Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17529/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while in contravention of a condition under s. 55.1(1)2 of the Act

Between:

Margaret E. Loyie

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR: Rupinder Hans

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Margaret E. Loyie, Self-represented

For the Respondent: Leila Pereira, Representative

HEARD: By Teleconference Thursday, September 18, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Margaret E. Lovie, (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of their motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Saturday, August 16, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, her son Shane Loyie (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle while their driver's licence was subject to a condition that prohibits them from driving a motor vehicle that is not equipped with an ignition interlock device as described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1). A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issue in dispute is:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

5For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship

6I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 (the “Regulation”), made under the Act.

7The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

8If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

9If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

10The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

11The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

There are alternatives to the impounded vehicle

12I am not satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

13I find that the appellant has been using alternative means of transportation since the impoundment. I note that the appellant testified that, since her vehicle was impounded, she has rented a vehicle, taken a taxi, borrowed her father’s vehicle, borrowed her son’s vehicle, gotten rides from a co-worker and her brother, and walked and biked to meet her transportation needs.

14The appellant testified that, from the period August 19 to 29, 2025, she rented a vehicle to meet her transportation needs. From August 30th until the time of the hearing, she has been using her father’s vehicle and more recently her son’s vehicle. She has been using her son’s vehicle for the past two and a half weeks.

15The appellant testified that her full-time employment requires her to travel to distant locations and be on call at times, and thus, she initially rented a vehicle to assist her. She testified that she has also walked and rode a bike to work which is located about 2 kilometres from her home. A co-worker has also driven her to work, and she has used her father’s vehicle and her son’s vehicle to meet her employment obligations. She has not missed any work as a result of the impoundment of her vehicle and has maintained her work schedule with alternative methods of transportation.

16The appellant resides in a home with her spouse, son and grandson. The appellant’s spouse has health concerns and needs, she has used her father’s vehicle to take him to his medical appointments, and no appointments have been missed. She also testified that she has been able to care for her spouse with the assistance of a community services program. In my view, the appellant has been able to ensure that her spouse’s transportation needs are met with the alternative means of transportation that she has arranged.

17The appellant is also responsible, along with her siblings, for the care of her elderly father. Her testimony established that, on several occasions, her brother or a co-worker have driven her to her father’s home, and she has also used her father’s and son’s vehicle for transportation. There is no evidence before me to indicate that the appellant was unable to attend her father’s home to assist him. In my view, the appellant utilized several alternative methods of transportation in this regard.

18The appellant has used alternative means of transportation, specifically a rental vehicle and her father’s vehicle, to obtain groceries and prescriptions, and she has not missed any medical appointments.

19I acknowledge the appellant’s testimony that she has been experiencing inconvenience while renting a vehicle, obtaining rides from others, and borrowing vehicles given the level of her familial and employment responsibilities. However, I note the Tribunal may not consider inconvenience when determining whether the appellant has proven exceptional hardship.

20I find that the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

21Since the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with the Act and the Regulation and I need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship.

22For the reasons set out above, I find that the appellant has not established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined in the Regulation.

Conclusion(s)

23I find that:

i. the appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

24The Tribunal Orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.