Crowley v. Security National Insurance Company, 2026 CanLII 15071

Licence Appeal Tribunal

Citation: Crowley v. Security National Insurance Company, 2026 ONLAT 24-013482/AABS-R

RECONSIDERATION DECISION

Before: Ulana Pahuta, Adjudicator

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 24-013482/AABS

Case Name: Angela C Crowley v. Security National Insurance Company

Written Submissions by:

For the Applicant: J.D. Virtue, Counsel Rasha M El-Tawil, Counsel

For the Respondent: Nawaz Tahir, Counsel

OVERVIEW

1On December 4, 2025, the respondent requested reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision dated November 19, 2025 (“decision”).

2The parties participated in a videoconference hearing before a panel of adjudicators. In this decision the Tribunal considered two preliminary issues: whether the applicant was involved in an “accident” as defined in s. 3(1) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule - Effective September 1, 2010 (including amendments effective June 1, 2016) (“Schedule”); and whether the respondent was estopped from denying accident benefits to the applicant. The Tribunal found that the applicant was involved in an “accident” as defined by the Schedule. Since the applicant was found to have been involved in an “accident”, the Tribunal found that it was unnecessary to address the issue of estoppel.

3The grounds for a request for reconsideration are found in Rule 18.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“Rules”). To grant a request for reconsideration, the Tribunal must be satisfied that one or more of the following criteria are met:

a) The Tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction or committed a material breach of procedural fairness;

b) The Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made; or

c) There is evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it, and would likely have affected the result.

4The respondent seeks reconsideration pursuant to Rule 18.2(b). It submits that the Panel erred in law in failing to follow binding Court of Appeal and Divisional Court decisions that had been relied upon at the hearing. Instead, the respondent argues that the Panel attempted to distinguish the binding caselaw on its facts. The respondent further submits that the Panel erred in law by finding that a narrow interpretation of “automobile” in such circumstances would be contrary to the spirit of consumer protection legislation.

5The respondent requests that the decision be varied or cancelled, so as to overturn the finding that the applicant was involved in an “accident” and entitled to accident benefits.

6The applicant submits that it was not an error of law for the Panel to disagree with the respondent’s position. She argues that the Panel gave careful consideration to both the unique facts of this case and the cited caselaw in coming to its decision, and that the respondent is attempting to re-litigate the dispute.

7The applicant further submits that the Panel properly considered the consumer protection mandate of the Schedule, in conjunction with the unique facts of this case to arrive at a balanced and fair result. The applicant requests that the respondent’s reconsideration request be dismissed.

RESULT

8The respondent’s request pursuant to Rule 18.2(b) is granted.

9Pursuant to Rule 18.4, I am cancelling the decision and ordering a rehearing of the issues in dispute before a new adjudicator.

ANALYSIS

10The test for reconsideration under Rule 18.2 involves a high threshold. The reconsideration process is not an opportunity for a party to re-litigate its position where it disagrees with the Tribunal’s decision, or with the weight assigned to the evidence. The requestor must show how or why the decision falls into one of the categories in Rule 18.2.

Background

11The parties are in agreement as to a number of facts in this case, and had provided an Agreed Statement of Facts for the videoconference hearing.

12On June 26, 2020 the applicant was driving an all-terrain vehicle (“ATV”) on her friend’s large property. Given the size of the property, people would travel by ATV to get to various locations. It was not disputed that to get to a number of places on the property, it was necessary to partly travel along one or more public municipal roadways which bisected the property.

13On the day of the incident, the applicant and one of the family members occupying the property travelled to and from the friend’s home to a swimming pond at the far end of the property. The two ATVs were in transit back to the home, when the applicant collided with a tree and sustained significant injuries. While the ATVs travelled along and across a municipal road for part of their return trip, there is no dispute that the tree the applicant struck with her ATV was on private property, owned by the owner of the ATV.

14Under s. 224(1) of the Insurance Act, R.S.O, c. I.8, an “automobile” is defined as: (a) a motor vehicle required under any Act to be insured under a motor vehicle policy.

15At the hearing, the parties agreed that the three-part test with respect to the definition of an “automobile”, as set out in Adams v. Pineland Amusements Ltd., 2007 ONCA 844 (“Adams”), was applicable. The parties further agreed that only the third part of the Adams’ test applied in the present case – “does the vehicle fall within any enlarged definition of ‘automobile’ in any relevant statute?”

16Both parties agreed that the vehicle involved in the incident was an ATV which is regulated by the Off-Road Vehicles Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. O.4 (“ORVA”). Subsections 15(1) and (2) of the ORVA stipulate that an off-road vehicle cannot be driven, nor may an owner permit the vehicle to be driven, unless it is insured under a motor vehicle liability policy. Section 15(9) provides that subsections (1) and (2) do not apply where the vehicle is driven on land occupied by the owner of the vehicle.

17Therefore, the central issue at the hearing was whether the ATV was required to be insured under s. 15 of the ORVA. If it was, then it would be an “automobile” as defined in s. 224(1) of the Insurance Act, and the incident would meet the definition of an “accident” under s. 3(1) of the Schedule. However, if it was found that the exemption under s. 15(9) applied, namely, that the vehicle was being driven on land occupied by the owner of the vehicle, then the ATV was not required to be insured under a motor vehicle policy and would not meet the definition of an “automobile” under the Insurance Act.

18At the hearing, the respondent cited Copley v. Kerr Farms Ltd., 2002 CanLII 44900 (ONCA) (“Copley”), a case where the Court of Appeal was asked to consider whether a tomato wagon was required to be insured. The Court of Appeal considered the timing of the incident, and found that even if the tomato wagon was used regularly to transport tomatoes along public highways, “it was not being operated on the highway when the accident occurred”. The respondent argued at the hearing that the reasoning in Copley was subsequently applied in Motors Insurance Corporation v. Cassondra Bouchard, 2012 ONFSCDRS 96, where the Director’s Delegate considered that while the vehicle in question may have been operated on another’s property at times “at the moment of the incident on that day Ms. Bouchard was operating it on the property occupied by him”.

19In its decision, the Panel found that because the ATV “was regularly driven on public highways and roadways to access different points of interest on the owner’s property, as was the case on the day of the incident”, the ATV was required to be insured under s. 15(1) and (2). The s. 15(9) exemption did not apply.

20The Panel distinguished the caselaw cited by the respondent on the basis that the facts of those cases were different than the present matter, and that none of the cases considered a scenario where a vehicle was used on both private property and a highway as part of the sequence of events leading up to the accident. The Panel noted that it was clear that the bulk of the route followed by the applicant on the day of the collision was on private property occupied by the owner of the ATV. However, the fact that the applicant was using a public roadway for part of the trip meant that the exemption under s. 15(9) was not applicable.

Grounds for reconsideration – Rule 18.2(b) error of law

21In this case, I find that the respondent has established grounds for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 18.2(b).

22The test in Rule 18.2(b) has two parts. The first part is that the Tribunal made an error of law or fact. The second part is that the error is such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made.

Error of law in consideration of binding appellate authority

23The respondent submits that appellate authority is binding on adjudicators, and that it is an error in law to attempt to distinguish binding case law on the facts when a decision sets out underlying legal principles of general application: see Intact v. Dominion and Wawanesa, 2020 ONSC 7982. It argues that, in coming to its decision, the Panel distinguished the binding jurisprudence on its facts, as opposed to first examining the underlying legal principles used in the jurisprudence and deciding the case based on those legal principles. The respondent further submits that the factual differences between the present case and the appellate cases were only superficial, and were not materially different.

24It argues that Copley sets out a legal principle regarding the “time and circumstances” of an accident. For instance, when considering whether the tomato cart was being operated on a highway for the purposes of s. 2(1) of the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 25, the Court found the fact that the vehicle was regularly taken on the highway (and that the claimant intended to take it on the highway later that day), did not extend the reach of s. 2(1). This principle was then reaffirmed in Adams, where the Court of Appeal stated that “this case can be resolved on a narrower basis in light of this court’s decision in Copley v. Kerr Farms…The court found at para. 32 that there was no requirement for the defendant to have it insured ‘at the time and place where the accident occurred’”.

25The respondent submits that this principle was reiterated by the Divisional Court in Bouchard v. Motors Insurance Corporation and Financial Services Commission of Ontario, 2013 ONSC 2205 (“Bouchard”). In this decision the Divisional Court upheld the Director’s Delegate’s decision reversing a prior arbitrator’s finding that a “pocket bike” was an automobile and that the claimant was involved in an “accident” as defined in the Schedule. The Director’s Delegate had also considered s. 15 of the ORVA, and found that the “Copley ‘time and circumstances’ analysis applies in this case.” The Divisional Court agreed with the Director’s Delegate’s analysis, and found that:

A contextual and purposive analysis of the legislation, including the exemption in s. 15(9) requires that the analysis of whether insurance was required is both time sensitive and context sensitive. In this regard, we believe the Court of Appeal’s analysis in Copley is directly applicable. This analysis was also adopted and applied by the Court of Appeal in Adams v. Pineland Amusements Ltd., 2007 ONCA 844 at paras. 15-17.

26The Divisional Court in Bouchard further applied the Court of Appeal’s analysis in Copley to the specific facts of the case, in particular, whether the vehicle must be used solely on the owner’s property to fall under the exemption in s. 15(9) of the ORVA:

[13] The applicant seeks to interpret that exemption provision as being inapplicable if the owner of the bike ever takes the bike off his own property or at least that he “regularly” does so. In our view, such an interpretation implies that the exemption applies only if the bike is used “solely” or “exclusively” on the owner’s own property. That is not what the section says. Giving the words used their plain and ordinary meaning, the bike is only required to be insured when it is off the owner’s property. Whenever it is operated on the owner’s property, it is not required to be insured…

[17] The past use of the bike is not the determinative point. As was the case in Copley, the determinative point is not the use of the bike in the past but at the time of the accident. At the time of the accident, the pocket bike was being operated on Mr. Stratton’s property and was not required to be insured.

27The applicant submits that, in its decision, the Panel gave proper effect to the distinguishable circumstances of the present case. Namely, the Panel found at paragraphs 15 and 24 of the decision, the ATV was regularly driven on public highways, including on the day of the incident, and that a public roadway was used for “part of the trip”. The applicant submits that the use of the public roadway was part of a “single, continuous and contemporaneous event” which clearly distinguishes this case.

28I agree with the respondent that Copley and Bouchard are binding on the Tribunal. While it is ultimately the adjudicator’s or panel’s determination as to whether the legal principles articulated in higher court decisions are applicable in the cases before them, in my view, the general legal principles should be articulated and considered, particularly when they were relied upon by a party at a hearing. I do not find that the facts in the present case were so materially different from Copley and Bouchard, such that the legal principles set out in binding caselaw did not need to be addressed by the Panel.

29In paragraph 18 of the decision, the Panel notes that the respondent cited several decisions at the hearing, including Copley and Bouchard, and that the respondent had argued that “these decisions support the principle that whether or not a vehicle can be driven on the highway is irrelevant to the analysis. Instead, it is the time and place of the incident that is determinative”. However, rather than engaging with the time and circumstances analysis set out in Copley and later reiterated in Adams and Bouchard, the Panel determined at paragraph 19 that the case law cited by both parties was not helpful, as “the facts in those cases are different from the matter before us.”

30In particular, the Panel distinguished Bouchard on the basis that there was no evidence that the pocket bike, the vehicle in that case, “was regularly driven on a public highway or municipal roadway as part of its ordinary use.” The Panel further distinguished Copley on the basis that a tomato cart fell outside the definition of an “off-road vehicle” under the ORVA and a “motor vehicle” under the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, and that the applicant and owner in the present case regularly took the ATVs on municipal roadways and highways.

31I find that it was an error of law to distinguish the Court of Appeal and Divisional Court decisions based on the cited factual grounds, without first considering the underlying legal principles set out in the binding caselaw. I do not find that the facts in the present case differed so significantly from those in Bouchard and Copley, such that the analysis of these higher courts did not need to be considered by the Panel. The Panel found at paragraph 19 that the Court of Appeal decision Copley was distinguishable, because the tomato cart was not an “off-road vehicle” under the ORVA, unlike the ATV in this case. However, this issue was considered by the Divisional Court in Bouchard. In Bouchard, the Court expressly addressed the claimant’s attempt to differentiate Copley on the basis that the pocket bike in question was different from the tomato wagon, which was not subject to the ORVA. The Divisional Court stated at paragraph 8: “We do not agree. Copley is directly applicable and binding”.

32I further do not agree with the Panel’s finding that both Copley and Bouchard are distinguishable due to the fact that the claimants in these cases did not “regularly” drive the vehicles on public roadways, including on the route taken on the day of the incident. Both the Court of Appeal in Copley (at paragraph 32) and the Divisional Court in Bouchard (at paragraphs 13-17) rejected the argument that taking the vehicle “regularly” on highways and roadways meant that the vehicle had to have been insured and was, correspondingly, an “automobile”. Accordingly, I agree with the respondent that it was an error of law for the Panel to distinguish binding decisions on these grounds without first addressing the underlying legal principles.

33While it is well-settled that a decision-maker is not required to address every submission, they do have an obligation to address all of a party’s key arguments including legal principles articulated in binding caselaw. I do not agree with the applicant that the factual matrix of the present case was so unique that the principles and analysis in the Court of Appeal decision Copley did not need to be considered by the Panel.

34Accordingly, I find that the respondent has established an error of law in the Panel’s consideration of these decisions, pursuant to s. 18.2(b). I am further satisfied that the respondent’s reliance on this caselaw formed a key aspect of its case, and that the outcome would likely have been different if the Panel had explicitly addressed the legal principles cited in the decisions.

35Given my finding that the respondent has established an error of law on this ground, it is not necessary for me to consider the respondent’s other reconsideration argument.

Rule 18.4 – Outcome of Reconsideration

36The respondent has established grounds for reconsideration under Rule 18.2, so I must determine what the appropriate remedy is under Rule 18.4. Though the respondent is seeking an order reversing the decision and finding that the applicant was not involved in an “accident”, I find the nature of the errors established above show that the most appropriate way to proceed is to cancel the decision and have the matter reheard by a new adjudicator.

37I further note that at first instance, this matter was heard by way of a one day videoconference hearing. From the hearing record, it appears that neither party retained a court reporter for the hearing and accordingly, it is not likely that a recording and/or transcript of the one-day videoconference hearing would have been made. Given that no transcript or recording would be available, I find that a rehearing cannot be conducted on the existing record.

38Accordingly, I am cancelling the decision and ordering a rehearing of the preliminary issue of whether the applicant was involved in an “accident” as defined in s. 3(1) of the Schedule before a new adjudicator. Further, the Panel noted in its decision that given its finding that the applicant was involved in an “accident”, it did not need to consider the second issue of estoppel. Accordingly, in the event the adjudicator at the rehearing concludes the collision does not meet the definition of an “accident”, the new adjudicator will also consider the second preliminary issue of whether the respondent is estopped from denying accident benefits to the applicant.

CONCLUSION & ORDER

39The respondent’s request for reconsideration is granted.

40Pursuant to Rule 18.4, the decision is cancelled. A rehearing before a new adjudicator will take place to address the following preliminary issues:

1. Was the applicant involved in an “accident” as defined in section 3(1) of the Schedule?
2. If the collision does not meet the definition of an “accident”, is the respondent estopped from denying accident benefits to the applicant?

41Within 30 days of the release of this decision, the Tribunal shall canvass the parties for a new one-day videoconference hearing date. The hearing date shall be set by the Tribunal.

42Within 45 days of this reconsideration decision, the parties shall re-file any submissions and evidence from the initial hearing that they wish to rely on for the purposes of the rehearing.

43Subject to my orders in this reconsideration decision, the procedural orders set out in the CCRO released on March 11, 2025, apply to the rehearing. I am not seized of the rehearing.

Ulana Pahuta Adjudicator Tribunals Ontario – Licence Appeal Tribunal