Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18226/MVIA
In the matter of an appeal under Section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”), from an impoundment of a motor vehicle pursuant to Section 55.1 of the Act.
Between:
Kylie Vermeer
Appellant
and
Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Respondent
DECISION AND ORDER
ADJUDICATOR:
Raymond C. Ramdayal, Member
APPEARANCES:
For the Appellant:
Kylie Vermeer, Self-represented
For the Respondent:
Leila Pereira, Agent
Heard:
February 4, 2026
OVERVIEW
1The appellant, Kylie Vermeer, appeals the 45-day impoundment of her 2012 Jeep Grand Cherokee motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”).
2The appellant’s vehicle was impounded on January 16, 2026, after police found it being operated by (T.S.D.), whose driver’s licence had been suspended following an impaired driving conviction under the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46 (“Criminal Code”). The parties do not dispute the fact that the vehicle was being driven by T.S.D. at the time of the impoundment.
3Subsection 55.1(1) of the Act allows for the impoundment of a vehicle for 45 days where a police officer is satisfied that the driver’s licence of the person who is driving a vehicle is under suspension at the time for, among other specified reasons, a suspension for ability impaired. T.S.D. was convicted of this offence on September 4, 2025. As a result of discovering this information at roadside, police impounded the vehicle pursuant to s. 55.1(1) of the Act.
4The appellant filed her appeal with the Licence Appeal Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) on January 20, 2025. The appellant appeals the impoundment pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act on the ground that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.
ISSUE
5The onus of proving this ground of appeal rests with the appellant. To succeed in her appeal, the appellant must establish that she suffered exceptional hardship, as a result of the impoundment, on a balance of probabilities.
RESULT
6Having considered the parties’ evidence and submissions, I find that the appellant has demonstrated on a balance of probabilities that she will suffer exceptional hardship as a result of the impoundment.
7I therefore set aside the impoundment and order that the vehicle be released to the appellant.
ANALYSIS
8It is undisputed between the parties that the appellant is the owner of the impounded vehicle, that T.S.D. was driving it at the time it was impounded, and that T.S.D.’s driver’s licence was under suspension. I am satisfied that the vehicle was lawfully detained and impounded under s. 55.1 of the Act.
Will the appellant experience exceptional hardship due to the impoundment?
9I find that the appellant has shown that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship for the reasons which follow.
10As a first step, s. 10(1) of O. Reg. 631/98 (“Regulation”) sets out the factors the Tribunal is to consider when determining whether an impoundment will result in exceptional hardship. The first step under s. 10(1) is that the appellant must demonstrate there is no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle available. Subsection 10(4) sets out that to show this, an appellant must establish that there are no reasonable alternatives to the impounded vehicle. Section 10(4) of the Regulation provides, as follows:
The owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.
11The appellant offered evidence to demonstrate that she has no reasonable alternative to the impounded motor vehicle.
12The appellant lives in Hamilton, Ontario and is a full-time college student. When not taking courses, she works in the hotel service industry between 32 to 42 hours per week. Her work hours are from 11 pm to 7 am and she would typically work 4-5 shifts per week. She relies on her vehicle to get to and from work. She testified that public transit is not available during the nighttime hours she works. As a result, she has been unable to work any shifts, except one, since the date of the impoundment.
13The appellant is also a single mother of two young children aged 6 and 3 years old. She requires her vehicle to transport them to school and daycare. Since the impoundment of her vehicle, she has been unable to take her youngest child to daycare on 5 occasions, thereby jeopardizing her placement at the daycare. The appellant testified that she simply cannot drop off her older child to school, her younger child to daycare, attend school and make it to work without her vehicle.
14I am satisfied that the appellant has explored other alternatives to her impounded vehicle. She testified that she has considered borrowing a vehicle from a family member but her options are limited. Her mother lives an hour away in Simcoe, Ontario and she cannot loan her vehicle. Similarly, her mother-in-law is unable to lend the appellant her vehicle because she uses it to care for other children. The appellant’s other family members live outside of the province or do not drive. She has asked friends, but they were not willing to lend their vehicles. The appellant has also inquired about getting rides from co-workers but their shifts do not match up to allow carpooling to occur.
15The appellant has also researched the cost of renting a vehicle. She states that she simply cannot afford the amount she was quoted. She also states she cannot afford a rideshare program such as Uber or Lyft. She is on a fixed income receiving OSAP and government money for baby bonuses for her children. This leaves minimal savings after paying for food, household goods, books and babysitting services.
16The appellant has minimal support around her and testified that she must walk 30 minutes one way to the nearest grocery store and pharmacy. She is able to take a bus to these locations but she states it is faster to walk since it would require two buses. She explained it has been particularly difficult this winter. Nonetheless, she has been making extraordinary efforts to venture on these walks without the impounded vehicle.
17I find the appellant has proven clearly on a balance of probabilities that she does not have any other vehicles available to her. She does not have any friends or family whom she can call to borrow a vehicle or get a ride. She has not been able to attend work because of the lack of public transit which she states she can afford and willing to take. However, due to her nighttime shift, the service is unavailable. Her income does not allow her to rent a vehicle or take a taxi.
18I find that the appellant does not have an alternative to the impounded vehicle. I am satisfied that she has considered and inquired into every reasonable option that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.
19Having satisfied myself that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle available to the appellant, I must now consider under s. 10(1)(a) and (b) of the Regulation whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person who is ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle, or a threat to the public health and safety or to the environment or property of a community in whose service the motor vehicle is ordinarily used. I may also consider, under s. 10(2) and (3), financial or economic loss, or loss of employment, but only if the owner demonstrates that:
(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;
(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;
(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and
(d) the impact of the loss,
(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and
(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).
20The appellant states that she has no choice but to miss work without her vehicle. While her employer is aware of her current situation, she is losing income as a result of not having her vehicle. This is much needed income given her current financial situation and the need to care for her two young children.
21The appellant also expressed ongoing concerns for her own safety and that of her children in relation to her former partner, with whom she previously had a no-contact order. That no contact order came to an end on January 26, 2026. She explained that she continues to be fearful and that her vehicle gives her a sense of security knowing she can leave a location promptly if necessary.
22Overall, I find that the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle results in a threat to the health and safety of the appellant and others who rely on the vehicle, and are ordinarily transported by the vehicle.
23I am satisfied that the appellant has demonstrated that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act.
ORDER
24For the reasons set out above, pursuant to the Tribunal’s authority under s. 50.2(5) of the Act, I set aside the impoundment and order the respondent to release the vehicle.
LICENCE APPEAL TRIBUNAL
_________________________
Raymond C. Ramdayal, Member
Released: February 18, 2026