Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18252/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while in contravention of a condition under s. 55.1(1)2 of the Act.

Between:

Claire Belsheim

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

VICE-CHAIR:

Jeffery Campbell

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Claire Belsheim, Self-represented

For the Respondent: Observers:

Leila Pereira, Representative Gary Marshall (for the Tribunal) Nikisha Evans (for the Tribunal)

OVERVIEW

1Claire Belsheim (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of her 2017 Honda HRV (the “vehicle”) under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The vehicle was impounded on Friday, January 16, 2026. At the time of the impoundment, G.R. (the “driver”) appellant was driving the vehicle while her driver's licence was under suspension due to a criminal conviction.

2The appellant appeals on the ground that the impoundment will cause exceptional harship.

ISSUES

3The issue to be determined is:

1. Whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship, under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

ANALYSIS

4For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship

5I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

6I am satisfied that alternatives to the impounded vehicle are available.

7The Registrar of Motor Vehicles (the “Registrar”) tendered evidence establishing that the vehicle was stopped by police while it was being driven by G.R., whose licence was suspended due to a prescribed Criminal Code conviction. On this basis, I am satisfied that the vehicle was validly impounded.

8The appellant resides in London, Ontario with her partner. She is employed in Stouffville, Ontario but testified that she works from home for the most part and is only required to attend the workplace every couple of months for meetings. She has not been required to attend in person during the impound period and does not anticipate such a requirement before the impoundment ends.

9The appellant testified that her partner suffers from significant medical issues. He attends between two and three medical appointments per week in London. To date, they have relied on Uber to attend these appointments. He has not missed any appointments and expects to continue using Uber, despite the high cost.

10With respect to groceries, prescriptions, and other necessities, the appellant stated that they have been using Uber and Uber Eats, although these services are expensive.

11She also testified that public transit is available although “it is hard”.

12The Registrar submits that the appellant has not required transportation for work and will not need it for the remainder of the impoundment period. The Registrar also notes that the appellant has been using Uber and Uber Eats for appointments and necessities, and that public transit is available, even if she has not used it. In the Registrar’s view these options constitute alternative means of transportation.

13I agree. Regulation 631/98 under the Act sets out the criteria that the Tribunal must consider in determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship. Under the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

14If the owner does not satisfy this threshold requirement, the appeal based on exceptional hardship must be dismissed, and the Tribunal is not required to assess the remaining factors set out in the Regulation.

15The Tribunal is not permitted to consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

16The appellant’s evidence demonstrates that she has obtained transportation through Uber, Uber Eats and has access to public transit. Although these options are costly, they remain viable alternatives within the meaning of the Regulation. As I have concluded that there are alternatives to the impounded vehicle, I find that the appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship as defined in Regulation 631/98.

ORDER

17The Tribunal Orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

Jeffery Campbell

Vice-Chair