RECONSIDERATION DECISION
Before: Avril A. Farlam
Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 16332/OCCA and 16809/OCCA
Case Name: Revolution Truck Training Academy Ltd. o/a Revolution Truck Training Academy v. Superintendent of Career Colleges
Written Submissions by:
For the Appellant: Semone Coghiel and Iesha Coghiel, Paralegals
For the Respondent: Andrea Huckins and Kristina Yeretsian, Counsel
OVERVIEW
1On October 3, 2025, the Superintendent of Career Colleges (the "respondent") under the Ontario Career Colleges Act, 2005, S.O. 2005, c. 28, Sched. L (the "Act") requested reconsideration of the Tribunal's Amended Decision and Order released October 3, 2025 (the "Decision"). The appellant in this appeal is Revolution Truck Training Academy Ltd. o/a Revolution Truck Training Academy (the "appellant")
2In the Decision the adjudicator ordered the respondent not to carry out in respect of the appellant the Notice of Proposal to Revoke a licence ("NOP") and a Notice of Immediate Suspension ("NOIS"), both issued September 26, 2024 by the respondent pursuant to s. 19 and s. 20 of the Act, lifted the NOIS, and imposed three conditions on the registration of the appellant as follows:
(i) The appellant shall hire a compliance monitor appointed by the respondent for a period of no less than six months following the date of the Decision;
(ii) The appellant shall ensure that all documentation including DVIRs, RODS, student logs, Advance Standing Forms, and all student evaluations be filed and reviewed on the dates that additions are required;
(iii) Any corrections of inadequacies, inaccuracies and omissions to any and all required documentation shall be made within 2 business days, initialized by the individual correcting the document.
3For reconsideration of decisions released on or after August 21, 2023, the grounds for a request for reconsideration are found in Rule 18.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules ("Rules"). To grant a request for reconsideration, the Tribunal must be satisfied that one or more of the following criteria are met:
a) The Tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction or committed a material breach of procedural fairness;
b) The Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made; or
c) There is evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it, and would likely have affected the result.
4The respondent seeks reconsideration on ground (b), that the Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made. In summary, the respondent submits that the Tribunal, having agreed with the overwhelming majority of the evidence and submissions made by the respondent, ultimately ordered the respondent not to carry out the NOP and lifted the NOIS.
5More specifically, the respondent seeks reconsideration of the Decision on the following grounds:
A. The Tribunal erred in failing to consider and rule on significant evidentiary and legal issues;
B. The Tribunal erred in law and evidence by refusing to consider evidence of the appellant's conduct following the issuance of the NOP and NOIS; and
C. The Tribunal erred in law in its interpretation and assessment of the Act.
6The respondent further submits that, absent these errors, the Tribunal ought to have confirmed the NOP and NOIS.
7The appellant submits that the respondent has failed to establish any of the grounds for reconsideration under Rule 18 and is seeking an appeal under the guise of Rule 18 because of disagreement with the Decision. With respect to Rule 18(b), the appellant submits that the Tribunal addressed all material issues, applied the correct legal tests, and reached a proportional and fair result supported by evidence. The appellant further submits that the request for reconsideration be denied and seeks costs.
8In reply, the respondent repeats submissions about the importance of the MELT program, that the appellant conflates the balance of probabilities standard with the reasonable grounds thresholds, that evidence led in the hearing was appropriate, and repeats the submission that the legislation was not appropriately interpreted, and conditions imposed.
RESULT
9The respondent's request for reconsideration is granted. The Decision is cancelled and a rehearing shall take place by videoconference before an adjudicator or a panel that does not include the adjudicator who made the Decision or myself. The Tribunal will schedule a Case Conference to take place within 30 days from the date of this Order.
ANALYSIS
The Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made
10I am satisfied that the Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made within the meaning of Rule 18.2 (b) for the following reasons.
Legislative Requirements Described in the Decision
11In paragraph 5 of the Decision the Tribunal describes two "required forms that are essential in the daily operations of a truck driver training", specifically Record of Duty Status ("RODS") (Regulation 555/06, s. 17 under the Highway Traffic Act ("HTA")) and Daily Vehicle Inspection Reports ("DVIR") (Regulation 199/07, s. 7 under the HTA).
12In paragraph 6 the Tribunal found that "also of importance to the operation of a truck driver training school...are Student Transcripts (Regulation 415/06 s. 34 under..." the Ontario Career Colleges Act, 2005, S.O. 2005, c. 28, Sched. L (the "Act"), "...Student Files (Regulation 415/06, s. 45 under the Act) and internal In Class-Training Logs".
Persons Referred to in the Decision
13Specific students are sometimes referred to as "S.K., S.S., P.S., and A.S.".
14The sole officer and director of the appellant is Brinderpal Singh Thind ("Mr. Thind"). Mr. Thind also acts as an instructor along with Arwinder Singh and Nirbhair Gill. The appellant's administrator is Jaspreet Kaur: paragraph 4.
Findings of Fact in the Decision
15Two hours of S.K.'s mandatory training are "unaccounted for". "Both the DVIR and the S.K. Training log were falsified and gives the impression that S.K. obtained training that he, indeed, appeared to have not": paragraph 17.
16The DVIR of Arwinder Singh of October 16, 2023 and the S.K. Training Log of the same date were falsified which produces the impression that S.K. obtained training that appeared not to have occurred: (paragraph 62(i)).
17The Training Log for S.S. for October 16, 2023 was falsified crediting S.S. with 2 hours of training that appeared not to have occurred: (paragraph 62(ii)).
18The appellant has failed to maintain accurate odometer readings on truck documentation required by Regulations 199/07 and 555/06. (paragraph 62(iii)).
19With respect to instructor Nirbhai Gill (paragraph 62(iv):
i. none of his DVIRs from November 1 to December 6, 2023 were signed by him contemporaneously. These were later signed retroactively between January 18 and February 15, 2024;
ii. None of P.S.'s Student Logs from October 25th to Dec. 6th, 2023, or A.S.'s Student Logs from Oct. 26th to Dec. 6th, 2023 were signed by purported instructor Nirbhai Gill; "I have concluded from the above that it is reasonable to believe that Nirbhai Gill was not an instructor at the appellant from October 15 to December 6, 2023, thereby raising doubts regarding the completion of the program by P.S. and A.S.;
iii. None of Nirbhai Gill's RODS indicate his instructing for the appellant after October 14, 2023; "I have concluded from the above that it is reasonable to believe that Nirbhai Gill was not an instructor at the appellant from October 15 to December 6, 2023, thereby raising doubts regarding the completion of the program by P.S. and A.S.;
v. (sic) Pre-signing of the Requests for Advanced Standing compromises the integrity and reliability of records and does speak to the integrity and trustworthiness of the appellant; and
vi. P.S.'s and J.S.'s mid-point evaluation forms were fabricated.
Conflicting Conclusions
20Notwithstanding the above findings of fact, the Decision contains contradictory conclusions in paragraphs 63, 64, and 65.
21"I find that there are grounds for belief that the appellant will not operate in accordance with the law and with honesty and integrity, pursuant to s. 18(2)(a) and s. 14(1)e of the Act": paragraph 63.
22"I am not persuaded that the many falsifications in the documentation (DVIRs, RODS, student logs, etc.) are indicators of a lack of honesty and integrity in this case": paragraph 64.
23"I accept that the falsifications were more than likely the attempt of Mr. Thind to correct deficiencies which were identified by Investigator Gould....It is clear that the appellant, with respect to the documentation, was not operating in accordance with the law": paragraph 65.
24"I find that the Superintendent has established that there are grounds for belief that the programs provided are not likely to meet the requirements of the Act and the regulations, pursuant to s. 18(2)(a) and s. 14(1)(c) of the Act? (sic)": paragraph 66.
25"Section 53(2) of the Act states that "policy directives are binding on career colleges and every career college shall comply with and be operated in accordance with the policy directives." One such directive is the compliance with the Commercial Truck Driver Training Standard (Class A) which includes 103.5 hours of itemized instruction to students: paragraph 68. "...it remains that there can be no certainty that the records of the appellant are accurate, and that the appellant has, and will, deliver the 103.5 hours of instruction to students, which are required by the MELT Standard": paragraph 69. "...I conclude that the Superintendent has established on a balance of probabilities that the appellant are not likely to meet the requirements of the Act of the regulations": paragraph 70.
26"...I find that the Superintendent has established on a balance of probabilities that the appellant has failed to comply with the provisions of the Act pursuant to s. 18(2)(c) of the Act by providing records of training that they knew or ought to have known were false and misleading in contravention of s. 38(10) of the Act": paragraph 71.
Ultimate Conclusion is Inconsistent with Findings Above and the Legislative Requirements set out in the Decision
27Ultimately, the Tribunal, after making multiple findings about non-compliance with legislative requirements, directs the Superintendent not to carry out the NOP for reasons outlined in paragraph 73.
28The first reason is that "...while the infractions regarding documentation are multiple, none of them convince me that public safety demands the closure of the appellant's school. I am also not prepared to conclude that the falsification of documentation were necessarily done with the intent to defraud the Superintendent": paragraph 73(i).
29The Decision does not sufficiently explain why "multiple" infractions regarding documentation did not convince the Tribunal that public safety demands the closure of the appellant's school. It is apparent from the legislative requirements referred to in the Decision that documentation is how compliance with the legislative requirements is established, as the Decision acknowledges in paragraphs 5 and 6. Further it is not necessary for the respondent to establish "intent to defraud".
30The second reason is that "...the appellant's business was relatively new at the time of infractions, having been registered on September 22, 2022": paragraph 73(ii).
31There is nothing in the legislative requirements set out in the Decision that excuses "new" businesses from compliance.
32The third reason is that "...the evidence leads me to conclude that the interventions of the Superintendent were clearly exploratory in nature (more fault-finding than fact-finding) with no intention or effort to assist the appellant into compliance...a graduated disciplinary approach would have more adequately balance the mandate to ensure public safety and consumer protection with the opportunity of the appellant to maintain their business in a responsible and compliant manner": paragraph 73 (iii).
33No evidence is cited to support the conclusion that interventions of the Superintendent were "...clearly exploratory in nature (more fault-finding than fact-finding with no intention or effort to assist the appellant into compliance...". No factual or legislative basis is cited for the proposition that the Superintendent's mandate includes assisting the appellant into compliance. No evidence or authority is cited for the statement that the respondent has a "consumer protection" mandate. Further, it is clear from the Decision that the appellant had opportunity over several years to operate its business in accordance with the law and the Tribunal found that it did not do so. While the appellant may be a business, it must comply with the legislative requirements for maintaining a licence.
34Purporting to provide training to truck drivers that didn't happen, is falsified in the records as found in the Decision, and is not in compliance with legislative requirements gives rise to an apparent public safety issue. The Decision does not appear to adequately consider public safety or give sufficient reasons on this.
Insufficient Reasons Given for the Lifting of the Immediate Suspension
35The lifting of the immediate suspension is ordered "...as the reasons for the suspension no longer exist...": paragraph 74. No further reasons are given for the lifting of the immediate suspension. I find the reason given is insufficiently explained.
36The Decision orders that the immediate suspension is lifted and that the appellant's registration as a private career college should continue subject to the three conditions: paragraphs 78, 79 and 80.
Failure to Appreciate the Legal Significance of Findings of Fact Made
37I agree with the respondent's submission that the Decision failed to appreciate the significance of the appellant advancing students that have not completed the mandatory requirements of the program.
38Having found in paragraphs 17 and 20 that S.K.'s and S.S.'s mandatory training of the MELT program were falsified, and having found in paragraphs 62(iv) and 69 that Nirbhai Gill was not an instructor at the appellant from October 15 to December 6, 2023 thereby raising doubts regarding the completion of the program by P.S. and A.S. and that the records were retroactively falsified to produce the appearance that the students did complete the program, the Decision fails to impose any appropriate sanction or order the appellant to take any specific steps to remedy these significant issues.
39I agree with the respondent's submission that, having found in paragraph 50 that the appellant fabricated grades on P.S.'s records, and having found in paragraphs 17, 20-21, 26, 37, 40, 52-53, 57, 62(i), 62(ii), 69, and 71, ten other falsifications of records including DVIR in breach of Regulation 199/07, s. 7(1), false student training logs, false odometer readings in breach of Regulation 199/07, falsification of J.S.'s mid-term evaluation, failure of instructor Nirbhai Gill to contemporaneously sign DVIR's, retroactively falsifying records of hours completed by P.S. and A.S., and failure to sign some of P.S.'s student logs at all, by the appellant, the Decision failed to appreciate the significance of these findings of fabrication and falsifications. As such the Tribunal made an error of fact and law such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made.
40Further, having found in paragraph 70 that the respondent established on a balance of probabilities that the appellant is not likely to meet the requirements of the Act of the regulations, and having found in paragraphs 71 that the appellant failed to comply with s. 18(2)(c) and s. 38(10) of the Act by "providing records of training that they knew or ought to have known were false or misleading", the Decision failed to appreciate the significant of these findings of fact and law. As such the Tribunal made an error of fact and law such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made.
41Instead, the Decision concludes in paragraph 73(i) that "...while the infractions regarding documentation are multiple, none of them convince me that public safety demands the closure of the appellant's school" and introduces the element of intent into the legislative requirements with "I am also not prepared to conclude that the falsification of documentation were necessarily done with the intent to defraud the Superintendent".
42Section 18(2)(c) of the Act provides that the respondent may suspend or revoke a registration if the registrant has failed to comply with a provision of the Act or the regulations. This section does not reference the "intent" of the registrant. If the legislature had meant to introduce "intent" into this requirement, it would have done so.
43Similarly s. 38(10) of the Act provides that no person shall provide information to the respondent that the person knows to be false or misleading. Having found in paragraph 70 that the appellant provided records that the appellant "knew or ought to have known were false or misleading", and having in fact found that the appellant breached s. 38(10), the Decision ought not to impute a legal requirement on the respondent to establish that "...the falsification of documentation were necessarily done with the intent to defraud the Superintendent". Again, if the legislature had meant to introduce an "intent to defraud" requirement into s. 38(10) it would have done so.
44Imputing the requirement for "intent" into these sections of the Act is an error of law based on the factual findings of falsification and fabrication already made.
Conditions
45While the Tribunal has discretion to impose conditions on continued registration, here the conditions do not appear to be a reasonable exercise of discretion given the above findings of fact made in the Decision about the appellant's conduct and the requirements of the Act.
46The first condition in paragraph 80 requires the appellant to "hire a compliance monitor appointed by the Superintendent" for six months. Implementation of this condition requires the respondent to "appoint" a compliance monitor for the appellant at the cost of the appellant, requiring the regulator to enter into a specific monitoring arrangement with the registrant.
47The second condition imposes a general obligation on the appellant to "...ensure that all documentation...be filed and reviewed on the dates that additions are required." The third condition imposes a general obligation on the appellant: "Any corrections of inadequacies, inaccuracies and omissions to any and all required documentation shall be made within 2 business days, initialized by the individual correcting the document." The appellant already has legislated record keeping requirements which the appellant was found in the Decision to have breached on multiple occasions. In view of the findings of fact and finding of breach of legislative requirements set out in the Decision, as for example, in paragraph 70, these conditions are unlikely to ensure the appellant's compliance with the Act, regulations and the Commercial Truck Driver Training Standard (Class A) which is the goal stated in paragraph 75. If compliance is accomplished by the conditions, it would be temporary. As such the conditions imposed constitute an error of fact and law.
48I am also satisfied for the reasons set out above that that the Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made.
49The appellant's submissions do not persuade me otherwise.
50Although the test for reconsideration under Rule 18.2 involves a high threshold, and the reconsideration process is not an opportunity for a party to re-litigate its position where it disagrees with the Tribunal's decision, or with the weight assigned to the evidence, and reconsideration is a limited, error correcting exercise, not an appeal or an opportunity to re-argue a case, here I find that the respondent has met its burden and established its grounds for reconsideration under Rule 18 for the reasons set out above.
Cost Request of Appellant
51In its submissions the appellant requests costs of this Reconsideration on the basis that the reconsideration is without merit and constitutes a re-litigation of matters already decided.
52I have found that the reconsideration is warranted for the reasons above.
53Further, there is nothing in the appellant's submissions that persuades me that the conduct of the respondent that rises to the level of acting unreasonably, frivolously, vexatiously, or in bad faith in this proceeding within the meaning of Rule 19.
54The respondent has the right to seek reconsideration and did so. The appellant's request for costs is dismissed.
CONCLUSION & ORDER
55For the reasons noted above, the respondent's request for reconsideration is granted.
56The Decision is cancelled and a rehearing shall take place by videoconference before an adjudicator or a panel that does not include the adjudicator who made the Decision or myself.
57The Tribunal will schedule a Case Conference to take place within 30 days from the date of this Order to set a date for the rehearing and to consider any other case management issues relating to the rehearing.
Avril A. Farlam Vice-Chair Tribunals Ontario – Licence Appeal Tribunal
Released: January 5, 2026