Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17494/MED
An appeal under subsection 50(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from a decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to suspend a licence pursuant to Section 47(1) of the Act.
Between:
Aliya Soychak
Appellant
and
Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Respondent
DECISION
ADJUDICATOR: Dr. Isla McPherson, Member
APPEARANCES:
For the Appellant: Aliya Soychak, Appellant
For the Respondent: Stephen Grootenboer, Agent
Held by teleconference: September 10, 2025
OVERVIEW
1Aliya Soychak (the “appellant”) appeals from the decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (“Registrar”) to suspend her Class G licence under s. 47(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) after the Registrar received an unsolicited Medical Condition Report stating that the appellant suffers from a medical condition that may affect her ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.
2The Registrar has the authority under s. 47(1)(g) of the Act to suspend or cancel a driver’s licence for any sufficient reason. Section 14(1)(a) of O. Reg. 340/94 under the Act (the “Regulation”) states that a holder of a driver’s licence must not suffer from any mental, emotional, nervous or physical condition or disability likely to significantly interfere with their ability to safely drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely. Under s. 14(2)(b) of the Regulation, the Registrar may require a driver to provide satisfactory evidence that they are able to drive safely.
3The Registrar takes the position that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely a mental health condition, that is likely to significantly interfere with her ability to drive safely and that this provides sufficient reason to suspend her licence under s. 47(1)(g) of the Act.
4The appellant appeals the suspension under s. 50(1) of the Act. She agrees that she suffers from a mental health condition but denies that her mental health condition interferes with her ability to drive safely.
5Pursuant to section 50(2) of the Act, after a hearing the Tribunal may confirm, modify, or set aside the decision or order of the Registrar.
ISSUES
6The issue in this appeal is whether the appellant suffers from a medical condition that is likely to significantly interfere with her ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.
7To resolve that issue, I will address the following questions:
i. Does the appellant suffer from a mental health condition?
ii. If so, is this likely to significantly interfere with her ability to drive a motor vehicle safely?
8The Registrar bears the burden of proving on a balance of probabilities that the answer to each of the above questions is “yes.”
RESULT
9Having considered all the evidence and submissions and for the reasons that follow, I find that the Registrar has satisfied its burden to establish that the appellant suffers from a medical condition that is likely to significantly interfere with her ability to drive a motor vehicle safely and I confirm the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.
ANALYSIS
Does the appellant suffer from a mental health condition?
10The evidence presented at the hearing establishes that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely a mental health condition.
11The Registrar’s position is supported by:
i. a Medical Condition Report (MCR) dated, July 13, 2025, from Dr. J;
ii. a narrative letter dated August 13, 2025, from Dr. S.
12The MCR from the appellant’s in patient psychiatrist, Dr. J, supports the Registrar’s position that the appellant suffers from a mental health condition. Dr. J has checked boxes on the MCR indicating that the appellant suffers from a cognitive impairment and a psychiatric condition due to psychosis, and added the following narrative, “Ongoing psychosis, impairment in perception/thinking lack of compliance/cooperation with treatment that would increase risk of relapse, known to have sudden moments of impaired situational awareness. Illness is not stable”.
13Following the receipt of the MCR the Registrar suspended the appellant’s licence due to a mental health condition and cognitive impairment and requested completion of a Mental Health Assessment Form and Cognitive Disorder Form.
14The appellant subsequently submitted a narrative letter from psychiatrist Dr. S dated August 13, 2025, indicating she had been following the appellant since her discharge from hospital on July 13, 2025, for symptoms of psychosis. The appellant had been discharged on a Community Treatment Order and long-acting antipsychotic injection and her mental illness had stabilized. Following the receipt of the narrative letter, the Registrar lifted the suspension for cognitive impairment and requested again the completion of a Mental Health Assessment Form along with a period of 3-6 months stability.
15The appellant testified that she agrees she suffered from a mental health condition, testifying she has experienced psychosis.
16The medical evidence in this case is clear and the diagnosis is not under dispute. Based on the information available, I find that the Registrar has established on a balance of probabilities that the appellant suffers from a mental health condition.
Is the appellant’s medical condition likely to significantly interfere with her ability to drive a motor vehicle safely?
17I find that the Registrar has proven on a balance of probabilities that the appellant’s medical condition is likely to significantly interfere with her ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.
18The Registrar’s position is supported by the Canadian Council of Motor Transport Administrators Medical Standards for Drivers [2025 Update] (the “CCMTA Standards”).
19The Registrar relies on the CCMTA Standards Chapter 14 which document that psychiatric disorders can result in either a persistent or episodic impairment of the functions necessary for driving and highlights that a driver’s level of insight is a critical consideration when assessing the risk of an episodic impairment of functional ability due to a psychiatric disorder.
20The Registrar relies on Standard 14.6.1. This Standard indicates a driver is eligible for a licence if the condition is stable, the driver has sufficient insight to stop driving if the condition becomes acute, the functional abilities necessary for driving are not impaired, and a treating physician supports a return to driving. The Registrar acknowledged that Standard 14.6.1 does not require a specific timeframe of stability, however given the appellant had a recent two-month hospitalization and is currently under a Community Treatment Order, three months of stability is a reasonable request to ensure the appellant’s mental health had improved sufficiently to handle the complexity of driving a motor vehicle. The Registrar further noted that in the letter from Dr. S she made no recommendation that the appellant was ready to return to driving.
21The Registrar stated that their decision to suspend the appellant’s licence and request a period of stability was reasonable and supported by the law, and on the balance of probabilities, the appellant did suffer from a medical condition that was likely to interfere with her ability to drive safely.
22Section 14(2)(a) of the Regulation allows the Registrar to consider the CCMTA Standards when determining whether the requirements of s. 14(1) are met. The Tribunal may take the CCMTA Standards into consideration but are not bound by them.
23The appellant argued that her licence should be reinstated for the following reasons: her medical condition is stable and she is compliant with her anti-psychotic medication as confirmed by Dr. S, she has the support of her parents who submitted a letter documenting their support for driving, she drove for a brief period of time after discharge from hospital because she did not know her licence was suspended, she has no driving infractions, and the loss of independence associated with losing her driver’s licence has further impacted her mental health.
24The appellant testified she is now under the care of Dr. S and has appointments with her every 3 weeks and has her support for appealing her driver’s licence suspension.
25Under cross-examination from the Registrar, the appellant testified that she had previously been admitted to hospital for psychosis in December 2023. For both this admission and her admission May – July 2025 she was placed on a Form 1 under the Mental Health Act. The Registrar questioned why she was on a Community Treatment Order and the appellant responded it was to ensure her condition would stabilize and testified in response to further questions that if she failed to adhere to the treatments in the order, she understood this may trigger an involuntary admission to hospital. The appellant further responded to the Registrar’s questions that she had not worked since last summer and was not working this summer nor attending school this fall as she was continuing to recover from her mental health episode that led to the hospitalization.
26It is acknowledged that Dr. J had checked the box on the MCR indicating that the appellant was aware of the report being submitted when it was completed on the date of her discharge from hospital, July 13, 2025. The appellant was questioned why she had driven with a suspended licence given that Dr. J had indicated he was reporting his driving concerns to the Registrar. The appellant testified that Dr. J had indicated he might complete an MCR, but it had not been clearly communicated.
27Under cross-examination the appellant testified regarding her use of medications to treat her psychotic symptoms. The appellant testified that she has been prescribed three different anti-psychotics, over the past few years and has been discontinued off two of them. She currently takes an anti-depressant and anti-anxiety medication in addition to her long-acting injectable anti-psychotic.
28I appreciate that the appellant’s psychotic episode was treated, and Dr. S indicated her illness has stabilized. However, this confirmation of stability is for only a very short time, as it is less than a month prior to the hearing. I also have considered that the appellant was psychiatrically unwell less than two months ago, at the time the MCR was completed, which was following a lengthy hospital admission of slightly more than two months. I further recognize that as per the appellant’s testimony this was her second admission to hospital for psychosis in less than two years.
29I acknowledge that psychotic episodes due to psychiatric illness may be the most urgent psychiatric situation regarding fitness to drive and an acute psychotic episode is incompatible with safe driving. This is considered when taking into consideration the appellant’s insight and understanding of her diagnosis. Insight is an important consideration when considering safety to drive. Insight means that a driver is aware of their medical condition, understands how the condition may impair their functional ability to drive and has the judgment and willingness to comply with a suggested treatment regimen. I also acknowledge that there is no medical opinion provided that supports the appellant’s insight into her condition. The Mental Health Assessment Form that the Registrar had requested asks the completing physician about the appellant’s insight and judgement, but the appellant had not submitted this form, and in the medical letter from Dr. S she does not comment on insight nor judgement and specifically does not make any recommendation to reinstate the appellant’s driver’s licence.
30Although this Tribunal is not bound by the CCMTA Standards, they can be considered when making the decision for the reason that these Standards are the result of a lengthy and intensive process to provide medical standards based on the best evidence available and with a focus on functional ability to drive rather than exclusively on medical diagnoses.
31Given that experiencing symptoms of psychosis is incompatible with safe driving, that the appellant has had two admissions in the past two years, that Dr. J has indicated there is a history of non-compliance with treatment that may increase the risk of relapse and subsequently that the appellant requires a Community Treatment Order, I accept and apply the CCMTA guidance that having a period of stability is reasonable. With only one month of documented stability, no medical evidence to confirm the appellant has the insight and understanding into her illness to stop driving should her symptoms become acute, and no supportive statement from a physician, I find this insufficient to set aside the suspension.
32I appreciate the hardships that the appellant is undergoing with the loss of her driver’s licence but given the medical evidence and the individual merits of this case, I believe a longer period of stability is reasonable and prudent for road safety given the risks associated with driving during a psychotic episode.
33As such, for the reasons cited, I am satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the appellant’s medical condition is likely to significantly interfere with her ability to drive safely.
Conclusion
34I find that the Registrar has discharged the onus of establishing on a balance of probabilities that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely a mental health condition, and that condition is likely to significantly interfere with her ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.
ORDER
35For the reasons set out above, pursuant to subsection 50(2) of the Act, I confirm the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.
Released: September 25, 2025
Isla McPherson MD
Adjudicator

