Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18325/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended

Between:

Joanne Labelle

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Gurleen Thethi

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Joanne Labelle, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Leila Pereira, Agent

LAT Observer:

Steve Clarke

HEARD By Teleconference: Friday, March 6, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Joanne Labelle, (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of their motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Friday, February 13, 2026. At the time of the impoundment, D.D (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issue in dispute is:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below the Registrar is ordered to release the impounded vehicle.

ANALYSIS

5For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The impoundment will cause exceptional hardship

6I am satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

7The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

8If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

9If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

10The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

11The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

12I am satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

13The appellant testified that the impounded vehicle is essential to meeting her basic employment, safety, and personal needs, and that she has no reasonable alternatives available. She works at Tim Hortons on early morning shifts beginning at 4:00 a.m. and ending at either 10:30 a.m. during the week or noon on weekends, after which she is required to transport the cash till from the smaller location to the main store. The appellant has attempted to change her shift timings and works, but her employer has not been able to do so. The appellant stated that there are no buses operating at that early hour, and that walking between 4:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. is unsafe due to a significant homeless population and drug activity in the area. She further stated that walking with the till would pose a serious risk to her personal safety.

14The appellant testified that she lives alone, has a dog, and her daughter visits bi‑weekly, and that she relies on the vehicle for groceries, prescriptions, and other personal necessities. During the impound period, the appellant has been walking to obtain groceries and run personal errands. She does not have family or friends nearby. The appellant testified that she does not have any money to rent a vehicle. She also testified that she suffers from sclerosis, which makes extended walking difficult, although she is not currently on medication and experiences episodic flare‑ups requiring hospital treatment.

15The respondent submits that the appellant could walk to work, make alternative arrangements to transport the till, or rely on others for transportation; however, the evidence does not establish that these options are reasonable, safe, or realistically available given the early hours, lack of public transit, ongoing safety concerns, medical limitations, and absence of a support network.

16On analysis, I find that the appellant has considered and, where possible, attempted to function without a vehicle, but the alternatives are not reasonable given her particular circumstances.

17I find that the appellant has established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

Threat to heath, safety, the environment or property

18The appellant has not alleged that the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

Financial, Economic, Employment or Education Losses

19The appellant alleges that the impoundment will cause financial or economic loss. In particular, the appellant testified that she is barely able to meet her expenses, has no surplus income, and that paying the impound fees would financially break her and may force her to surrender the vehicle. She testified that she has only been able to set aside $1,000.00 toward the costs of the impound fees and cannot rely on compensation from the driver, who is unemployed and on social assistance. The appellant testified that she requested and received an advance on her paycheque to pay the fees for the appeal.

20She further stated that without the vehicle she risks losing her employment, as she relies on it to travel to early morning shifts beginning at 4:00 a.m. and to transport the cash till to the main store after her shift. I find that the appellant has proven, on a balance of probabilities, that the impoundment is likely to result in significant financial and economic loss.

21The evidence establishes that the financial hardship alleged is personal to the appellant and not a result of losses suffered by the suspended driver. Accordingly, section 10(3)(d) of the Regulation does not apply, and the losses are not excluded from consideration.

22As I am satisfied that the impoundment will result in losses that are not excluded by section 10(3)(d) of the Regulation, I will continue with the analysis under section 10(2).

23I am satisfied the losses will be immediate, significant and lasting. The loss of the vehicle would immediately impair her ability to work, earn income, and transport cash safely, placing her employment at risk. Given her financial circumstances, inability to replace the vehicle, and lack of alternative transportation, the impact of the losses would be ongoing and substantial.

24For the reasons set out above, I find that the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined in the Regulation.

Conclusion(s)

25I find that:

i. the appellant has established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

26The Tribunal Orders that the Registrar shall release the impounded vehicle.