Licence Appeal Tribunal
RECONSIDERATION DECISION
Before: Craig Mazerolle, Vice-Chair
Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 24-000103/AABS
Case Name: Yanhong Liu v. Security National Insurance Company
Written Submissions by:
For the Applicant: Vanessa Liang, Counsel
For the Respondent: Jaclyn Kram, Counsel
OVERVIEW
1On November 27, 2025, the applicant requested reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision released November 6, 2025 (“decision”).
2Stemming from an accident on January 5, 2019 and a request for benefits made pursuant to the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule – Effective September 1, 2010 (including amendments effective June 1, 2016) (the “Schedule”), the parties participated in a written hearing. In the decision, the Tribunal made a series of findings about the applicant’s entitlement to payment of an income replacement benefit (“IRB”). These findings can be broken into several, overlapping periods.
3First, for the period from January 12 to November 14, 2019, the Tribunal found the applicant met the entitlement test for the IRB, but no payment was owing since she had already received payment from the respondent. The Tribunal then determined that, for the period from November 15, 2019 to November 14, 2023, the applicant did not have a “reasonable explanation” for her failure to comply with certain s. 33(1) requests. This finding barred her from any payments during this period. Finally, for the post-104 week period, the Tribunal concluded that the applicant did not meet this entitlement test.
4Taken together, no IRB payment was found owing, and, as a result, no interest or award was payable.
5The grounds for a request for reconsideration are found in Rule 18.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“Rules”). To grant a request for reconsideration, the Tribunal must be satisfied that one or more of the following criteria are met:
a) The Tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction or committed a material breach of procedural fairness;
b) The Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made; or
c) There is evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it, and would likely have affected the result.
6The applicant relies on all three criteria to support her request. She is seeking an order finding she is entitled to certain IRB payments.
7The respondent asks the Tribunal to dismiss the request.
RESULT
8The applicant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.
ANALYSIS
9The test for reconsideration under Rule 18.2 involves a high threshold, and the requesting party must show how or why the decision falls into one of the categories in Rule 18.2. The reconsideration process is not an opportunity for a party to re-litigate its position where it disagrees with the Tribunal’s decision, or with the weight assigned to the evidence.
Rule 18.2(a) – Hearing Format and Procedural Fairness
10The applicant challenges the Tribunal’s decision to conduct this hearing via written submissions. According to the applicant, the only issue in dispute was whether the respondent should reinstate her IRB, and, for an application involving the IRB, “a video-conference hearing is required to ensure a fair and open procedure”.
11I do not find the applicant has shown how the decision to proceed with a written hearing materially breached her right to procedural fairness. First, there is no indication in the Case Conference Report and Order (released June 28, 2024) that the applicant asked for this matter to proceed via videoconference, nor was there any Notice of Motion from the applicant asking for this kind of relief. Parties are expected to put their best foot forward during the hearing. It is not appropriate to raise new procedural requests on reconsideration.
12I do note that there was a brief reference to the difference between virtual hearings and written hearings in the applicant’s reply. Aside from the practical difficulties involved with asking for a hearing format change in reply, it is unclear whether the applicant was, in fact, asking for a videoconference hearing (at paragraph 1, emphasis in original):
In para. 2 of the Respondent’s submissions, they want to dictate that the Applicant is not entitled to IRB post December 24, 2024 and any subsequent Applicant [sic] is barred. The Respondent has no right to dictate the Applicant’s IRB entitlement post December 24, 2024. The 2-year limitation only starts to run from the stoppage date, December 24, 2024. The Applicant has it until [sic] December 24, 2026 to dispute post-104 weeks IRB. The reason why the Applicant limits the IRB issue from January 13, 2019 to December 24, 2024 because it is only proportionate to frame the issue in this way for this written hearing. Post-stoppage IRB should be determined through a virtual hearing.
13I am satisfied that the applicant was not asking for the parties’ written hearing to be converted into a videoconference hearing. Rather, she was explaining her opposition to the respondent’s argument about the scope of the IRB request.
14Further, I do not find the applicant has established any procedural fairness breaches that resulted from proceeding with a written hearing.
15Section 5.1(2) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22, states that a written hearing shall not be held “if a party satisfies the tribunal that there is a good reason for not doing so.” The respondent used s. 33 to request financial and medical records from the applicant, and the applicant argued she missed these exchange deadlines due to communication issues with her former counsel and the fact that she moved during the relevant period. She supported this latter argument by providing a copy of a lease agreement. Considering the document-heavy nature of the parties’ dispute, I do not see why their arguments and evidence could not have been sufficiently explored via written submissions. As such, the applicant has not shown, on a balance of probabilities, why there was a “good reason” for not proceeding with a written hearing.
16Taken together, the applicant has not shown how the Tribunal breached her right to procedural fairness by proceeding with a written hearing. She has not met her onus under Rule 18.2(a).
Rule 18.2(b) – Section 37(2) and the June 5, 2019 Letter
17The applicant argues that the Tribunal erred in finding she is not entitled to any post-104 week IRBs for the period of January 2, 2021 to December 25, 2024, because it incorrectly determined that the respondent had complied with s. 37(2) of the Schedule prior to December 25, 2024.
18The 104 week mark post-accident is January 2, 2021.
19Section 37(2) lays out the procedure an insurer must follow if it is seeking to “discontinue paying a specific benefit to an insured person”. The provision sets out several circumstances when an insurer may stop paying a specified benefit. According to the applicant, the respondent did not follow this process when it denied her IRB claim in a letter dated June 5, 2019. Specifically, the applicant argues the respondent “wanted to confuse the Applicant or the Tribunal” by claiming this letter was seeking an OCF-3, yet it did not.
20I do not find the applicant has shown how this ground meets the standard under Rule 18.2(b). First, I note that the applicant did not raise s. 37(2) during the written hearing. Once again, parties are expected to put their best foot forward during the hearing, and they are discouraged from raising new arguments on reconsideration that could have been reasonably raised at first instance. I note that the applicant claims in her reconsideration reply that she “could only raise this issue after the LAT released its decision.” Yet, considering there was a lengthy discussion about the parties’ IRB correspondence in the decision (including the June 5, 2019 letter), I see no reason why this argument could not have been raised earlier.
21Second, I do not find the applicant has shown how this ground constitutes an error that would trigger Rule 18.2(b). In reviewing the June 5, 2019 letter, I accept that there was no request for an OCF-3. Rather, the respondent was asking for financial records, confirmation of her return to work status, and some clinical notes and records.
22Yet, despite the applicant’s argument to the contrary, the fact that this letter did not request an OCF-3 appears to have been within the Tribunal’s knowledge. When describing an April 29, 2024 letter from the applicant to the respondent, the Tribunal noted (at paragraph 23): “The letter also advises that no updated OCF-3 was requested in the respondent’s letter dated June 5, 2019.” I am satisfied that the Tribunal understood there was no request for an OCF-3 in the June 5, 2019 letter. As such, I am not satisfied that the applicant has demonstrated that the Tribunal erred in this regard.
Rule 18.2(b) – Receipt of Documents from the Respondent
23To support her claim that she had a “reasonable explanation” for the s. 33 non-compliance, the applicant argued during the written hearing that she had several issues with receiving documents from the respondent. Specifically, the respondent took a long time to send her a copy of the accident benefits file, and it sent some correspondence to her former address. The Tribunal did not accept these explanations.
24On reconsideration, the applicant claims the basis for this conclusion was wrong and unfair for several reasons. I do not agree.
Accident Benefits File
25For the accident benefits file, the applicant claims the Tribunal erred by finding that this handoff took place on July 26, 2023, as the “only secure email from [the respondent] regarding this particular claim was received on November 7, 2023”. Accordingly, the applicant claims the respondent never provided evidence of the alleged exchange on July 26, 2023.
26The Tribunal addressed this part of the applicant’s argument at paragraph 44 of the decision:
With respect to the applicant’s submission that she could have rectified her non-compliance earlier if the respondent had provided the AB file when it was first requested, I find that the evidence supports that the AB file was provided to counsel for the applicant on July 26, 2023, as set out in the email attached to the respondent’s submissions. While I acknowledge that there was a delay from the applicant’s first request on April 20, 2023, I also find that there was a delay in the applicant providing a response to the AB file until November 14, 2023. I find that neither of these delays are acceptable however, the fact remains that the documents were not submitted to the respondent until November 14, 2023.
27This July 26, 2023 correspondence was included with the respondent’s written hearing submissions. In this letter, the respondent stated (emphasis in original): “As per your request, we have enclosed a copy of the Accident Benefits file for the above noted file for the above noted claimant.” At the bottom of the letter, the respondent further wrote: “Copy of file was sent via email.” I find the Tribunal was entitled to rely on this letter to conclude that “the evidence supports that the AB file was provided to counsel for the applicant on July 26, 2023”. The applicant may disagree with this finding, but disagreement alone is not sufficient to trigger Rule 18.2(b).
28I further find that the applicant’s evidence concerning the lack of a secure e-mail on July 26, 2023 is unpersuasive. To support this position, the applicant included a screenshot of an untitled Gmail inbox with her reconsideration submissions. The applicant’s claim number is listed in the search bar, and the earliest entry on the page is an e-mail dated November 7, 2023. However, there is no indication on the screenshot of who owns this Gmail account. There is also no way to confirm whether prior, related e-mails may have been deleted or stored in another location. On a balance of probabilities, I do not find this screenshot demonstrates that the first secure e-mail the applicant’s counsel received from the respondent concerning the applicant’s claim was sent on November 7, 2023.
29I also note that the inclusion of this screenshot with her reconsideration request is another attempt to present new evidence and arguments that could have been reasonably introduced during the written hearing. Specifically, the applicant argued in her written hearing reply that the respondent “failed to provide any proof” that the file was sent on July 26, 2023, and her counsel did not receive it until November 7, 2023. I see no reason why this screenshot could not have been provided to the Tribunal at that time.
Receipt of Documents Following the Applicant’s Move
30The applicant also argues that the Tribunal “made errors of fact” concerning the alleged receipt of certain letters in 2019, as they were sent to her mother’s house in Richmond Hill following her move to King City. The applicant also argues that it was incorrect “to infer that she has received the 2019 letters because she received the 2022 letters”, as there were stressors in 2019 that did not exist in 2022, e.g., she gave birth in February 2019; she was recovering from her injuries, etc. Overall, the applicant claims the Tribunal’s chain of reasoning shows it did not account for the consumer protection mandate of the Schedule.
31The Tribunal addressed the applicant’s arguments about her move at paragraph 43:
With respect to the applicant’s non-compliance with s. 33 of the Schedule, I find that the applicant has not provided a reasonable explanation for her failure to comply with the s. 33 production requests until November 14, 2023. I do not accept the applicant’s submission that she did not receive the s. 33 request letters because she did not reside at the Richmond Hill address at the time of the accident or when the letters were sent. The applicant listed the Richmond Hill address on her OCF-1 and OCF-2 that she submitted to the respondent. I find that at no time did she advise the respondent that she did not live at this address. I agree with the respondent that the applicant attended the s. 44 IE assessments as per the respondent’s letter dated April 26, 2019. In addition, the applicant’s emails to her previous legal representative dated March 23, 2022 and May 6, 2022, confirm that she received the respondent’s letters about the suspension of her benefits and that her file was closed. Therefore, the applicant’s explanation in the April 29, 2023 letter that “she was even unaware that TD requested her financial documents and suspended her IRB because of the non-compliance” is not supported by the evidence.
32I find this ground is an attempt to have the Tribunal re-weigh evidence considered at first instance. Once again, the reconsideration process is not a venue for parties to seek a different weighing of the evidence, nor is it a chance to re-litigate positions that were dismissed at the hearing. Rather, the requesting party must show there was a factual or legal error in the Tribunal’s evidentiary assessment. The applicant has not met this onus under Rule 18.2(b).
Rule 18.2(c) – Medical Evidence and the Post-104 IRB
33In what appears to be an extension of the hearing format argument detailed above, the applicant claims there was medical evidence that was not reviewed by the Tribunal—an oversight she links to the written hearing:
The Tribunal failed to review any medical evidence to come to a decision that the Applicant is not entitled to post-104 IRBs. The Applicant will provide an incomplete list of medical evidence that the Tribunal failed to review as the post-104 IRB entitlement shall be heard in a video-conference hearing [sic]…
34The applicant lists a series of medical records in her reconsideration submissions, including the parties’ catastrophic assessment reports. According to the applicant, these reports “were not introduced or reviewed by the Tribunal in this written hearing, which would likely have affected the result.” Though a bit unclear, I interpret this part of the applicant’s argument to be a reference to Rule 18.2(c).
35The respondent disputes this position by submitting that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the IRB denial, including her failure to provide any medical evidence with her written submissions.
36In reply, the applicant appears to add the following context to this ground (at paragraphs 1 and 2):
It was the legitimate expectation of the Applicant that the issue of this Application was solely limited to the non-compliance issue under s.33 of the SABS. It was expressively discussed during the Case Conference and formed the basis upon which both parties agreed to proceeded by way of a written hearing.
At the time of the Case Conference, the Applicant’s IRB had not been stopped. The stoppage was made following the s.44 Assessments on December 24, 2025. After this determination was made, the Applicant wrote to the LAT requesting that the IRB issue be limited to the period from the suspension date to the stoppage date.
37The Tribunal addressed the post-104 week IRB at paragraphs 52 – 55:
I find that the applicant is not entitled to post-104 week IRBs for the following reasons.
The applicant has not addressed in her submissions how she has suffered a complete inability to engage in any employment or self-employment for which she is suited by education, training or experience as a result of the accident. I find that the applicant has not addressed the respondent’s submissions that she was off work following the accident due to her three maternity leaves and not because of her accident-related impairments. She has also not addressed the dates that she was able to return to her pre-accident employment at [Jing Yi Glass and Mirror Inc.] or what modified duties she was able to perform.
I find that while the applicant was determined by the IE assessors to suffer a substantial inability to perform her pre-accident employment duties, the test for entitlement for post-104 week IRBs is not the same. I find that the applicant is not automatically entitled to receive post-104 week IRBs just because she was found to be entitled to pre-104 week IRBs. The applicant has an onus to prove that she suffers a complete inability to engage in any employment or self-employment for which she is suited by education, training or experience as a result of the accident, which she has not met.
I find that the applicant has not provided any medical evidence to support that she meets the post-104 IRB test. I further find that the financial documentation that was produced by the applicant on November 14, 2023 supports that she did return to work following the accident and that she was off work due to three maternity leaves. I find that the applicant has not provided any submissions or evidence to refute the respondent’s position that she does not meet the post 104-week IRB test.
38Starting with the parties’ catastrophic impairment reports, I find she has not met the test under Rule 18.2(c), because she has not shown why the reports “could not have been obtained” prior to the release of the decision. The applicant’s reports are dated September 30, 2024, while the respondent’s reports are dated March 6, 2025. Since the written hearing was set for March 28, 2025, the reports were prepared and presumably served on the parties in advance of the hearing. The applicant has not provided a compelling explanation for why these documents could not have been filed with the Tribunal prior to the decision being rendered.
39The applicant claims it was her understanding that only her s. 33 non-compliance would be addressed at the hearing, yet there is no such limit noted in the Case Conference Report and Order’s description of the IRB issue. She also does not appear to have filed any motion asking to change the description of this issue, nor did she challenge the wording of this issue in her written hearing submissions.
40Additionally, the respondent noted in its responding written hearing submissions that the applicant had not met her onus to show entitlement: “She has not provided any medical, financial or employment documentation or any expert medical report opinion in her submissions that she is entitled to IRBs and meets the prescribed tests under s.5 and 6 of the SABS.” As such, the applicant knew the respondent had raised this issue, yet she did not address this concern with medical evidence in her reply.
41Turning to the other pieces of evidence listed in the applicant’s reconsideration (e.g., clinical notes and records from CAMH, physiotherapy notes from Aurora North Rehab, etc.), I find that the same analysis applies to these records. The applicant knew the lack of medical evidence included with her written hearing submissions was being challenged by the respondent, yet there is no compelling explanation for why these records were not then provided to the Tribunal.
42I do note that at least one of the records listed in the applicant’s reconsideration submissions post-dates the release of the decision, i.e., the CAMH records were printed out on November 11, 2025. However, the applicant has the onus to explain why the records could not have been obtained at an earlier date, e.g., what efforts were made to try and obtain these notes. The applicant also has the onus to establish why any records that may not have existed until after the decision was released would likely have impacted the outcome of the decision. I find the applicant has not met this onus.
43Finally, while the applicant appears to raise an issue with how she alerted the Tribunal about her decision to limit the IRB claim, the Tribunal granted her request at paragraph 3 of the decision:
The Case Conference Report and Order dated June 28, 2024, lists issue 1 as, “Is the applicant entitled to an income replacement benefit in the amount of $400.00 per week from January 12, 2019 to date and ongoing?” On January 17, 2025, counsel for the applicant advised the Tribunal that she was limiting her claim for entitlement to income replacement benefits (“IRBs”) from November 15, 2019 to the stoppage date. The respondent did not dispute this. I therefore have amended the issue in dispute.
44I see no issue with this approach.
45Taken together, the applicant has not established any grounds for reconsideration under Rule 18.2(c).
CONCLUSION & ORDER
46The applicant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.
Craig Mazerolle Vice-Chair
Released: February 20, 2026