RECONSIDERATION DECISION
Before:
Craig Mazerolle, Vice-Chair
Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number:
24-008672/AABS
Case Name:
Samuel Agyapong v. Aviva General Insurance Company
Written Submissions by:
For the Applicant:
Rita M. Gratsias, Counsel Kwaku Bona, Paralegal and Student-at-Law
For the Respondent:
Geoffrey Keating, Counsel
OVERVIEW
1On December 4, 2025, the applicant requested reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision released October 2, 2025 (“decision”).
2Stemming from an accident on September 26, 2016 and a request for benefits made pursuant to the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule – Effective September 1, 2010 (including amendments effective June 1, 2016) (the “Schedule”), the parties participated in a three-day videoconference hearing. In the decision, the Tribunal found the applicant did not establish a catastrophic impairment based on Criterion 8. The Tribunal also determined that the applicant was not entitled to an OCF-6 for prescriptions or interest.
3The grounds for a request for reconsideration are found in Rule 18.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“Rules”). To grant a request for reconsideration, the Tribunal must be satisfied that one or more of the following criteria are met:
a) The Tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction or committed a material breach of procedural fairness;
b) The Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made; or
c) There is evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it, and would likely have affected the result.
4The applicant relies on Rule 18.2(a) and Rule 18.2(b) to support his request. He is seeking an order finding that he is catastrophically impaired. Or, in the alternative, he is asking for a new hearing.
5The respondent is asking the Tribunal to dismiss this request.
RESULT
6The applicant’s request for reconsideration is granted.
7Pursuant to Rule 18.4, the decision is cancelled. A rehearing will be conducted before a new adjudicator.
8A case conference will be scheduled within 30 days of the release of this reconsideration decision.
ANALYSIS
9The test for reconsideration under Rule 18.2 involves a high threshold, and the requesting party must show how or why the decision falls into one of the categories in Rule 18.2. The reconsideration process is not an opportunity for a party to re-litigate its position where it disagrees with the Tribunal’s decision, or with the weight assigned to the evidence.
Rule 18.2(a) – Material Breaches of Procedural Fairness
10Claiming he was entitled to a high level of fairness based on Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC) (“Baker”), the applicant argues the Tribunal breached his right to procedural fairness as follows:
a. The applicant was not permitted to have a student-at-law represent him at the hearing;
b. The Tribunal excluded the applicant from certain parts of the hearing;
c. The applicant was denied continuous interpretation during the hearing;
d. The Tribunal interfered with the applicant’s right to a full examination and reply; and,
e. The hearing adjudicator exhibited a reasonable apprehension of bias.
11I find the applicant has established material breaches of procedural fairness, pursuant to Rule 18.2(a). In light of this conclusion, I do not find it is necessary to consider the applicant’s grounds for reconsideration based on Rule 18.2(b).
12As the issues in dispute involve a determination of catastrophic impairment, the Tribunal owed the parties a high level of procedural fairness. Catastrophic impairment designations are among the most significant rulings that the Tribunal is empowered to make under the Schedule, and the impact of finding one way or the other is highly consequential for both parties. The significant impact of this designation means that, in accordance with Baker, there is a greater level of scrutiny when procedural fairness concerns are raised.
Applicant’s Legal Representation
13First, I find the applicant has shown the Tribunal materially breached his right to procedural fairness by limiting the ability of one of his chosen legal representatives to participate in the hearing.
14The Tribunal addressed the applicant’s legal representation at paragraphs 10 – 13 of the decision:
Rita M. Gratsias, Counsel, and Kwaku Bona, Paralegal, identifed [sic] themselves as the applicant’s representatives. I questioned Mr. Bona’s ability to represent the applicant at the hearing given that he is a Paralegal and given that one of the issues in dispute is catastrophic impairment.
Mr. Bona advised me that he was currently a student-at-law, and he can call himself a lawyer. As such, he asserted he is able to represent the applicant in this matter. It is his submission that, since he is well on his way to being a lawyer, the Law Society of Ontario’s (“LSO”) By-laws do not apply in this case. In fact, he has represented the applicant in other cases which appeared before the Tribunal.
Before making a ruling, I asked Mr. Bona to provide me with the authority that allows a law student to act as counsel for someone who may be catastrophically impaired. I was not provided with any legal authority.
Since Mr. Bona’s status appears as a Paralegal in the LSO’s Directory, I declined to allow him to represent the applicant in this matter. I rely on LSO By-Law 4, which prohibits paralegals from representing a party in a statutory accident benefits claim where an individual is or appears to be catastrophic impaired. Counsel Rita M. Gratsias proceeded to represent the applciant [sic] for the duration of the hearing.
15The applicant claims this determination breached his right to procedural fairness, as there is no legal basis for placing a limit on a student-at-law’s participation in a claim involving catastrophic impairment. To support this position, the applicant cites s. 10 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22 (“SPPA”), which allows a party to be represented, as well as the permission granted to a student-at-law to provide legal services under the LSO By-Laws.
16It is well-established that the ability for a party to be represented by the counsel or paralegal of their choosing is a fundamental right in our adversarial system. Limits may be placed on this right, but a decision-maker should be cautious when deciding to intervene. By reviewing LSO By-Law 4, I am satisfied that a student-at-law is permitted to provide the same legal services as a Class L1 licensee (i.e., a lawyer), so long as they are working under the supervision of counsel.
17Section 6 of LSO By-Law 4 states that paralegals are not permitted to represent individuals who have or appear to have a catastrophic impairment. Specifically, they are only permitted to address a “claim”, and a “claim” is defined as “a claim for statutory accident benefits… excluding a claim of an individual who has or appears to have a catastrophic impairment within the meaning of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule”.
18Section 34 of the By-Law then details the type of legal services that a student may provide. This provision does not include the same limit on catastrophic impairment claims:
A student may, without a licence, provide legal services in Ontario under the direct supervision of a licensee who holds a Class L1 licence who is approved by the Society while, (a) in service under articles of clerkship; or (b) completing a work placement in the law practice program.
19In the present case, the applicant was seeking to be represented by two individuals: Ms. Gratsias and Mr. Bona. The former is a licensed lawyer with the LSO, while the latter (at the time of the hearing) was both a paralegal and a student-at-law. There was some confusion over Mr. Bona’s status during the hearing, especially as his Declaration of Representative form listed his paralegal licensing number. However, during the first day of the hearing, Ms. Gratsias confirmed that Mr. Bona was both a paralegal and a student-at-law.
20Considering his status as a student-at-law (as well as the presence of Ms. Gratsias, a Class L1 licensee, throughout the hearing), I find the Tribunal did not have the ability to limit Mr. Bona’s participation in the proceeding on account of the applicant’s claim of catastrophic impairment. Rather, by limiting the ability of his chosen legal representatives to participate in the hearing (a limit that did not accord with LSO By-Law 4), the Tribunal materially breached the applicant’s right to procedural fairness. This breach is especially consequential considering catastrophic impairment was the key issue in dispute.
21The respondent challenges this position by claiming that Mr. Bona was allowed to participate in the hearing. Specifically, it submits the adjudicator ruled that, so long as he did not touch on “catastrophic impairment adjacent issues”, Mr. Bona could make submissions. The respondent also claims that s. 23(3) of the SPPA allows the Tribunal to remove certain representatives from a hearing.
22I agree that Mr. Bona was permitted to make submissions on some preliminary matters, but this permission was tightly constrained in a way that does not accord with the LSO By-Laws. For instance, when Mr. Bona attempted to make submissions about surveillance evidence, the adjudicator found this argument “has to do with the CAT matter.”
23I am also satisfied that Mr. Bona made it clear that he took issue with this limit being placed on his ability to participate. For instance, following the discussion about surveillance, Mr. Bona raised a clear concern about the potential impact this limit could have on his client: “I want to make sure the Tribunal does not deprive [the applicant] from proper representation.”
24Finally, I do not find the respondent’s argument about s. 23(3) is persuasive. Section 23(3) of the SPPA states:
A tribunal may exclude from a hearing anyone, other than a person licensed under the Law Society Act, appearing on behalf of a party or as an adviser to a witness if it finds that such person is not competent properly to represent or to advise the party or witness, or does not understand and comply at the hearing with the duties and responsibilities of an advocate or adviser.
25Aside from the fact that I have found Mr. Bona’s status permitted him to participate, the respondent has not pointed to any section of the transcript or decision where the adjudicator concluded that Mr. Bona was “not competent properly to represent or to advise the party or witness, or does not understand and comply at the hearing with the duties and responsibilities of an advocate or adviser”. Rather, the Tribunal’s determination was based on Mr. Bona’s LSO status.
26In sum, the applicant has demonstrated that the Tribunal materially breached his right to procedural fairness by limiting the ability of one of his chosen legal representatives to participate in the proceeding.
Applicant’s Removal from the Hearing
27The applicant has also shown the Tribunal materially breached his right to procedural fairness by removing him from the hearing.
28Though the parties’ submissions discuss several instances when the applicant was removed from the hearing, I am focusing my analysis on his removal during a portion of the cross-examination of Dr. Jodi Grenier, the respondent’s psychiatric assessor. Specifically, when Ms. Gratsias was questioning how she reached her conclusions about the applicant’s Criterion 8 ratings, an objection was raised. According to the transcript, the adjudicator placed Dr. Grenier, the applicant, and “Ms. Aripal” (which I assume is a misspelling of Arsheena Harripaul, the respondent’s claims representative) in a virtual waiting room. Following this removal, the parties’ legal representatives discussed an aspect of Dr. Grenier’s report. Following this discussion, the adjudicator stated that she would “let them all back in.” The cross-examination continued.
29According to the applicant, procedural fairness required the Tribunal to ensure he was present throughout the entire hearing. I agree. Save for very limited exceptions (such as a party acting in an abusive manner), parties are entitled to be present during a hearing that involves their rights and interests. There is no indication that the applicant was exhibiting any kind of behaviour that would require his removal, and—even if the adjudicator had concerns about how the objection might impact the evidence—the applicant had already testified by this point. There was no reason why the applicant had to be removed from the hearing during the discussion of this objection.
30Further, I note that this objection involved an expert witness’s testimony on the key issue in dispute. In fact, Dr. Grenier’s opinion ended up playing a pivotal role in the denial of catastrophic impairment, as the Tribunal preferred Dr. Grenier’s evidence over the opinion of the applicant’s assessor for one of the Criterion 8 domains: see paragraph 69 of the decision.
31The respondent challenges this ground by claiming that the applicant did not object to his “temporary” removal from the hearing. Further, the respondent submits that its claims representative was also removed from the hearing.
32I do not find these arguments disrupt my findings above. Though I accept that there was no objection raised about his removal during the hearing, the impact was still significant. Specifically, the level of procedural fairness required during the cross-examination of this witness was very high, because this evidence played a key role in the determination of the applicant’s claim for catastrophic impairment. Therefore, while it would have been preferable for the applicant to have lodged his opposition during the hearing, the impact of the breach remains.
33Similarly, I do not find the removal of both parties mitigates the effect of the breach. Neither party should have been removed, so the removal of both parties does not eliminate the negative impact of this procedural choice on the applicant.
Reasonable Apprehension of Bias
34Though the two breaches above are sufficient to trigger the remedy I have set out below under Rule 18.4, I still find it necessary to discuss the applicant’s allegations of bias. Bias allegations call into question the integrity of the adjudicator, as well as the integrity of the overall administration of justice. The Tribunal takes these allegations very seriously. Overall, I find the applicant has not met the high burden needed to establish a reasonable apprehension of bias.
35The test for a reasonable apprehension of bias is set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in the oft-cited case of Committee for Justice and Liberty v. Canada, 1976 CanLII 2 (SCC), at p. 394:
[T]he apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and right-minded persons, applying themselves to the question and obtaining thereon the required information. In the words of the Court of Appeal, that test is “what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically – and having thought the matter through – conclude. Would he think that it is more likely than not that [the decision-maker], whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly.”
36In Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, 2003 S.C.R. 45, at paragraph 59, the Supreme Court confirmed the existence of a strong presumption of judicial and quasi-judicial impartiality. To overcome this presumption, a party alleging actual bias or a reasonable apprehension of bias must establish the presence of serious and substantial grounds.
37The applicant claims the hearing adjudicator demonstrated bias by not considering the “totality of the evidence”. The applicant also suggests that his concerns about the decision to bar one of his representatives from fully participating in the hearing, as well as alleged interference with his examination-in-chief and cross-examination, are further examples of bias. Finally, the applicant claims the adjudicator “demonstrated antagonism” toward him.
38To start, I do not find the applicant has shown how the adjudicator’s handling of the evidence demonstrates a reasonable apprehension of bias. Aside from the fact that decision-makers are not expected to mention every piece of evidence or argument presented during a hearing, the Tribunal is entitled to weigh evidence as it sees fit. It is not enough for a party requesting reconsideration to merely disagree with the evidentiary findings made by the Tribunal, especially if they are seeking to challenge the integrity of the adjudicator.
39In a similar vein, the applicant’s allegations that there was “antagonism” directed toward him is unsupported. Bias allegations, especially those based on the alleged conduct of an adjudicator towards the parties, must be supported by cogent evidence and specific submissions. The applicant has not shown serious and substantial grounds based on his sparse comments about “antagonism”.
40I then find the applicant has not shown that the adjudicator interfered with his examination-in-chief and cross-examination. The applicant claims that the Tribunal “interfered or denied” him the right for his representative to examine him and other witnesses. The one example that he highlights involves his counsel’s cross-examination of Dr. Grenier. Specifically, the applicant claims the adjudicator ordered Ms. Gratsias “to stop” her questioning during a “very crucial point” by saying she has “got two more minutes.”
41Aside from the fact that adjudicators are entitled to oversee the timely and fair conduct of a hearing, such that reminders about timing are often a necessary tool, I do not see how this single moment is sufficient to establish bias. In fact, from my review of the transcript, it appears the cross-examination of Dr. Grenier was quite extensive. According to the time stamps, this questioning ran for over 70 minutes. I also note that, when Ms. Gratsias was told she had two more minutes, her response was: “Okay.” Though not determinative on its own, there was no noted opposition at this juncture. Taken together, I do not see how this single example of time management merits a finding that the adjudicator exhibited a reasonable apprehension of bias.
42Though the applicant adds in reply that the “transcripts speak for themselves and point to [the adjudicator] repeatedly rushing or warning” his representative, the applicant only points to this one example. The applicant also claims the Tribunal interfered with his counsel’s closing arguments. No specific example is provided.
43Finally, though I accept that the applicant has demonstrated a breach of procedural fairness based on Mr. Bona’s limited ability to participate, I do not find this breach reaches the level of bias. The transcript shows the adjudicator engaged in a lengthy discussion with the parties concerning Mr. Bona’s participation, and there was a detailed explanation provided for this procedural choice in the decision. Even though I find the adjudicator erred in this approach, there is no indication that this determination was driven by bias, nor do I find that an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically – and having thought the matter through – would conclude that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias. Rather, I conclude that an informed person would be aware of the specific limitations placed on certain legal representatives for claims involving catastrophic impairment, and that the adjudicator turned her mind to the relevant considerations at play.
44In sum, though he has not demonstrated how the Tribunal exhibited a reasonable apprehension of bias, the applicant has established grounds for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 18.2(a).
Rule 18.4 – Cancelling the Decision
45Due to the limits placed on Mr. Bona’s participation in the hearing, as well as the removal of the applicant during the hearing, I find the only appropriate remedy under Rule 18.4 is to cancel the decision and order a rehearing. A rehearing is required to allow the applicant and his chosen legal representatives the chance to fairly participate in the proceeding.
46This rehearing will take place before a new adjudicator. A case conference will be scheduled to allow the Tribunal to issue procedural and administrative directions as necessary for the conduct of this rehearing.
CONCLUSION & ORDER
47The applicant’s request for reconsideration is granted.
48Pursuant to Rule 18.4, the decision is cancelled. A rehearing will be conducted before a new adjudicator.
49A case conference will be scheduled within 30 days of the release of this reconsideration decision so that the Tribunal may issue procedural and administrative directions as necessary for the conduct of the rehearing. The Tribunal shall reach out to the parties to canvass dates for this case conference.
50I am not seized.
Craig Mazerolle
Vice-Chair
Released: February 27, 2026