Ward’s Towing Service Ltd. v. Director of Towing and Vehicle Storage Standards, 2026 CanLII 10348

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 16773/TSSEA

In the matter of an appeal from a suspension order issued under s. 7 of the Towing and Vehicle Storage Safety and Enforcement Act, 2021, S.O. 2021, Sched. 3 (the “Act”).

Between:

Ward’s Towing Service Ltd.

Appellants

and

Director of Towing and Vehicle Storage Standards

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR: Caley Howard

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Dara Saunders, paralegal

For the Respondent: Patrick Moore, Counsel

Court Reporters: Charlotte St Croix Danice Earle

Heard by Videoconference: January 6-9 and 12, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Ward’s Towing Service Ltd (the “appellant”) appeals a suspension order dated February 24, 2025, issued by the Director of Towing and Vehicle Storage Standards (the “suspension order”), suspending the appellant’s Tow Operator and Vehicle Storage Certificates for a period of 30 days. The suspension was ordered to take effect March 10, 2025.

2On March 7, 2025, the Tribunal granted a stay of the suspension pending the outcome of the appeal.

3The respondent issued the suspension order on the grounds that the appellant contravened or failed to satisfy the requirements of s. 7 of the Act.

ISSUES

4The issues in dispute are:

i. Has the respondent established that it has grounds for the suspension under the Act?

ii. If so, what is the appropriate outcome?

RESULT

5I find that the respondent has established several grounds for the suspension under the Act. However, I find that the appropriate outcome in this situation is to keep in place the conditions attached to the appellant’s tow and storage certificates when they were issued as well as the conditions set out in the resolution of March 5, 2025, indefinitely, at the discretion of the respondent.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES

Appellant’s adjournment application

6On the first day of the hearing, the appellant replaced its previous counsel with Ms. Saunders and sought an adjournment to enable Ms. Saunders to familiarize herself with the appeal and prepare for the hearing. It sought an adjournment of approximately 30-45 days. The appellant submitted that the change of representative was necessary as it lost confidence in its previous counsel.

7The respondent opposed the appellant’s adjournment request on the basis that there had been three previous adjournments of this hearing and that the last adjournment had been granted on the basis that the hearing dates of January 6-9 were peremptory on both parties. In addition, the respondent submitted that the suspension order had been stayed for over 10 months and it had safety concerns about leaving the stay in place any longer, particularly because it had concerns that the conditions on which it had agreed to the stay order were not being met by the appellant.

8Pursuant to Rule 16.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (the “Rules”), an oral adjournment request can be made at an event in compelling circumstances where the party did not and could not have known of the circumstances giving rise to the adjournment request prior to the event.

9I found that in the circumstances, where the hearing dates of January 6-9, 2026 were peremptory on both parties, the appellant was responsible for ensuring that it was ready to proceed on those dates, including ensuring that its chosen representative was ready to proceed as scheduled. The appellant did not persuade me that its last-minute change of representative amounted to compelling circumstances that the appellant could not have known about prior to the hearing.

10Therefore, I denied the appellant’s request for an adjournment.

11I note that because of the witness schedule, I was able to give the appellant’s new counsel the afternoon of the first day of the hearing to familiarize herself with the materials for the hearing.

Appellant’s request to rely on documents that were produced late

12On the second day of the hearing, the appellant served and filed a supplementary document brief and sought to rely on those documents at the hearing. The appellant submitted that these were documents that the appellant’s previous counsel should have produced much earlier.

13The respondent consented to the appellant relying on some of the documents that had been produced as party of an affidavit in March 2025, in relation to the stay hearing. However, there were certain documents that had not been produced by the appellant prior to the start of the hearing and the respondent objected to the appellant relying on those documents at the hearing.

Updated CVOR history

14I granted the appellant’s request to rely on its CVOR history, current to January 6, 2026, at the hearing.

15The appellant sought to rely on its updated CVOR history as it would show the lengths that the appellant has gone to improve its safety ratings since the March 3, 2025 history that was relied upon by the respondent.

16The respondent submitted that it would be prejudiced by the admission of this document as its witnesses had not had a chance to review it during their preparation for the hearing.

17I found that the updated CVOR history would be relevant to the issue of the appropriate sanction and that there was limited prejudice to the respondent in admitting this document because the information contained therein was in the respondent’s possession. In order to mitigate any potential prejudice, I offered the respondent some time to discuss the document with Mr. Armstrong prior to his testimony.

Current safety meeting records

18I found that the safety meeting records were not admissible.

19The appellant submitted that these short documents were relevant as they would show who is attending the safety meetings and what topics are discussed. The respondent submitted that it would be prejudiced by the admission of this document as its witnesses had not had a chance to review it during their preparation for the hearing.

20I found that the safety meeting records were not admissible. There was already an example of a safety meeting record in the appellant’s document brief. I found that additional examples added little information that could not be covered by the testimony of the appellant’s witnesses. Therefore, the potential prejudice to the respondent in admitting the document outweighed any prejudice to the appellant arising from not admitting the document. I denied the appellant’s request to admit the document.

Current warning, termination and suspension letters to employees

21I denied the appellant’s request to admit the warning, termination and suspension letters to employees.

22The appellant sought to include a series of disciplinary letters to employees issuing warnings, suspensions and terminations of employment. The appellant submitted that they were relevant as they demonstrate efforts by the appellant to ensure that its drivers comply with the Act and regulations.

23The respondent submitted that the disciplinary letters did not address any of the specific incidents listed in the suspension order or either of the Notice of Further and Other Particulars (“NOFOP”s) and so were of minimal relevance to the issues in dispute. It further submitted that its witnesses had already had to review numerous documents that were served on it by the appellant in advance of the hearing and that the witnesses had not had the opportunity to review these late-produced documents.

24I denied the appellant’s request because there were other examples of such disciplinary letters to employees in the appellant’s document brief. As these letters were not directly related to the alleged grounds for suspension, I found that the appellant would not be significantly prejudiced if it could not rely on these documents at the hearing.

25I found that the potential prejudice to the respondent due to the extremely late production outweighed the minimal prejudice that the appellant would experience if it could not rely on these documents. I denied the appellant’s request.

Email between Tariq Mahmud and Randolph Whan

26I denied the appellant’s request to depend on an email from Mr. Mahmud, the appellant’s safety consultant, to Mr. Whan, the appellant’s sole officer and director.

27The appellant submitted that the email was relevant as it summarized advice that Mr. Mahmud had given to Mr. Whan in his function as the appellant’s safety consultant. The respondent submitted that both Mr. Mahmud and Mr. Whan were going to testify at the hearing, so the email was redundant.

28I found that the prejudice to the appellant if not permitted to rely on the email was minimal, as both the sender and recipient of the email were testifying at the hearing and could testify about the contents of the email. The respondent would be more prejudiced if it had to have its witness review the email at the last minute in preparation for his testimony.

Various emails between the parties

29I allowed the appellant’s request to rely on a series of emails between the appellant and the respondent’s towing@ontario.ca email address.

30The appellant submitted that these emails were relevant as they show the appellant attempting to get information from the respondent in order to ensure its compliance with the Act and regulations. The respondent submitted that it would be prejudiced if its witness had to review the document prior to his testimony.

31I found that the emails were within the knowledge of the respondent prior to the hearing as it was one of the parties to the emails. I further found that the emails may be relevant to the issue of the appropriate sanction. Therefore, I allowed the appellant’s request. I gave the respondent the opportunity to review the documents with Mr. Armstrong before his testimony.

Photographs of a tow truck

32I allowed the appellant to rely on three photographs of a tow truck.

33The appellant submitted that the photographs were relevant as they were taken in response to allegations that one of the appellant’s tow trucks did not have the appropriate information on both sides of the exterior of the truck.

34I found that the three photographs of one truck would not require a significant amount of time for the respondent’s witness to review prior to his testimony. I found that the photographs may be relevant to an allegation set out in the suspension order of NOFOPs and that the prejudice to the appellant if not permitted to rely on them would outweigh the prejudice to the respondent if the photographs were relied on at the hearing. Again, I gave the respondent the option of discussing the photographs with counsel prior to Mr. Armstrong commencing his testimony.

ANALYSIS

Issue i - Has the respondent established that it has grounds for the suspension under the Act?

General grounds for suspension order

35Section 7 of the Act provides that the Director may suspend a certificate if:

a) The Director is satisfied that the holder no longer meets the qualifications and requirements prescribed for the certificate; or

b) The holder has contravened or failed to comply with the Act or the regulations.

36Section 11 of the Act provides that every tow operator, in providing or offering to provide towing services, must ensure that persons employed or engaged by it comply with the Act and its regulations, including the prescribed requirements and standards respecting the provision of towing services.

37Section 8 of O. Reg. 167/23, under the Act, sets out the qualifications and requirements for the issuance or renewal of a tow certificate, which includes, at paragraph 5, that the applicant has not contravened the Act, the Highway Traffic Act (“HTA”), or regulations made thereunder and that the applicant has always provided tow services competently and safely.

38Section 9(3) of O. Reg. 167/23 provides for the suspension or cancellation of a tow certificate where the holder fails to meet the requirements of s. 8. Where the specific grounds addressed involve contraventions of the HTA or its regulations, this provision provides that those contraventions, if proven, are grounds for suspension of the appellant’s tow certificate.

39Similarly, s. 24(3) of O. Reg. 167/23 provides for the suspension or cancellation of a vehicle storage certificate where the holder ceases to meet a qualification or requirement set out in s. 23 after the certificate was issued. Paragraph 5 of s. 23 provides that one of the qualification or requirement is that the applicant has not contravened the Act or its regulations.

40Section 11(2) of the Act provides that no tow operator shall employ or engage a person as a tow truck driver unless the person is the holder of a valid tow driver certificate.

Grounds for suspension involving driver Jake Lockwood

The appellant employed Jake Lockwood as a tow truck driver after July 1, 2024

41I find that the respondent has proven this ground for its suspension order.

42The respondent submits that Jake Lockwood, a driver for the appellant, was issued refusals in response to three applications for a tow driver certificate. The refusals were dated March 26, 2024, June 3, 2024 and October 4, 2024. The respondent submits that the appellant continued to allow Mr. Lockwood to drive a tow truck after July 1, 2024, in violation of s. 11(2) of the Act. In support of its position, the respondent relies on the testimony of Officer Richard Brunet and the commercial vehicle inspection reports (CVIRs) of September 4, 2024, September 14, 2024 and January 31, 2025.

43The appellant acknowledged that it was aware that Mr. Lockwood did not have a valid tow driver certificate, but submits that after July 1, 2024, Mr. Lockwood was assigned to haul freight only and was not employed or engaged to drive a tow truck. In support, the appellant relies on the testimony of Mr. Whan and Mr. Lockwood.

44Mr. Lockwood testified that he was employed by the appellant to haul freight only after July 1, 2024. However, the same trucks were often used to haul freight and vehicles and on at least two occasions, as set out in the CVIRs dated September 4, 2024 and January 31, 2025, he agreed to haul vehicles for friends or acquaintances using the appellant’s trucks. Mr. Lockwood testified that he deliberately hid this activity from Mr. Whan.

45Mr. Whan testified that he was unaware that Mr. Lockwood was towing vehicles on September 4, 2024 or January 31, 2025 until about March 5, 2025, and that when he learned about Mr. Lockwood’s deception, he immediately terminated his employment.

46The appellant did not dispute that it continued to employ Mr. Lockwood after July 1, 2024. I find that Mr. Lockwood drove a tow truck, on at least two occasions, without a tow driver certificate, after July 1, 2024. While I accept that this was done without the knowledge of Mr. Whan, the appellant is ultimately responsible for ensuring that its employees comply with the Act, pursuant to s. 11. Therefore, I find that the respondent has proven, on a balance of probabilities, that the appellant employed Mr. Lockwood as a tow truck driver after July 1, 2024.

On September 4, 2024, Mr. Lockwood drove a tow truck of the appellant without holding a valid tow driver certificate

47I find that the respondent has proven this ground for the suspension.

48Section 12 of the Act provides that every tow truck driver must comply with the prescribed requirements and standards respecting the provision of towing services that apply to tow truck drivers.

49The respondent submits that Mr. Lockwood was driving a tow truck of the appellant, without holding a valid tow driver certificate, on September 4, 2024. In support, the respondent relies on the testimony of Officer Brunet and a CVIR dated September 4, 2024.

50The appellant submits that the appellant was unaware that Mr. Lockwood was towing vehicles on the date in question. In support, the appellant relies on the testimony of Mr. Lockwood and Mr. Whan.

51Officer Brunet testified that he stopped Mr. Lockwood on September 4, 2024 and Mr. Lockwood was unable to produce his tow driver certificate. Officer Brunet testified that his computer system confirmed that Mr. Lockwood did not hold a valid tow driver certificate so he had the tow truck impounded for 7 days. I find that the CVIR dated September 4, 2024 supports Officer Brunet’s testimony.

52Mr. Lockwood testified that on September 4, 2024, he was assigned to pick up a tow truck that had been having maintenance work done in Montreal. Once he picked up the tow truck, he agreed to tow a friend’s vehicles to earn some extra money on the date in question. Mr. Lockwood testified that Mr. Whan was not aware of his activities and had not authorized him to tow the vehicles.

53Mr. Lockwood admitted to driving the tow truck as alleged in the suspension order. Therefore, despite the testimony that Mr. Whan had not authorized Mr. Lockwood to tow the vehicles, I find that the respondent has proven, on a balance of probabilities, that Mr. Lockwood drove a tow truck of the appellant without holding a valid tow driver certificate, contrary to s. 12 of the Act.

54I further find that this amounts to a failure of the appellant to comply with s. 11(1)(b) of the Act, as the appellant did not ensure that its employee Mr. Lockwood complied with the Act on this occasion.

On September 4, 2024, driver Jake Lockwood presented a falsified document respecting his eligibility for a tow driver certificate

55I find that the respondent has proven this ground.

56Section 54(14) of the Act provides that no person may provide an inspector with information on matters relevant to the inspection that the person knows to be false or misleading.

57The respondent submits that on September 4, 2024, Mr. Lockwood presented a falsified email to Officer Brunet, which email purported to be from the Ministry of Transportation’s Towing Office to the appellant, dated August 24, 2024. The email stated that Mr. Lockwood’s appeal process had moved forward and that his tow driver certificate would be sent shortly. It relies on the testimony of Officer Brunet and Mr. Armstrong and a photograph of the email in question on Mr. Lockwood’s phone.

58The appellant does not deny that this incident occurred, but submits that Mr. Whan was not aware that Mr. Lockwood presented a falsified document to Officer Brunet until March 2025, at which point he immediately terminated Mr. Lockwood’s employment. The appellant relies on the testimony of Mr. Lockwood and Mr. Whan.

59Mr. Lockwood testified that when he was stopped by Officer Brunet on September 4, 2024, he called a friend, who sent him the falsified email, which he then presented to Officer Brunet.

60I find that Mr. Lockwood’s acknowledgment that he presented a falsified document to Officer Brunet corresponds with the testimony of Officer Brunet. Therefore, I find that the respondent has proven, on a balance of probabilities, that Mr. Lockwood knowingly presented a falsified document to Officer Brunet during an inspection. I find that this amounts to a violation of s. 54 of the Act.

61I further find that this incident amounts to a failure of the appellant to comply with s. 11(1)(b) of the Act, as it did not ensure that its employee Mr. Lockwood complied with s. 54 of the Act on this occasion.

On September 14, 2024, did Mr. Lockwood drive a tow truck of the appellant without a valid tow driver certificate?

62I find that the respondent has not proven this ground.

63The respondent submits that on September 14, 2024, Mr. Lockwood again drove a tow truck of the appellant without a valid tow driver certificate. It relies on the CVIR dated September 14, 2024, completed by Officer T. Munro.

64The appellant submits that the appellant was not towing a vehicle at the time of this inspection. The appellant acknowledged that Mr. Lockwood was employed by the appellant to haul freight and often used tow trucks to do so.

65The CVIR completed by Officer T. Munro indicates that Mr. Lockwood was driving a tow truck of the appellant on September 14, 2024 and failed to surrender a tow driver certificate to Officer Munro upon request.

66Mr. Lockwood testified that he was not towing a vehicle at the time of this inspection. I find that the respondent did not make submissions or direct me to evidence that the truck driven by Mr. Lockwood at the time of the inspection required him to have a tow driver certificate. Therefore, I find that the respondent has not proven, on a balance of probabilities, this ground for the suspension.

On January 31, 2025, Mr. Lockwood drove a tow truck of the appellant in the left lane, where his vehicle was prohibited, without a valid tow driver certificate, and without operable stop, tail lamp or turn signals on rear most vehicle

67I find that the respondent has proven this ground for the suspension.

68Section 1(1) of O. Reg. 608, under the HTA, provides that no person shall operate a commercial motor vehicle or any combination of a commercial motor vehicle and a towed vehicle that exceeds 6.5 metres in length in the left lane of those portions of a highway described in the Schedules, which includes specified portions of King’s Highway 401.

69Section 107(11) of the HTA prohibits a person from driving a commercial motor vehicle with a prescribed defect, in this case, the inoperable tail lamps, on a highway.

70The respondent submits that on January 31, 2025, Mr. Lockwood was pulled over for driving in the left lane on a section of King’s Highway where it was prohibited for a vehicle over 6.5 metres in length. The respondent submits that in addition, Mr. Lockwood did not have a valid tow driver certificate at the time and, while the tow truck was loaded with two vehicles, there was no operable stop lamp, tail lamp or turn signal on the rear most vehicle. In support, it relies on the testimony of Officer Jon Milton, the CVIR completed by Officer Milton on January 31, 2025, the ticket issued to Mr. Lockwood and Officer Milton’s handwritten notes relating to the incident.

71The appellant submits that the appellant was unaware that Mr. Lockwood was towing vehicles on the date in question. In support, the appellant relies on the testimony of Mr. Lockwood and Mr. Whan.

72Officer Milton testified that he observed Mr. Lockwood driving the tow truck, which was towing two vehicles at the time, pull into the left lane on a section of highway where it was prohibited for a vehicle over 6.5 metres in length, drive there for a period of time, passing slower-moving vehicles, and then return to a right-hand lane. Officer Milton initiated a traffic stop, which resulted in an inspection of the tow truck. Officer Milton testified that Mr. Lockwood did not surrender a tow driver certificate and told him that he probably did not have one because his application was refused. Officer Milton testified that he went onto the Ministry of Transportation database and found no active tow driver certificate for Mr. Lockwood. Officer Milton went on to testify that the light bar attached to the rear most vehicle was inoperable such that there were no operable tail lamps, stop lamp or signal lamps on the vehicle.

73I find that the CVIR, the notes attached to the ticket and Officer Milton’s handwritten notes are all consistent with his testimony. The appellant did not direct me to contradictory evidence. Mr. Lockwood acknowledged the incident in his testimony and testified that on Jan 31, 2025, he was assigned to haul a trailer to auction. After dropping off the trailer, he agreed to tow the two vehicles for an acquaintance. He testified that Mr. Whan did not know or authorize him to tow the vehicles.

74I find that Mr. Lockwood’s testimony supports the testimony of Officer Milton. Therefore, I find that the respondent has proven, on a balance of probabilities, that Mr. Lockwood contravened the HTA and the regulation as specified on January 31, 2025.

75In addition, I find that Mr. Lockwood once again drove a tow truck of the appellant without a valid tow driver certificate, contrary to s. 12 of the Act. I find that this incident amounts to a failure of the appellant to comply with s. 11(1)(b) of the Act, as it did not ensure that its employee Mr. Lockwood complied with s. 12 of the Act.

Grounds for suspension involving driver Tony McDiarmid

76I find that the respondent has proven this ground for the suspension.

77The respondent submits that on June 19, 2024, Mr. McDiarmid, a tow truck driver for the appellant, drove a tow truck:

a) In excess of the posted speed limit (87 km/hr in a 60 km/hr zone), contrary to s. 128 of the HTA; and

b) Failed to surrender a daily vehicle inspection report and inspection schedule, contrary to s. 107(7) of the HTA.

78The respondent submits that as a result of Mr. McDiarmid’s contraventions of the HTA, the appellant has failed to provide towing services competently and safely as required by s. 8, paragraph 7 of O. Reg. 167/23; and the appellant has failed to comply with the conditions of its tow operator certificate, contrary to s. 6(4) of the Act. In support of its position, the respondent relies on the summary of tow operator interventions from March 3, 2023 to March 3, 2025, the CVIR related to the June 18, 2024 inspection and the December 18, 2023 Tow Operator Certificate with Conditions issued to the appellant.

79The appellant submits that Mr. Whan issued a suspension letter to Mr. McDiarmid on the day following the incident.

80Daniel Armstrong, senior regulatory compliance administrator for the Ministry of Transportation, testified that Mr. McDiarmid, who was an employee of the appellant, drove a tow truck on June 18, 2024, and was pulled over for speeding. Mr. Armstrong directed me to the related CVIR, which indicated that the driver was speeding and failed to surrender a valid pre-trip inspection or the required inspection schedule.

81Mr. Armstrong testified that speeding by tow drivers is of particular concern to the respondent as it relates directly to highway safety. He also testified that the rules relating to inspection reports and schedules is important because that is how the respondent ensures that tow trucks can be operated safely on the highway.

82Mr. Armstrong further testified that this incident was after the appellant’s tow operator and storage certificates were issued, with conditions, on December 18, 2023. The conditions included ensuring that drivers were sufficiently trained to prevent future violations of the Act and the HTA, and develop a system to periodically review drivers’ compliance with the inspection and reporting requirements of the HTA in regard to daily trip inspections. I find that the Tow Operator Certificate with Conditions supports Mr. Armstrong’s testimony.

83The appellant did not lead any evidence to dispute that of Mr. Armstrong, therefore I give significant weight to Mr. Armstrong’s testimony and the supporting documents. I find that the respondent has proven, on a balance of probabilities, that Mr. McDiarmid committed the above-referenced HTA violations on June 18, 2024 and that these violations qualify as a failure by the appellant to provide towing services competently and safely, which in turn violates a condition under which the appellant’s tow operator certificate was granted.

Grounds for suspension involving Mr. Whan

On September 6, 2024, Mr. Whan failed to surrender his tow driver certificate

84I find that the respondent has proven this ground for the suspension.

85Section 13 of the Act provides that a tow truck driver must surrender their tow driver certificate upon demand by an officer or inspector.

86The respondent submits that on September 6, 2024, Mr. Whan, who is the officer and director of the appellant, but was driving a tow truck at the time, failed to surrender his tow driver certificate.

87The appellant submits that Mr. Whan had a valid tow driver certificate at the time of the inspection and that it disputes the validity of the warning given to Mr. Whan by Officer Brunet. The appellant did not direct me to any evidence relating to this incident.

88Officer Brunet testified that Mr. Whan failed to surrender either a paper copy or an electronic copy of his tow driver certificate. Officer Brunet testified that he was able to confirm on his computer system that Mr. Whan had a valid tow driver certificate, which is why Mr. Whan was only issued a warning to have a copy of his certificate on him while driving in the future.

89I find that the CVIR dated September 6, 2024, completed by Officer Brunet, supports his testimony. Mr. Whan did not provide any conflicting testimony. I find that the appellant’s submission, that Mr. Whan had a valid tow driver certificate at the time of the inspection, is confirmed by Officer Brunet’s testimony, but is not relevant to the allegation. I therefore find that the respondent has proven, on a balance of probabilities, that Mr. Whan failed to surrender his tow driver certificate on September 6, 2024, in contravention of s. 13 of the Act.

90I further find that this incident amounts to the appellant contravening s. 11 of the Act by failing to ensure that a person employed or engaged by it complied with the Act and its regulations.

On June 30, 2024, Mr. Whan was at fault in a collision while driving a tow truck

91I find that the respondent has proven this ground for the suspension.

92The respondent submits that on June 30, 2024, the appellant failed to ensure the competent and safe operation of a tow truck, when the vehicle was involved in a collision while being operated at a speed that was too fast for the conditions.

93The appellant made no submissions specific to this incident and directed me to no evidence in relation to this incident.

94The respondent relies on the collision report dated June 30, 2024, and completed by Officer R.G. Ryan Drazilov. The report indicates that Officer Drazilov determined that Mr. Whan was driving too fast for conditions and was at fault for the collision. I give weight to the collision report as it was prepared by Officer Drazilov in his professional capacity as an Ontario Provincial Police officer. Therefore, I find that the respondent has proven, on a balance of probabilities, that the vehicle was involved in a collision while being operated at a speed that was too fast for the conditions.

95I find that as a result of the above incident, the appellant has failed to provide towing services competently and safely, as required by s. 8, paragraph 7 of O. Reg. 167/23.

Grounds for suspension involving driver Lucas Mulder

On September 30, 2024, driver Lucas Mulder drove a tow truck without holding the correct class of driver’s licence, missing the means of attachment for a drawn vehicle, and with rear stop lamps inoperative

96I find that the respondent has proven these grounds for the suspension.

97Section 32(1) of the HTA prohibits a driver from driving a vehicle on a highway unless the motor vehicle is within a class of motor vehicles in respect of which the person holds a driver’s licence issued to him or her under the HTA.

98Section 32(10) of the HTA prohibits the owner of a vehicle from allowing another person to drive the vehicle on a highway unless the driver holds a driver’s licence for the class of vehicle to which the vehicle belongs.

99Section 80(1) of the HTA requires the use of two separate means of attachment when a vehicle is towed by another vehicle on a highway.

100The respondent submits that on September 30, 2024, Lucas Mulder, a tow truck driver employed by the appellant, drove a tow truck without holding the correct class of driver’s licence, contrary to s. 32(1) of the HTA, missing the means of attachment for a drawn vehicle, contrary to s. 80(1) of the HTA, and with rear stop and signal lamps inoperative, contrary to s. 107(11) of the HTA. The respondent relies on the testimony of Officer Brunet and the CVIR completed by Officer Brunet, Mr. Mulder’s driver record, one of the tickets issued on that date and some photographs of the tow truck taken by Officer Brunet.

101The appellant submits that the tickets issued to Mr. Mulder on this date are being disputed in Provincial Offences Court and that I therefore have no jurisdiction to consider the incident.

102I disagree with the appellant. First, there is nothing in the Act that removes my jurisdiction to determine the licence suitability question before the Tribunal simply because the same or similar factual allegations culminated in charges before the Provincial Offences Court.

103Further, I find that any decision I make respecting this incident will not affect the appellant’s dispute of the resulting tickets in Provincial Offences Court. This is because charges prosecuted in Provincial Offences Court differ significantly from a hearing before the Tribunal. In the former, the question is whether a person is guilty of an offence and that must be proven on a standard of beyond reasonable doubt. In the latter, the question before the Tribunal is about the suitability of a person to be licensed in a regulated industry and to be proven on a balance of probabilities. The fact that a tribunal may conclude that a person has failed to comply with a statutory provision on a balance of probabilities does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the offence has been committed. See broadly Guindon v. Canada, 2015 SCC 41, Martineau v. M.N.R., 2004 SCC 81 and R. v. Wigglesworth, 1987 CanLII 41 (SCC). Here, although the appellant has disputed a ticket in Provincial Offences Court, it is not relevant to my decision. I must consider the evidence that each party directs me to in respect of the incident. I therefore find that I do have jurisdiction to determine whether the respondent has proven the incident occurred, on a balance of probabilities, and, if so, whether that constitutes a ground for the suspension.

104Officer Brunet testified that he pulled the driver over for failure to wear a seat belt, which led to a full inspection of the vehicle. Officer Brunet explained that while Mr. Mulder has since upgraded his licence to a DZ class, he had only a G licence on the date in question, which limits him to driving a vehicle up to 11,000 kg. Officer Brunet weighed the tow truck during the inspection and the total weight was 12,500 kg. I find that Mr. Mulder’s driver’s licence history, which indicated that his licence was changed from a G class to a D class on October 10, 2024, supports Officer Brunet’s testimony.

105The appellant questioned Officer Brunet respecting the accuracy of his measurements. I find that Officer Brunet was trained to weigh commercial vehicles using the portable scales, he testified that they were properly calibrated and his description of the method for weighing a vehicle was the same as the description given by Mr. Armstrong, who previously worked as an MTO officer. While Officer Brunet identified an inaccuracy in the remarks on the CVIR, this inaccuracy related to the amount by which the vehicle exceeded its registered gross weight, which was not one of the grounds for the suspension order. I find that the weight of the tow truck, as weighed by Officer Brunet, was likely accurate and that the inaccuracy identified on the CVIR was unrelated to the alleged grounds for the suspension.

106Officer Brunet testified that Mr. Mulder was towing a vehicle using a spoon attachment at the time of the inspection. His inspection revealed that the vehicle was not properly attached as the driver had used only one insufficiently sized pin on one wheel. He was missing a pin on the other side and he also neglected to use a back-up chain attachment. I find that the photographs and notes referred to by Officer Brunet supported his testimony. The photographs clearly showed that the vehicle was sitting in the spoon attachment and no chain attachment was visible.

107The appellant did not direct me to evidence that conflicted with the testimony of Officer Brunet.

108I give significant weight to the testimony of Officer Brunet, which was supported by the documents. Therefore, I find that the respondent has proven, on a balance of probabilities, that Mr. Mulder contravened the HTA as set out above, and that these contraventions amount to the appellant failing to provide towing services competently and safely, because the specific contraventions relate directly to safely towing vehicles.

109I further find that the appellant permitted Mr. Mulder to drive the tow truck without the appropriate class of driver’s licence, contrary to s. 32(10) of the HTA. I find that this constitutes a failure by the appellant to provide towing services safely and competently. I further find that the failure of the appellant to provide towing services competently and safely is a contravention of the conditions under which the appellant’s tow operator certificate was issued.

Grounds for suspension involving driver Christopher Scheulderman

On December 3, 2024, driver Christopher Scheulderman drove a tow truck with an unsecured load and with an inoperative signal device

110I find that the respondent has proven this ground for the suspension.

111The respondent submits that on December 3, 2024, Mr. Scheulderman, who was a tow truck driver employed by the appellant, drove a tow truck:

a) with an unsecured load, contrary to ss. 107(11) and 111(2) of the HTA; and

b) with an inoperative signal device, contrary to s. 107(11) of the HTA.

112The respondent further submits that as a result of the above contraventions, the appellant:

a) failed to provide towing services competently and safely, as required by s. 8, paragraph 7 of O. Reg. 167/23, under the Act; and

b) failed to comply with the conditions to which the tow operator certificate is subject, contrary to s. 6(4) of the Act.

113In support of its position, the respondent relies on the testimony of Mr. Armstrong, the CVIR related to the incident completed by Officer W. Holmes, and the tow operator certificate with conditions.

114The appellant submits that it terminated the employment of Mr. Scheulderman shortly after this incident, when it became clear that he was not willing to adhere to the company’s requirements for securing a load to a tow truck. It relies on the testimony of Mr. Whan.

115I find that the appellant does not dispute that Mr. Scheulderman committed the contraventions in question. In the circumstances, I give weight to the CVIR that sets out the contraventions as it was prepared by Officer Holmes in his professional capacity and find that the respondent has proven, on a balance of probabilities, that Mr. Scheulderman drove with an unsecured load and with an inoperative signal device on the date in question.

116Mr. Armstrong testified that unsecured loads and inoperable signal lamps were of significant concern to the respondent as they are directly relevant to highway safety.

117Therefore, I find that the conduct of Mr. Scheulderman on this occasion amounts to the appellant failing to provide towing services competently and safely.

On December 10, 2024, Mr. Scheulderman drove a tow truck while using a cell phone and with an unsecured load

118I find that the respondent has proven these grounds for the suspension.

119Section 78.1(1) of the HTA prohibits driving a motor vehicle on a highway while holding or using a cell phone.

120Section 111(2) of the HTA prohibits driving a motor vehicle on a highway with a load unless the load is secured so that no portion of the load may become dislodged or fall from the vehicle.

121The respondent submits that on December 10, 2024, Mr. Scheulderman drove a tow truck of the appellant:

a) While using a cell phone, contrary to s. 78.1(1) of the HTA; and

b) With an unsecured load, contrary to s. 107(11) and 111(2) of the HTA.

122The respondent further submits that as a result of the above contraventions, the appellant:

c) failed to provide towing services competently and safely, as required by s. 8, paragraph 7 of O. Reg. 167/23, under the Act; and

d) failed to comply with the conditions to which the tow operator certificate is subject, contrary to s. 6(4) of the Act.

123The respondent relies on the summary of tow operator interventions and the CVIR dated December 10, 2024.

124As above, the appellant submits that Mr. Scheulderman’s employment was terminated shortly after this incident.

125The CVIR, which was completed by Officer W. Holmes, indicates that the officer observed the driver with a hand held communication device in his hand, that there was dolly equipment and a metal bar on the deck of the truck that was not secured by any tiedowns or otherwise contained, and that a truck was being towed with a strapless wheel lift, without the use of the required retaining pins. In addition, the break lights and turn signal lights on the rear of the towed vehicle were inoperable.

126I give significant weight to the documents relating to this incident, as they were prepared by Officer Holmes in his professional capacity. Therefore, I find that Mr. Scheulderman contravened the HTA as set out above on December 10, 2024. I further find that this conduct amounts to the appellant failing to provide towing services competently and safely, which is, in turn, a failure of the appellant to comply with the conditions under which its tow operator certificate was issued.

Grounds for suspension involving driver Damien Graham

On February 14th, 2025, did driver Damien Graham drove a tow truck without electrical signalling device and without making an entry in the daily inspection report?

127I find that the respondent has proven this ground for the suspension, in part.

128Section 62(29) of the HTA provides that every vehicle over a specified width and length must have electrical signaling devices that comply with s. 142(6) of the HTA.

129Section 142(6) of the HTA requires that a mechanical or electrical signal device must clearly indicate the intention to turn, must be visible and understandable during day-time and night-time from the front and from the rear of the vehicle for a distance of 30 metres and shall be self-illuminated.

130The respondent submits that on February 14, 2025, Mr. Graham, a tow truck driver for the appellant, drove a tow truck: without an electrical signalling device that complies with s. 142(6) of the HTA, contrary to s. 62(29) of the HTA; and without making an entry in the daily inspection report forthwith upon a defect coming to the driver’s attention after the daily inspection is conducted, contrary to s. 107(8)(a) of the HTA. The respondent relies on the CVIR dated February 14, 2205, completed by Officer J. Dunn.

131The appellant submits that it is disputing the tickets issued to Mr. Graham on February 14, 2025 and October 17, 2025 in Provincial Offences Court and that, as such, I have no jurisdiction to consider these events. For the reasons set out above, I disagree with the appellant’s submission and find that I have the jurisdiction to consider whether the respondent has proven that this incident occurred, on a balance of probabilities, and if so, whether it amounts to a ground for the suspension.

132The CVIR states that upon inspection, Officer Dunn found that the front driver side signal light was inoperative and that no minor defect was recorded in the trip inspection report.

133I give weight to Officer Dunn’s notes respecting the inoperative signal light in and find that the respondent has proven, on a balance of probabilities, that the appellant violated s. 62(29) of the HTA. However, the respondent did not make submissions or direct me to evidence respecting when the driver discovered the inoperative signal light and whether it should have been recorded in the trip inspection report as a result. Therefore, I find that the respondent has not proven, on a balance of probabilities, that Mr. Graham drove the truck without making a required entry in the daily inspection report.

On October 17, 2025, driver Damien Graham drove a tow truck while using a cell phone and with information missing from his run sheet

134I find that the respondent has proven this ground for the suspension.

135Section 78(1) of the HTA provides that no person shall drive a motor vehicle on a highway if the display screen of a device in the motor vehicle is visible to the driver.

136Section 19(0.1) of O. Reg. 167/23, under the Act, provides that a tow truck driver shall create a run sheet at the beginning of each shift and shall record the driver’s name and the start time of the shift on the run sheet.

137The respondent submits that on October 17, 2025, Damien Graham, a tow truck driver employed by the appellant, was driving one of the appellant’s tow trucks while using a cell phone and with information missing from his run sheet. In support, the respondent relies on the testimony of Officer Brunet, the CVIR dated October 17, 2025 and completed by Officer Brunet, and the ticket for distracted driving served on the driver.

138The appellant made no submissions relating to this incident other than to submit that I have no jurisdiction to consider the incident as the tickets are being disputed in Provincial Offences Court, which I addressed above.

139Officer Brunet testified that he initiated the traffic stop on this date because he observed the driver holding a cell phone. Upon request, the driver submitted a run sheet in electronic format to Officer Brunet. Officer Brunet testified that the run sheet submitted to him was missing the driver’s name and the start time.

140I find that the notes included in the CVIR completed by Officer Brunet and the ticket issued to Mr. Green on October 17, 2025 support Officer Brunet’s testimony, therefore I give significant weight to Officer Brunet’s testimony.

141I find that the respondent has proven, on a balance of probabilities, that Mr. Graham contravened the HTA as set out above. I further find that the conduct of Mr. Graham on this date amounts to a failure by the appellant to comply with a term or condition of its certificates, specifically the condition that it provide towing services safely and competently.

Grounds for suspension involving driver Ryan Da Costa

142I find that the respondent has proven this ground for the suspension.

143The respondent submits that on June 20, 2024, driver Mr. Da Costa drove a tow truck of the appellant at a rate of speed in excess of the posted limit (126 km/hr in a 100 km/hr zone), in contravention of s. 128 of the HTA. The respondent relies on the testimony of Mr. Armstrong and the summary of tow operator interventions in the appellant’s CVOR history, from March 3, 2023 to March 3, 2025.

144The appellant submits that the respondent improperly included this ground on its NOFOP dated April 15, 2025, despite the fact that the incident occurred prior to the date of the suspension order, which was issued on February 24, 2025. The appellant submits that it is procedurally unfair for the respondent to rely on grounds that it could have included in the suspension order, but chose not to, only to include it at a later date in an NOFOP.

145I find that there were a high number of grounds included in the suspension order of February 24, 2025 and additional grounds were added in the NOFOP of April 15, 2025 and then a second NOFOP of December 10, 2025. I agree with the respondent’s submission that the purpose of an NOFOP is to provide the appellant with notice that the respondent intends to rely on additional grounds, which were omitted from the original suspension order for whatever reason. I find that the ground involving Mr. Da Costa was set out in the NOFOP issued April 15, 2025. This was almost nine months prior to the start of the hearing. Therefore, I find that the appellant had sufficient notice of this ground and that it was fair to permit the respondent to rely on it. See, e.g., Hodge v. Registrar, Real Estate and Business Brokers Act, 2022 ONSC 7206 at para. 18; and Goldlist v. Registrar, Alcohol, Cannabis and Gaming Regulations and Public Protection Act, 1996, 2022 ONSC 2505 at para. 40.

146Mr. Armstrong, during his testimony, directed me to the June 20, 2024 entry in the CVOR history, involving Mr. Da Costa, which indicates that the appellant received a conviction for Mr. Da Costa’s speeding on that date. The appellant did not lead any contradictory evidence.

147Therefore, I find that the respondent has proven, on a balance of probabilities, that Mr. Da Costa contravened s. 128 of the HTA and that this conduct amounts to a failure by the appellant to comply with a term or condition of its certificates, specifically the condition that it provide towing services safely and competently.

Grounds for suspension involving traffic cameras

148I find that the respondent has proven these grounds for the suspension.

149In the NOFOP dated April 15, 2025, the respondent alleged that the appellant, as the owner of the vehicles involved, pursuant to s. 207 of the HTA, committed the following offences:

a) Speeding (67km/hr in a 40 km/hr zone), on December 19, 2024, contrary to s. 128 of the HTA;

b) Failing to stop at a red light, on December 27, 2024, contrary to s. 144 of the HTA; and

c) Speeding (58 km/hr in a 40 km/hr zone), on December 30, 2024, contrary to s. 128 of the HTA.

150The respondent relies on the testimony of Mr. Armstrong and the appellant’s CVOR abstract.

151The appellant submits that the respondent did not lead evidence related to any of these offences.

152I find that Mr. Armstrong went through the appellant’s CVOR abstract and directed me to the details respecting the convictions relating to the three incidents listed above. Mr. Armstrong testified that each incident involved a ticket issued to the appellant through the use of traffic cameras, so the driver at the time of the incident was unknown to the respondent.

153I give weight to the CVOR abstract, which was supported and explained by Mr. Armstrong’s testimony, and find that the respondent has proven that the appellant contravened the HTA as listed above.

Grounds for suspension involving violations of the March 5, 2025 resolution entered into by the parties pending the resolution of the appeal

154I find that the respondent has not proven these grounds for the suspension.

155The parties entered into a resolution dated March 5, 2025, as a condition of the respondent’s consent to a stay of the suspension order pending the resolution of the appeal. The respondent submits that the appellant has failed to comply with the following clauses of the resolution:

a) The appellant, its drivers and employees shall not commit a violation of the Act, its regulations or the HTA and its regulations (clause 3(a) of the Resolution);

b) The appellant must report any violations within one week of which it becomes aware to the respondent at Towing@ontario.ca (clause 3(b) of the Resolution);

c) The appellant must ensure that all tow trucks operated by it on or after March 12, 2025 are registered with wrecker permits (clause 5 of the resolution); and

d) The appellant must ensure that all drivers on or after April 30, 2025 have completed a tow truck driver training course approved by the Ministry and provided by one of the following course providers: WreckMaster Tow Truck Driver Training, CAA Club Group Tow Truck Driver Training, or DriveWise Tow Truck Driver Training (clause 7 of the resolution).

156While the respondent also submits that the appellant also failed to comply with clause 6 of the resolution, I did not make a decision with respect to clause 6 because it was not listed as a ground in the suspension order or either NOFOP.

157The respondent submits that various incidents set out above amounted to violations of the Act or the HTA and their respective regulations. The respondent further submits that the inspection dated October 17, 2024, involving driver Damien Green, was not reported to the respondent as required by the resolution. The respondent submits that while most of its tow trucks were registered by wrecker permits by March 12, 2025, there were three trucks that were registered by wrecker permits as of March 31, 2025, July 14, 2025 and August 12, 2025. The respondent further submits that two of the appellant’s drivers, Damien Graham and Lucas Mulder, did not have the required training course pursuant to clause 7 of the resolution.

158The appellant submits that it notified the respondent of every violation within one week of learning of same, in accordance with clause 3(b) of the resolution, that all tow trucks were registered as wreckers as of March 12, 2025 before they went back on the road, and that it verified that all of its drivers had one of the listed certification courses set out in clause 7 of the resolution. The appellant relies on Mr. Whan’s testimony and the testimony of Mr. Mulder.

159Respecting resolution number 3, the respondent relies on the CVIR dated October 17, 2025, and completed by Officer Brunet, the testimony of Officer Brunet and the testimony of Mr. Armstrong. As set out above, I find that the respondent has proven, on a balance of probabilities, that Mr. Graham committed the violations set out in the CVIR. Mr. Armstrong testified that these violations were not reported to the respondent pursuant to the resolution.

160Mr. Whan testified that he reported every incident as soon as he learned about it, as required by the resolution, by emailing the respondent’s towing@ontario.ca email address. He did not provide any details or documents respecting his report of the October 17, 2025 incident.

161I find that the testimony of Mr. Armstrong respecting the reports of incidents was vague and unsupported. Therefore, I find that the respondent has not proven that the appellant violated clause 3 of the resolution.

162Respecting clause 5, the respondent relies on the vehicle profiles for the appellant’s trucks, which indicate the date on which they were registered with wrecker permits.

163The appellant submits that the vehicles that were not registered with wrecker permits by March 12, 2025 were not operational at that time, and could not be registered until they were repaired and passed their safety inspection.

164The respondent did not direct me to any evidence that the trucks in question were on the road between March 12, 2025 and the dates on which they were registered with wrecker permits. Therefore, I find that the respondent has not proven that the appellant violated clause 5 of the resolution.

165With respect to clause 7, the respondent relies on the driver’s licence abstracts for drivers Damien Graham and Lucas Mulder and the testimony of Mr. Armstrong. The abstracts do not show any tow driver education courses on the drivers’ records. The respondent submits that if the drivers had taken the course, as required by the resolution, that it would be on the abstract.

166Lucas Mulder testified that he took a basic tow driver education course from CAA club in 2022 or 2023, which was paid for by a previous employer. He testified that the previous employer did not provide him with proof that he passed the course, but that he had a CAA number and was qualified as a CAA tow driver, which he would not have qualified for without taking the course. He further testified that when he was hired by the appellant, Mr. Whan confirmed that he had passed the course with the regional CAA representative. Mr. Whan also testified that he had confirmed Mr. Mulder’s training with a CAA representative.

167I find Mr. Mulder’s testimony credible as Mr. Whan was able to confirm with CAA that he took the training. I give less weight to the fact that no tow driver training courses appear on the driver abstracts of Mr. Mulder and Mr. Graham because there are other explanations for the absence, such as a clerical error, while the preponderance of evidence indicates that the drivers had taken a tow driver training course.

168The respondent further submits that courses taken prior to January 1, 2024, when the Act came into force, were not the same as the courses taken after that date. However, I was not directed to evidence to establish that the CAA course was significantly different in 2022, when Mr. Mulder took the course, and 2024. In addition, I find that the resolution does not make it clear that the respondent intended the appellant’s drivers to take the course after January 1, 2024.

169Therefore, I find that the respondent has not proven, on a balance of probabilities, that the appellant violated the resolution.

Issue ii - What is the appropriate outcome?

170I find that the appropriate outcome is to maintain the conditions attached to the appellant’s tow and storage certificates when they were issued as well as the conditions set out in the resolution of March 5, 2025, indefinitely, at the discretion of the respondent.

171Section 37 of O. Reg. 167/23 provides that I may confirm, modify or set aside the suspension order.

172The respondent submits that the 30-day suspension of the appellant’s towing and storage certificates is appropriate due to the number of violations and incidents of non-compliance that occurred in 2024 and 2025. The respondent submits that despite the conditions that were placed on the appellant’s towing and storage certificates when they were issued on December 18, 2023, the appellant’s drivers continued to demonstrate concerning behaviour that raised safety concerns. The respondent relies on the testimony of Mr. Armstrong, the appellant’s CVOR abstract March 3, 2023 to March 3, 2025. The respondent submits that the types of contraventions are serious and of significant concern to the respondent. Multiple instances of speeding, unsecured loads, drivers using cell phones and inoperable signal lamps are all directly related to highway safety and are the type of behaviour that the Act was enacted to control. The respondent takes the position that it has given the appellant a chance to self-correct and the appellant has been unable to do so. The respondent submits that a suspension will force the appellant to engage seriously and make changes that will result in improved safety outcomes.

173The appellant submits that it has made significant changes to how the business is run since about March 2025 and that its safety record is rapidly improving as a result. The appellant further submits that the previous officer and director of the appellant, also named Randolph Whan (“Mr. Whan Senior”), was ill throughout 2024 and died in February 2025. Mr. Whan was managing the company during this time while also dealing with his father’s terminal illness. The appellant further submits that due to the nature of the appellant’s business, which it submits is made up of 70% municipal and police contracts, that a 30-day suspension would result in a permanent loss of these contracts and would lead to the bankruptcy of the appellant.

174While I find that the public interest in a tow industry where drivers and operators meet the requirements of the legislation is important for maintaining highway safety, I find that the appellant has made, and has committed to continuing to make, significant efforts to complying with the Act and the HTA and improving its safety record as a result.

175I give significant weight to the testimony of Mr. Whan and Mr. Mahmud, who testified that they went over every incident from the past several years and that there is now a standard operating procedure (“S.O.P.”) to prevent similar incidents going forward. They also testified about the ongoing training and safety meetings for drivers and the “three strikes” system of disciplining drivers who do not follow the S.O.P.s. Mr. Whan talked about several drivers who were issued warnings, suspended or had their employment terminated when they did not follow an S.O.P. or did not respond in an acceptable manner to a warning.

176One criticism that Mr. Armstrong had respecting the changes put in place by Mr. Mahmud was that Mr. Whan was not giving his drivers enough training before terminating their employment. However, I find that Mr. Whan explained that the terminations were warranted in certain cases when drivers reacted to his warnings and corrections with a poor attitude and an unwillingness to learn and change. Mr. Armstrong also criticized Mr. Mahmud’s driving test, specifically the fact that a particular driver passed a driving test after making a high number of errors. However, I accept Mr. Mahmud’s explanation that the driver passed after his errors were “corrected to 100%”, which meant that the driver had been trained with respect to the errors that he made that day. I accept that Mr. Mahmud’s driving tests were educational exercises and the point was not to weed out drivers who lacked knowledge, but to find areas where education was needed and meet that need.

177Mr. Armstrong testified that the CVOR violation rate is not determinative under the Act. The respondent looks more at specific contraventions of the Act to determine if suspension is appropriate. However, Mr. Armstrong agreed that a high violation rate may indicate a problem. While the appellant’s violation rate was over 100% in March 2025, when the suspension order was issued, I give weight to the testimony of Mr. Mahmud, supported by the January 6, 2026 CVOR abstract for the appellant, that in the year that Mr. Mahmud has been working with the company, he has reduced the appellant’s violation rate to just under 50%. Mr. Mahmud testified that he was confident he would have the violation rate under 35% within the next year. I find that the reduction in the violation rate is an indication that the changes implemented by Mr. Mahmud and Mr. Whan since the suspension order was issued have had a positive effect on the appellant’s violation rate.

178While the respondent submits that the change in violation rate was caused by false kilometric travel readings, I find that the respondent has not proven that there was a problem with the kilometric travel readings submitted by the appellant. The respondent raised certain inconsistencies between the GeoTab readings and the odometer readings from inspection reports for the first time at the hearing. The appellant provided several possible explanations for the inconsistencies, but without the opportunity to check the trucks or the relevant inspection and repair records, the appellant could not respond more fully. I find the appellant’s possible explanations were plausible and the respondent’s allegations respecting the inconsistencies in kilometric readings were vague and based on generalities and assumptions. Therefore, I find that the respondent has not proven, on a balance of probabilities, that the violation rate was inaccurate or that the appellant submitted false kilometric travel readings to the respondent.

179I find that the suspension order has had the effect that the respondent was hoping for. Specifically, I find that the appellant hired Mr. Mahmud as a safety consultant and has put in the work to correct the problems that were of major concern to the respondent.

180I also give weight to the extenuating circumstances that existed in 2024 surrounding the illness of Mr. Whan Senior, the owner and director of the appellant at the time. I find that this situation, which likely contributed to the poor record of the appellant in 2024, is no longer a concern.

181While I accept that the appellant contravened the Act and its regulations on a number of occasions in 2024 and early 2025, and that many of the contraventions were of serious concern to the respondent, I find that the appellant has put procedures in place, since March 2025, to minimize such contraventions in the future. I further find that the procedures put in place by the appellant since March 2025 have been proven effective by the significantly reduced number of incidents.

CONCLUSIONS

182For the reasons set out above, I find that the respondent has not proven that a 30-day suspension is warranted to protect the public interest. I find that the appropriate sanction in this situation is for the conditions currently in place, both those attached to the tow and storage certificates when they were issued, and those set out in the resolution of March 5, 2025, should remain in place indefinitely, at the discretion of the respondent. I have modified the wording of certain conditions for clarity.

ORDER

183Pursuant to s. 37 of O. Reg. 167/23, I order the respondent to cancel the suspension order. I direct the respondent to maintain the following conditions on the appellant’s tow and storage certificates until such time as the respondent agrees that the conditions are no longer necessary. The appellant must:

a) Ensure its drivers are sufficiently trained to prevent future Highway Traffic Act and Towing and Storage Safety and Enforcement Act violations;

b) Develop a system to monitor the driving behaviour of its drivers, identify and record any driving violations of its drivers, and take appropriate disciplinary and remedial action;

c) Record the details of any training, discipline or remedial action in relation to its drivers;

d) Establish a system to periodically inspect and review all components of its towing vehicles and equipment, maintain a record of each inspection and review.

e) Develop a system to periodically review its drivers’ compliance with the inspection and reporting requirements of the Highway Traffic Act in regard to daily trip inspections;

f) Report, within one week, any violation of the Towing and Storage Safety and Enforcement Act and its regulations, or the Highway Traffic Act and its regulations, committed by the appellant, its drivers or employees, of which the appellant becomes aware, to the Director by email at towing@ontario.ca;

g) Ensure that all tow trucks operated by it on or after March 12, 2025 are registered with wrecker permits from the Ministry of Transportation;

h) Ensure that no vehicle operated by the appellant on or after March 12, 2025, that is registered with a wrecker permit, shall be driven by a person who does not hold a valid tow driver certificate, regardless of whether the wrecker is being used to tow vehicles at the time; and

i) Ensure that all persons who drive its tow trucks on or after April 30, 2025 have completed a tow truck driver training course on or after January 1, 2024 provided by WreckMaster Tow Truck Driver Training, CAA Club Group Tow Truck Driver Training or DriveWise Tow Truck Driver Training, or a similar training course taken prior to January 1, 2024, if approved by the Ministry of Transportation.

Released: February 9, 2026

__________________________

Caley Howard

Adjudicator