Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17968/MVDA

In the matter of an appeal from a Notice of Proposal to revoke registrations under s. 9 of the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 30, Sch. B.

Between:

Peter Kinal and 1054382 Ontario Limited o/a Trinity Auto Brokers

Appellants

and

Registrar, Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Bruce Stanton

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellants:

Peter Kinal, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Zachary Kowalsky, Counsel

Heard by videoconference:

February 6, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Peter Kinal and 1054382 Ontario Limited o/a Trinity Auto Brokers ("Trinity Auto"), collectively, the appellants, appeal from a Notice of Proposal to revoke their registrations issued by the Registrar under the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 30, Sch. B. (the "Act"), the respondent, on November 3, 2025. Trinity Auto holds a registration as a motor vehicle dealership and Mr. Kinal is a director of Trinity Auto and also a registered motor vehicle salesperson at the dealership.

2The parties do not dispute that the November 3, 2025 Notice of Proposal to Revoke Registrations (the "NOP") was not served on the appellants until November 15, 2025.

3The appellants filed an appeal of the NOP with the Licence Appeal Tribunal ("Tribunal") on December 5, 2025. Since the appeal was filed after the expiry of the statutory 15-day appeal period, the appellants filed a Notice of Motion seeking an order from the Tribunal to grant an extension of the appeal period to allow their appeal of the NOP to proceed.

ISSUE

4The issue to be determined is:

i. Whether there are reasonable grounds for extending the statutory time limit for requesting a hearing under s. 9 or the Act.

RESULT

5I am satisfied there are reasonable grounds for extending the time limit. The motion is granted.

ANALYSIS

Authority to extend a time limit

6Section 7 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 12, Sched. G stipulates that if the Tribunal is satisfied there are reasonable grounds for doing so, it may extend the time required under any Act for the giving of notice of an appeal from a decision or notice of proposal.

Reasonable grounds for extending a time limit

7I find that the appellant has demonstrated that reasonable grounds exist to grant an extension to the time required for giving a notice of appeal.

8The Divisional Court in Manuel v. Registrar, Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002, 2012 ONSC 1492 ("Manuel"), at paragraph 14, reiterated the factors for considering whether reasonable grounds exist to grant an extension of a time limit, which are found in the Court of Appeal's decision in Frey v. Macdonald, [1989] O.J. No. 236 (C.A.) ("Frey"), as follows:

i. The existence of a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period;

ii. The length of the delay;

iii. Prejudice to the other party; and

iv. The merits of the appeal.

9Manuel further articulated the reasonable grounds test at paragraph 15, affirming that all four factors of the test need to be considered with no one factor having priority over another, and that an extension should not be granted if the appellant is not reasonably able to explain why he failed to observe the limitation unless the "justice of the case" requires otherwise.

10Manuel, referred to Frey, at paragraph 17, in noting that "the general rule is that time for an appeal is not extended unless the appellant has shown that these factors apply to support an extension." To obtain an order for an extension an appellant bears the onus of demonstrating that reasonable grounds exist to grant an extension.

11Manuel stated further, at paragraph 40, that "the justice of the case is the overriding consideration", and that the four factors considered above may properly be understood to be factors that assist in assessing whether the justice of the case requires that an extension be granted.

12The reasonable grounds test, guided by the Court in Manuel and Frey, therefore consists of two elements; firstly, as determined by the facts and circumstances of the four factors in Frey, with no one factor having precedence, and secondly, by the overriding consideration of whether the justice of the case requires an extension.

Bona Fide intention to appeal within the appeal period

13I find that the appellant has not demonstrated that he had a bona fide intention to appeal the NOP within the appeal period.

14Peter Kinal, on behalf of the appellants, testified that he could not remember when he first decided to appeal the NOP, and that he was "in a fog" and was shocked at the realization that the respondent was preparing to take his registrations away and leave him without a livelihood. He testified that this whole process has been difficult, and he is not familiar with the procedures of an appeal.

15The respondent submits that Mr. Kinal first contacted the Ontario Motor Vehicle Industry Council ("OMVIC"), the administrative branch of the respondent, about the NOP on November 17, 2025, but adds that simple communication with the respondent does not constitute a bona fide intention to appeal. It submits that the appellants had information in the covering letter of the NOP about how to appeal, and the legal department of OMVIC corresponded with Mr. Kinal on November 24, 2025, providing greater detail and instructions on how to appeal. It submits that the appellants have produced no evidence of a genuine intention to appeal within the appeal period.

16I am not persuaded that the appellants had a genuine intention to appeal within the appeal period because, beyond Mr. Kinal's vague oral evidence of being shocked at receiving the NOP and his unfamiliarity with the appeal process, he has not provided any reasons as to why the Notice of Appeal ("NOA") could not have been filed by the due date.

17Mr. Kinal's apparent lack of attention to the appeal time limit is contrasted by his otherwise prompt attention to the NOP itself. I note that he contacted the respondent within two days of receiving the NOP, and he appears to have exchanged correspondence with the respondent on at least one other occasion, November 24, 2025 being an example, within the appeal period.

18While I understand that receiving the NOP was a troubling development for his business, Mr. Kinal has not provided any clarity or insights as to why he did not appeal the NOP within the time period.

19I find that the appellant has not demonstrated that he had a bona fide intention to appeal the NOP within the appeal period.

Length of Delay

20I find that the length of delay in filing is relatively insignificant and does not constitute reasonable grounds to deny an extension.

21The documentary evidence before me shows that the appellant filed his appeal on December 5, 2025, five calendar days after the deadline of November 30, 2025 (15 days after the NOP was served on the appellants).

22The respondent submits a different view of the timelines of the filing of the appellants' NOA, that the appellants' (incomplete) request for a hearing was not submitted until December 9, 2025. That is the date the Tribunal first replied to the appellants, advising that their appeal was incomplete.

23The respondent submits that, due to delays in getting all the components of the NOA filed, the Tribunal did not have a complete, finalized NOA until January 20, 2026, almost two months after the deadline. The Tribunal granted the appellants' extensions for filing the missing components of the NOA, including a copy of the Notice of Proposal, a Notice of Motion (owing to filing the NOA after the appeal period), and the required fee for the appeal of both appellants. It submits that is over four times the length of a standard appeal period which is grossly excessive, and the appellants have offered no explanations for the delay.

24I disagree with the respondent's submission that the NOA was first submitted December 9, 2025. An email from the appellants to the LAT Registrar, dated December 5, 2025 at 3:25 p.m., and copied to the OMVIC legal department, is included in the respondent's book of documents. That email essentially provides a time stamp of when the Tribunal received the appellants' NOA.

25I am persuaded by the relevant facts presented by the parties, that the length of delay is relatively insignificant and does not establish reasonable grounds to deny an extension.

26I find the expiry of the appeal period was December 1, 2025, because the 15-day limit after service of the NOP extended to November 30, 2025, a Sunday. Section 89(1) of the Legislation Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 21, Sched. F stipulates that the time limits that would otherwise expire on a holiday, including a Sunday, are extended to include the next day that is not a holiday. Accordingly, the November 30, 2025 expiry of the appeal period extends to the next day, Monday, December 1, 2025.

27I find the appellants' NOA was filed on December 5, 2025, which equates to a four-day delay in filing.

28I am not persuaded by the respondent's submission that the date of the "finalized" NOA (January 20, 2026) should be determinative of the "length of delay". Section 9(2) of the Act clearly articulates that a registrant is entitled to a hearing by the Tribunal if they mail or deliver, within 15 days after service of the notice, a written request for a hearing. The respondent's logic suggests that a notice of appeal would need to be "finalized" and complete, within the 15-day appeal period to be in compliance with s. 9(2). I disagree.

29I find that the appellants' filing of their NOA on December 5, 2025, albeit four days late, constitutes their written request for a hearing. I find the administrative steps taken between the appellants and the Tribunal to complete and finalize the NOA's various components should not negate the date on which they first requested, in writing, a hearing pursuant to s. 9(2) of the Act.

30I find that a four-day delay is not an unreasonable delay in filing the appeal, considering the appellants are self-represented and unfamiliar with the appeal process, and is not reasonable grounds to deny an extension of the time limit. This factor weighs in favour of granting the extension.

Prejudice to the other party

31I find there would be prejudice to the other party by granting an extension, by virtue of allowing the appellants to continue operating pending the outcome of a hearing. This would raise the possibility of harm to consumers, which the respondent works to protect. However, I find this is not a significant prejudice.

32The appellants provided no specific submissions on the prejudice factor, but Mr. Kinal testified about the nature of his business, and in so doing, spoke to the potential risks to consumers by his continuing to operate the business pending a hearing.

33Mr. Kinal testified that Trinity Auto continues to operate, employs one or two other salespersons and sells two to three vehicles per week. He testified that he has been registered with OMVIC for over 30 years and while, in recent years, he has run into conflict with OMVIC, he respects their role as a regulator and generally does not refute the basis of the allegations set out in the NOP. He admits that he let his attention to bookkeeping slip.

34Mr. Kinal testified that since receiving the NOP, he has focussed his efforts on complying with OMVIC and has been working to improve the bookkeeping that he had been less attentive to in the years after COVID and the death of his parents in 2022.

35Mr. Kinal testified that he has never "ripped anyone off" and when there have been repair issues with cars, as there often can be, he has stood behind the commitment to make it right for his customers. He acknowledged that there was a complaint against Trinity Auto regarding the sale of a 2014 GMC Terrain, that is the subject of a provincial offences court case, but testified that he knows of no other complaints to OMVIC against him.

36The respondent submits that prejudice is presumed when a limitation period is missed because there is a public interest in ensuring that time limits are met in decisions regarding the finality of registration. It submits that if the legislature thought otherwise, it would not have imposed a 15-day limit for a hearing request to be made.

37The respondent submits that it is extremely prejudicial to the respondent to allow an appeal, that was effectively submitted 51 days after the appeal deadline and amounts to 51 days for the appellants to continue to operate within the industry despite the respondent reasonably believing the appellants will not carry on business in accordance with the law and with integrity and honesty.

38I find there is some prejudice to the respondent, owing to the risk of harm to consumers by the appellants' continued operations pending the outcome of a hearing, that the respondent is mandated to protect against. However, the prejudice is not significant.

39I am persuaded by Mr. Kinal's oral testimony regarding the appellants' history as registrants with OMVIC and his recent attentions toward correcting the issues related to his bookkeeping, that the potential for harm to consumers by granting an extension is not significant.

40I also note that the respondent did not order an immediate temporary suspension of the appellants' operations upon issuing the NOP, which it could have done.

41The respondent submitted that it has the ability to impose an Immediate Temporary Suspension Order ("ITSO") along with notices of proposal to revoke registrations and does so in cases where the potential for consumer harm is greater. The respondent submitted that the appellants' case did not meet that threshold; no such ITSO was issued for the appellants. I find the fact that the respondent chose not to impose an ITSO relevant to the consideration of the level of harm to consumers and prejudice to the respondent from granting an extension, and find that this further supports a finding that the potential harm, while present, was not significant.

42I also note that the NOP was not issued until November 3, 2025, nearly eight months after the 2025 inspections. It seems that the respondent did not pursue the revocation order on such an urgent basis as might be suggested if the appellants' continued operations posed a considerable risk of consumer harm.

43Although the respondent submits that allowing the appellants to operate 51 days (the length of delay the respondent argues occurred in the appellants' filing of the NOA) is extremely prejudicial to it, I find that the appellants filed their written request for a hearing only four days after the appeal period, not 51 days.

44I find it contradictory for the respondent to suggest, on one hand, that allowing the appellants to operate 51 days is an extreme prejudice against it, while, on the other hand, it accepted the appellants' continued operations for nearly eight months after its early 2025 inspections, before issuing the NOP.

45Considering the period that the appellants were allowed to continue operating after the January and March 2025 inspections until the issuance of the NOP, the respondent's decision not to issue an ITSO to the appellants, and Mr. Kinal's oral testimony on the nature of his business operations, I find that the risk of harm to consumers by the appellants' continued operations, is not significant.

46Accordingly, I find that there is prejudice to the respondent by granting an extension, owing to the risk of harm to consumers by the appellants' continued operation, but the risk is not significant. Therefore, I find the level of prejudice is also not significant and should not deny the granting of an extension.

Merit of the appeal

47In Manuel, at paragraphs 35 to 39, the Court determined that it was not unreasonable for the LAT to conclude that the appeal had no merit. The Court stated, at paragraph 37, that the Appellant could have demonstrated some merit to the case, for example, "by offering some clearer and more specific evidence as to why he had not taken a course" (emphasis is my own).

48In a previous Tribunal decision, Stimpson v. Registrar, Horse Racing Licence Act, 2015, 2023 CanLII 52273 ("Stimpson") considering the "merit of the appeal" factor on a motion to extend an appeal period, the Tribunal took the view that, the appellant must show that "his version of events", if believed, could reasonably result in a favourable outcome, i.e., an appellant must demonstrate that they have a reasonable chance of success by offering some clear and specific evidence they would put forward at a hearing to support their position.

49I am not bound by previous decisions of the Tribunal, but I find Stimpson to be an appropriate basis to consider the "merit" of an appeal because it compels an appellant to show they have a case to present and, if believed, they have the possibility of a positive outcome.

50Considering the Court's direction in Manuel, and the Tribunal's precedent in Stimpson, for the purposes of whether the appeal has merit, the appellants ought to be able to point to clear, specific evidence as to how the grounds or basis for the NOP could be challenged – i.e., challenge the allegations that the appellants' past conduct affords reasonable grounds for belief that they will not carry on business in accordance with the law and with integrity and honesty, and/or that they did not make a false statement.

51Mr. Kinal testified that he hoped this appeal process would be a means to get the respondent's reconsideration of the NOP such that he could remain registered and continue his livelihood, and he would accept conditions or probationary requirements during the time taken to get Trinity Auto into compliance.

52Mr. Kinal testified that a decision in the provincial offences case regarding the 2014 GMC Terrain, that was cited in the NOP, will likely be released in April 2026. He testified that he acknowledges the infractions listed in the 2025 inspection but points to his 30-year record as a registrant with one noted complaint (the 2014 GMC Terrain) that he has defended at Provincial Offences Court.

53The respondent submits that the appellants have submitted no evidence to the Tribunal on the reasons for the NOA and that without any evidence, submissions, or even a position on the NOP, it is very reasonable for the Tribunal to find there is no merit to the appeal.

54I find that there is merit to the appeal because Mr. Kinal has provided oral evidence during this motion hearing which suggests he has a history of conduct as a registrant that is relevant to the issues raised in the NOP. He has pointed to some clear and specific evidence he would put forward at a hearing to support his position.

55If the appellants' evidence is found to be persuasive, a hearing could result in a favourable outcome, from Mr. Kinal's perspective. He testified that he seeks a resolution of this dispute and understands that "resolution" could mean conditions and limits being imposed on his registration. Section 9(5) of the Act provides the Tribunal the jurisdiction to direct the respondent to carry out the NOP, but the Tribunal can also, under s. 9(5), substitute its opinion for that of the respondent and may attach conditions to its order or to a registration.

56I find there is merit to the appeal because the appellants have demonstrated they have specific evidence to present that, if believed, could result in a favourable outcome.

The justice of the case favours granting an extension

57I find, on balance, that the justice of the case favours granting an extension of the appeal period.

58Although the appellants did not demonstrate an intention to appeal within the appeal period, their NOA was only four days late, which is not significant and does not constitute reasonable grounds to deny an extension. There is some prejudice to the respondent from extending the appeal period, but it is not significant. There is merit to the appeal because the appellants have demonstrated, by Mr. Kinal's oral evidence, that, although he does not refute many of the allegations in the NOP, he intends, on behalf of the appellants, to present specific evidence to challenge the basis of the NOP and he seeks a resolution of the revocation orders that would allow him to continue as a registrant.

Conclusion

59Taking the four factors into consideration, I find that the appellants have met their onus in demonstrating there are reasonable grounds for an extension of the appeal period, and I find that the justice of the case favours an extension.

ORDER

60I order the following:

i. The statutory appeal period in this matter is extended pursuant to s. 7 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 12, Sched. G, to December 5, 2025, the date on which the appellants filed their written request for a hearing under s. 9(2) of the Act.