Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18288/MVIA
In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act
Between:
Elaine DeCunha
Appellant
and
Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Respondent
DECISION
VICE-CHAIR: Avril A. Farlam
APPEARANCES:
For the Appellant: Elaine DeCunha, Self-represented
For the Respondent: Leila Pereira, Representative
HEARD: By Teleconference Wednesday, February 25, 2026
OVERVIEW
1Elaine DeCunha, (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of their motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Friday, February 6, 2026. At the time of the impoundment, James Grant (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.
2The appellant appeals on the grounds that that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.
ISSUES
3The issue in dispute is:
i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.
RESULT
4For the reasons set out below the Registrar is ordered to release the impounded vehicle.
ANALYSIS
5For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.
The impoundment will cause exceptional hardship
6I am satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).
7The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:
[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.
8If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.
9If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.
10The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:
(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;
(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;
(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and
(d) the impact of the loss,
(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and
(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).
11The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.
Alternative to the impounded vehicle
12I am satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.
13The appellant testified that she lives by herself in a home in the country where there is no public transportation, uber, and ride sharing services are not available to her. The appellant has no family or friends who live near to her and can provide transportation to her during the impoundment period.
14The appellant testified that she has considered using a taxi to get to the grocery store and the pharmacy but the cost of doing so is $110.00 and she cannot afford that on her pension income.
15I find the appellant’s testimony credible and reliable. As a result, I find that using a taxi during the impoundment period is not a reasonable alternative for the appellant given that she is not working and the cost of a taxi is so high because she lives in the country.
16Although the respondent’s records show that other vehicles in addition to the impounded vehicle are registered to the appellant, specifically a 2002 Chevrolet, a 2001 Subaru, and a 1993 Nissan, the appellant testified that these vehicles are not available to her. The appellant admitted that she has a 1995 Toyota is her driveway which is not working and cannot be used by her during the impoundment period.
17As a result, I find that the appellant has established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.
Threat to health, safety, the environment or property
18I am satisfied that the impoundment will result in a threat to the health and safety of a person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, specifically the appellant, based on the following facts established by the appellant’s testimony.
19The appellant testified that she has medical issues and needs to attend medical appointments regularly. The appellant was unable to obtain transportation to her medical appointment scheduled for February 19, 2026 and had to miss this appointment.
20The appellant also testified that she has two other medical appointments scheduled for March 11 and March 31, 2026. The appellant’s March 11, 2026 medical appointment requires her to attend a hospital in another municipality approximately a one-half hour drive from her home. The appellant testified that she has no way of attending the March 11, 2026 medical appointment without her vehicle. Based on the appellant’s description of her medical issue, I find that there is likely a serious risk to her health if the appellant does not have her vehicle so that she can attend this medical appointment.
21The appellant also testified that she has been unable to obtain groceries, pharmaceutical and other items since her vehicle was impounded and has not left the house. I find that there is also likely a serious risk to the appellant’s health if she cannot obtain groceries, pharmaceuticals, and other items during the impoundment period.
22Given the facts I have found, as set out above, here I find that there is a threat to the health and safety of persons ordinarily transported by the vehicle, specifically the appellant, because her vehicle is needed to provide transportation to medical and personal appointments, and for the appellant to obtain groceries, pharmaceuticals, and household items.
23I can also consider financial, employment and education or training losses listed in s. 10(2) of the Regulation given that the appellant has established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.
24I accept that the impoundment fees will be a financial burden for the appellant based on the testimony of the appellant at the hearing which established the limited financial means of the appellant.
25I am also satisfied the losses will be immediate, significant and lasting given the limited financial means of the appellant and her medical issues.
26For the reasons set out above, I find that the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined in the Regulation.
Conclusion(s)
27I find that:
i. the appellant has established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.
ORDER
28The Tribunal Orders that the Registrar shall release the impounded vehicle.
Released: March 2, 2026
__________________________
Avril A. Farlam
Vice-Chair

