RECONSIDERATION DECISION
Before: Raymond Ramdayal, Adjudicator
Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 16922/MVIA
Case Name: Gilham v. Registrar of Vehicles
Written Submissions by:
For the Appellant: Kerri Ann Gilham, Appellant
For the Respondent: Leila Pereira, Representative
OVERVIEW
1On May 23, 2025, the appellant requested reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision dated May 5, 2025 (“decision”).
2Following an oral hearing, I confirmed the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle, pursuant to s. 50.2(5) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8. The decision articulates my reasons in concluding that the appellant did not demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities, that the vehicle was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded. The decision also reasoned that the appellant did not demonstrate that the impoundment would result in exceptional hardship. Moreover, the appellant was found to have alternatives to the impounded vehicle, thereby making the ground of exceptional hardship unavailable to her.
3The appellant’s reconsideration request is on grounds set out in Rule 18.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“Rules”). To grant a request for reconsideration, the Tribunal must be satisfied that one or more of the following criteria are met:
a) The Tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction or committed a material breach of procedural fairness;
b) The Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made; or
c) There is evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it, and would likely have affected the result.
4In her request for reconsideration, the appellant is relying on 18.2(c).
5The appellant is seeking a reconsideration of the decision, submitting that she continues to experience undue hardship with the loss of her vehicle. In her reconsideration request, she provides further examples of this alleged hardship, such as: she will not be able to transport her child to and from summer school; she is at risk of losing her two part time jobs; her financial situation remains precarious; and her mental health is suffering.
6In addition to this, the appellant submitted three new documents in support of her reconsideration request:
- A personal letter to the Tribunal, dated May 22, 2025;
- A medical note from Dr. A. Reidel from Shelter Health, dated May 23, 2025; and
- An undated letter from one of her children.
7The appellant is asking for reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision to confirm the impoundment. It is the respondent’s position that the new evidence submitted by the appellant would not likely have affected the result of the hearing.
RESULT
8After considering all the submissions, the appellant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.
ANALYSIS
9The test for reconsideration under Rule 18.2 involves a high threshold. The reconsideration process is not an opportunity to re-litigate its position where it disagrees with the Tribunal’s decision, or with the weight assigned to the evidence.
10I find that most of the appellant’s submissions are attempts to re-argue the same submissions she presented at the hearing. The exception though is the letter from Dr. Reidel, who provides an opinion about the impoundment and how it factors into the appellant’s mental health and personal circumstances.
11The respondent asserts that, even if the Tribunal considers some of the appellant’s reconsideration submissions as new evidence, it is likely that this new evidence would not have affected the result of the hearing. According to the respondent, I placed significant weight on the fact that the appellant testified to the availability of alternate transportation during the impoundment period, including public transit, walking, getting rides from friends and the use of grocery delivery services. As a result of having these alternatives in place, the ground of exceptional hardship is unavailable to the appellant.
12I have carefully considered Dr. Reidel’s letter, the appellant’s letter to the Tribunal and the letter from her daughter to determine if this new evidence would likely change this assessment regarding exceptional hardship, pursuant to Rule 18.2(c).
13With regard to Dr. Reidel’s letter, I am unpersuaded that alternate forms of transportation are not feasible, particularly since the appellant previously testified that she has been taking advantage of those alternatives and confirmed so during the hearing. I also took into consideration that the medical information was possibly available to the appellant prior to the hearing but was not presented. The appellant had the opportunity to seek and obtain this information to support her position at the hearing but chose not to. In addition, the medical note does not appear congruent with what the appellant stated with regards to alternative transportation. In fact, the appellant appears to have successfully taken advantage of the alternatives available to her, whereas the medical note states that those alternatives are not feasible for her. This also applies to her daughter’s letter and her own submissions which appear to re-argue the same facts. There are alternative modes of transportation, albeit options which the appellant and her daughter find undesirable, which they have been accessing.
14Most of these arguments lead back to the appellant’s precarious financial situation. Importantly, the cost of the impoundment cannot be considered a ground for demonstrating hardship. While it can be considered in a case, it cannot be the sole basis for an appeal.
15Furthermore, exceptional hardship must involve immediate, significant and lasting loss. The impoundment period expired on May 10, 2025. This likely predates the appellant’s argument that she is unable to transport her child to and from summer school. In addition, any alternate transportation for the purpose of school and work was not intended to be lasting since the impoundment period would eventually come to an end. The appellant confirmed in the previous hearing that her child has been able to attend school despite not having the vehicle.
16I do not question that the appellant has faced great inconvenience during this time. It may also aggravate her poor financial condition, however, the cost of impoundment cannot be the sole reason for exceptional hardship. The appellant has also expressed concern about her mental health and how the impoundment has exacerbated this. This link has not been clearly established. The appellant also had an opportunity at the hearing to advance this argument with supporting evidence but did not do so.
17In her request for reconsideration form, the appellant also mentions that she works at a restaurant and must use public transit to get to and from. This confirms that she remains employed and has a source of income coming in.
18I find there is no new evidence that would likely result in a different outcome to what was previously ordered. In addition to this, the Tribunal rejects the assertion that the new information was not available to the appellant before the hearing. Even so, I find the appellant has not shown it would likely have affected the result.
19The transportation alternatives have also been clearly established and proven, making the ground of exceptional hardship unavailable to the appellant.
CONCLUSION & ORDER
20After carefully considering the issues raised by the appellant, the Tribunal dismisses the reconsideration request.
Raymond Ramdayal Adjudicator Tribunals Ontario – Licence Appeal Tribunal
Released: September 19, 2025