Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17368/CVOR
An appeal from a Notice of Cancellation and Seizure Order of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles under the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8
Between:
Cool D. Trucking LTD.
Appellant
And
Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Respondent
DECISION AND ORDER
ADJUDICATOR:
Rupinder Hans
APPEARANCES:
For the Appellant:
Dexter Wynter, Representative
For the Respondent:
Patrick Moore, Counsel
Held by videoconference:
August 14, 2025
OVERVEW
1The appellant, Cool D. Trucking LTD., appeals the Cancellation and Seizure Order, dated February 4, 2025 (the “Order”), relating to its CVOR certificate and the plate portion of vehicle permits for all commercial motor vehicles and trailers issued to it by the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (the “Registrar”) under sections 47 and 47.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”).
2Section 50 (1.0.1) of the Act provides the right to appeal the Order to the Tribunal within 30 days after the order takes effect. The effective date is February 11, 2025, and the 30-day appeal period ended on March 13, 2025. The appellant filed the appeal on July 13, 2025, 122 days after the statutory limitation date for appealing the Order.
3The appellant brings this motion to extend the time for filing of its appeal.
ISSUES
4The issue to be decided on this motion is whether the appellant has established reasonable grounds to support an extension of time to appeal.
RESULT
5The appellant’s motion to extend the time to file the appeal is denied. The appeal is dismissed.
EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS
6Section 7 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 12, Sch G gives the Tribunal the discretion to grant an extension of time where there are reasonable grounds for applying for the extension and for granting relief.
7In Manuel v. Registrar of Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002, 2012 ONSC 1492, the Divisional Court ruled that, on a motion to extend the time to appeal, the overriding consideration is whether the justice of the case requires that the extension be granted. The factors to be considered are:
a) the existence of a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period;
b) the length of the delay;
c) prejudice to the other party; and
d) the merits of the appeal.
8No single factor is determinative. I have considered the parties’ evidence and submissions relating to each of these factors as they apply to this case.
9The onus is on the appellant to establish there are grounds for the granting of the extension.
Bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period
10I do not find that the appellant had a bona fide intention to appeal within the 30-day appeal period.
11The appellant’s representative and sole driver for the appellant, Dexter Wynter, testified on behalf of the appellant. I note that the Order was emailed to the appellant on February 4, 2025, and Mr. Wynter acknowledged that he received and reviewed the Order. There is no dispute in this regard.
12Mr. Wynter conceded that he was aware the appellant did not appeal within the 30-day limitation period and submitted the following reasons. Mr. Wynter testified that he thought the Order had not taken effect because the appellant had provided some of the information and documents sought by the Registrar in an email dated January 28, 2025. He acknowledged that the appellant had not provided all of the information/documents sought by the Registrar, including confirmation of valid vehicle insurance. He further acknowledged that at no time did the Registrar advise that all the required information and documents were received, and the Order would not take effect on February 11, 2025. I do not find credible Mr. Wynter’s assertion that he did not know the Order had taken effect on February 11, 2025, and the time period to appeal had commenced. I find this is not a legitimate reason for neglecting to appeal within the prescribed period.
13In any event, Mr. Wynter testified that, on June 10, 2025, he learnt that the Order had taken effect. He testified that a representative of the Registrar told him over the phone. I note that, even after learning that the Order had taken effect, the appellant waited an additional 33 days before filing an appeal on July 13, 2025. When questioned on why the appellant waited an additional 33 days, Mr. Wynter testified that he spent this time inquiring on how to file an appeal, seeking clarification on whether the appellant could file a late appeal, and that he did not fully understand what was going on.
14The Registrar submits there was no bona fide intention to appeal within the prescribed period, and even after the appellant claims it finally became aware that the Order was not withdrawn, it waited further. The Registrar submits that a reasonable operator would not have assumed the order was not going into effect given that the appellant failed to provide valid insurance. A reasonable operator would have asked the Registrar if it was satisfied with the information and documents provided. I concur with the Registrar.
15In my view, the appellant received no indication from the Registrar that the Order had been withdrawn or that it would not become effective, and it made no efforts to ascertain such. Mr. Wynter testified that he did not know if the Order went into effect and did not check. Even after the appellant learnt that the Order had become effective, it waited a further 33 days prior to filing an appeal. Under the circumstances, I do not find that the appellant had a bona fide intention to file within the prescribed time.
16For the reasons stated above, I conclude the appellant did not have a bona fide intention to file within the appeal period. While the appellant presented reasons for not filing within the 30-day period, I do not find them convincing.
Length of the delay
17The Registrar submits that the delay of 122 days is lengthy and significant, and I agree. One of the purposes of legislatively enacted limitation periods is to create a level of predictability and for parties, particularly respondents, to regulate their affairs on the basis of those limitation periods.
18I find that the length of the delay is excessive.
Prejudice
19The Registrar submits that the length of the delay creates a prejudice and uncertainty to its office when it is unable to proceed with the regulatory action. The Registrar submits that it is important for a regulator to impose regulatory action in a timely fashion. The Registrar asserts that I can presume there would be prejudice to the Registrar if the motion is granted. I have considered these submissions, and I find that, in particular, the delay of over 122 days in filing the appeal produces an unpredictability to the Registrar in regard to when regulatory action can be taken and when an Order could potentially be appealed. I find this to be prejudicial.
The merits of the appeal
20On a motion to extend time, the appellant need not establish its case on a balance of probabilities but only that its version of events, if believed, could reasonably result in a favourable outcome. In my view, it appears the appeal is unlikely to succeed on the merits, even if the time to appeal were extended.
21The Registrar points to problems with the appeal. First, that the appellant continues to not have valid insurance. Second, Mr. Wynter is the sole driver for the appellant, and he does not have a valid driver’s licence.
22There is no dispute that the appellant does not have a valid insurance policy in place. Mr. Wynter testified that the appellant’s insurance policy has expired as its sole truck was not operating and the insurance had been stopped.
23The Registrar presented the affidavit of Sherry Werner, a Senior Regulatory Compliance Administrator in the Commercial Safety and Compliance Branch of the Ministry of Transportation, who advised that the appellant’s driver’s licence is under suspension as a result of unpaid fines and a conviction for driving under suspension. A driver’s licence abstract for Mr. Wynter was presented that showed his licence is suspended. The appellant did not dispute this at the hearing, and I accept it. Mr. Wynter testified that his driver’s licence was suspended on April 15, 2025, for failure to pay a ticket. He further testified he is the sole driver for the appellant and the appellant cannot operate until he has a valid licence. He testified that he expects to have a valid licence by October 15, 2025.
24I also considered the reasons for appeal set forth in the Notice of Appeal, which merely states: “I was unable to participate in the hearing due to technical difficulties with the zoom link, which deprived me of a fair opportunity to present my case.” From the parties’ submissions, I find Mr. Wynter is referring to the show cause meeting scheduled by the Registrar for January 23, 2025 regarding the appellant. There is no further information provided with regards to the merits or grounds of the appeal.
25Given the above, I remain unconvinced that the appellant’s appeal could result in a favourable outcome even if the time to appeal were extended.
CONCLUSION
26I am not satisfied that the justice of the case requires that an extension of time for filing the appeal be granted in the circumstances of the case. I conclude that the appellant has not demonstrated a bona fide intention to appeal within the statutorily prescribed time period of 30 days. I also conclude that the length of the delay is excessive and would result in prejudice to the Registrar, and that there is not a reasonable chance of a favourable outcome should the matter proceed to a hearing.
I ORDER AS FOLLOWS:
27The appellant’s motion to extend the time to file its appeal is denied. The appeal is dismissed.
Released: September 10, 2025
Rupinder Hans
Adjudicator