Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18287/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while in contravention of a condition under s. 55.1(1)2 of the Act.

Between:

Megan Karrandjas

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Michael Beauchesne

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Megan Karrandjas, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Leila Pereira, Representative

HEARD by teleconference: Wednesday, March 4, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Megan Karrandjas, (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of her motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Sunday, February 8, 2026. At the time of the impoundment, Taylor Lee (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle while her driver's licence was subject to a condition that prohibits her from driving a motor vehicle that is not equipped with an ignition interlock device as described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1). A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that the impounded motor vehicle was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded. The appellant also submits that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issues in dispute are:

1. Pursuant to section 50.2(3)(a) of the Act, whether the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded; and

2. Pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

5For the Tribunal to order the respondent to release a vehicle impounded pursuant to section 55.1 of the Act, the appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that she satisfied one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in section 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The vehicle was not stolen

6I am not satisfied that the impounded motor vehicle was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded.

7In Marshall v. Ontario (Registrar of Motor Vehicles) [2002] O.J. No. 745 (Div. Ct.) (“Marshall”), the Divisional Court held that a vehicle is “stolen” in this context:

“…when it is taken without the owner’s consent and when the perpetrator intends to deprive the owner of it, whether permanently or temporarily.”

In other words, to establish that the vehicle was stolen for the purposes of section 50.2(3)(a) of the Act, the appellant must prove that the vehicle was taken without her consent and that the driver intended to deprive the appellant of the vehicle, either permanently or temporarily.

8The appellant submits that she is the owner of the impounded vehicle, and that the driver at the time her vehicle was seized for impoundment had no permission to be at her rental property, let alone to take and drive the impounded vehicle parked there. The appellant emphasizes that she has no interlock conditions on her licence, and maintains that it is unfair to bear the brunt of the driver’s “criminal actions” by having her vehicle impounded and incurring the associated storage fees. The appellant relies on a police occurrence number to show she reported her stolen vehicle to authorities immediately after she became aware of the incident.

9The respondent submits that police did not pursue any enforcement action against the driver that supports the appellant’s claim of vehicle theft.

10I accept that the appellant is the owner of the impounded vehicle. The appellant produced a bill of sale to show the vehicle sold to her is one and the same as the impounded vehicle. Further, I find the identification and description details of this vehicle are consistent with the respondent’s records in evidence, which show the appellant as the registered owner.

11The appellant’s evidence did not assist in proving her theft claim, however. I accept the appellant made a report to police because she shared a police occurrence number (i.e., “PR26005247”) that she allegedly obtained on February 16, 2026. But despite having this occurrence number more than two weeks before the hearing, the appellant did not produce the actual police report as evidence. I would point out here that the appellant is not required by the Act to produce police reports to prove grounds at section 50.2(3)(a). That said, it remains the appellant did not, and this hampers the appellant’s ability to meet her onus in this case because both parties agree the police did not charge the driver with theft of the impounded vehicle upon completing their investigation. In my view, the lack of enforcement action taken by police—with little explanation other that it was treated as a “domestic matter” according to the appellant’s testimony—does not support the appellant’s claim because it does not persuade me the driver took the appellant’s vehicle without consent, nor that she intended to deprive the appellant of the vehicle.

12The appellant also testified that her garage and rental home were ransacked by the driver at the time she stole the vehicle. The appellant explained that she was away from her property when the driver located a hidden door key in the garage that provided interior access to take the keys to the impounded vehicle among other things. However, the appellant did not corroborate her testimony by producing, for example, the claim report she allegedly filed with her insurance company, or any photos of her ransacked home to support her allegation of a break and enter. Given that the parties also agree that police did not pursue any charges—criminal or otherwise—in relation to the driver’s activities at the appellant’s residence, I further diminish the weight afforded to the appellant’s stolen vehicle claim, or that her vehicle keys were taken without her consent for that matter.

13When I consider all this evidence together on a balance of probabilities, I find it falls short of establishing that the impounded motor vehicle was stolen at the time it was detained to be impounded. As such, the appellant has not met her onus and I decline to release the impounded vehicle on this basis.

The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship

14I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

15The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

“[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.”

16If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

17If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

18The Tribunal is generally precluded by section 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, section 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

19The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

20I am not satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

21The appellant submits that she is currently responsible to sustain loan payments on the impounded vehicle despite being deprived of its use by the impoundment. She also submits that “being required to also pay impound and storage fees for an incident caused by a third party would add an unreasonable financial burden,” and requests relief from all associated towing and storage charges arising from the driver’s “criminal act.” She further submits that she has relied on public transit and ride-share services to travel during the impoundment period, which has created “serious” difficulties in her daily responsibilities.

22The respondent argues that the appellant has alternate means of getting to work outside of her impounded vehicle.

23I have not considered the appellant’s arguments on loan payments or recouping storage and towing fees because I am precluded from doing so unless the appellant first establishes she has no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

24During the hearing, the appellant testified that she is responsible to get her child to school. While I accept this as fact, I did not place full weight on her corresponding testimony about the difficulties she related in getting her child to school. This is because her evidence was inconsistent. For example, the appellant’s notice of appeal says that public transit schedules do not align with school start times, and that the travel distance requires multiple transfers, which will cause frequent lateness and missed classes. However, at the hearing, the appellant testified that she is not familiar with the transit route to her child’s school and relies only on Uber and taxi to travel the 15 kilometres between her home and school. I find that this contradiction about her familiarity and use of transit diminishes the probative value of the appellant’s evidence and does not persuade me that she has, in fact, considered and enquired into every reasonable option for alternate transportation as the law requires her to do.

25Similarly, I discounted the appellant’s testimony that her child had missed five days of school during the impound period because “Uber is unreliable.” This is because the appellant had, at a different point in the hearing, testified that Uber had caused her child to be late for school (as opposed to missing school days entirely) because it did not arrive at the requested time. I find this testimony to be inconsistent. Further, the appellant did not credit any of the time missed at school to reliability difficulties with the local taxi—an option that remained available to her according to her testimony.

26I am not satisfied that the appellant’s testimony about difficulties getting to work proves her claim of exceptional hardship either. She explained that she works in a different community than where she lives and travels to and from her work location via Uber when she can afford the $100 to $130 fee. I note the appellant voiced no concerns about the reliability of Uber in a commuting context. The appellant added that she has also been carpooling at a cost of $25 to $50 with other employees who work at a “sister location” and has used the GO Train as well.

27Despite these alternatives, the appellant testified that she had missed 10 to 15 shifts of work—seven of which were unpaid—since the impoundment began. In her testimony, she initially attributed all the days of work she missed to alignment issues with her co-workers’ commuting schedule. She later said that “the days I cannot [financially] help with gas” are the days I miss. The appellant then offered that she had missed “quite a bit” of work shifts or been late taking the GO Train to work. These inconsistencies in the appellant’s testimony caused me to put less weight on her claim that missed work due to a lack of transportation alternatives to her impounded vehicle. Further, when asked about the details of her transit route to work, the appellant offered that she “believed” there are a “bunch” of connecting buses but “had not done this much,” which is at odds with her earlier testimony that she had missed “quite a bit” of work shifts or been late taking transit. Ultimately, I was not persuaded the appellant had made a reasonable attempt to establish whether transit is a viable commuting alternative to her impounded vehicle because she testified that “I am not too familiar with transit down there. I get lost.”

28When I take all this evidence together in totality on a balance of probabilities, I find that the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle. Since the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with the Act and the Regulation and I need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship. I therefore do not agree the impounded vehicle should be released on this basis.

ORDER

29The Tribunal orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.