Amirarshia D. Esfahani v. Security National Insurance Company, 2026 CanLII 15045

RECONSIDERATION DECISION

Before: E. Louise Logan, Vice-Chair

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 23-014367/AABS

Case Name: Amirarshia D. Esfahani v. Security National Insurance Company

Written Submissions by:

For the Applicant: Frances Panganiban, Paralegal

For the Respondent: Ashley Dunkley, Counsel

OVERVIEW

1On October 24, 2025, the applicant requested reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision dated October 3, 2025 (“decision”).

2In the decision, the Tribunal determined that the applicant was barred from proceeding to a hearing for non-earner benefits (“NEBs”) and was subject to the Minor Injury Guideline (“MIG”). As the applicant is in the MIG, the Tribunal determined it was not necessary to consider if the treatment plans in dispute were reasonable and necessary, and the applicant was not entitled to an award or interest.

3The grounds for a request for reconsideration are found in Rule 18.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“Rules”). To grant a request for reconsideration, the Tribunal must be satisfied that one or more of the following criteria are met:

a) The Tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction or committed a material breach of procedural fairness;

b) The Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made; or

c) There is evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it, and would likely have affected the result.

4The applicant is requesting reconsideration, pursuant to Rule 18.2(b), arguing that the Tribunal is biased; failed to consider, assess, analyze and reach intelligent, coherent conclusions with respect to the evidence presented in the hearing; and misapprehended the evidence.

5The applicant seeks removal from the MIG, payment of the disputed treatment plans with interest, and entitlement to an award.

6The respondent argues the request for reconsideration should be dismissed.

RESULT

7The applicant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.

ANALYSIS

8The test for reconsideration under Rule 18.2 involves a high threshold. The reconsideration process is not an opportunity for a party to re-litigate its position where it disagrees with the Tribunal’s decision, or with the weight assigned to the evidence. The requestor must show how or why the decision falls into one of the categories in Rule 18.2.

9The applicant raises a number of grounds for reconsideration. I will address them in turn.

Preliminary Issue

10I find that the applicant has not established grounds for reconsideration with respect to the preliminary issue of whether he is barred from proceeding to a hearing for NEBs. The Tribunal found he willfully made a material representation when he applied for accident benefits, and is therefore barred from receiving specified benefits, based on s. 31(1)(b) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule – Effective September 1, 2010 (including amendments effective June 1, 2016) (the “Schedule”).

11The applicant made no submissions on this preliminary issue at the initial hearing, and did not list it as an issue in dispute in his initial hearing submissions. The applicant also did not file a reply to the respondent’s submissions. On June 2, 2025, the applicant’s counsel emailed the Tribunal and indicated that he would not be making any reply submissions.

12On reconsideration, the applicant’s arguments about the preliminary issue centre on the Tribunal’s treatment of the Investigation Report, dated February 25, 2022. The applicant argues that the respondent did not provide the applicant with this report prior to the hearing, as ordered in the Case Conference Report and Order (CCRO), dated May 14, 2024. At the initial hearing, the Tribunal accepted the Investigation Report and determined that the applicant made a material misrepresentation. The applicant argues the applicant was blind-sided by the Investigator’s Report, and was prejudiced by its admittance into evidence.

13The respondent submits that the applicant’s reconsideration submissions are a request for the Tribunal to conduct a wholesale reweighing of the evidence, and that the applicant is attempting to relitigate the issues by putting forward new arguments not raised on the initial hearing. The respondent submits that this is not grounds for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 18.2.

14More specifically, the respondent submits that the applicant did not make any submissions at the initial hearing with respect to the preliminary issue. Further, it submits the applicant’s submission that the respondent failed to provide him with the Investigation Report is not true. The Report was sent to the applicant by email on June 6, 2024. It was enclosed with the accident benefits file, and it is contained in the applicant’s document brief for the initial hearing, at page 605.

15First, I agree that the applicant is advancing new arguments that were not made at the initial hearing, as his submissions did not address the preliminary issue, and he did not file a reply.

16I further find that the applicant was not blind-sided by the Investigation Report. The evidence shows that the applicant received the Investigation Report, and it was included in his document brief for the initial hearing. I have also considered that, on reply for this reconsideration, the applicant does not dispute that he received the Investigation Report. Instead, the applicant’s reply is that the respondent “failed to provide a coherent index of the documents provided” and “failed to confirm if there were any other documents that included within the surveillance file of the investigators” [sic].

17I find that these arguments do not establish grounds for reconsideration. This is because the applicant did not raise an objection to the format of the respondent’s evidence, nor did he raise an objection to the information provided by the respondent with respect to the surveillance file, at the initial hearing. Given that the applicant had notice of the preliminary issue in the Case Conference Report and Order (CCRO), had received the respondent’s Investigation Report, and had an opportunity to raise concerns about the Report at the initial hearing but chose not to, I find that the Tribunal did not err in its treatment of the Investigation Report.

18The applicant has not established grounds for reconsideration with respect to the preliminary issue and the Tribunal’s treatment of the Investigation Report.

Minor Injury Guideline

19I find that the applicant has not established grounds for reconsideration with respect to the MIG.

Consideration of Medical Evidence

20I will first address the applicant’s arguments with respect to the Tribunal’s treatment of the medical evidence. The applicant submits that:

i. The Tribunal based its conclusion that he is subject to the MIG solely on MRI reports;

ii. The Tribunal erred at paragraph 29 in focusing solely on the fact that his knee pain was due to a probable ACL tear from a football injury and failed to properly review relevant evidence and reach intelligent and coherent conclusions;

iii. The Tribunal should have considered the clinical notes and records of 101 Physio and 101 Assessments with respect to his accident-related complaints;

iv. The Tribunal erred, at paragraph 37, when it concluded that he had not made submissions or directed it to medical evidence that his accident-related injuries have impacted his functionality and erred in failing to properly consider all of his evidence and submissions; and

v. The Tribunal erred at paragraphs 39 to 50 of the decision where it failed to properly assess his submissions and evidence with respect to his psychological impairment.

21I find that these arguments do not establish grounds for reconsideration.

22At the outset, I note that I have reviewed the submissions for the initial hearing, and the applicant’s submissions under the heading “Are the Applicant’s injuries predominantly minor as defined in s.3 of the Schedule?” are:

The Applicant’s psychological and physical injuries and impairments as a result of the subject accident will show decisively that the Applicant should have been removed from the minor injury guideline on both a physical and psychological basis. Through the s.25 reports and medical documentation on file to date, it is clear that the Applicant should not have been kept within the confines of the minor injury guideline. The submissions below will show that the Applicant should not been within the confines of minor injury guideline, as both physical and psychological impairments should have led to his removal.

23The remainder of the applicant’s submissions address entitlement to an NEB and the treatment plans in dispute, with submissions on the MIG integrated into submissions in support of entitlement to the treatment plans. For example, under the heading “Is the Applicant entitled to multiple treatment and assessment plans for physiotherapy services?”, the applicant submits:

The plethora of medical documentation, and recent imaging that was provided not only shows that the treatment plans are reasonable and necessary, and the Applicant should be removed from the Minor Injury Guideline, but also shows that there was a lack of handling on the file from the Respondent.

24Another example is found under the heading, “Is the applicant entitled to a treatment plan for psychological services and a psychological assessment?” where the applicant refers to Metallo v. Economical Insurance Company, 2024 CanLII 86472 (ON LAT) (“Metallo”), and he argues that Metallo supports his removal from the MIG. Then, in the conclusion to his submissions, the applicant states:

The Applicant submits that with the evidence provided, assessments and medical records to date, it is clear that the Applicant should be removed from the confines of the minor injury guideline. The Applicant’s complaints with his family doctor, testing, and the s.25 psychological report completed by Dr. Papazoglou, are clear indicative [sic] of the Applicant’s condition as a result of the subject accident. The Applicant further submits that with these records, the s.44 assessments that were completed should have little weight. The Applicant submits that the Tribunal finds the treatment and assessment plans reasonable and necessary. As the treatment plans should be deemed reasonable and necessary, appropriate interest on the overdue payment of benefits should apply.

25In his reconsideration submissions, the applicant lays out, in detail, the reasons why he should be removed from the MIG on the basis of Metallo as well as the medical evidence of his family physician, 101 Physio, the pre-screen for the OCF-18 for a chronic pain assessment, the OCF-3 (dated February 14, 2022), and the IE report of Dr. Berbrayer, physiatrist.

26The respondent submits that, as argued in its submissions for the initial hearing, the applicant did not pinpoint evidence and authorities in its 1,150 page document brief, despite the CCRO expressly ordering him to do so. It submits that it is not the role of the Tribunal to advocate for a party by presuming to know which evidence a party intends to rely on in advancing their case.

27The respondent further submits that the Tribunal set out a detailed analysis from paragraphs 17 to 50 as to why the applicant did not meet his burden to be removed from the MIG. The analysis included consideration of physical pain, as well as whether the applicant suffered from chronic pain and/or a psychological impairment that would warrant removal from the MIG.

The Tribunal did not fail to consider the applicant’s evidence and submissions

28I have considered the applicant’s reconsideration submission that the Tribunal failed to consider all the evidence and submissions in support of his position, and that it made its MIG decision solely based on the MRI. I do not agree. In my view, the Tribunal undertook a generous and holistic reading of the applicant’s submissions and evidence.

29Specifically, at paragraphs 17 to 50 of the decision, the Tribunal conducted a comprehensive analysis of whether the applicant should be removed from the MIG. It considered the applicant’s submissions that he had a disc bulge, chronic pain, and psychological impairment, and it considered whether these conditions warranted removal from the MIG. In its analysis, the Tribunal considered the medical evidence referred to by the applicant, including the medical evidence referred to with respect to the MIG, as well as entitlement to the other issues in dispute.

30While I agree that the Tribunal did not refer to the records of 101 Physio and 101 Assessments or the OCF-18 pre-screen, this is because the applicant did not refer to this medical evidence in his submissions. Where evidence is not referenced in a party’s submissions, it is not the Tribunal's role to make the argument on behalf of the party: see Dooman v. TD Insurance, 2025 ONSC 184, at para. 50.

31In reaching its conclusion with respect to the MIG, the Tribunal also set out the applicant’s argument that he does not have access to OHIP, and that he should not be prejudiced for choosing to seek treatment in Iran. However, the Tribunal did not discount the applicant’s MRI evidence because it was from Iran, and I see no error in its treatment of the MRI. The Tribunal considered the MRI, and determined it could give it little weight, not because of origin, but because it only listed conclusions without details about the findings or complaints being investigated. There was also a lack of clarity about the date of the image.

32The applicant also submits the Tribunal erred, at paragraph 29, in focusing solely on the fact the family physician’s notes of March 24 and 30, 2022 record that the knee pain was from a probable ACL tear from a football injury. He submits that it is evident the Tribunal had reviewed the clinical notes, but failed to properly assess the notes and the applicant’s evidence and reach intelligent and coherent conclusions.

33In context, paragraph 29 addresses the worker’s submissions related to chronic pain. The analysis of whether the applicant should be removed from the MIG on the basis of chronic pain with a functional impairment spans paragraphs 27 to 38 of the decision. Paragraph 29 reads as follows:

The applicant refers to the clinical notes and records (“CNRs”) dated February 11, 2022 of his family physician, Dr. Afshin Jafarian where the applicant complained of ongoing neck and lower back pain because of the accident. The applicant also submits that there are several entries of post accident headaches, lower back pain, knee and leg pain, and neck and shoulder pain over six months after the accident. I note that on July 26, 2022, the applicant complained of post accident intermittent headache and anxiety, pain in the knees and leg, neck and shoulder. I also note, however, that Dr. Jafarian’s CNRs dated March 24 and 30, 2022 related to the applicant’s knee pain indicate that it was due to a probable ACL tear from a football injury.

34While the applicant submits that the Tribunal failed to properly assess the clinical notes, I find that it did not. The Tribunal considered the clinical notes, and in doing so, it noted that the applicant had made complaints of pain over six months after the accident, and also that the family doctor connected his knee pain to a football injury. In its chronic pain analysis, the Tribunal then went on to consider the reports of Dr. Berbrayer and Dr. Papazoglou, case law referred to by the applicant, and the AMA Guides. It concluded that the applicant had not met his onus. The Tribunal’s conclusion was the result of a cogent analysis of the evidence and submissions in light of the applicable legal test. It did not focus solely on the knee injury.

35The applicant also argues that the Tribunal erred, at paragraph 37, in concluding that he did not make submissions or point to medical evidence that his accident-related injuries have a detrimental impact on his functionality. I disagree. The Tribunal’s statement at paragraph 37 is also in relation to whether the applicant has met his onus to establish chronic pain with a functional impairment that warrants removal from the MIG. At paragraphs 36 and 37, the Tribunal concludes:

36I find that the Guides are helpful in assessing whether a person has chronic pain. Since the applicant has not made submissions in this regard, and when considering the totality of the evidence, I find that the applicant has not demonstrated that he meets three of the six criteria for chronic pain as set out in the Guides. I also find that the applicant has not directed me to a diagnosis of chronic pain by any treating physician.

37Further, for chronic pain to take someone out of the MIG, there must be an effect on their functionality. The applicant has not made submissions on or directed me to medical evidence that his accident-related injuries have had a detrimental impact on his functionality. More is required to establish to what extent a chronic pain condition, be it syndrome or “chronicity of symptoms,” affects functionality. This opinion must be supported by medical evidence that establishes an applicant’s functionality is impaired and that the chronic pain is the cause of the disability.

36Thus, the Tribunal found that the applicant had not established that he has chronic pain that impacted his functionality. After reviewing the applicant’s submissions for the initial hearing, including paragraphs 10 to 12 as highlighted in his reconsideration submissions, I find that the Tribunal did not err at paragraph 37. While the applicant’s submissions for the initial hearing refer to the results of the reports of the s. 25 report, they do not refer to the applicant having chronic pain that has a detrimental impact on his functional abilities.

37Finally, the applicant argues that the Tribunal erred, at paragraphs 39 to 50, in not properly assessing his submissions and evidence with respect to whether he has a psychological impairment as a result of the accident. In this regard, the applicant submits that he referred to Metallo in his submissions, and the Tribunal failed to properly review this case law.

38However, a review of the decision shows that the Tribunal considered the applicant’s arguments with respect to Metallo at paragraphs 43 to 44 of the decision. It found that Metallo was distinguishable, concluding at paragraph 44:

I find that the Metallo decision is distinguishable. In that case, the Tribunal preferred the s. 25 report over the s. 44 report, however there was no indication that there were issues with invalidity. In this case, Dr. Papazoglou administered six self-reporting psychological tests, with only one of the tests, the Pain Patient Profile, containing a validity index. On that test, the applicant attained an invalid profile. Further, as outlined below, there were validity issues with respect to Dr. Syed’s testing.

39The applicant may not agree with the Tribunal’s assessment of Metallo, but disagreement alone is not grounds for reconsideration.

40In sum, I find that the applicant has not established grounds for reconsideration due to the alleged failure to fully consider his submissions and evidence.

Dr. Amena Syed’s Report

41I also find that the Tribunal did not err in its treatment of the respondent’s report from Dr. Amena Syed.

42The applicant argues that the Tribunal erred at paragraph 45 of the decision, when it concluded that five of the eight tests conducted by the respondent’s assessor had validity testing. According to the applicant, only three of the tests had validity testing. He also submits that the report of Dr. Syed should be deemed incomplete, because Dr. Syed did not assess all his psychological complaints, specifically, this assessor did not administer a Travel Anxiety Questionnaire, which had been administered by his psychological assessor, Dr. Papazoglou.

43Paragraph 45 of the decision reads as follows:

The respondent relies on Dr. Syed’s in-person assessment of the applicant on June 15, 2022. As part of the assessment, Dr. Syed reviewed the applicant’s treatment documentation and medical records, including Dr. Jafarian’s CNRs. Eight psychological tests were administered, five of which had validity measures. Dr. Syed indicated that the findings suggest that the applicant may not have answered in a completely forthright manner and that he attempted to portray himself in a negative or pathological manner in particular areas. Dr. Syed further indicated that the applicant presented with certain patterns or combinations of features that are unusual in clinical populations but relatively common among individuals feigning mental disorder. Accordingly, Dr. Syed opined that limited confidence can be ascribed to the reliability and validity of the data gathered in the evaluation and concluded that the examination found no objective evidence to substantiate the applicant’s self-reporting of psychological impairment related to the accident.

44My review of the evidence for the initial hearing indicates that Dr. Syed conducted the following tests that included validity testing: M-FAST structured interview; and the MCM Multi-Axial Inventory III, specifically the MCM-III Basic Personality Style Scales, MCM-III Severe Personality Style Scales and MCM-III Clinical Syndrome Scales. Dr. Syed’s report also notes that the applicant completed the Pain Catastrophizing Scale, which showed his results as being high-risk in three areas: Rumination, Magnification, and Helplessness. Dr. Syed opined that limited confidence could be ascribed to the data gathered in the evaluation, stating as follows:

As part of this evaluation, Mr. Daghooghi Esfahani underwent psychometric testing to assess the degree to which response styles may have affected or distorted the report of symptomatology. The findings suggest that certain symptomatology fall outside of the normal range, suggesting that Mr. Daghooghi Esfahani may not have answered in a completely forthright manner as his responses may have led me to form a somewhat inaccurate impression of him as there are suggestions that he attempted to portray himself in a negative or pathological manner in particular areas. Some concerns about distortion of the clinical picture must be raised as a result; Mr. Daghooghi Esfahani presents with certain patterns or combinations of features that are unusual or atypical in clinical populations but relatively common among individuals feigning mental disorder. As such, limited confidence can be ascribed to the reliability and validity of the data gathered in this evaluation. There is some evidence suggesting that Mr. Daghooghi Esfahani may be suffering from some psychological concerns given his subjective account. This unfortunately could not be reconciled with the objective test results due to validity concerns. The degree of distress as outlined by Mr. Daghooghi Esfahani in this evaluation is greater than what he may be experiencing if any and my clinical impression does not support these findings. Due to the unreliable and invalid findings of this evaluation, and erring on the side of caution, | would at most rule out at an Adjustment Disorder with Mixed Anxiety and Depressed Mood if applicable. Objectively speaking, Mr. Daghooghi Esfahani’s responses on the psychometric measures employed were indicative of infrequent and atypical responding. The present psychological examination found no objective evidence to substantiate Mr. Daghooghi Esfahani’s subjective self-report of psychological impairment related to the subject motor vehicle accident.

45It is clear from this report that the testing done by Dr. Syed included validity measures, and that Dr. Syed opined that limited confidence could be ascribed to the reliability and validity of the data gathered during the evaluation. This is what is noted in paragraph 45 of the decision. Therefore, without further explanation of which three tests the applicant is referring to in his reconsideration submissions, how the Tribunal erred or how such an error would likely have changed the outcome of the decision, I find that the applicant has not established grounds for reconsideration with respect to paragraph 45 and Dr. Syed’s report.

46With respect to the applicant’s argument about the completeness of Dr. Syed’s report, I find that this submission was not made at the initial hearing. It is an attempt to reargue his case, which is not grounds for reconsideration.

The argument that the respondent is required to remove the applicant from the MIG in order for him to undergo testing is not grounds for reconsideration

47The applicant argues on reconsideration that, if the respondent required additional testing to be conducted to assess his injuries, the “proper approach” would have been for the respondent to take him out of the MIG and agree to fund the necessary assessments. The applicant also argues that the respondent required him to undergo “inappropriate testing”, which the applicant was unable to have done because he does not have OHIP; and that he could not afford to see doctors and specialists.

48At paragraph 23 of the decision, the Tribunal noted the respondent’s submission that Dr. Berbrayer had asked the applicant to complete an MRI, EMG and nerve conduction test. The applicant did not attend the EMG and nerve conduction tests on September 5, 2023. While the applicant argues that it is inappropriate for the respondent to consider his injuries within the MIG, but require him to undergo testing to further assess his injuries, I find this is not grounds for reconsideration because it was not argued at first instance. The respondent determined that it required additional information about the applicant’s condition in order to assess his claim. This is what is provided for in section 33(1) of the Schedule and no arguments were made about the respondent’s request at the initial hearing.

49Although the applicant argues on reconsideration that the applicant should have been removed from the MIG and then funded for the necessary assessments, this was also not argued at the initial hearing, and it is not what is provided for in the Schedule. As set out in the decision at paragraphs 17 and 18, pursuant to subsections 18(1) and 18(2) of the Schedule, the onus is on the applicant to establish he should be removed from the MIG. Then, even if he meets his onus in this regard, the applicant bears the further onus to demonstrate that a treatment and assessment plan is reasonable and necessary as a result of the accident, pursuant to sections 15 and 16 of the Schedule.

50In this case, the Tribunal determined he had not met his onus to demonstrate removal from the MIG. As the applicant is in the MIG, the Tribunal correctly concluded that his medical/rehabilitation benefits are subject to the $3,500.00 statutory limit.

51For these reasons, I find that the applicant has not established grounds for reconsideration on this basis.

52In conjunction with his arguments about the MIG, the applicant argues that the Tribunal erred at paragraph 51 of the decision, where it states that, as he is in the MIG, it is unnecessary to consider the reasonableness and necessity of the treatment plans in dispute.

53I find that the Tribunal did not err. It concluded the applicant was subject to the MIG, and therefore subject to the $3,500.00 cap on benefits. As a result, it was not necessary to consider if the treatment plans in dispute are reasonable and necessary.

54The applicant also argues that he should have entitlement to the treatment plans due to denial notices that are not compliant with section 38 of the Schedule. Specifically, the applicant submits that the respondent approved treatment in excess of the MIG limits, and failed to advise the applicant in the February 11, 2022 notice that his injuries were in the MIG, as required by section 38(9). He also submits that the denial letter of August 5, 2022 did not comply with section 38(8), as it did not provide medical reasons.

55The challenge with these arguments is that they were not made at the initial hearing. In fact, no notice arguments were made in the applicant’s submissions for the initial hearing. It is not an error for the Tribunal to not consider arguments that were not made. Therefore, I find that the applicant has not established grounds for reconsideration with respect to section 38 of the Schedule.

56In sum, the applicant has not established grounds for reconsideration with respect to the treatment plans.

Allegations of Bias

57The applicant argues that the Tribunal showed institutional bias by accepting the respondent’s Investigation Report, dated February 25, 2022. The applicant also argues that the Tribunal was biased by “showing favor towards the s. 44 assessment of Dr. Amena Syed”.

58The Supreme Court of Canada set out the test for a reasonable apprehension of bias in Committee for Justice and Liberty et al. v. National Energy Board et al., 1975 CanLII 2 (SCC), at page 394:

[T]he apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and right-minded persons, applying themselves to the question and obtaining thereon the required information. In the words of the Court of Appeal, that test is “what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically – and having through the matter though – conclude. Would he think that it is more likely than not that the [decision-maker], whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly.”

59In Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, 2003 S.C.R. 45, at para. 59, the Supreme Court confirmed the existence and importance of a strong presumption of judicial or quasi-judicial impartiality. In order to overcome this presumption, a party alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias must establish the presence of substantial grounds:

Viewed in this light, “[i]mpartiality is the fundamental qualification of a judge and the core attribute of the judiciary” (Canadian Judicial Council, Ethical Principles of Judges (1998), at p.30). It is the key to our judicial process and must be presumed. As was noted by L’Heureux-Dubé J. and McLachlin J. (as she then was) in S. (R.D.), supra, at para. 32, the presumption of impartiality carries considerable weight, and the law should not carelessly evoke the possibility of bias in a judge, whose authority depends upon that presumption. Thus, while the requirement of judicial impartiality is a stringent one, the burden is on the party arguing for disqualification to establish that the circumstances justify a finding that the judge must be disqualified.

60In this case, while the applicant submits that the decision reflects institutional and personal bias on the part of the Tribunal, he has not substantiated this argument. The applicant does not provide probative evidence in support of this submission. While he points to the fact that the Tribunal did not decide in his favour, an adverse decision, in and of itself, does not rebut the presumption of impartiality: see Taucar v. Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, 2017 ONSC 2604, at paras. 84-85.

61Further, as set out above, in accepting the respondent’s surveillance evidence, the Tribunal noted the absence of submissions from the applicant on this point. At paragraph 15, the Tribunal stated:

In the absence of any submissions or evidence from the applicant, I accept the evidence of the applicant’s admission to the respondent’s investigator that he used his vehicle for deliveries with Instacart, as well as the screenshots of the applicant’s phone showing that he was paid to make deliveries between January 3 and 9, as well as on January 10 and 11, 2022, which overlaps with the date of January 6, 2022, when he entered into an agreement with the respondent for an automobile policy for personal use only. I find that the applicant’s conduct in signing this contract for personal use only when he was using his vehicle to work for Instacart, amounts to “an assertion not in accordance with the facts.”

62With respect to the argument that the Tribunal has shown bias to the respondent by showing favour towards the s. 44 assessment of Dr. Syed, the applicant points to paragraph 45 of the decision where the Tribunal concluded that five out of eight of the tests administered by Dr. Syed had validity testing. As set out above, the applicant argues that only three of the tests had validity measures. Not only did I not accept this argument above about the testing, but he makes no further submissions on how the Tribunal’s assessment and weighing of this evidence is evidence of bias. On review of the decision, I find that the Tribunal provided clear and cogent reasons for its weighing of the evidence. I see no bias in the decision.

63In my view, the applicant has not established grounds for reconsideration with respect to these arguments. He has invoked the possibility of bias without establishing that the circumstances justify such a finding, nor does he point to an evidentiary basis for his argument.

64Accordingly, the applicant has not established grounds for reconsideration with respect to bias.

CONCLUSION & ORDER

65For the reasons set out above, the applicant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.

E. Louise Logan

Vice-Chair