Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18333/MVIA
In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while in contravention of a condition under s. 55.1(1)2 of the Act.
Between:
Liam Boyle
Appellant
and
Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Respondent
DECISION
ADJUDICATOR:
Dagmar Boettcher
APPEARANCES:
For the Appellant:
Liam Boyle, Self-represented
For the Respondent:
Leila Pereira, Agent
HEARD: By Teleconference
Thursday March 5, 2026
OVERVIEW
1The appellant, Liam Boyle, appeals under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”) from the 45-day impoundment of a 2013 Volkswagen JTD motor vehicle (the “vehicle”). The appellant’s vehicle was impounded on February 12, 2026. At the time of the impoundment, the appellant was driving the vehicle while his driver's licence was subject to a mandatory ignition interlock condition as a result of a Criminal Code conviction. There was no ignition interlock device installed on the impounded vehicle.
2A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days, ending on March 29, 2026.
3The appellant is appealing on the ground that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.
ISSUES
4The issue in dispute is:
i. Whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.
RESULT
5For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.
ANALYSIS
6For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.
The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship
7I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).
8The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:
[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.
9If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.
10If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.
11The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:
(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;
(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;
(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and
(d) the impact of the loss,
(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and
(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).
12The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.
Alternative to the impounded vehicle
13I am not satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.
14The appellant testified that he purchased the vehicle on February 11, 2026 and made the decision to drive the vehicle home on February 12, 2026. The appellant testified that he was aware that his driver’s licence (“licence”) had a condition that required an ignition interlock system and that the vehicle he drove home on February 12, 2026 had no interlock device installed. The appellant testified further that he regretted his decision and acknowledged his poor judgment in the situation. The appellant testified that there is no public transit in Brighton Ontario and that taxis are available, but far too costly.
15The respondent testified that the vehicle was lawfully impounded due to a criminal code suspension on the appellant’s licence. The respondent submitted further that, not only did the appellant’s licence require an ignition interlock system, but the class of licence held by the appellant was a G1, and that a G1 licence requires a licenced passenger in the vehicle who holds a G class licence.
16During the respondent’s cross-examination, the appellant testified that there was no other roadworthy vehicle registered in the household, and that he and his girlfriend and daughter live in Brighton, while his immediate family as well as that of his girlfriend live too far away to offer assistance with rides. However, the appellant testified that the family was using the food delivery service “Hello Fresh” and that there were no immediate health concerns requiring medical appointments within the family. Additionally, the appellant testified during cross-examination that in the past three weeks since the impoundment he had missed two weeks of work due to weather and the lack of a ride. During the past week, the appellant testified that he had either walked the three hours to work in Colbourne or been given a ride.
17The respondent submitted that there has been no threat to the health and safety of the appellant or any family member and that groceries and essentials are delivered to the home, and occasional rides are offered to the appellant to get to work. The respondent submitted that the criteria of “exceptional hardship” has not been met.
18I find that the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle. The family has access to food delivery services and taxis if an emergency should occur. In addition, the appellant is in good health and testified that he has walked three hours to work. Additionally, on today’s date, he testified that he will be receiving a ride to work.
19The appellant has testified that he was the driver of the vehicle and was aware that an ignition interlock was required on the vehicle. Additionally, the respondent submitted that the class of the appellant’s driver’s licence precluded him from being the sole occupant in the vehicle and that the appointment to install the interlock was only scheduled for February 24, 2026. The appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle and therefore exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with the Act and the Regulation. I therefore need not make determinations with respect to the remaining components of the exceptional hardship test.
Conclusions
20I find that:
i. the appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship and the appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act must fail.
ORDER
21The Tribunal Orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.
Released: March 9, 2026
Dagmar Boettcher
Adjudicator

