Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18311/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while in contravention of a condition under s. 55.1(1)2 of the Act.

Between:

Elijah Rudy

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Michael Beauchesne

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Elijah Rudy, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Leila Pereira, Representative

HEARD by teleconference: Wednesday, March 4, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Elijah Rudy (the “appellant”) appeals the impoundment of his motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Saturday, January 31, 2026. At the time of the impoundment, the appellant was driving the vehicle while his driver's licence was subject to a condition that prohibits him from driving a motor vehicle that is not equipped with an ignition interlock device as described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1). A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUE

3The issue in dispute is, pursuant to section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below, the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

PROCEDURAL ISSUE

The appellant may rely on his late materials

5I consent to admitting the appellant’s late materials as evidence to the hearing.

6Rule 9.5.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (the “Rules”) provides that the appellant shall, no later than 10 days before the hearing, exchange with the respondent every document and thing he intends to rely on at the hearing. The consequences of failing to so are set out in Rule 9.3, which provides that the appellant may not rely on filings that do not comply with the Rules without the consent of the Tribunal.

7The appellant filed a Notice of Motion (“Motion”) on February 23, 2026, that requested leave to admit late evidence. The evidence included screen shots of his appeal notice, a transit route map, and a letter from his employer. The appellant explained at the hearing that he did not know he had to exchange this evidence with the other party at the time he filed it with the Tribunal on February 18, 2026. The appellant submitted that these materials would help his case and that he could not prove his claim if the documents were not admitted. The appellant added that the materials were relevant because they show his community’s transit services do not go outside its municipal boundaries, and prove he is employed and the address of his work.

8The respondent clarified that while the appellant did not exchange these documents with it prior to the hearing, the Tribunal had included them with the Motion notice it released to the parties on February 24, 2026. The respondent advised it was consenting to the materials being admitted to the proceeding as evidence.

9When I considered the factors set out at Rule 9.3, I was persuaded to provide consent to the appellant to rely on his late materials. I accepted they were, in fact, filed on time with the Tribunal and that the substance of the information conveyed in these materials was sufficiently known to the respondent, having received them at least a week before the hearing. Further, the respondent consented to their admission as exhibits and I found the appellant, who bears the onus in this case, would be prejudiced by their exclusion owing to their relevancy.

10I therefore ordered that the appellant’s late materials be admitted as evidence to the hearing.

ANALYSIS

11For the Tribunal to order the respondent to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to section 55.1 of the Act, the appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the satisfies one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in section 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship

12I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

13The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

“[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate

any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.”

14If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

15If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

16The Tribunal is generally precluded by section 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, section 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

17The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

18I am not satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

19The appellant submits that he cannot afford to keep taking taxis to work because it is depleting his savings. The appellant also says that having to pay the impoundment fee will put him at risk of defaulting on his mortgage and losing his home. The appellant further submits that he was unaware his ignition interlock condition was in force at the time his vehicle was impounded.

20The respondent argues that the appellant has alternate transportation options available to him and that the impoundment should be confirmed.

21The appellant’s evidence persuades me that he has alternatives to his impounded vehicle. The appellant testified that he walks to the grocery store across the road from his home and has not missed any medical appointments during the impoundment period because he can also walk to the medical clinic and the pharmacy. As well, the appellant has not missed a day of work during the impoundment period because he uses a taxi.

22While the appellant testified that taking taxis to work is not financially sustainable, I find that up to the time of the hearing he has been able to unfailingly manage the $56 round-trip fare, which, in my view, shows he has an alternative to the impounded vehicle to get to work. Further, the appellant did not produce evidence to corroborate his testimony that the taxi fare is unaffordable. While the appellant is not required by the Act to produce, for example, bank statements or pay stubs or other such documentation to prove his claim, it remains that he is asserting the taxi fare is unaffordable despite testifying that he has had the means to pay for taxis since the impoundment period started. As such, I find there is little basis for putting weight on the appellant’s prospective testimony about taxis not being an affordable alternative to his impounded vehicle in the absence of corroborating evidence.

23I am also not persuaded that public transit is unavailable as an alternative for commuting purposes. While the appellant produced a map that purportedly shows his work location is outside the geographical limit of transit service in his community, the map does not pinpoint the appellant’s job address or even identify the highway where his work site is located per his employer’s letter. Further, the map does not indicate how recently the “moovit” app verified the accuracy of the data it relies on or the date and time the appellant queried the data. As such, I find the probative value of this evidence to be low.

24I did not afford weight to the appellant’s argument about losing his home owing to the “devastating’ impact of the impound fees because section 10(2) of the Act precludes me from considering financial or economic loss, or the loss of employment, where the appellant has not established he has no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle available to him.

25I find that the appellant’s awareness of his ignition interlock condition is not relevant to the legal test for exceptional hardship and have therefore not considered it further in this matter.

26When I take all this evidence together on a balance of probabilities, I find the appellant has not established there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle. Since the appellant has not demonstrated there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with the Act and the Regulation, and I need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship.

ORDER

27The Tribunal orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

Released: March 17, 2026

_____________________

Michael Beauchesne

Adjudicator