Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18270/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended.

Between:

Jane Tilling

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

VICE-CHAIR: Kevin Kovalchuk

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Jane Tilling, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Leila Pereira, Representative

HEARD BY TELECONFERNCE: February 19, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Jane Tilling, (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of her motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Wednesday, February 4, 2026. At the time of the impoundment, her son K.T. (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded and that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issue(s) in dispute are:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(a) of the Act, whether the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded; and

ii. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below the Registrar is ordered to release the impounded vehicle.

ANALYSIS

5The Registrar of Motor Vehicles (the “Registrar”) presented evidence that the vehicle was stopped by police while it was being driven by K.T. whose licence was suspended due to a prescribed Criminal Code conviction. I am therefor satisfied that the vehicle was validly impounded.

6For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The vehicle was stolen.

7I am satisfied that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded.

8In Marshall v. Ontario (Registrar of Motor Vehicles) [2002] O.J. No. 745 (Div. Ct.) (“Marshall”) the Divisional Court held that a vehicle is “stolen” in this context “when it is taken without the owner’s consent and when the perpetrator intends to deprive the owner of it, whether permanently or temporarily”.

9In other words, in order to establish that the vehicle was stolen for the purposes of s. 50.2(3)(a) of the Act, the appellant must prove that the vehicle was taken without the owner’s consent, and that the driver intended to deprive the owner of the vehicle, either permanently or temporarily.

10The appellant testified that her son K. T.’s driver’s licence had been suspended three or four years ago for impaired driving. The Registrar confirmed that K.T.’s licence was in fact suspended on October 7, 2022, for impaired driving. The appellant testified that after her son’s licence was suspended, she told him that he was never to use her car as he did not have her permission to use her car. She testified that she may have added her son as an excluded driver to her motor vehicle policy of insurance, but she was not sure of this.

11Her evidence was that her son had never taken her vehicle before the impoundment, while his licence was under suspension. Her son lives with her.

12The appellant testified that she normally kept the keys to her car in her purse. She normally kept her purse in her bedroom when she went to bed for the night. She testified that she went to bed at around 9 P.M. on the night of February 3, 2026. When she retired for the evening, her son was “on the computer”. At that time her car keys were in the bottom of her purse, they were not visible, and her purse was under the dining room table in her living room. She testified that this was a departure from her normal routine where, she kept her purse with her car keys in her bedroom when she went to bed. She did testify that she had left her car keys in her purse in the dining room on a prior occasion, without incident. She testified that she had no reason to suspect that her son would take her vehicle that evening, she “assumed” that he would be on the computer after which he would go to bed. She did not hear son leave the house after she went to bed.

13Her evidence was that she was awakened by a call from her son at around 5 A.M. on February 4, 2026, and told her that that the police were there because he had driven the car into a snowbank.

14The appellant was asked by the Registrar as to why she did not charge her son with theft of the vehicle. The appellant explained that her son has been struggling with mental health issues and drug addiction, and she did not want to compound his problems by having him charged with theft of the vehicle.

15I find that the appellant has established that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded.

16The vehicle was taken without the appellant’s consent, and I find that the driver intended to temporarily deprive the appellant of her vehicle.

17I accept the appellant’s evidence that she had no reason to believe that her son would go into her purse that evening to take the keys to her vehicle in order for him to take her vehicle. Her son did not ask to take the vehicle that evening, nor had he ever taken the vehicle before.

18The Notice to Registrar which was part of the Registrar’s submissions indicates that the incident leading to the impoundment took place at 05:12 hours on February 4, 2026. I find this to corroborate the appellant’s testimony that she was asleep when her vehicle was taken.

19I find that the appellant did not consent to, or acquiesce in, her son taking the vehicle either on a temporary or permanent basis.

20As I have decided to release the vehicle on the ground that it was stolen at the time it was impounded, I need not determine whether the other grounds have been established.

Conclusion

21I find that the appellant has established that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded. As such it is not necessary to consider the other grounds for appeal.

ORDER

22The Tribunal Orders that the Registrar shall release the impounded vehicle.

Released: March 2, 2026

__________________________

Kevin Kovalchuk

Vice-Chair