RECONSIDERATION DECISION
Before: Christopher Yan, Adjudicator
Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 23-004264/AABS
Case Name: Corinna Stroop v. Allstate Insurance
Written Submissions by:
For the Applicant: Michael Ferrante, Paralegal
For the Respondent: Suzanne Clarke, Counsel
OVERVIEW
1On July 10, 2025, the respondent requested reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision released June 17, 2025 (the “decision”).
2The decision followed a hearing by way of written submissions. In the decision, I found that the applicant was entitled to pre-104 week income replacement benefits (“IRBs”) in varying amounts for the period of August 15, 2022 to May 7, 2024, plus interest on any overdue amounts.
3In determining the quantum of IRBs, my decision placed greater weight on the respondent’s accounting report from Davis Martindale, dated June 12, 2024. However, I found that two key assumptions in that report required adjustment as they were unsubstantiated by the evidence. The two assumptions were:
a. that approximately $17,788.00 in “unknown deposits” into the applicant’s bank account should be treated as post-accident earned income; and
b. that the applicant continued earning income at a similar rate after her employment at Buist Landscaping ended on November 18, 2023.
4The respondent’s request for reconsideration challenges my rejection of these two assumptions and seeks to have the Davis Martindale report accepted in its entirety.
5The grounds for a request for reconsideration are found in Rule 18.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“Rules”). To grant a request for reconsideration, the Tribunal must be satisfied that one or more of the following criteria are met:
a) The Tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction or committed a material breach of procedural fairness;
b) The Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made; or
c) There is evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it, and would likely have affected the result.
6The respondent relies on Rules 18.2(a) and 18.2(b), alleging that I made significant errors of law and fact and breached the rules of natural justice and procedural fairness. The respondent seeks a determination that the applicant is not entitled to any IRBs between August 15, 2022 and May 7, 2024, and that the applicant is not entitled to interest.
7The applicant opposes the respondent’s request for reconsideration, submitting that the respondent has failed to meet the criteria under Rule 18.2 and is merely attempting to re-argue its case.
RESULT
8The respondent’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.
ANALYSIS
9The test for reconsideration under Rule 18.2 involves a high threshold. The reconsideration process is not an opportunity for a party to re-litigate its position where it disagrees with the Tribunal’s decision, or with the weight assigned to the evidence. The requestor must show how or why the decision falls into one of the categories in Rule 18.2.
10The respondent submits that I made several errors and breached its right to procedural fairness. These grounds can be summarized as follows:
a. I made an error of law by reversing the onus of proof regarding the post-accident bank deposits;
b. I breached natural justice by assuming, without evidence, that the applicant earned no income after November 18, 2023, and erred by not drawing an adverse inference against her; and
c. I made an error of fact by mischaracterizing the respondent’s accounting report.
11I find the respondent has not established that any of these grounds meet the standard for granting a reconsideration.
The Post-Accident Bank Deposits and Onus of Proof
12The respondent argues that I made an error of law by reversing the legal onus of proof. It submits that the applicant bears the onus to prove the quantum of IRBs, including her post-accident income. The respondent submits that there was no evidence substantiating the applicant’s position that these deposits were support from friends and family. The respondent further submits that I accepted an unproven assertion and then faulted the respondent for not providing a deposit-by-deposit analysis or evidence to disprove the applicant’s explanation.
13I do not accept that my reasoning reversed the legal onus. The applicant bears the onus to establish the quantum of IRBs on a balance of probabilities, which includes establishing her post-accident earned income. The issue on reconsideration is whether I made a material error in how I weighed the evidence relevant to these deposits.
14In this case, the applicant’s position on the deposits was not merely a statement in submissions. As the respondent acknowledges in its reconsideration materials, the applicant provided an explanation to her accountant that the deposits were financial support from friends and family, and that explanation was recorded in the Great Oak accounting report that was filed in evidence. In my decision, I summarized this evidence at paragraph 53(i) when I stated that the applicant explained the deposits were financial support from friends and family. While this evidence was not accompanied by a deposit-by-deposit corroboration, it was nonetheless evidence I was entitled to weigh, and there was no evidentiary basis advanced that made the explanation implausible on the record before me.
15Having weighed the record, I found the applicant’s explanation satisfactory and was not satisfied that these deposits were post-accident earned income. The respondent’s report treated the deposits as earned income primarily because they were “unidentified.” The fact that a deposit is “unidentified” does not, without more, establish that it is earned income. The respondent’s original submissions did not explain why those deposits should be treated as post-accident earned income (beyond the blanket characterization that they were post-accident deposits), and it did not direct me to evidence connecting the deposits to any employment or business activity. On this record, classifying the deposits as earned income would have required speculation.
16The respondent’s request, in substance, seeks a different reweighing of the same record and different inferences about these deposits. Disagreement with the inferences drawn, or with the weight assigned to the evidence, is not a basis for reconsideration under Rule 18.2.
Post-Employment Income after November 18, 2023
17The respondent argues that I breached natural justice by assuming the applicant had no income after her employment at Buist Landscaping ended on or about November 18, 2023. It argues there was no positive evidence of zero income for the period to May 7, 2024 because bank statements were not produced beyond November 18, 2023. It submits that, given the applicant’s history of multiple pre-accident income streams, I should have drawn an adverse inference from her failure to produce bank statements for the period after this date. Moreover, the respondent argues that I breached procedural fairness by using the applicant’s incomplete disclosure to her benefit.
18To the extent the respondent now seeks an adverse inference, I note that this was not squarely advanced as a discrete remedy in the respondent’s original hearing submissions. Reconsideration is not an opportunity to raise new arguments or reframe a party’s case after the fact. In any event, even if I were to consider the adverse inference argument, it would not likely have changed the outcome for the reasons below.
19My finding was based on the evidence that was before me regarding the applicant’s known post-accident employment. The Record of Employment and the EI materials confirmed that the Buist employment ended in November 2023. The respondent did not identify any specific additional employment or business income source after that date, nor did it provide evidence from which a post-November 2023 earned income amount could be determined.
20Even if an adverse inference were drawn from the non-production of additional bank statements, an adverse inference does not supply a rational basis to assign a specific amount of post-accident earned income for the period November 19, 2023, to May 7, 2024. The respondent’s requested outcome requires a finding that the applicant earned at least enough income to eliminate IRB entitlement, and the record does not provide a non-speculative basis to make that finding. My decision to rely on the Record of Employment and Employment Insurance evidence and to decline to assume hypothetical earnings from unknown sources was a weighing of the evidence, not a breach of natural justice or procedural fairness.
21The respondent has therefore not shown that I made an error of law or a material error of fact, or that any alleged omission in my reasons would likely have changed the result.
Mischaracterization of the Davis Martindale Report
22The respondent submits that I misstated its accounting report by finding it “assumed Ms. Stroop continued to earn income from Buist Landscaping Inc. at the same rate after November 18, 2023.” It clarifies that the report calculated the IRB quantum only up to November 18, 2023, and then provided commentary on a possible future scenario.
23I accept that my characterization in the decision of the report’s finding was imprecise. The report itself did not make a definitive calculation past November 18, 2023. However, this imprecision does not amount to a material error of fact that would likely have changed the result. The functional effect of the respondent’s overall position at the hearing was to ask the Tribunal to reduce the applicant’s IRBs after November 18, 2023, based on a hypothetical continuation of income for which there was no evidence. Whether this position was grounded in an assumption in the report, my core finding remains the same: there was no evidence of post-accident income after that date. Therefore, this minor mischaracterization does not meet the threshold required by Rule 18.2(b).
CONCLUSION & ORDER
24The respondent has not met its onus to show I acted outside of my jurisdiction or committed a material breach of procedural fairness, pursuant to Rule 18.2(a).
25The respondent has not met its onus to show that I committed an error of law or fact such that I would likely have reached a different result, pursuant to Rule 18.2(b).
26The respondent’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.
Christopher Yan Adjudicator Tribunals Ontario – Licence Appeal Tribunal
Released: January 14, 2026