Leanne Crumb v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2026 CanLII 18314

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18284/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while in contravention of a condition under section 55.1(1)2 of the Act.

Between:

Leanne Crumb

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR: Michael Beauchesne

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Leanne Crumb, Self-represented

For the Respondent: Steve Grootenboer, Representative

HEARD by teleconference: Thursday, February 19, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Leanne Crumb (the “appellant”) appeals the impoundment of her motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Act. The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Saturday, February 7, 2026. At the time of the impoundment, Bradley Dolce (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUE

3The issue in dispute is whether, pursuant to section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below, the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

5For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to section 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in section 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship

6I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

7The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Section 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate

any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

8If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

9If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

10The Tribunal is generally precluded by section 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, section 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

11The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

12I am not satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

13The applicant submits that she does not have access to paid transportation, such as taxis and Uber, and could not afford these services even if they were available to her. She also submits that her child is unable to get to school because he is suspended from riding the bus. As well, the appellant submits that she needs to attend medical appointments for herself, and that her son sees a pediatrician. The applicant further submits she now has a job and cannot get to it without her car.

14The respondent argues that the appellant has not demonstrated that transportation options are unavailable to her, nor that she needs her car to meet her transportation needs.

15I am not persuaded that the appellant considered and inquired into every reasonable option to her impounded vehicle during the impound period. The applicant testified that taxi cabs are scare “very deep in the country” where she lives with her one child—a six-year-old son. During cross-examination, the appellant explained she rented living space at her parents’ home and agreed this residence is a seven-minute drive to the downtown of her community. The appellant added that she has never heard of “anyone” using Uber and does not “believe” that Uber operates in her community. The appellant also maintained she had no money for taxis or Uber, which she “imagined” would cost her $40 per round trip to her community’s downtown. However, I placed little weight on this testimony because later in the hearing, the appellant acknowledged she had not called the local taxi company to enquire about rates or availability because she had always had her car. Further, the appellant confirmed that while she has an Uber account, she had not checked to see if this service was available in her community.

16During her testimony, the appellant described her relationship with her parents as “hostile.” She said her parents “want nothing to do with her” and discounted their willingness to assist with her transportation needs. I did not place full weight on this testimony as evidence that the appellant’s parents were not a viable alternative to the impounded vehicle. While I accept the appellant has a strained relationship with her parents, she has nevertheless sustained a shared living arrangement with them for two years by her account. Further, she credited her mother with driving the appellant’s son to school when his bus riding privileges were suspended during the impoundment period. The appellant also explained that her son had been driven to the hospital by her mother to attend a scheduled pediatric appointment during the impound period. As such, I find that owing to her mother’s assistance, the appellant’s son had not missed any school or scheduled medical appointments because of the vehicle impoundment up to the date of the hearing. In addition, the appellant acknowledged that her parents had been helping her with groceries, although the appellant indicated this was more owing to lack of financial resources than the vehicle impoundment. When I take this evidence together, I find it is at odds with the appellant’s assertion that, her mother at least, is unwilling to help her with transportation needs during the impoundment period.

17Concerning her own medical needs, the appellant testified that her most recent medical appointment was prior to the vehicle impoundment. She added that she has a future medical appointment that requires transportation to a different community during the impoundment, and that she had no way of getting to this appointment. However, during cross-examination, the appellant confirmed she had not made enquiries with friends or family about getting a ride to this appointment. Rather, she assumed that nobody would be available to help her because the appointment was scheduled during working hours. While this may be the case, it remains that the appellant must demonstrate she has no alternative to the impounded vehicle, and I find that mere speculation without at least making reasonable enquiries falls short of meeting this onus.

18The applicant’s testimony about having no way to get to work was not persuasive. The appellant testified that she had “lined up” a new job at a downtown daycare in the basement of a church. But during cross-examination, she clarified that she did not have a starting date for employment. I therefore placed little weight on this as evidence of exceptional hardship resulting from impoundment because the appellant did not establish she would even require transportation for employment during the impound period. In any event, the appellant led no evidence to show she had made enquiries about alternate transportation to get to this work location, such as, for example, contacting the employer to explore sharing rides with co-workers for the duration of the impoundment period. Rather, the appellant offered that she did not know anyone who worked there as the daycare had only just recently opened at the start of 2026.

19In conclusion, when I consider all this evidence on a balance of probabilities, I find that the appellant has not shown there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle. As such, exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with the Act and the Regulation and I need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship.

ORDER

20The Tribunal orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.