Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18214/MVIA
In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while in contravention of a condition under s. 55.1(1)2 of the Act
Between:
Deborah Signoretti
Appellant
and
Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Respondent
DECISION
VICE-CHAIR: Jeffery Campbell
APPEARANCES:
For the Appellant: Deborah Signoretti, Self-represented
For the Respondent: Leila Pereira, Representative
Observers: Gary Marshall (for the Tribunal) Gary Harvey (for the Tribunal) Martin He (for the Respondent)
OVERVIEW
1Deborah Signoretti (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of her 2024 Volkswagen Tiguan (the “vehicle”) under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The vehicle was impounded on Saturday, January 10, 2026. At the time of the impoundment, F.T.S. (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle while his driver's licence was under suspension due to a criminal conviction.
2The appellant appeals on the grounds that the impoundment will cause exceptional harship.
ISSUES
3The issue to be determined is:
- Whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship, under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.
ANALYSIS
4For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.
The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship
5I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).
Alternative to the impounded vehicle
6I am satisfied that there are alternatives to the impounded vehicle.
7The Registrar of Motor Vehicles (the “Registrar”) tendered evidence that the vehicle was stopped by police while it was being driven by F.T.S., whose licence was suspended due to a prescribed Criminal Code conviction. I am therefore satisfied that the vehicle was validly impounded.
8The appellant testified that she is employed in three positions, one full-time with the government and two part time as a server. She has two adult sons, one residing in Buffalo, New York and the other who resides in Sudbury, Ontario. Her 17-year-old daughter resides with her in Kanata, Ontario.
9With respect to reasonable alternatives, the appellant testified that although she also owns a 2017 Nissan, that vehicle is currently being used by her son in Sudbury and is unavailable to her. Since the impoundment, the appellant testified that she has relied on Uber during the initial seven days and has since rented a vehicle. She expects to continue renting a vehicle until the impound period ends. She has used the rental car to commute to her workplaces, obtain groceries and prescriptions, and transport her daughter to various appointments
10The Registrar submits that, because the appellant has access to both Uber and a rental vehicle, she has alternative means of transportation.
11I agree with the Registrar. Regulation 631/98 under the Act sets out the criteria that the Tribunal must consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship. Under the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:
[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.
12If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship must be dismissed and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.
13The Tribunal is not permitted to consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.
14It is clear from the appellants testimony that she has secured the use of both Uber and a rental vehicle to compensate for the loss of her vehicle. While these options are understandably costly to the appellant, they nonetheless constitute alternatives. As such, I find that the appellant has not established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined in the Regulation.
ORDER
15The Tribunal Orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.
Jeffery Campbell Vice-Chair
Released: February 9, 2026