Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17565/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act

Between:

Intosh Enterprise Inc.

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

VICE-CHAIR:

Avril A. Farlam

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Craig McIntosh, Owner of Appellant

For the Respondent:

Leila Pereira, Representative

HEARD: By Teleconference Tuesday, September 16, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Intosh Enterprise Inc., (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of its motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s 2015 Ford Fusion, the vehicle was impounded on Tuesday, August 12, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, Natasha Elena Sabourin (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded and that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issues in dispute are:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(a) of the Act, whether the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded; and

ii. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

5For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that it satisfies one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The vehicle was not stolen

6I am not satisfied that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded.

7In Marshall v. Ontario (Registrar of Motor Vehicles) [2002] O.J. No. 745 (Div. Ct.) (“Marshall”) the Divisional Court held that a vehicle is “stolen” in this context “when it is taken without the owner’s consent and when the perpetrator intends to deprive the owner of it, whether permanently or temporarily”.

8In other words, in order to establish that the vehicle was stolen for the purposes of s. 50.2(3)(a) of the Act, the appellant must prove that the vehicle was taken without the owner’s consent, and that the driver intended to deprive the owner of the vehicle, either permanently or temporarily.

9Craig McIntosh, the owner of the appellant corporation, testified that he did not know what occurred on August 12, 2025, as he was out of town from August 5, 2025, until August 14 or 15, 2025 and only knows what the appellants employee Brandon told him. Mr. McIntosh said that Brandon is a mechanic and acts as the office manager when Mr. McIntosh is away.

10Mr. McIntosh testified that while he was out of town, Brandon hired the driver as a part-time employee, and that she took the keys to the vehicle and drove it on August 12, 2025. Mr. McIntosh testified that he has no knowledge as to what, if anything, Brandon had told the driver at any time about her access or permission to drive the appellants vehicle and had no knowledge whether the keys to the vehicle were accessible to the driver. Mr. McIntosh testified that he “assumes the driver took the keys”.

11Mr. McIntosh testified that Brandon wrote the document dated August 13, 2025, submitted with the Notice of Appeal. This document is addressed “to whom it may concern” and appears to be from “Intosh Enterprises”. It is not signed by anyone. Brandon did not testify at the hearing. This document does not state that the vehicle was stolen but states that the driver “without the consent or authorization of Intosh Enterprises, took possession…” of the vehicle and states “at no point was Ms. Sorbin granted permission to operate or remove this vehicle from company property”.

12Although Mr. McIntosh testified that he charged the driver with theft, he had no documents to substantiate this and, when asked in cross examination, could give no details such as the name of the officer who laid the charge, had no information what the charge was except “taking the vehicle without his permission” and had no police report number. Mr. McIntosh could not give the date on which the charge was supposedly laid.

13The testimony of Mr. McIntosh is not persuasive that the vehicle was stolen given that he has no direct knowledge of the driver, her hiring, the terms of her employment, communication about permission to drive the vehicle (or not), her access to the keys, or what specifically occurred on August 12, 2025, except second-hand knowledge obtained from Brandon. As Brandon did not testify at the hearing, it is not possible to assess the credibility of Brandon and he was not available for cross examination so that his credibility could be tested.

14I do not find the statement by Mr. McIntosh that the driver has been charged with theft of the vehicle given that he could give no details and had no documents to corroborate his evidence.

15Further, Mr. McIntosh put forward no evidence that the driver intended to deprive the appellant of the vehicle, either permanently or temporarily.

16I find that the appellant has not established that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded.

The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship

17I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

18The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

19If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

20If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

21The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

22The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

23I am not satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

24The evidence is that the appellant has alternatives to the vehicle during the impoundment period. Records filed by the Registrar show that the appellant owns several other vehicles. Mr. McIntosh testified while some of these vehicles are not roadworthy or are no longer in the appellants possession, he admitted that the appellants 2012 Dodge is roadworthy, and he has been driving it since the impoundment of the vehicle.

25Mr. McIntosh testified that the appellant has been able to carry on its business during the impoundment period and, that he has been able to walk to the appellants shop that is near to his home, has been able to borrow his brother’s vehicle sometimes, and to take public transit during the impoundment period.

26I find that the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

27Since the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with the Act and the Regulation and I need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship.

28For the reasons set out above, I find that the appellant has not established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined in the Regulation.

Conclusion(s)

29I find that:

i. the appellant has not established that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded;

ii. the appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

30The Tribunal Orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

Released: September 25, 2025

__________________________

Avril A. Farlam

Vice-Chair```