Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18121/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act

Between:

Julie Johnston

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

VICE-CHAIR:

Avril A. Farlam

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Julie Johnston, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Leila Pereira, Representative

HEARD: By Teleconference Friday, January 9, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Julie Johnston, (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of her motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Friday, December 19, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, Graig Fontaine (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle in contravention of a condition that prohibits him from driving a motor vehicle that is not equipped with an ignition interlock device. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2Section 55.1(1) provides that where an officer is satisfied that a person driving a motor vehicle on a highway while his or her driver’s licence is under suspension, or in contravention of a condition that prohibits him or her from driving a motor vehicle that is not equipped with an ignition interlock device, shall detain the vehicle and shall impound it under s. 55.1(3).

3The appellant appeals on the grounds that that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

4The issue in dispute is:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

5For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

6For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship

7I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

8The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

9If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

10If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

11The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

12The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

13I am not satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

14The appellant testified that she requires the vehicle in order to provide it to one of her children who is living and attending high school in another municipality. The appellant testified that the impoundment of the vehicle has caused exceptional hardship for her and her child because she could not provide this mode of transportation to her child.

15The appellant admitted in her testimony, and the Registrar’s documents establish, that the appellant owns a second vehicle, a 2019 Ford which she and other family members are using to get to work, obtain groceries, pharmaceutical needs. The appellant had planned to provide the impounded vehicle to her child who lives in another municipality so that she can get to school.

16The appellant also admitted in her testimony that her child who is the intended user of the impounded vehicle can and does walk to school, although it is a 40 minute walk, has access to public transportation such as the bus, and has taken the bus to return to her home after school. The appellant testified that her child cannot take the bus to school because of the bus scheduling in the early morning. The appellant is concerned that the public transit available to her child is not convenient and that walking to school in winter weather is difficult and the child is sometimes late for class or misses class.

17The appellant also testified that her child could takes uber or taxis to school but that this is not affordable.

18Although the appellant spoke of the inconvenience of taking the bus, this is not a factor which the Tribunal can take into consideration.

19Because the appellant owns another vehicle which she is using to care of her personal transportation needs and to get to work, I find that this constitutes an alternative to the use of the impounded vehicle. Further the child who lives in another municipality has alternatives to the impounded vehicle given that the child is able to walk and take public transit for that child’s transportation needs and has done so during the impoundment period.

20The appellant’s preference to provide the second vehicle she owns to her child as opposed to the child taking the bus or walking is a matter of convenience which I am not permitted to consider in determining whether there is exceptional hardship.

21As a result, I am unable to consider the appellant’s submissions related to financial or economic loss.

22Because the appellant has alternatives to the impounded vehicle as set out above, I find the appellant has not established the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the HTA and s. 10 of the Regulation.

23I find that the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

24Since the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with the Act and the Regulation and I need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship.

Conclusion

25I find that:

i. the appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

26The Tribunal Orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

Released: January 12, 2026

__________________________

Avril A. Farlam

Vice-Chair