Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17653/HTA

In the matter of an appeal under subsection 50(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”), from a decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to suspend a licence pursuant to Section 47(1) of the Act

Between:

Akashdeep Singh

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

REASONS FOR DECISION

VICE-CHAIR:

Colin Osterberg

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

V. Sood, Paralegal

For the Respondent:

A. Qanbery, Representative

HEARD by Teleconference: November 17, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Akashdeep Singh (the “appellant”) appeals from the decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (“Registrar”) to suspend their licence under s. 47(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”).

2The Registrar alleges in its letter to the appellant dated September 2, 2025 that there is reason to believe that the appellant’s Class A licence was obtained as a result of dishonesty during their Class A testing and/or training processes and that the appellant’s failure to abide by the regulatory framework that protects road safety in Ontario has undermined the confidence of the Ministry of Transportation (“MTO”) in the appellant’s ability and intention to drive safely.

3The Registrar, in their letter to the appellant dated October 10, 2025, advise him that the suspension period had changed and that it would end on October 14, 2025, and that on that date the appellant’s licence would be downgraded to Class G(Z).

4At the hearing, the Registrar alleged that the appellant’s Class A licence was obtained as a result of the appellant’s dishonesty during the Class A testing process and that the Registrar’s ability to determine that the appellant’s was able to drive a commercial vehicle safely was therefore compromised. The Registrar clarified that the suspension of the appellant’s Class A Licence was pursuant to s. 47(1)(g) of the Act. The Minister clarified that the downgrade of the appellant’s licence was pursuant to s. 32(5)(b)(i) of the Act.

5The Respondent denied that he was involved in any dishonesty related to the testing process and says that his ability to drive a commercial vehicle safely is supported by the fact that he successfully completed the required training prior to testing and that his driving record since obtaining his Class A licence has been clear.

6At the conclusion of the hearing, I provided the parties with my decision and reasons orally and later issued a written decision. The appellant has requested written reasons for the decision and those reasons are as follows.

PRELIMINARY ISSUES

Confidentiality Order

7At the commencement of the hearing, the Registrar requested that three pages, pages 6, 9, and 10, included in its submissions be treated as confidential and not disclosed to the public. Those pages consisted of two letters sent to the Ministry of Transportation (“MTO”) by the Ontario Provincial Police (“OPP”) with details of an investigation that was ongoing. The Registrar advised that it had been asked by the OPP to keep the letters confidential and to only disclose them for the purposes of the hearing before the Tribunal. The Registrar argued that it was in the public interest to maintain confidentiality with respect to the letters because they relate to an investigation which was ongoing; the disclosure of the letters might compromise the investigation; the letters contain names of persons who are the subject of the ongoing investigation and who may be prejudiced should the letters be open to the public.

8The appellant had no objection to the issuance of a confidentiality order as requested by the Registrar.

9The Tribunal’s adjudicative records are generally open to the public, in accordance with the open court principle and s. 2(1) of the Tribunal Adjudicative Records Act, S.O. 2019, c. 7, Sch. 60 (“TARA”). However, s. 2(2) of TARA provides that the Tribunal may order that all or part of an adjudicative record be treated as confidential and not disclosed to the public if the Tribunal determines that matters contained in the record are of such a nature that the public interest or the interest of a person served by avoiding disclosure outweighs the desirability of adhering to the principle that the record be available to the public.

10Similarly, the Supreme Court of Canada in Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25, held that the following requirements must be met before placing limits on the open court principle:

i. court openness poses a serious risk to an important public interest

ii. the order sought is necessary to prevent this serious risk to the identified interest because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent this risk; and

iii. as a matter of proportionality, the benefits of the order outweigh its negative effect.

11I am satisfied that the release of the documents in question to the public poses a serious risk to the important public interest being the conduct of an ongoing criminal investigation and that a confidentiality order is necessary to prevent this serious risk. I find that the relief requested is proportional to the negative impact of the order on court openness.

12I therefore ordered that Pages 6, 9, and 10 of the Respondent’s Submissions filed at the hearing shall be treated as confidential and not disclosed to the public.

ISSUES

13The issue in this appeal is:

i. whether the Registrar has established sufficient reason to suspend the appellant’s licence pursuant to s. 47(1)(g) of the Act.

RESULT

14Having considered all the evidence and submissions and for the reasons that follow, I find that the Registrar has not satisfied its burden to establish sufficient reason to suspend the appellant’s licence and I set aside the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.

ANALYSIS

15The Registrar has the authority under s. 47(1)(b) and (g) of the Act to suspend or cancel a driver’s licence for any sufficient reason not referred to in clauses 47(1)(d), 47(1)(e) or 47(1)(f) of the Act.

16One of the fundamental purposes of the Act as describe in s. 31, is to ensure the public’s safety on highways. See British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), 1999 CanLII 646 (SCC) at para 26-28; Mitanidis v Ontario (Transportation), 2024 ONSC 5879; Adam Giffen v. Ontario (Minister of Transportation), 2013 ONSC 7461 at para. 33.

17Pursuant to section 50(2) of the Act, after a hearing the Tribunal may confirm, modify, or set aside the decision or order of the Registrar.

18Registrar alleges that it received information from the Ontario Provincial Police (“OPP”) that the appellant’s licence may have been obtained as a result of a fraud committed during the licence testing process and in particular that the MTO received information from the OPP that the examiner who conducted the testing of the appellant had received payment in exchange for a favourable road test. The Registrar does not allege that the appellant participated in this transaction. The Registrar alleges that the testing process is one of the primary methods by which the Registrar can be satisfied that the appellant will drive a motor vehicle safely and that the appellant’s testing process cannot provide that assurance because of the impugned transaction.

19The evidence comes from two OPP letters to the Registrar:

i. A letter dated August 19, 2025, states that the OPP has reasonable grounds to believe that approximately 250 individuals may have fraudulently obtained their Class A commercial driver’s licence including the appellant;

ii. A letter dated October 8, 2025; states that the OPP was investigating a bribery scheme in which certain commercial driver examiners were accepting cash payments in exchange for providing passing results to applicants during their commercial driver’s licence road examinations. The letter states that after an extensive examination the OPP has reasonable grounds to believe that the appellant fraudulently obtained their Class A licence in that way. Evidence is described, including that the appellant’s driver’s licence was sent to a complicit driver’s examiner which was the method of communication used by the participants in the bribery scheme to facilitate the sharing of applicant information in order to ensure the applicants that were to benefit from the bribery scheme were examined by complicit examiners and that a complicit examiner did the appellant’s road test.

20The appellant says that there is no evidence that the appellant was involved in the improper transaction. He argues that the Registrar’s conclusions that the appellant was involved in the bribery scheme amounts to suspicions only and that there is no objective evidence of a connection of the appellant to the participants in the bribery scheme.

21I am not satisfied that the evidence establishes that there is sufficient reason to suspend the appellant’s licence under s. 47(1)(g). The OPP letter of August 225 only states that the appellant may have been one of the persons who obtained their Class A licence as a result of fraud. In my view, the mere possibility that the appellant’s licence had been obtained by fraud is not sufficient under s. 47(1)(g) to suspend a licence.

22I am buttressed in this decision by the fact that, once the Registrar received further information in October 2025, which specifically outlined the bribery scheme and the appellant’s involvement in it, the Registrar apparently determined that a suspension was not necessary and only a downgrade of the licence was required.

23The evidence connecting the Appellant to the bribery scheme in August 2025 was sparse and the Registrar did not produce a representative of the OPP which could confirm or expand upon the allegations in the two letters.

24Further, the reason given for the suspension in September 2025 was that the appellant himself was involved in the fraud, a position it no longer takes and for which little evidence was presented at the hearing.

25In my view, although the evidence may be sufficient to support a downgrade of the appellant’s licence, there is insufficient evidence to justify the suspension of the appellant’s licence.

26I find that the Registrar has not establish that there is sufficient reason to suspend the appellant’s licence under s. 47(1)(g) of the Act.

ORDER

27For the reasons set out above, pursuant to subsection 50(2) of the Act, I set aside the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence pursuant to s. 47(1)(g) of the Act.