Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18190/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while in contravention of a condition under s. 55.1(1)2 of the Act

Between:

Shanelle See

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

PANEL:

Gary Harvey, Adjudicator

Jeffery Campbell, Vice-Chair

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Shanelle See, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Observer:

Ian Sookram, Representative

Martin He (for the Respondent)

OVERVIEW

1Shanelle See (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of her 2011 Kia Sorrento (the “vehicle”) under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The vehicle was impounded on Saturday, January 3, 2026. At the time of the impoundment, the appellant was driving the vehicle while her driver's licence was under suspension due to a criminal conviction.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issue to be determined is:

Whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship, under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

ANALYSIS

4For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship

5We are satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

6We are satisfied that there are no alternatives to the impounded vehicle.

7The Registrar of Motor Vehicles (the “Registrar”) tendered evidence that the vehicle was stopped by police while it was being driven by the appellant., whose licence was suspended due to a prescribed Criminal Code conviction. I am therefore satisfied that the vehicle was validly impounded.

8The appellant lives with her partner and their newborn daughter in Shelburne, Ontario. The appellant testified that she is currently on maternity leave from work, as she gave birth to their daughter just one week ago. She and her partner have limited incomes and do not have the financial means to pay to get the vehicle from the impound. Her partner works in Brampton, Ontario, a 50-minute drive. According to the appellant, her partner has missed seven shifts at his work since the impoundment of the vehicle and is in danger of losing his job if he continues to be unavailable to work due to a lack of transportation. This, of course, would compound their volatile financial situation.

9With respect to reasonable alternatives, the appellant testified that she and her partner live in Shelburne, Ontario which does not have public transit or access to Uber. She further testified that she does not have any family or friends that live in her town or close by that have a vehicle to assist with transportation. The closest relative is her mother who resides in Markham, Ontario, a 40-minute drive from Shelburne. Her mother has assisted in bringing groceries and necessities to the appellant when she has been able to do so.

10Of greatest concern to the appellant is the health of their newborn daughter and their ability to take the baby to necessary medical appointments. Without their vehicle, it is questionable as to how they would be able to meet that crucial need.

11Upon questioning, the Registrar submitted that, should the appellant be unable to obtain their vehicle from impound, the appellant “would likely meet the definition of exceptional hardship”, primarily as the health and safety of the child would be at risk as there is no reasonable alternative to take the child to medical care. Secondarily, the Registrar also suggested that the appellant’s partner’s employment could be at risk without his ability to get to work dependably.

12We agree with the Registrar. Regulation 631/98 under the Act sets out the criteria that the Tribunal must consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship. Under the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

13If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship must be dismissed and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

14The Tribunal is not permitted to consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

CONCLUSION

15It is clear from the appellants testimony that she is suffering an immediate financial hardship as a result of her vehicle being impounded due to her partner missing multiple shifts at work. While we are unable to consider the financial impact of the impoundment on the appellant (as she was the driver of the vehicle at the time of the impoundment), we nevertheless find that the continuation of the partners inability to find consistent transportation to and from his job will create a financial and employment loss to the partner which will be immediate, significant and lasting.

16Most importantly, it is also clear that without the appellant having access to a vehicle creates a threat to the health and safety of her newborn child as they reside in a rural town that is 20 minutes away from the nearest hospital and for necessary medical appointments.

17Given the above, we find that the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined in the Regulation.

18A verbal Order for the Registrar to release the vehicle was provided to the parties at the time of the Hearing. That Order was effective immediately.

ORDER

19The Tribunal Orders that the Registrar shall release the impounded vehicle.

Gary Harvey

Adjudicator

Jeffery Campbell

Vice-Chair