ii. Major Depressive Disorder, Recurrent, Severe;

iii. Somatic Symptom Disorder, with Predominant Pain, Persistent, Moderate; and

iv. Specific Phobia, Situational Type, Travelling in a Motor Vehicle.

11Ms. Singh and Ms. Yong opined that the applicant does not fall under the MIG given her ongoing physical pain and psychological impairment. I note that the applicant submits that she is not seeking to be removed from the MIG due to chronic pain.

12The applicant argues that the respondent did not obtain a s. 44 report, and requests that I consider this when weighing the evidence adduced by both parties. Further, the applicant indicates that the respondent has not made any production requests from the applicant, or sought information to corroborate portions of the psychological assessment. However, the burden of proof does not rest with the respondent, and the respondent is not obligated to obtain a s. 44 report or even adduce any evidence at a hearing. The applicant has the burden of proving, on a balance of probabilities, that she does not belong in the MIG.

13Ultimately, I do not find the psychological report persuasive. It is not clear whether Ms. Singh was present for the assessment or what her level of involvement was in supervising Ms. Yong. In her reply submissions, the applicant relies on a note from Ms. Singh which she submits clears up any ambiguity, however the note still does not state whether Ms. Singh was present for the assessment. I give less weight to the diagnoses proffered by Ms. Singh where there is no indication that she was involved in the assessment process or even spoke to the applicant.

14Further, when indicating whether the diagnoses were directly related to the accident, the authors of the report answered “no”. They noted that the applicant was reportedly diagnosed with depression in 2006 and 2016, and post-traumatic stress disorder and depression in 2019. While the authors indicate that the applicant’s “mood concerns were further exacerbated” by the accident, there is no additional explanation. There is also no elaboration within the report, including the section pertaining to the applicant’s background, about these past diagnoses. In fact, in that section, the authors note that the applicant “denied a medical history”. Further, none of the medical records before me mention this history. I question how Ms. Singh was able to make the findings that she did without further information or explanation, and find that this undermines the credibility of her conclusions.

15Aside from the psychological report, the only other medical evidence relied on by the applicant is an OCF-3 authored by Dr. Igor Sapozhnikov, chiropractor, dated March 23, 2023. While it lists one of the applicant’s symptoms as “state of emotional shock and stress, unspecified”, chiropractors are not qualified to diagnose psychological conditions, and no further information was provided as to the degree or duration of this symptom. I do not find this piece of evidence to be salient or compelling.

16The respondent’s submissions include records from Cortelluci Hospital from a visit on January 20, 2023, and records from Dr. Maximillian Mulakandov, family physician, from February 9, 2022, to April 8, 2023. The notes from Cortelluci Hospital indicate that the applicant complained of back pain, but no psychological symptoms. The records from the applicant’s visits with Dr. Mulakandov do not mention any psychological symptoms, nor do they mention the accident. There are no further clinical notes and records before me.

17The applicant relies on Raja-Mohamad v. The Personal Insurance Company, 2022 CanLII 33191 and Elbahja v. Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company, 2023 CanLII 116485, where the Tribunal noted that its role is not to scrutinize diagnoses made by professionals within their expertise, but to weigh evidence. The Tribunal also found that just because an applicant did not complain to a treating practitioner does not mean that a medical professional did not conduct an appropriate assessment or make a proper diagnosis.

18I not bound by these cases. I am, however, bound by Dooman v. TD Insurance Co., 2025 ONSC 184. At paragraph 36 of that decision, the Court stated that, while a trier of fact is obliged to consider all the evidence before it, it is not required to accept all of a medical expert’s evidence merely because there is no contrary expert testimony tendered on behalf of the other party. Further, the Court held that it was within the Tribunal’s discretion to find that the expert’s evidence was not persuasive. I am accordingly not obliged to accept the findings contained in the psychological report.

19The applicant also relies on Lo v. TD General Insurance Company, 2024 CanLII 4243, and submits that the Tribunal in that case relied primarily on a s. 25 psychological assessment. However, the Tribunal in that case found that the s. 25 report was corroborated by clinical notes and records from the family physician and hospital psychiatrist which referred to psychological difficulties. That type of evidence is not before me.

20In light of my concerns with the credibility and accuracy of the psychological report, and in the absence of other compelling evidence, I find that the applicant has not proven, on a balance of probabilities, that she sustained a psychological condition as a result of the accident. As such, I find that she has not met her burden of proving that she should be taken out of the MIG.

21As I have found that the applicant is not removed from the MIG, it is not necessary for me to determine whether the treatment plan in dispute is reasonable and necessary pursuant to s. 15(1) of the Schedule.

Interest

22Interest applies on the payment of any overdue benefits pursuant to s. 51 of the Schedule. Since no benefits are owing, interest is not payable.

ORDER

23The applicant has not sustained an injury that would warrant her removal from the MIG.

24As I have found that the applicant is not removed from the MIG, it is not necessary for me to determine whether the treatment plan in dispute is reasonable and necessary pursuant to s. 15(1) of the Schedule.

25As no benefits are owing, interest is not payable.

Released: March 20, 2026

Rachel Levitsky

Adjudicator```