Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18360/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while in contravention of a condition under s. 55.1(1)2 of the Act

Between:

Brandy Ireland

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATORS:

Gary Marshall, Member Emily Morton, Member

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Brandy Ireland, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Leila Pereira, Representative

HEARD: By Teleconference Friday, March 13, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Brandy Ireland, (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of her motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Sunday, February 22, 2026. At the time of the impoundment, her daughter, (the “driver”), was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days. The impoundment is effective to April 8, 2026.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issue in dispute is:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below the Registrar is ordered to release the impounded vehicle.

ANALYSIS

5For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The impoundment will cause exceptional hardship

6We are satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

7The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

8If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

9If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

10The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

11The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

12We must first examine if there is a reasonable alternative to the impounded vehicle. We are satisfied that the appellant has established it is more likely than not that there is no reasonable alternative to the impounded vehicle. We find that the appellant has demonstrated it is more likely than not that she has considered and inquired into every reasonable option that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to her, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without the impounded vehicle until April 8, 2026.

13We have considered the appellant’s oral evidence at the hearing and the statement she provided in her Notice of Appeal, which is Exhibit 1 to this hearing. We have also considered her responses to questions from the respondent’s representative, which explored a number of options to use of the impounded vehicle.

14The appellant testified that she resides in Port Burwell, a rural area where there is no public transportation available. The cost of alternative transportation is prohibitively expensive, with a single ride to the nearest grocery store costing approximately $150. The appellant has spent $300 already to take two trips to the grocery store following the impoundment. The appellant is unable to rent a vehicle as she does not have a credit card. The appellant also testified that she has limited support and help from family and friends as she has only recently moved to Port Burwell. Her closest family and friends reside in London, which is a one-hour drive, and most of her family members do not drive a vehicle.

15The appellant gave evidence relevant to whether a reasonable alternative to the vehicle would be to simply not use a vehicle at all. The appellant is a single mother to four children who live in her household, aged nine, 11, 14 and 16. The appellant drives her 14-year-old son to school when school bus services are not available. As it happened, the school bus was not available for this son for the entirety of last week. This means that he missed school for one week. The appellant’s two younger children typically walk to school; however, when there is inclement weather, the appellant drives them to school or these two children will stay home if the appellant does not have her vehicle during inclement weather.

16The appellant testified that she is currently unemployed, though she is seeking employment in her field, as an aesthetician. She testified that she cannot look for employment, or travel to a job, if she obtains one, without her vehicle, as the nearest communities with businesses that hire aestheticians are in Aylmer and another town, which are each a 30-minute drive away from her home in Port Burwell. Her employment search is thus suspended as a result of the impoundment, and the appellant relies on Ontario Works and the Child Tax Benefit to meet the financial needs of her household. The appellant’s 16-year-old daughter is also seeking employment, and this search has been impacted by the loss of the vehicle.

17In cross-examination by the respondent’s representative, the appellant confirmed that while she is the registered owner of a second vehicle, that vehicle has now been sold and she has no access to it. The appellant also confirmed that there is no public transit system servicing Port Burwell. She confirmed that she is able to use ride share services using her debit card, but since she does not have a credit card, she cannot rent a vehicle. She confirmed the high cost of resorting to ride share services, given her location in rural Port Burwell.

18The appellant gave other evidence relevant to whether making do without the impounded vehicle is a reasonable alternative. She testified that she has missed one doctor appointment and one dentist appointment as a result of the impoundment, and the very high cost of using ride share to travel to these appointments in London is prohibitive. The appellant also testified that she will be responsible for her four children during the March Break in Ontario schools that begins for one week on March 16, 2026. The appellant testified that simply living life without the impounded vehicle means her children will not be able to do any activities at the March break. She also testified that two of her children will have birthdays in late March and early April, where no arrangements can be made for celebration, such as purchasing a cake or other supplies, due to the expense of using a ride share to go to the grocery store.

19The legislation requires an owner to consider and inquire into every reasonable option that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to her, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without the impounded vehicle. We find the appellant has met the burden of establishing these legislative requirements. We find she has turned her mind to and made inquiries about renting a vehicle and has learned she cannot rent a vehicle as she does not have a credit card. The appellant has inquired into using a ride share and has used it twice now to obtain groceries for her family of five. We accept the appellant’s evidence that the round-trip cost of using a ride share to obtain groceries is $150, and she considers this a prohibitive expense and thus not a reasonable alternative during the period of impoundment. We also accept the appellant’s evidence that public transit does not service Port Burwell. We accept the appellant’s evidence that she cannot ask friends or family for assistance with rides, as she has recently relocated to Port Burwell and family and friends she already had live one hour away.

20We find the appellant has inquired into ruled out each reasonable alternative to use of the impounded vehicle, other than the occasional use of ride share, which she has used twice at considerable financial cost. We find there is not a reasonable option as that term is employed in the Regulation. We remind ourselves the Regulation requires the appellant to demonstrate a reasonable option “that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any alternative to use of the impounded vehicle” including using another vehicle. We find that the appellant has met the burden of proof of establishing that none of the options available to her are reasonable.

21We also find the appellant has met the burden of establishing that making arrangements to do without the use of the impounded vehicle is not a reasonable alternative. We accept the appellant’s evidence that her son had to miss school for one week as there was no school bus service; we find this establishes that going without the impounded vehicle creates an unreasonable result of a high school student missing a week of school. We also find that it is unreasonable for a single mother of four children, two of whom are primary school aged, to have no means of transportation by car for a period of almost four weeks, which includes the school March break and two birthdays. We find that doing without the vehicle entails a cost of $150 per round trip to obtain groceries for a family of five. We find this is not a reasonable option. We find that the option of doing without the vehicle is not a reasonable one in the appellant’s circumstances.

Threat to heath, safety, the environment or property

22The appellant has not alleged that the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

Financial, Economic, Employment or Education Losses

23The appellant submits that the impoundment will cause financial or economic loss., loss of employment or an employment opportunity, and loss of education to her children, in particular her 14-year-old son.

24With respect to loss of an employment opportunity, the appellant testified that she was actively looking for work as an aesthetician in two nearby communities. The communities are each a 30-minute drive away. Without the impounded vehicle, the appellant has suspended the employment search. We find that the impoundment creates an immediate loss to employment or an employment opportunity. This is just one factor that we have considered under the heading of “losses”; the suspended employment search may not itself be a sufficient type of loss to establish exceptional hardship, but it is a relevant factor and we consider it along with the other types of losses discussed below.

25With respect to financial loss, we accept the appellant’s evidence that to even go to the grocery store she must spend $150 per round trip. We find that this creates an immediate and significant financial loss. We accept the appellant’s evidence that she relies on Ontario Works and the Child Tax Benefit, and does not receive child support. We find that spending another $300 or $600 for the balance of the impoundment to go to the grocery store two or four more times will cause immediate and significant financial loss to the appellant. This will only be compounded if the appellant is required to resort to ride share services to attend other necessary but non-emergency appointments for her or her four children between now and April 8, 2026. We find it will be a lasting financial loss as the appellant will have spend considerable money to do this, which in turn will create hardship down the road as a result of spending all of this money in the period leading up to April 8, 2026.

26Further, we find there is a significant, immediate and lasting loss to education as a result of the impoundment. The appellant is the primary caregiver for four children, ages 9, 10, 14 and 16, three of whom attend school. The appellant’s 14-year-old child has already missed a week of school due to a lack of transportation as the school bus was not running that week. This child has an Individual Education Plan and requires consistent school attendance for specialized classes, or to avail himself of special school resources. When school bus services lapse, which we accept they did last week, her son stays home from school if she does not have a vehicle to drive him. We find this establishes a loss to education. We find “remote learning” if this happens again during the impound period will constitute a loss to education that is significant and immediate. Continued absence may negatively affect the child’s educational progress. We find the educational loss to the appellant’s son is significant, immediate and lasting. We also accept the appellant’s evidence that her two youngest children will miss school if the weather becomes inclement, and she cannot drive them.

27Finally, we find the family faces challenges accessing essential services without the impounded vehicle. Though these challenges do not readily fit within the concept of employment, financial, economic or educational losses, they compound the effect of those losses. The appellant has missed scheduled medical and dental appointments because of the impoundment. The upcoming March Break further compounds the hardship, as the appellant is unable to transport her children to activities or basics outings. In addition, two of the children have upcoming birthdays, and without transportation the appellant is unable to complete simple tasks such as purchasing groceries or a birthday cake without incurring considerable transportation cost that the appellant can not afford. While these concerns would not, on their own, establish exceptional hardship, we find that they compound the effect of the financial, employment and educational losses that we have found have been established.

28We find that the impact of the loss to the appellant and her children who ordinarily transported by the impounded vehicle. We find that the appellant’s evidence does not describe mere inconvenience by having to reallocate funds to finance an alternative form of transport, to have her son do schoolwork at home, and to temporarily suspend a job search. Rather, we find her evidence establishes that it is more likely than not these are immediate, significant and lasting losses to the appellant and her four children.

29For the reasons set out above, we find the appellant has established it is more likely than not that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined in the Regulation.

Conclusion

30We find that:

i. the appellant has established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

31The Tribunal Orders that the Registrar shall release the impounded vehicle.